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The Fall of Warsaw

IN all likelihood, history will record that the terrific Austro-German offensive culminating in the fall of Warsaw marked the last desperate bid for victory of the Central European Empires. The fall of Warsaw was the second epochal event of the war, the first being the Battle of the Marne. Apparently, the two events are wholly different; yet they are comparable in this, that defeat for Russia seems about to produce the identical aftermath that victory produced for France.

The Battle of the Marne resolved itself into a general Allied offensive to drive the Germans out of Belgium and France. The offensive failed. But in the meanwhile, methodically and superbly, with characteristic initiative and genius, France achieved in the midst of war what Germany had achieved in the days of peace. The army was practically re-organized and brought up to the highest point of efficiency, until today critics agree that in nearly all respects the French army is superior to the German. Industry was mobilized, and in spite of tremendous disadvantages, in spite of the fact that the invaders were in possession of an industrial district holding 80 per cent of the coal and iron ore of the nation, France achieved results that make her impregnable. The French are now prepared for the mighty struggle impending—and all this has been largely an aftermath of the Battle of the Marne.

The fall of Warsaw was a staggering blow to Russia. But what was Russia's answer? Orders

for munitions aggregating hundreds of millions of dollars were placed in the United States; and the significant fact about these orders is that shipments can only be made many months hence. An industrial re-organization was initiated; and the government, under the stress of defeat, allowed representatives of the business interests to participate in the re-organization—a recognition of industry as a governing factor in the state. Work was started in a thorough way to remedy the deficiency in munitions by mobilizing industry for military purposes. An apparently reliable report states that free speech was granted the members of the Duma, and an agitation started to extend the workers wider liberties in order to rally them to the national defense.

Accordingly, instead of crushing the enemy and compelling the Czar to sue for a separate peace, the Austro-German victory in its larger aspects is producing the opposite result. It seems about to produce a greater "Russian menace" by compelling Russia to develop her tremendous resources systematically and adopt more efficient methods of waging war—and by making the capitalist interests stronger in the government.

The military answer was just as immediate. It took the form of a new and more vigorous attack upon the Dardanelles by the French and British forces. It is only a matter of time before Italy will be at war with Turkey, and the sending of an Italian army of one quarter of a million men to Gallipoli an

accomplished fact. Now more than ever does the vital character of this campaign show itself; it is the key to the future of the Great War.

All these considerations are involved in the larger strategy of the fall of Warsaw. But they should not blind one to the many advantages accruing to the Austro-German victor. All efforts to minimize these advantages are futile. The loss of conquests won at a terrific wastage of men and resources, the end of the potential invasion of Hungary and the disposal of Austria, the loss of the larger part of Poland, and the definite stoppage of the Russian offensive for months to come—all these momentous military facts cannot be conjured away by references to Napoleon's retreat from Moscow nor to "the illimitable vastness of Russia's territory."

More important in a military sense, is the fact that now more than ever the offensive initiative remains with Germany. The Allies are not in a position to know where the next blow will fall. Germany can strike for a decision wherever she chooses. Undoubtedly, she will seek a decision against Russia. The Austro-German offensive against Russia ended its first phase with the fall of Warsaw. The greater offensive to dispose of Russia or compel her to make a separate peace is now in process of development. And there is no saying whether this offensive may not prove successful.

As important as the military strengthening of Germany's position by the fall of Warsaw is the strengthening of her industrial position. The section of Russian Poland now under the control of the Austro-Germans is richer in iron ore than any other section of Russia except South Russia and the Ural regions. It is an important agricultural section, and the population will undoubtedly be put to work producing food for the Germans. This is perhaps the greatest gain of the Teutonic victory—securing large resources of iron and food. More than ever is Germany in a position to stand a long war. All this was undoubtedly in the German mind in launching the offensive. The drive through Belgium was not merely to attempt the capture of Paris but to secure control of the rich mining and industrial regions of northern France. Securing industrial power is just as important as securing military power—ultimately more so. But while the conquest of Poland strengthens Austria and Germany industrially, it does not materially weaken Russia.

The Austro-German drive at Russia sought to dispose of her as a vital factor in the war. That end has not yet been achieved. Russian armies are intact; in spite of defeat and scarcity of munitions are holding firm in retreat. This and the circumstance that for months before the great offensive there was a strong agitation in Germany for peace with Russia, lends a color of authenticity to the rumors that Germany has made overtures to Russia for a separate peace. This would fit in with Ger-

man plans as snugly as anything short of absolute victory. Peace and an alliance with Russia would satisfy the Junkers, who feel an affinity of interests with reactionary Russia; would satisfy the commercial interests, as Germany could then devote its efforts to destroy the colonial empire of Great Britain; and would satisfy the militarists, as France, the one really powerful enemy of German hegemony in Europe, could be disposed of finally, as Bernhardt advocates. But Russia refuses to accept a separate peace, and, strangely enough, this refusal is based upon the fact that the liberal and conservative capitalist elements of Russia are behind the war, while the feudal and bureaucratic reactionary interests oppose it. A Russian acceptance of a separate peace is conceivable only if Russia is crushed, or if the feudal reactionaries prevail in the councils of the nation.

Granting that Russia holds firm and that Germany fails to secure a decisive triumph on either front—and the indications are that way—the Allies are bound to win the war. Wars are not won on the field of battle. In the last analysis, wars are won by the industrial resources of the nation in back of the army in the field. That is the secret of German success. That is why France presents an impassable barrier to the hosts of the invader. When Russia, England and Italy do as France has done, when the Allies thoroughly *organize* their resources and fully utilize the resources of the world, the defeat of the Austro-German aggressors will be in sight.

The fall of Warsaw does not bring peace or German victory nearer; it prolongs the war.

LOUIS C. FRAINA.

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Current Affairs

Russia and the Socialist Conscience.

THE role which Russia has played in this war as an element determining the Socialist attitude toward the war, is a truly remarkable one and deserves more than the passing notice which has been given to it so far. The only thing that has been at all discussed in this connection—or that is, indeed, generally known—is the circumstance that when the German Socialists announced their decision to support the Kaiser's government in this they gave Russia as the reason for their action. As a matter of fact, however, this circumstance by no means exhausts the relation of Russia to the Socialist—or, rather, the German Socialist—conscience in its relation to the war. Nor can even this circumstance be properly judged without a knowledge of what has followed it. The conclusion of the first year of the great war may, therefore, be a fitting time for a review of the relation between Russia's participation in the war and the attitude of the German Socialists toward the question of war and peace.

This relation may be divided into three periods, each of them representing a different phase of the question.

The first of these periods was of short duration. It extended over the few days when the question of the entry of the German Socialist Party into the war by voting the war credits was up for decision. The struggle within the party was brief but intense. Those who favored the war used Russia, or rather "Russian Barbarism" and the Russian Czar, as their trump card. The argument is well-known: the Russian Czar is a menace to European progress, "Russian Barbarism" threatens the free development of German Kultur; the "half-Asiatic" empire of the East is the traditional enemy of the Socialist movement, and it would be carrying out the policy of Marx and Engels to help destroy it, etc., etc. To the advocates of the war there was no Russian people, but only Cossacks, Tartars, Calmucks. Those who opposed the war met this argument with the assertion that the old Marxian policy of unalterable opposition to Russia became senseless when the old Russia against which it was directed disappeared and a new Russia, nearly similar in character to her western neighbors, and constantly growing more so,—had taken her place. They then proceeded to show that Marx and Engels themselves were not slow in recognizing the changes which had taken place in Russia since the time when they first preached a Western-European crusade against it, and therefore dropped their attitude of hostility toward it. And they finally pointed to the fact that besides a Czar,

Russia has a strong *revolutionary* movement—the strongest in fact in the world. Under these circumstances, not only was there no occasion for a war upon Russia in the interest of Western-European democracy, but that such a war would cause immeasurable harm to democracy in general by crippling the revolutionary movement in Russia.

As is well-known, the anti-Russian party prevailed, and the German Socialists decided to join the German government in a war which was supposed to be principally a war against Czarism.

It soon turned out, however, that "the war against Czarism" was principally a war against France and England. Whereupon the roles changed—or at least partly so. Those who originally opposed the war—the "pro-Russians"—now demanded that Germany's main efforts be directed against the enemy on the eastern front. If the German proletariat was to support this war as a war against absolutism and for the preservation of democracy, it is at least in duty bound to see to it that democratic Belgium, France and England be not crushed while the Czar and his military power remained unharmed. In this demand for "a change of front" in the military operations, the original opponents of the war were joined by a few original supporters of the war—who, whatever may be said of their judgment in not seeing through their government's hollow pretext, have at least proven their sincerity by insisting that the promise of a war against Czarism be carried out. Not so the majority of the German Socialists. Under one pretext or another they continued to support the war, although they could not help admitting that this was an entirely different war from the one upon which they were supposed to be entering when they voted the first war credits. When pressed hard for an explanation of their course of conduct some of the leaders gave evasive answers, while others gave no answers at all. But a few of the bolder spirits among them openly turned face about and declared that "England is the real enemy", and therefore the war must be conducted hardest against England—through Belgium and France.

Then came the third period, and the third phase of the discussion. Germany had so far succeeded in her military campaigns that the time was considered ripe for discussing peace terms, the censor winking one eye so as to permit "our people" to state their preferences as to which of "our enemies" should be "punished" hardest, and what form the punishment should assume.

It was to be expected that in this plebiscite Russia should fare badly—at least at the hands of the Socialists. Russia could be dismembered without offending the formal principle of "no annexations," and even the original opponents of the war could have nothing against the creation of an independent Poland now the war *has* been fought. That those

who went into the war enthusiastically should now enthuse for a form of punishment of the Czar which would at the same time "free the oppressed nationalities" from his yoke was a foregone conclusion. Unexpectedly, however, there arose champions of Russia, champions advocating generous terms of peace for her. And, strange to say, these champions came from the midst of the most enthusiastic supporters of the war. And strangest of all, the arguments advanced by them in favor of Russia now were the very ones that were advanced by the radicals who opposed the Socialists' entry into the war. Russia's new champions suddenly recalled that the Czar was not all that there was to Russia, that there was such a thing as a Russian people. It was even discovered that the Russians were a very fine sort, in fact, a highly gifted people.

But let no one imagine that our warlike fellow Socialists of Germany repented them of their sins, and want to atone them by treating *even* the Russian Czar with generosity in the terms of peace, now that German Kultur has been saved. Oh, no! The real cause for this generosity is of quite a different nature, as was explained by one of the spokesmen of this group of German Socialists: Russia—that is the Russian Czar—is to be treated generously because we really have no very great quarrel with that country. In fact we have many and important interests in common. "Our" interests, therefore, demand that we shall preserve her as a "Great Power," and we shall have in her not only a good neighbor but a friend as well. That will, incidentally, enable us to wreak exemplary vengeance upon our real enemies—France and England; and, by God, we shall make them pay for what we have lost by being generous to the Russian Czar.

Is Kautsky to be Expelled?

THE condition of utter moral degradation which some of our party circles in Germany have reached as a result of the party's war policy is best shown by the fact that in some party quarters in Germany the demand has actually been made that Kautsky be "disciplined," which in this connection means expulsion from the party, for joining with Haase and Bernstein in issuing the manifesto mentioned in our last issue. As stated, that manifesto is couched in very mild terms. But because he has dared to openly criticize the war-policy of the party and to demand a change of attitude, now that the war has avowedly become a war of conquest on the part of Germany, Kautsky is to be "disciplined." And yet this demand for Kautsky's expulsion shows that matters are not half as bad in the German Socialist movement as most of us thought. The very preposterousness of this demand shows that the German working class is awakening; and that the war-party in the movement, feeling its position insecure, is

ready to go to any lengths in order to prevent the present minority who are opposed to the war from becoming a majority.

A High Treason Prosecution.

MOST Socialists outside of Germany will learn with pleasure that those two valiant women, Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg, and two of their men co-workers, are to be prosecuted for high-treason. Not that any of us wish any harm to happen to our four good comrades, but we are getting a bit tired of reading constantly about the promotions and distinctions which the German government has been conferring upon Socialists, and a serious prosecution has the flavor of novelty. Besides, it reminds us of the heroic age of the German Social Democracy—now, unhappily, a mere memory of the distant past—when Bebel and the elder Liebknecht were prosecuted for high treason for the same offense—opposing Germany at war.

Heligoland, 1890-1915.

ON August 9th, 1890, the Germans took possession of the island of Heligoland, which had been ceded to them by the English, who had held it since 1807. Few people paid any particular attention to the occurrence at the time; and fewer still would have paid any attention to the silver jubilee of the German occupation which occurs on the 9th of this month, if it were not for the prominence which this little North Sea island has played in the present war as the naval base from which most of Germany's operation against England are directed.

The importance of Heligoland does not lie, however, in its strategic position in an accidental war between Germany and England, but in the fact that it is a cog in the wheel of the Juggernaut of German Imperialism, in the victorious progress of which the present war was a *necessary* incident. Nothing throws a better light on the "true inwardness" of the present war than the battle-cry of the German Imperialists: "From Heligoland to Bagdad."

And the importance of the jubilee goes even beyond the importance of Heligoland in the German scheme of world-power. Its real importance lies in the fact that it forcibly reminds us of the change of character which our little world has undergone in the past twenty-five years. In 1890 England voluntarily ceded Heligoland to Germany. Can anyone imagine England doing such a thing today? And not only today when the two countries are at war: It was unthinkable ten or fifteen years ago, when the two countries were abiding in "peace" with each other. The truth is that the cession of Heligoland was the last act of the *old*, pre-imperialist England, when war with Germany, or with any other civilized country for that matter, was far from her thoughts.

L. B. BOUDIN.

An Interview With Suedekum

By Frank Bohn

MANY American Socialists were surprised because the Social Democratic Party of Germany proved to be patriotic and pro-German, ready and anxious to support the military clique in its attack upon Serbia. As one of those who was not surprised, one who expected the German Socialists to act exactly as they did, I must say that the words of Dr. Suedekum, which follow, are exactly what might have been anticipated by any one who was at all familiar with the German Socialist and Labor movement.

The history of German Socialism since the death of the elder Liebknecht, has created in Germany a party of social reform, a majority of which should have united with the Liberal Party of Germany at least ten years ago. There are, perhaps, all told, a quarter of a million real Socialists in Germany. These have a number of able leaders, and, alone, they could have stopped the war. But this group was chained to the pillar of conservatism. It was crushed by a party organization which correctly represented a vast majority of the German so-called Socialists.

The interview given below has been visited by Dr. Suedekum, with the exception of a single paragraph which he instructed me to add. Let me say that I hold Dr. Suedekum in honor as a man who says exactly what he thinks, whose position is known to all, who occupies his position of influence in the party and the country because of those views. He does not loudly acclaim his "revolutionary" position one day and support reform the next. He is a reformist all the time, honestly, candidly, without fear, hesitation, or equivocation.

I first saw Dr. Suedekum in the uniform of an officer of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. He had that day returned from the western war front where he was hourly risking his life for the Germany he loves better than anything else in life.

As regards things political, Dr. Suedekum, like all Germans of education, has a general philosophical point of view. He talks in terms of world history. "This was possible in Rome," he says, "and so and so it might have been under Charles V., but today, under such different conditions, we must come at the matter in a different way." In talking with Dr. Suedekum one always gets the impression that his opinions are a part of his life, inextricably bound up with what he is doing and planning to do.

The Social Democratic Party comprising a good part of the world outside of Germany, from the first has been officially united with the German Government in protecting its own country, How could this

happen? Dr. Suedekum and his associates of the Socialist right are prepared to give quite intelligible reasons for their stand. The fundamental reason Dr. Suedekum compacts into a dozen sentences:

"You ask about Serbia. You say that in America it was not understood why Austria acted with such extreme severity. Why, my dear sir, there isn't any such entity as Serbia—from the political viewpoint. It is exactly like Delaware in your United States. Serbia in her actual form is a forepart of Russia, nothing more. Every important act of its government has been and is dictated from Petrograd. Down to the beginning of the war the real ruler of Serbia was 'The Russian ambassador at Belgrade.' Russia has been pressing toward the Mediterranean for a hundred and fifty years. She wants a port on the Adriatic. What that would mean to Western European civilization I leave you to infer. That port Russia would now have, through Serbia, but for the vigilance of Austria.

"Again, it is a very great error to think that Austria has hemmed in and strangled Serbia. Austria offered Serbia at the end of the Balkan war an Adriatic port, one quite sufficient for her needs, even went so far as to offer to build a railroad to that port, but quite naturally requested that guarantee be given that the port and railroad be not turned over to Russia.

"Finally, what can be the meaning of an act such as this? The daughter of the murderer of the Servian King Alexander, the last Karageorgevitch, married a Russian Grand-Duke. What more proof is needed for the illimitable hunger of Russia for the control of the Balkans?

"Please ask Americans to start with these facts, otherwise an understanding of the present world conflict is impossible. Russia, which has absorbed half of Asia, wished to dominate Western Europe, as she today controls Finland. From this point of view the immediate events appear clear as crystal. Misguided France permitted her hatred to league her with Russia against us.

"Now comes step number three, the action of England. Nor does the action of England permit of so simple an explanation as that of France. How could this supposed bearer of the farthest torch of civilization be so interested in helping barbarous Russia gain a foothold on the Mediterranean as to join in an attempt to destroy Germany? Let us take time to put two and two together.

"Open the London *Times* of April 26, 1915. A distinguished English statesman writes in the Russian supplement that German commerce must be

destroyed. To my mind that sums up the whole matter. But the basis of so curious and vast a policy must be explained historically. It is embedded in the very nature of the British Empire. This Empire is simply an antediluvian institution. A heterogeneous mass of colonies and dependencies held together by force and nothing else but force, this Empire is inherently doomed to decay. Soon Australia, Canada and South Africa will become independent nations. They have tariff barriers against even their mother country. India is oppressed so brutally and ruthlessly that a revolution is developing, with independence as its goal. This whole British Empire has been the result of conquests, wars by the score, running on through centuries. Look at Ireland, remember the South African Boers and their gallant struggle for freedom but yesterday. And now England comes forward as the rescuer and the savior of Belgium!

"The power that held this aggregation together is power at sea—the British Navy. Asquith and Churchill have very recently said, 'A great navy is for England a necessity, for Germany a luxury.' Now, my dear sir, let me ask you very candidly, Why is so great a navy a necessity for your United States? You have no large commercial fleet of your own. You are not surrounded by hostile nations as we are. Isolated and strong as you are, the product of your labor does not need to pass, day by day, under the very nose of the British Lion. A navy like your army would include perhaps six light cruisers. Yet there is real cause for your present naval policy. The sea, the world's common highway is not at all free to the world. 'Britannia rules the waves' is a national anthem in England and very correctly expresses the situation. The Panama Canal is not really yours. It is the property of England. The day England needs it in her business it is hers. Business, business that is the only issue. We have been, through our intelligent labor in the whole field of industry, encroaching upon the business of England. That is what the English capitalists have at heart in their attack upon us. England could easily enough endure our growing navy if we would keep out of her fields of trade. We have been actually taking her markets away from her in her own Colonies in Canada, Australia, and South Africa. We do not need guns and ships and marines and soldiers for that. We have scientists and organizers and workers somewhat protected by the law and educated in our free schools. That has been our real field of conquest. All that we can say to England is, 'Do better than we and you will get your markets back or keep what you still retain.' Her answer? It is join Russia to murder us. It is incomprehensible! It is terrible!

"But let us remain calm and look a little closer into the matter. What is the real secret of English

navalism which has for so long endangered the world? It lies in just this one fact—England does not respect private property upon the sea. We Germans hold that all private property upon the sea should be as sacred in time of war as in time of peace. We want the safeguards thrown by the military code about private rights in war on land extended to cover private rights and private property at sea. England has always opposed this in her international relations. Puffed up in the utter selfishness of her colossal naval power, she had the nerve to urge us to reduce our naval strength. We, with our thousands of ships and our national life more and more dependent upon commerce, were actually urged to leave all power at sea in the clutch of the English navy, to be ready to die whenever she chose to strike at us.

"Had England consented to the civilized provision I have emphasized, your America would not need to build a single war vessel for your protection. You would never be endangered by any European war. Not one of your ships would fear to proceed to any port in the world at the present moment. But England has chosen to continue open piracy at sea. And then *we* are blamed for what is transpiring. It is of course enough to make us very angry, that I confess. But they shall fail. All our enemies cannot reach our heart, even with the help of America, and I have just left the front where I have heard American bullets whiz and American shells burst around me.

"You ask about 'German militarism.' Let me quickly dispose of that. The real thing of that kind is our own affair, and the purely imagined thing does not take our time. A German army officer is a technical expert, like an engineer or a chemist. He performs his peculiar service in his appointed place and lets other people alone. Here in Germany there is no connection between the army and politics, as in France. A very amusing incident, that literary effort of Bernhardt. In the army here he is forgotten, as he is old and a man of no great significance. No one of us here ever heard of his dangerous book until the English, for political reasons, advertised a cheap English edition of the work in America. I understand that it was peddled among you on the streets. I guarantee to you that out of a hundred and eleven Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag not five ever read that book. I never knew of it until it was widely advertised in America. Not five thousand copies were ever sold here. How could you in America fall so easily for so barefaced an English trick as they worked on you?

"Concerning the probable length of the war? I have no notion whatever. It will go on until our enemies perceive their error. They can, I am certain, have peace whenever they want it. We wish

nothing but to be left in peace. We can hold out indefinitely as I have already stated. Please note this fact, our natural increase in population, between 800,000 and 900,000 annually, has more than made up for losses in the field during these nine months. We have lost 180,000 dead, perhaps twice that number seriously wounded.

"In connection with your interest in peace, which I believe you share with all Americans, let me add this further word—Germany will surprise the world by the moderation of her demands. There is a notion abroad that we desire conquests. Again let us cling to the simplest facts and let them guide us. Who, during the immediate past, has made wars of conquest? Look at Russia extending her power, entirely through the sword, over a sixth part of the globe. Recall the history of English military expansion only since the Sepoy Rebellion. France has made conquest of 2,000,000 square miles of land in the same time. But yesterday we saw her strike against Morocco, and carry out a purely 'rule or win' policy. Even peaceful America, with an undeveloped continent for the home of its people, has made a war of conquest recently, securing the Phillipines and islands elsewhere. Germany is the only nation which secured a few colonies absolutely without a blow, without firing a shot. The only nation which has put every available acre at home to the best use, the country best fitted by reason of its high general level of education to control and develop colonies—this nation, Germany, has not had a single war of conquest. We have a huge surplus population. France has none to spare. We have needed colonies, yet secured none available for our purposes. And now the whole world falls upon us and shrieks that we are a danger to peace, to civilization, and must be destroyed. Is it not enough to drive the sanest mind stark mad? Is there rhyme or reason in any part of this insane attack upon us? If there is, my very diligent search has failed to reveal it.

"We have put off the discussion of our International Socialist Party until the end, so that we might better come at the matter. Our party in Germany is quite united in its support of the nation in this crisis. We have not forgotten our peculiar position in the affairs at home and in the world. We wish to cleave to the International movement after as before the war. We are ready to join with our comrades in the enemy countries in any reasonable effort looking for peace. But what do we observe abroad? We see the distinguished members of our Party in France and England joining in the hue and cry against us. So long as this continues we cannot present a plan for peace. The French Socialists cry for the complete fall of the power of Germany. They have already partitioned parts of our country off and allotted the various sections to

the conquerors, to Russia, to France and to England. What a suggestion from these, whom we have always thought of as comrades! Shall we come crawling back to the International and beg to be taken in again? The German Socialist movement is indeed the very foundation of the International. Without us I can hardly conceive an International at all. I think that our comrades abroad will ultimately perceive this and act with due consideration. Be assured, however, that Socialism will come out stronger because of this war. In our home affairs much will have been accomplished. To particularize, we shall act upon the theory that a sound working class population is absolutely needed for national defense. Our ruling classes must acknowledge this. Hence we shall secure many social reforms looking toward improved social and industrial conditions for the workers; Second, immense sections of industry will be nationalized and municipalized. This is taking place every day. The public service is thus improved and the conditions of the workers much more easily elevated. The educational facilities for the workers will also be deepened and broadened.

"What I say of the Party and of the working class, I can say of society as a whole. The theory that 'Civilization will be destroyed by the war' is all rot and nonsense. Society has weathered many wars. It is a tough growth, this human society of ours. It too will come out better than it went in. Common suffering, common ideals, these bring together and elevate all. Germany will recover so quickly as to surprise even itself. It is so easy to exaggerate the sensational and purely evil in war.

"To summarize, we Germans shall hold out. We have plenty to eat, plenty of men, plenty of munitions, plenty of money. After the war the world will and shall go on better than before. The bitterness, the race hatreds, will die away. The facts make me optimistic as regards my country, as regards my party and as regards the great purposes and principles for which both stand now as heretofore."

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“The Trust of Nations”

By William English Walling

THE Fabian Society of England has thought out a State Socialist plan for ensuring permanent peace. Bernard Shaw headed the committee that prepared the plan and Sidney Webb was the vice-chairman. As always the Fabians work out everything on a purely governmental or political basis. Like other peace movements they ignore the underlying economic facts, and as a consequence their plan has no relation either to practical politics or to Socialism—both of which, in different ways, are founded on solid economic fact.

The new Fabian plan proposes that above the Hague Tribunal there shall be a Council of Nations which (1) is to decide questions not of a nature to be submitted to the Tribunal and (2) is to have the power to amend international law. This second clause provides for changes in international law to accompany economic evolution.

But far more important than the power to be exercised by the Council is the power that is to enforce its decrees, the manner in which the Council is constituted. And here the Fabians make no provision whatever for economic evolution. The power is apparently to rest forever, as it does now, in the hands of the eight Great Powers, or a sufficient majority of them. For the Council is to be prepared “to make common cause, even to the extent of war, against any constituent State which violates this fundamental agreement.”

The “Council of Nations” is to sit as a whole, and the Fabians suggest for these sittings a distribution of voting power as provided for by the Hague Tribunal in 1907, in its proposed international prize court. But the Council as a whole is unimportant. It is divided into the Council for Europe, the Council for America, the Council of the eight Great Powers, and the Council for the States other than the eight Great Powers. But all the actions of the other three Councils must be referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers “for ratification”, and also “any other question in which any of such Powers formally claims to be concerned, and requests to have so referred.”

The Council of the Nations has about as much power as the Russian Duma; the eight Great Powers are the Czar.

The Great Powers, we are truthfully told, “are probably administering three-fourths of the total population of the world, disposing of seven-eighths of its governmental revenues and controlling nine-tenths of its armed forces.” In view of this fact the Fabians very deceitfully refer to their scheme of voting for the Council as a whole—according to which the Great Powers are to have only 160 votes

against 125 or more for the smaller nations. But we have seen that they really place *all* the power in the hands of the Great Nations.

At first the Fabian plan seems modest from the British standpoint, since it gives the British Empire only one vote among the eight Great Powers. But we must remember that the scheme divides the rest of the world among these Powers, thus giving the British Empire a one-eighth share in all the world outside the British Empire.

The scheme is “patriotic” for another reason. It calmly assumes that Great Britain is to keep all her vast empire—and it is only because of India’s 300,000,000 people that the Fabians can claim that the eight Great Powers “administer” three-fourths of the population of the world. Otherwise they would administer scarcely half.

The Fabian scheme is typical in that it estimates the Powers according to population, military power, and *governmental income* only. It says nothing whatever about national income which depends upon wealth or about future national income (which depends upon economic resources). It is economic power and development that count in the long run. The more advanced nations can use for military and governmental purposes a larger part of their income than the smaller and less advanced. The real strength of the Great Powers then is not to be gauged by their military strength—which may be even more than 90 per cent of the world’s military power. Nor is it to be gauged by their governmental revenues, which are doubtless even more than 87½ per cent of the world’s governmental revenues—as the Fabians estimate them. But assume that the Great Nations have 87½ per cent of the world’s economic income and productive power. Is not this proportion rapidly changing? Are not a large part of the world’s economic resources in China and South America? And as India develops will she not claim and obtain independence?

These are the fallacies of the Fabian plan from the standpoint of economic Socialism. But there is a far more fatal weakness from any practical standpoint—namely, the proposed equal division of the control of the world among the eight Great Powers. According to productive capacity we may estimate these Powers are roughly responsible for the following proportions of the world’s income:

DIVISION OF THE WORLD’S INCOME.

The United States	20	per cent.
The British Empire	15	per cent.
Germany	15	per cent.
France	10	per cent.
Russia	7½	per cent.
Austria	7½	per cent.
Italy	5	per cent.
Japan	5	per cent.
Smaller Powers	15	per cent.

According to the Fabian plan each of these Powers would be given a one-eighth vote or 12½ per cent in the control of the world. This would be a gross underestimate of the power of American capital, which the latter would never consent to. It would also be a gross exaggeration of the economic power of Italy and Japan. (Germany is underestimated for by the fact that Austria is overestimated. Russian power is placed too high from the economic standpoint, but she will doubtless earn this higher place in a few years—when her resources are developed).

In such a scheme there is no cement binding the Powers together, nothing to prevent a future split. But this cement exists—in international finance. In the matter of war loans and the production of arms, as we now see, America counts for its full value. And after the present war the combined financiers of London and Paris will give their partner financiers of America and other countries almost exactly as much voting power as their economic power entitles them to. The “trust of nations” is already in existence, the “Council of Great Powers”

will probably never exist. The “trust of nations” distributes voting power automatically—year by year; the Council could do nothing of the kind.

In the Council of Great Powers, England and her *political* allies, France, Russia, Italy and Japan would control. (They would have 62½ per cent of the votes). In the Trust of Nations these Powers will have no control. (I have estimated their strength at 42½ per cent.) Great Britain could not dominate through *political* allies. She would have to rely on her *economic* associates. If her policy—as to the neutrality of the seas, and the opening of India—satisfied the capitalists of the United States and the smaller powers, her Germanic enemies would be absolutely helpless to disturb the peace of the world.

The peace of the world—from the economic standpoint—depends upon international economic development and not upon international political schemes. And if this is the last war it will be due to the victory of the international financiers, to the formation of “a trust of nations”—paving the way to the internationalization of production.

The Basis of Solidarity

By Austin Lewis

THOSE trades which make alliances for the purpose of united action against an employer are by the very nature of the case shut off from any comprehension of solidarity. The apparently effective stand made by such trades is due to temporary advantage of situation and the victory thus gained is precarious. Such victories, and they are admittedly of diminishing frequency, cause a loss rather than a gain in the direction of solidarity. For the victorious portion of the trades, seeing that their fellow workers have not contributed to their victory, are rendered the more confident of their ability to maintain their position without the assistance of the others.

This rule applies to all those trades which by virtue of the possession of specialized skill and consequently of a greater or less power of gaining a monopoly in the market as regards that skill are able to “control” the job and make a “closed shop” for their particular labor-power commodity.

It also applies to such other trades as, by virtue of the local conditions, find themselves temporarily in “control” of the situation, and, able to keep the distribution of jobs in their own hands. This has happened quite frequently in the far West for the former comparative inaccessibility of that region gave the craftsman a peculiar though, of course, transitory advantage.

To such as these the term “solidarity” naturally

conveys no meaning, or one that is essentially idealistic. The ordinary unionist under such conditions, never feeling the need of solidarity, as a matter of fact, does not know the word, and the radical or socialist unionist sees in it only that “ideological” quality already spoken of.

The essence of solidarity is “coherence of interest” (Standard Dictionary). At this point we may apply the Marxian doctrine with advantage. By “interest” we mean economic interest. Where the interests are identical or coherent solidarity follows automatically. On the contrary where the interests are not such as can be called coherent there is no solidarity.

We can predicate almost with certainty, in the absence of limited and local circumstances, how various sections of the community will vote with respect to taxation and other matters directly affecting classes. We know that a threatened raise of taxation which would impose a burden on the small middle class will be met by the united resistance of that class. The solidarity of the class arises at once and automatically. It is not a theory, neither is it an aspiration. It is a fact. Indeed it is the fact upon which the threatened class relies for its protection or salvation.

Solidarity, then, rests upon no sentimental or “ideological” basis but, like every other concept of any value, upon a definite substratum of fact.

Where this does not exist the very essential element of solidarity is lacking and the term becomes a mere idle expression of no significance, other than mystical.

The socialists, indeed, base their "solidarity" upon the irreconcilability of the interests of the workers with those of the capitalists and declare that the political solidarity of labor must follow automatically and necessarily from that fact.

But there are actually cases where the interests of certain portions of the laboring class are apparently with certain groups of employers rather than with the laboring masses, as Kautsky and others have admitted in their classification of the revolutionary elements. What becomes of the solidarity of labor under such circumstances?

A "solidarity" results, but it is between the groups whose economic interests are more nearly identical between the particular capitalist group and the labor group whose interests for the present seem to correspond. Hence we have the every day phenomenon of the political support given by the craft-labor element to the smaller middle class. The organized craftsman is still, particularly in the West, a potential member of the smaller middle class and all his aspirations are bound up with that class rather than with the unorganized and relatively unskilled portion to which the term proletariat may be more particularly applied.

To make an arbitrary classification of society upon the basis that it consist of the greater capitalists, the smaller middle class and the working class, is not satisfactory, for, were it true, it could have no very clear meaning, unless we can define what is meant by "working class." Indeed it is just at this point that the criticism of the ordinary man in the street is directed. He always meets this classification with the question "What do you mean by the 'working class?'" If he is a professional man he generally adds rather scornfully "I am a working man myself."

Unless we can determine what we mean by the working class we are no nearer a solution of the difficulty. The only test is the Marxian economic test. We must analyze the various economic ingredients which go to the making of the "working class." The result of this analysis does not reveal that homogeneity, that compelling "coherence" which must be regarded as the prime essential quality, without which no solidarity is possible.

At this point the official socialist has refused to proceed further. Only in the recent discussion by Kautsky, Pannekoek and a few others do we find any reminder that the nucleus of skilled workers comprising the unions that has taken to itself the name "working class" does not constitute the whole of that body.

Later examination moreover leads to the conclu-

sion that such a nucleus does not in reality comprise even the really effective fighting portion.

This is by the way, however; the point to which we wish at present to call attention is that such differences are in themselves proof of the absence of solidarity. For solidarity cannot exist between such divergent elements. In reality it does not exist, as experience in the labor movement and its manifestations amply testify.

A rather interesting example of this appeared during the Los Angeles strike of 1910. A parade was to be held and it was imperative that as representative a showing as possible should be made of the laboring class in that city. The strike was conducted by the metal trades and was supported generally by organized labor throughout the state. Los Angeles rests fundamentally upon a basis of unskilled labor, foreign unskilled labor, notably Mexicans, Russians and Italians. This foreign unskilled labor had of course no place in the trades organization of Los Angeles. It was not represented in the labor council and, in spite of the fact that numbers of this unskilled labor class were going into the shops and keeping them running, no effort had really been made to awaken their interest and to placate them. The labor unrest had however affected the Los Angeles working population to its depths. After some agitation therefore numbers of the foreign unskilled expressed their willingness to parade with the organized trades. They did so to the number of about two thousand, almost all Mexicans. It was the first time in the history of the Coast that this class of labor had paraded with the organized trades; and it was painfully, almost ludicrously, out of place.

The unions marched in the van with their crafts organization banners and the national flag at the head of each division. But what emblem could the unskilled workers carry? The fact, however, as usual produced its own expression and the Mexican workers paraded under the Marxian adjuration "Workers of the World Unite." The craft organizations expressed themselves in trade mottoes and national flags; the unskilled with their mass-organizaition could find no other expression than a statement of that solidarity which their condition demanded.

In short solidarity cannot be founded on a philosophical theory nor on political activity and propaganda. To take out a red card does not mean that one is a proletarian or that the same economic influences are not at work with the holder of the red card as effect others of the same economic proposition as himself.

Solidarity is a fact and rests on a fact. That fact produces an unconscious psychological reaction. Stress must be laid on the word unconscious. The reaction is so direct as to be practically automatic.

And to say this is to say no more than the Marxian student admits to be a theoretical commonplace which however he frequently ignores in practice.

An instance of the working of this unconscious solidarity resting essentially and indeed solely upon the economic fact may be seen in the later developments of the hoppers' strike at Wheatland, California.

This strike was in itself a pure example of mass action for it was without prior organization and flared up spontaneously under the pressure of certain conditions which were later adjudged by public opinion to be also inhuman. As a result of this spontaneous strike two men were found guilty of murder in the second degree. The Industrial Workers of the World had taken up the matter of the defense of the men, and subsequent to their conviction placed the demands of the hoppers on the Durst ranch where the trouble had occurred as the minimum demands of hoppers in the State of California. These demands were promptly conceded by the employers, and the State Commission on Housing and Immigration suggested and enforced sanitary measures which it is safe to say had been unheard of in the State prior to the uprising on the Durst ranch.

So far the victory may be said to rest with the migratory workers. They had at one blow raised the standard of pay in the hopgrowing industry and had at the same time compelled the sanitary improvement of the camps so that the entire status of hoppers was raised. And it must not be forgotten that these hoppers were very largely foreigners heretofore considered incapable of cleanliness, and who by this one stroke had proven their claims to consideration as civilized human beings. In fact the victory has, as regards sanitation, made their conditions in the camp better than their ordinary life conditions in the city, for the same Commission has made a report on housing conditions in the City of San Francisco which shows those conditions to be in certain vital respects inferior to those obtaining in the camps.

But this victory was not enough. Ford and Suhr were in jail. These were the two men who had been convicted of the murder of the district attorney already mentioned. They were considered by the mass of the laboring people everywhere to have been unfairly convicted and much indignation existed throughout the State on that account. Accordingly the committee of migratory workers who had taken charge of the matter issued broadcast statements that there would be no hops picked unless the two men who had been convicted and whose cases were now pending in the appeal court were released.

To the ordinary unionist and the business man this demand seemed to be the acme of absurdity as well as of stupidity, for did it not show an entire ignorance

of existing social and political conditions? The hopgrowers, that it to say the employers who were organized in the Hopgrowers Association, consulted with the Industrial Workers, an organization which hitherto they had utterly despised and scorned in an endeavor to reach an agreement. They offered to concede everything which the committee demanded. "But how about the release of Ford and Suhr?" they were asked. The hopgrowers answered indignantly with another question, "How can we release Ford and Suhr?" To which the astute committee replied, "By the use of your economic power just as we are going to use ours to prevent your hops being picked."

Such an undertaking would apparently be doomed to failure from the start. There was no effective organization such as we generally understand. There was no money to do more than advertise more or less widely the fact that a boycott of the hopfields was contemplated. The hoppers, as we have already pointed out, consisted of the under stratum of workers and were racially and otherwise without any homogeneity. Yet the Japanese and the Indians on the reservations who were accustomed to take part in the hoppers equally declared their intention of remaining away from the fields and there was a general movement among the Latin people, who furnish the largest quota of pickers, not to undertake the work although times were hard and there was a lack of employment in the cities. To add to the wonder of it all the Building Trades Council of San Francisco as well as the Labor Council each endorsed the boycott to the extent of advising their members to keep away from the hopfields. In the latter case the motion was carried in spite of the objection of two of the most prominent and strongest leaders in the council and was indicative of a sympathy on the part of the masses of union men with the migratory worker. As regards the two labor bodies the action was purely sympathetic and rested in the main on human impulses for their members were not interested in the hoppers industry and very few of them had ever or probably ever would take part in it. Other labor councils followed this lead.

Where can we look for the main impetus to this solidarity of action? As regards the first spontaneous movement, the answer is ready, for the conditions were such as in themselves to produce the revolt which spontaneously occurred. But as regards the boycott the conditions were so different as to merit notice. All the old grievances had been practically abolished. It was generally conceded that the conditions were beyond expectation better than they had ever been, hoppers appeared more inviting as an occupation both from a sanitary standpoint and in respect of actual economic returns than ever before, and yet we had the united action of

large bodies of men differing widely in speech and modes of life.

This action moreover was directed to a distinctly nonpersonal end, the release of two prisoners, whom the vast majority had never seen and had only heard of as champions of the common cause. It is very doubtful if we have ever had a more complete example of the operation of the solidarity notion than in this instance. The contrast between this spontaneity of expression and the labored alliances of the organized trades is too apparent to require pointing out.

This solidarity involved more than a mere demand for better conditions of employment. It refused to recognize the limitations of legality as expressed in terms of the state and the dominant class in whose interests the state was managed and the laws enforced. It declared itself as an effort to impose the will of a distinct body of men, the migratory workers, on the community and so far was a demand for status. In other words it was a solidarity founded upon an economic basis and embracing all the members of a certain economic category.

War Against War

By Jessie Wallace Hughan

FOR ten months we Americans have been priding upon our superiority to Europe and we Socialists upon our superiority to European Socialists. Our time of trial is just now beginning, however, and the question is whether we too shall be whirled into the mad conflict with our peace proclamations upon our lips.

Up to the last week of July, 1914, the German, English, French and Belgian Socialists talked peace as vociferously as most of us are talking it now. They held mass meetings, circulated posters, heaped maledictions on the capitalist governments that were fomenting war, and then—on the first of August marched off tamely to shoot each other at the word of command. Many of us refused to believe this incredible thing last summer, but the incredible happened,—and why?

They were forced into the war, we say to our critics. Yet we know this is not strictly true. England, at least, has had no recourse to conscription, the Reichstag members were not forced to vote war credits, and the French and Belgian Socialists were not commandeered into the war cabinets of their respective countries. In Russia, on the other hand, the very stronghold of absolutism, a bold minority actually refused the war credits and are now charged with treason. The brave members of the Duma have taught us that the human will cannot be forced.

The entrance of the English workers into the war, and the consent of those on the continent to that war, was a voluntary matter, for those of us who are not so obsessed by economic determinism as to deny the existence of free will. As we look back upon it, however, we realize that our surprise was uncalled-for. What could have been expected? The platforms of the European parties contained no definite declarations against all war and all armaments. The refusal of the war budget in Germany was a mere custom, strengthened by no promises or party decrees. Not a man of the Socialist parties

was bound by pledge or prohibition against enlistment even as a volunteer. The general strike against war not favored by the Socialists, while the Congresses had contented themselves on the one hand with fiery denunciations of war and on the other with mildly conservative proposals in favor of arbitration and limitation of armaments. Not a plan existed for the actual war against war *after* such war should arise.

In the same situation we American Socialists find ourselves at present. In spite of our criticism of the comrades abroad, what are our plans in this country, where conscription does not as yet exist and where Congress has the sole right to declare war? Have we instructed our Congressman to vote unconditionally against war, have we pledged a single man against enlistment, and does our national platform contain so far one demand for disarmament and universal arbitration? If not, why not?

In America, as in Europe, we Socialists have long and rightfully prided ourselves upon our comprehension of the economic causes of war. War is a by-product of capitalism, we say, and will pass away with it. Teach the workers their economic interests and they will not fight; destroy capitalism and only then will war be abolished. With these splendid generalizations we scoff at militarist and pacifist alike.

Are we justified in so doing? First of all, we cannot accuse the German workers, our teachers in Marxism, whose vote for Socialism is the largest in the world, of being ignorant of their economic interests. Yet they consented to a war which, by their own declaration, was of capitalism and for capitalism. Therefore, whatever may be the economic motives of the ruling class in initiating a war, it is hardly practical for us, in analyzing the reasons why men fight, to keep to economics alone. It was a social rather than an economic motive,—patriotism, race hatred, race fear,—call it what

you will,—that sent the workers of Europe to fight as volunteers the economic battles of their masters.

Secondly, are we scientific in claiming that war will cease with the fall of capitalism and then only? To get rid of a by-product it is not always necessary to destroy the whole process from which it arises. The old law tenement, the twelve hour day, the infant factory worker, were all products of capitalism, but in large areas of the world they have already disappeared, and we know them all destined to pass long before the days of the co-operative commonwealth. Working class pressure can do away with specific evils when it has not yet gained general power; public morality is an overwhelming force, even when itself based unconsciously upon economic interest; moreover, capitalism itself is clogged by certain of its by-products and seeks to get rid of them. War will disappear from the world, as opium has practically disappeared from China, vodka from Russia, and whiskey from many towns in the United States, when the social forces opposing it become stronger than the economic forces that have hitherto upheld it.

Finally, can we guarantee that Socialism will automatically abolish international war? If we mean by this a Socialism that will spread from the North to the South Pole and include the Sahara and the Amazon forests,—granted. We all know, however, that this universal Socialism, depending necessarily upon the even industrial development of these diverse regions, is so far ahead that we may as well plan for Anarchism or for the Millennium. What we do mean by Socialism Triumphant is Socialism in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, the most advanced industrial nations of our day. Japan, Spain, Russia, will still be a generation behind us, and China, India, and the now savage unpeopled lands after them still farther in the rear, emerging only one by one into permanent industrial democracy. What will be the attitude of the first Socialist nations toward these belated peoples? If peace, it will not be an automatic, but a deliberate and voluntary peace, founded on the interest, not of the workers of one nation, but of the workers of all nations. A fatal error of our European comrades was that they trusted almost wholly in an automatic peace to arise from economic causes, and so neglected to erect firm bulwarks against the social forces born of capitalism that make for war.

There was another reason for the failure of the Socialists of Europe to stand as internationalists, the simple fact that none of them were really opposed at all to defensive war. The general strike lost in the Socialist Congresses because each set of comrades was afraid of some other set and refused to incur any risk for its own nation by unconditional peace. The militarists played upon this fear, and we have therefore a war at present in which no

nation except perhaps Italy, believes itself an aggressor. Each is defending its home, its culture, its national existence, against some inhuman group of barbarians across the frontier. "Aggressive" war is obsolete; all war now is "defensive," though the defense may carry one far across the border to devastate a neutral nation.

Two lessons, then, we in America can find in the tragedy of Europe. The first is that a knowledge of Socialism and an expectation of industrial democracy will not keep us immune from the guilt of war any more than a knowledge of Christianity, and an expectation of the Church clear of immorality. The second is that, if we allow defensive war, we allow all war, and unless our internationalism is without loopholes and exceptions it cannot stand.

The National Committee in the recent Lusitania resolution and anti-war manifesto has just struck a vigorous note in its declaration that no crime can justify war, and in its splendidly constructive proposal of a world commission to enforce its decisions "without resort to arms". It is for us to follow up the declarations of our party with specific action.

First let us insert definite planks in our platform demanding complete disarmament of the United States and the announcement that henceforth we will settle all disputes without recourse to arms. Second, let us instruct our Congressmen and other legislators to vote always and unconditionally against war and war credits. Finally, if the majority of the party are unreservedly opposed to war, let us include in our membership pledge the promise to refuse enlistment as a volunteer.

With regard to the last suggestion there will doubtless be difference of opinion; and a referendum is a slow and uncertain process. Meanwhile something is being done in a small way by some of us who believe that a line-up on the question of enlistment is the surest test of internationalism. The following pledge is being circulated among both men and women, for as consenters to enlistment, women have long been the bulwarks of war.

"I, being over eighteen years of age, hereby pledge myself against enlistment as a volunteer for any military or naval service in international war, and against giving my approval to such enlistment on the part of others."

The phrase "as a volunteer" absolves us from the charge of treason, but the stand that this pledge requires is not easy. Many a man would rather be a coward than be called one, and few of us are such internationalists that we dare risk the word "unpatriotic." Yet if we are cowards we are cowards with Jaures, Liebknecht, and Keir Hardie; if unpatriotic, we share the term with every true lover of his country who has cared more for her real than for her fancied honor, who has cared more for the bodies and souls of his fellow-workers than for the color of the world map.

Morality and the Movies

By Floyd Dell

IT has been a reproach against the arts hitherto that they were immoral. Beginning with the work of Phidias, who "made Aphrodite without any nightie," sculpture has been notoriously indecent; painting just as bad. Poetry has encouraged any amount of naughtiness; there was the case of Paolo and Francesca, for instance: two well brought up young people who wouldn't have thought of anything wrong if it hadn't been put into their heads; but they got to reading the poem about Lancelot and Guenevere, and—well, as Dante says, "in the book they read no more that day." Even music has stirred up emotions that perfect gentlemen and especially ladies ought not to have. And as for novels and plays, everybody knows how harmful Ibsen and Shaw and Zola have been. Yes, the arts have encouraged wickedness; that is, the arts of the past have done so. A new art has, however, recently been created which is free of this reproach. Pure from the beginning, it stands alone among its sinful sisters as the only moral art—the art of motion pictures.

The trouble with the other arts, of course, is that they were allowed too much freedom; it was not strictly insisted upon that they limit themselves to a view of life in conformity with the conventions. Sculpture and painting were allowed to represent men and women in a state which the proprieties distinctly forbid. Nothing like that is permitted in the movies. Poetry and music are allowed to go in convincing detail into the subject of sexual passion. In the movies that is, of course, touched on as lightly as possible; at the crisis of a love episode the movie hero and heroine exchange a fraternal kiss, and then the attention is quickly drawn to something else.

The difference in this respect between the movie and drama or fiction is less obvious, but it is even more profound. The harmfulness of books and plays has lain in the fact that they were permitted to ascribe good motives to bad actions, and bad motives to good actions, and generally to mix up right and wrong until people were led to doubt whether right and wrong were two perfectly distinct things. This has all been put a stop to in the movies. Good people are good and bad people are bad, and anybody can tell the difference.

Moreover, to ensure all this propriety, the movies have instituted a self-censorship. In this respect they are unlike all the other arts, which have wanted freedom, and chafed under restraint. The movies on the contrary, pay the expenses of a National Board of Censorship, to which they invite moral experts to belong, and to which they submit their productions. Anything improper is cut out

of the reel. If a kiss is too realistic, several feet are cut right out of the middle of it.

Unfortunately, the movies are dependent to a great extent on those tainted arts, fiction and the drama, for their materials. Movie-scenario writers cannot write fast enough to supply the demand, so books and plays have to be drawn upon. The public, moreover, has not yet been completely weaned away from these dangerous sources of entertainment, and they like to see famous books and plays done over in the movies. This fact is responsible for the slight suggestion of reality, with all its attendant demoralization, that has crept into the movies. However, this difficulty is beginning to be met—successfully and subtly.

It has been found possible to preserve the outlines of a story or play, the characters, the scenes and most of the incidents, and yet rob it entirely of those qualities which made it dangerous. This may be illustrated by the case of Ibsen's "Ghosts," recently turned into a movie-play.

Ibsen was an immoral man. He didn't believe in morals, and he wrote this play to discredit conventional morality. He made it clear in his play that the reason why Oswald went insane was that his mother was such a puritan that she drove his father out to seek pleasure in the company of syphilitic prostitutes; and he points out, and makes the woman realize, that if she had eloped with Pastor Manders, as she wanted to, this would not have happened. Ibsen makes the pastor's injunction, "Go back to your husband," and the whole theory of conventional marriage which it implies, seem hateful and stupid.

Well, all that is changed in the movies. Oswald is there, his mother is there, Regina is there (elevated considerably in the social scale, but still recognizable), all is there, but it is not the same. Instead of being a normal pleasure-loving young man who is wrecked by an unsatisfactory marriage, Oswald's father is shown as a scoundrel who marries knowing that he has a transmissible venereal disease; and he teaches his innocent little boy to drink beer, which leaves no doubt that he is really a bad man. The wife is a saint and martyr, and no one would ever guess that Ibsen thought she was to blame. The great scene in the play is that which shows the doctor hurrying over hill and dale breathlessly to the church in which Oswald and Regina are being wedded, and arriving just in time to hold up his hand and say impressively, "I forbid this marriage!" In the final scene, as Ibsen wrote it, Oswald's mother gives him the poison with her own hand. That would never do. So in the movies Oswald wriggles across the floor making faces, and gets it himself, while his mother and the pastor are hurrying—up hill and down dale, of course—to prevent it. Seeing the dead body, she swoons in the

good man's comforting arms, virtuous to the last.

All the harm, the fever of thought, of doubt, of inquiry which Ibsen's play might set up in impressionable minds, is thus eliminated. The husk is preserved, and those who have seen it will think they have seen Ibsen's "Ghosts," as advertised outside. Thus is art robbed of its sting, truth of its victory.

Another movie play recently shown, which illustrates what can be done to fiction, is "Manon Lescaut." Some opera versions of this story exist, but they all represent Manon as being incidentally unfaithful to her young lover, while nevertheless loving him dearly. Probably it was thought that this characteristic of hers, this curious combination of faithlessness and devotion, was the heart of the story, and the secret of the charm of the book. But that view does not hold in the movies. Manon is a virtuous heroine. The Chevalier does not cheat at cards, either, in the movies. It is made into a story of persecuted innocence.

These changes are of course due in part to the sheer inability of the good people who arrange the movie play to believe that the writers in question could really have intended a sweet mother to poison her boy, or a beautiful and charming girl to leave her lover for a rich old man. They are too pure-minded to understand such things, so they leave them out. But they have an eye to their censorship, too, and if they forgot it and let a woman (who wasn't a prostitute) smoke a cigarette in one of their pictures, they would be forcibly reminded. The cigarette smoking lady would be cut out of the reel. "It is our policy," say the Censors, "not to show a good woman doing anything which is contrary to the moral standards of the community," and they adduce the cigarette example.¹ Good women do not smoke cigarettes in the movies—nor anything else improper, depend upon that.

The whole art of fiction and drama consists in showing good people doing things which are contrary to the moral standards of the community. This only means, of course, that fiction and drama are immoral. But the defect is being remedied in the manner described. We care not who writes the books and plays (because nobody reads or sees them any more), if we can turn them into movie plays. Thus sterilized, emasculated, completely innocuous, they can safely be presented to the public.

1) Nowhere more than in the section of the little booklet on the Standards of the National Board which makes comparison of customs, tastes, and morals does the wise philosophy that lies at the heart of the practice of this Board show at its full value. There are, it is explained, "certain acts which are sometimes a question of custom, sometimes of taste, and sometimes of morals. One example of this is the question of women's smoking and drinking. To the women of certain nationalities and places, it is a matter of custom altogether, and the pictures would be untrue without it; to women of other places it is a matter of taste, that is, it is no longer a question of morals with them, and yet it is not crystallized into custom; and to women of yet other places it is esteemed a matter of morals. In judging pictures, the National Board takes these facts into consideration. The National Board disapproves of showing a good woman doing what would be considered a bad thing by the society of which she forms a part, for this kind of disregard of conventional morality tends of itself to break down the moral fibre of the people."—"The Theory and Practice of the Censorship," by Thomas H. Dickinson, in *The Drama* for May, 1915.

War and the Elders

By Elsie Clews Parsons

HOW obscurely after all the really important wars are fought out," had observed the man I was dining with before going on to hear Jane Addams at Carnegie Hall, "the really great wars, the war of the sexes, caste wars, and perhaps most important and least noticed of all, age-class war, the war between youth and age. In comparison with these conflicts international war is a trifling affair, its most interesting aspect indeed being its effect upon one or another of these greater conflicts."

"As for example," I joined in, "the effect of the present war upon feminism, the new jobs it is bringing women, and the old prejudices it is taking from men."

My ethnologist friend and I finished our coffee and went to the meeting. A coincidence in the expression of ideas is a peculiarly exciting accident and that was the special adventure ahead of us. For of the many interesting impressions Jane Addams imparted that night of most significance, to us at least, was her impression of the relation between the European war and senescence. "In all the warring countries, everywhere," she said, "we heard that this war was an old man's war; that the young men who were dying, the young men who were doing the fighting, were not the men who wanted the war, and were not the men who believed in the war. That somewhere in church and state, somewhere in the high places of society, elderly people and middle-aged people had established themselves and had convinced themselves that this was a righteous war and must be fought, and the young men must do the fighting." In conclusion she quoted the saying of an Englishman that one of the worst things about the war was the way it had let loose upon the world the old men.

"But that is what war has always done," commented my companion as after the meeting we sought coolness and a park bench. "War has always given the elders a chance and war, I surmise, has usually been provoked by them."

"Cato certainly was an old chap when he began to din into the Romans his 'Carthago delenda est.'" I smiled, "but *a priori* your theory sounds valid, for isn't war generally an outcome of fear and the elders are of course the preeminently anxious and apprehensive members of society. This because of their timidity and fearfulness, old people are so conservative. They're afraid of innovations."

"They are," he agreed, "and dreading change as they do, they are the conservatives *par excellence*. Isn't war by the way, a conservative enterprise, conservative, I mean of course, of the distinctions

the elders most care about, the distinctions of sex and caste and, as we have been hearing, of age-class—. But the view of the elders as war-makers is not only sound psychology," he went on, "it is sound ethnology. It is the tribal council that declares for war or peace and in the tribal council the younger men have very little place. They may attend it, but without a voice in it. Sometimes they can't even attend it. Even in modern legislatures where the qualifying age-limit has been pushed back there is still an age limit, in law as well as in the practice of usually returning the older men. Most United States Senators, for example, could not qualify for the United States army because of their age."

"Haven't I heard you say too that magic and mysticism were vital factors among primitive peoples in carrying on war and isn't supernaturalism under the control of the elders?"

"Exactly, it is the tribal elders and the chiefs, and chiefs are not usually young men, those are the fellows who make war magic, who doctor the trails and anoint the weapons and look for favoring omens. It is they who work spells against the enemy. It is they who win the good will of the gods, for it is they and not the youth who know how to pray and sacrifice and make charms."

"Did you notice," I interrupted, "what Jane Adams said about the antique shibboleths appealing more to the older generation in this war than to the younger, the ancient mysticisms about king and country? And that it was only the elders who were content not to analyze the meaning of national honor and loyalty to the empire and patriotism?"

"Analysis plays no great part in magic," he answered.

Book Reviews

The Religious Revolution

REVOLUTION—of all words that which most nearly expresses the modern spirit in politics, in art, in philosophy, in science, in religion.¹ The primitive field of religion as nice as that of life itself has been gradually narrowed by the differentiation and secularization of its various functions. Medicine, law, art, philosophy, science, ethics, politics, have been removed from the realm of mystery and taboo and developed on a rational basis. This process of secularization gradual and hardly conscious through the ages, become conscious and militant in the eighteenth century. The religious revolution appeared "in all its red Jacobinism." Authority entrenched on every side faced the eternal question of modern science and democracy. Nowhere has the struggle been more bitter and prolonged than in the field of religion. The attacks upon clericalism of the philosophers of the enlightenment, Voltaire, Diderot and the rest, were met by political persecution and attempts at suppression and social excommunication. The rationalists were read out of society with bell, book and candle. Nothing daunted they continued their attacks and equipped anew with the positions, weapons of nineteenth century science entered the fray with fresh vigor. To many the battle has been so clearly won. For science that they have lost interest in the unequal struggle. Such is the situation in France and England where anti-cler-

icalism has become a political rather than a philosophical issue. Elsewhere the battle still rages. In England rationalism is still militant. Our own America has hardly arrived at the age of Voltaire.

In the last few decades however the relation of science and religion have been affected by a new influence. Science has abandoned in many quarters her attitude of defiance or indifference and is taking religions under her wing. There is little more affection in this patronage, it is true, than that of the eagle for the rabbit. The new interest of science in religion is purely objective. Religion has become a thing, an object of examination like all other things. Another stage in its development has been added to the three of Comte. Religion has not only grown from the childhood of theology and the adolescence of metaphysics to the full maturity of science, but has turned and examined its own part—is writing its own autobiography in that spirit of calm contemplation of the errors of youth which cannot come without the strength of manhood.

In this small volume, which contains a series of lectures delivered at Amherst College, the author presents a hypothesis for a re-examination of religion in the light of recent researches in history, psychology and anthropology. It is thus the kernel for what might have been a much larger work. The fundamental conception is dynamic. "Not *semper idem* but *semper alterum* is the keynote of science." For this

evolutionary treatment of the subject, history and anthropology furnish the data, while individual and social psychology, by investigation into the nature of religious emotion, aid in the definition of religion. No student of the social sciences should overlook this significant contribution to an important department of sociology.

JULIET STUART POYNTZ.

Out of Work

DESPISE what it has done to its author, *Out of Work*¹ is such stuff as Socialists are made from.

The absolute lack of organization of the "labor market", the foul practices of employment agencies, the co-operation between employers and padrone for the fleecing of ignorant, unskilled workers, the failure of the public schools to prepare boys or girls for jobs, the incapacity of organized labor to protect itself much less the unorganized, the failure of government or business to adopt even obvious and easy preventive or curative measures,—all here are set down with much convincing detail. On the side of constructive proposals a nation-wide system of free government employment exchanges is advocated as essential, whatever other measures, such as unemployment insurance, be adopted later. Miss Kellor is without doubt correct in her insistence that the municipality and not the State, is the proper unit from which the exchanges shall operate. Insurance in some form

1) *The Religious Revolution*, by James H. Shottwell. Cambridge: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

1) *Out of Work*—A study of Unemployment by Frances A. Kellor. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. \$1.50 net.

she sees coming across the waters, but only after much experimentation and careful modification of systems in use in foreign countries shall we here "be ready to formulate a national policy".

Indeed the citizens in "positions of power" so dear to the Progressive theory are in for a deal of hard thinking and they must perform unwonted deeds of public services before the ranks of mere mortals out of work shall be much reduced.

Despite its curious omissions, the book is full of statements of fact, which should help to rid the uninformed of a lot of current loose thinking and looser talking about the man and the woman unable to find work. But the reader will look in vain for reference

to such well known and pertinent facts as the twelve hour shifts and the seven day labor in the steel mills and the effect of such over-work on unemployment. The taxation of land is to be reformed before we can get far away from unemployment. That private ownership of public utilities has any bearing upon the matter, that the workers might themselves alleviate their own precarious condition, that there is or ever shall be Socialism to hold out promise of deliverance to the exploited and dispossessed is nowhere intimidated. In commendable charity, however, the veil of silence is drawn over "Bundle Day" and the performance of the much advertised Mayor's Committee on Unemployment in New York.

PAUL KENNADAY.

Justice for H. G. Wells

EVEN the most ardent non-British admirer of H. G. Wells would probably admit that he has said things since the present war that are distinctly tainted with nationalism. Marxian Socialists are not altogether ardent admirers of H. G. Wells and their criticism would be even more adverse. Nevertheless, it would be a gross injustice to Wells to deny the value of much that he has written since the war merely because of these errors, no matter how serious they may be.

Taking Wells' writings as a whole, as they appear, for example, in the little book entitled *The War That Will End War*,¹ we must admit that they are overwhelmingly socialistic and international. That his writing is frequently brilliant needs scarcely to be added.

What, then, is Wells' position as a whole as we see it in this little volume? Wells' basic assumption is undoubtedly the following:

"We are fighting Germany. But we are fighting without any hatred of the German people. We do not intend to destroy either their freedom or their unity. But we have to destroy an evil system of government and the mental and material corruption that has got hold of the German imagination and taken possession of German life. We have to smash the Prussian Imperialism as thoroughly as Germany in 1871 smashed the rotten Imperialism of Napoleon III. And also we have to learn from the failure of that victory to avoid a vindictive triumph."

"Consider what the Germans have been, and what the Germans can be. Here is a race which has for its chief fault docility and a belief in teachers

and rulers. For the rest, as all who know it intimately will testify, it is the most amiable of peoples. It is naturally kindly, comfort-loving, child-loving, musical, artistic, intelligent. In countless respects German homes and towns and countrysides are the most civilized in the world. But these people did a little lose their heads after the victories of the sixties and seventies, and there began a propaganda of national vanity and national ambition."

Wells' attack on British Imperialism and on what Shaw calls the British junkers is scarcely weaker than that of Shaw himself and is undoubtedly more clearly and consistently carried out. Wells says that there is a precise English equivalent of "those professors of Welt Politik who have guided the German mind to its present magnificent display of shrewd, triumphant statecraft."

Wells' ideas of peace to be secured are, then, in no sense jingoistic, as many German sympathizers have asserted. He says:

"At the end there will be no Conference of Europe on the old lines at all, but a Conference of the World. It will be a Conference for Kraft to laugh at. He will run about button-holing people about it; almost spitting in their faces with the eagerness of his derisive whispers. It will conduct its affairs with scandalous publicity and a deliberate simplicity. It will be worse than Woodrow Wilson."

"It is a war that must be fought to such a finish that every man in each of the nations engaged understands what has happened. There can be no diplomatic settlement that will leave German Imperialism free to explain away its failure to its people and start new preparations. We have to go on until we are absolutely done for, or

until the Germans as a people know that they are beaten, and are convinced that they have had enough of war."

Wells even favors that measure which is so unpopular in Great Britain, the neutralization of the seas. If a League of Peace is formed after the war, as Wells desires, then there will be an end to British rule of the seas:

"It will lie in the power of England, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States, if Germany and Austria are shattered in this war, to forbid the further building of any more ships of war at all; to persuade, and if need be, to oblige the minor Powers to sell their navies and to refuse the seas to armed ships not under the control of the confederation. To launch an armed ship can be made an invasion of the common territory of the world. This will be an open possibility in 1915."

That this is suggested by so influential a person as Wells is of almost momentous significance. Surely after this no one will go so far as to call Wells a blind partisan. The most that can be said is that he is at times impulsive and has said things which cannot be harmonized with the main current of his thought. In spite of these aberrations his pen may be one of the chief influences making for a permanent peace and increasing the prestige of the Socialists at the end of the war.

Wells has since cooled his temper, and he now sees that Germany is not alone militarism and aggression, Hohenzollern and Junkers. This alone could not explain German prowess, efficiency, national strength. He points out in a recent article, very thoughtful and illuminating, the value of conscious, definite social organization what a great factor this has been in the development of German power.

Brilliantly, thoroughly he develops the role and mission of this national organization, points out its strong points and its defects. It is splendid, this social organization of Germany, and will be adopted by the rest of the world—minus its Prussianism and its imperial despotism.

Being a nationalist and a State Socialist explains the strong and the weak points in the Wells arguments. There is hardly any essential difference between Shaw and Wells—except that Wells has lost a great deal of his mental poise and Shaw hasn't.

A new sort of Imperialism—more social, more democratic—will develop in Great Britain after the war, and H. G. Wells will probably be its prophet. Just as Kipling hymned the older Imperialism, Wells may hymn the new.

J. D. W.

¹ *The War That Will End War*. H. G. Wells. New York: Duffield & Company. 75c.

A Socialist Digest

After the War--Rise of the "Inferior Races"?

THE larger aspects of the war are beginning to loom up on the horizon of events. One of the great changes will be in the relation of the races of the world. There is a diversity of opinion on what form the changes will assume. One opinion is that the "inferior races" will be exploited worse than ever, a coalition of the great powers being a probability, with an international police force to keep the "inferior races" in subjection. This is likely; on the other hand, the relations between Japan and China, while infringing on China's national autonomy, has undoubtedly strengthened the autonomy of the "yellow" race against the "white".

The rise of a South African Empire, part of, or independent of, the British Empire, is also probable. The new York *Evening Post* sees great changes in the status of the inferior races after the war. Its analysis, while disputable in many ways, is thought provoking:

"As the war progresses, there becomes apparent the magnitude of the changes certain to result in the 'backward' parts of the world. These changes, inevitable whichever side wins, will probably surpass in importance any immediate alteration of boundary lines in Asia or Africa. Their nature and scope in India, the most important and restless of European possessions have been the theme of much speculation. We have the predictions of the *Monatsschrift* that 'the nimbus of England's invincibility must fade in the eyes of Indian troops, for they have been included in the rout of the English, and many as prisoners share the captivity of their masters.' We have heard from Hindu sources the prophecy of a new Indian coherence in the demand for governmental and economic reforms. An Under Secretary for India has told the Commons that she now claims 'to be not a mere dependent of, but a partner in, the Empire; and her partnership with us in spirit, and on the battlefields, cannot but alter the angle from which we shall all look upon the problems of the government of India.' Of Africa we have heard little. Yet there, too, may not the relations of the white to the 'inferior' races be transformed? May we not look to them with even greater hope that certain long-deferred changes for the better will be made?

"How wrongful much African administration has been we know but im-

perfectly. Yet British, German and French black troops have been fighting side by side with Englishmen, Germans, and Frenchmen. Hopefulness for the future lies in the malleable social state into which much of Africa has been thrown. Every one knows a little of Belgian atrocities in the Congo; and there are records nearly as black of German, French and Portuguese wrongdoing. Gustav Frenssen has made his shortest novel one long denunciation of the German extermination of the Herreros in Southwest Africa. It has been the ordinary report of travellers in Togoland, Kamerun, and East Africa that the German machine of economic exploitation was of iron harshness. The native has been brought into contact with a system of military precision—a rigid administration, time-table requirements as to the labor upon governmental and commercial undertakings, fixed prices, and countless general regulations. Revolts have been followed by crushing punitive blows. 'The German Secretary of State for the Colonies,' the *Gold Coast Leader* recently stated, 'has admitted that, from 1903 to 1913, 105,000 natives of Togoland have been killed in expeditions against them.' Disease and repression have done as much in East Africa. As for the French, an English administrator, J. H. Harris, writes in the *Nineteenth Century* that, although German Kamerun 'has been the scene of many terrible deeds,' 'it must be admitted that the actual atrocities have probably been less revolting than those in the neighboring French Congo.' It is well-known that one of the objects of Lord Bryce's association for the protection of native races was the ending of the slavery existent in Portuguese Africa.

"The war has now thrown the two races, in many parts of Africa, into a new attitude of mutual support; at the same time, the white man must be aware that it has clarified some of the native conceptions of him. The French and English conflicts in which Indians participated constitute no analogy. The native peoples are here capable of a far more immediate response to the processes of civilization, and, serving not as savage guerrillas, but as trained legionaries, their association with the white forces is on quite a different plane. When Marchand and Kitchener faced each other in 1898 at Fashoda, there was much conjecture as to the effect in Africa of having to set black

troops at each others' throats. Its effect now can scarcely be doubted. In German Africa some portions of the native population are stated to have required rough treatment at the opening of the war. The British in Central Africa have taken steps which, whatever the political future of Germany's colonies, will secure the permanent loyalty and affection of the natives of their own and invaded territories. One report is of proclamations in Nigeria against the retention of laborers on plantations by force or fraud, in a new effort to eliminate slave-holding. The French administration of Senegal and North Africa has always been excellent, and even the slighter forms of injustice should now be out of the question; it is impossible to mistreat a man who has fought for you. There and in Egypt greater political freedom may be asked for. But for Africa as a whole the essential question is of humanity of treatment rather than of marked change in government."

What is the Object of the War?

THE British anti-war Socialists have settled down to a single demand: let the government declare its objects in the war, in other words, the conditions under which it will accept peace.

Eduard Bernstein, the leader of the German moderate Socialists, is also for an early peace, but he realizes that the peace terms of the various governments must depend upon their military position or relative power at any given moment. In a Lausanne weekly, Bernstein repeats his accusations that the Germans are frankly undertaking a war of conquest, while he believes that the same is the case with Russia. Previous quotations in the *NEW REVIEW* and the following passage leave no doubt that this is his meaning. He says:

"The shaping of the political geography of Europe is not a question the details of which can be discussed apart from the relative positions of the great powers to one another. Take for example, the question of Poland: Social-democratic principles would demand the restoration of the free commonwealth of Poland, which embraces the entire territory where the Polish inhabitants preponderate. But neither the central powers (Germany and Austria) nor Russia desire such a Poland. With them it is only a question of

another division of Polish territory, a question which from the point of view of democratic politics is of secondary importance, but gains an entirely different complexion for all Europe according as the relations between Germany and the two great Western powers (England and France) shape themselves. It is similar with the map of the Balkans. This question takes on another character if the central powers conquer from what it would have if the war remains indecisive, or if Russia should finally conquer—

Bourbon Despotism

THE war has already amply demonstrated, as history had showed before, that despotism will concede absolutely nothing to democracy except when forced to do so. The tremendous losses of Russia and her difficulties in the earlier stages of the war brought no relief to the Russian people; the defeats in Galicia brought no relief, perhaps because of the entrance of Italy into the war; but when Warsaw was menaced the Czar at last decided to call a special session of the Duma. The importance of this new move must not be overestimated. The Duma session was called for by the conservative business men's party, the Octobrists. It had been demanded by all the leading business interests of the country and was only opposed by the feudal reactionaries, that is, the big landlords, and high officials of the army, bureaucracy, and the court. It may, however, mean the beginning of the conversion of the government of Russia into a modern capitalistic form, with just enough democracy to serve as a counterbalance against the reactionaries.

The Kaiser, having had an uninterrupted series of victories and considering his position to be favorable seems inclined to make no concession whatever to the German people. This is most clearly seen in the Prussian Landtag—and it is well-known that the government of Prussia is more powerful than the Reichstag. *Vorwärts* shows that the Landtag, dominated by the landlords and bureaucrats, has made no concession even to the so-called Liberals or business classes. The only advance made has been a somewhat more liberal provision for the widows and orphans of soldiers and for others damaged by the war—an action to be explained entirely from the point of view of military efficiency. *Vorwärts*, moreover, asks:

"But what is the use of this military benevolence, no matter how well organized, if the means of nourishment

which seems scarcely likely. A demand which one might and would make in the first case would be a political impossibility in the latter case. And with the necessary changes in the hypothesis this is also true of the question of Alsace-Lorraine."

Therefore Bernstein refuses, as an International Socialist, to answer the question asked by the British pacifist Socialists of the British government. What Socialists would demand, like what nations would demand, depends entirely upon the results of the war.

of the people are artificially raised in price and if the representatives of the people, instead of making a decisive attack on the speculators, justify everything that has happened in this field and scarcely plan to undertake any thorough action in the future?

"In view of the attitude of the government and the Conservatives, in view of the session of the Budget Committee in which the Conservatives expressly declared that the experiences of the war had taught something quite different from the need of a complete democratization of the suffrage, namely, 'that not democracy but a strong governmental power, the importance of which the present war plainly teaches, must result'—in view of this fact is it not the part of political wisdom to use every opportunity to speak of the necessity of an equal suffrage and to show the government what the people think of the suffrage question?

"But a number of other important bills were also made impossible by the closing of the session. We refer to the bill demanding the grant of a law of ministerial responsibility, which is still lacking in Prussia, also to the bills demanding the abolition of secret voting in local elections, and the motion as to the religious instruction of the children of Dissidents, as well as the motion for the use of foreign languages, above all Polish, in public meetings."

The above mentioned bills and motions referred only to a few of the crying evils of the Prussian despotism against which the Socialists are constantly fighting. Of course, since the war, no discussion of *military* evils has been possible; on the other hand, the abuse of police power with regard to the labor unions and the Socialist Party has been worse than ever and has resulted in numerous speeches by the Socialists in all of the Landtag sessions since the war. It may be added that the Prussian constitution would not cease to be autocratic with the remedy of one or two of these evils. As long

as a single one remains the whole system will still be essentially autocratic. For example, to make the ministers responsible to the Landtag without making the Landtag democratic would be entirely useless, and vice versa.

Conditions in Austria are scarcely better, while despotism in Hungary is, perhaps, even worse than in Russia.

The only hope, then, is that both the Czar and the two Kaisers will suffer such losses in the war that their governments will be wrecked and their people actually driven into desperate reprisals. Another year of war, which seems highly probable, would certainly bankrupt Austria and Russia, while it would ruin the larger part of the calculating and money-loving ruling class of Germany. History has never shown a case where a people has failed to place the responsibility for unexpected and unbearable losses on the shoulders of its government.

Annexation Under Another Name

IN the Reichstag Session of May 28th the non-Socialist Parties demanded annexations on a large scale. Imperial Chancellor von Bethman Hollweg said the Government would demand "guarantees of future peace". This satisfied most of the annexationists, also the pro-governmental Socialists, represented by Scheidemann, David and others. Kautsky now accuses this faction of favoring annexation or conquest under the name of "guarantees".

The only "guarantee of the freedom of the seas," as demanded by David, would be the annexation of Belgium and part of the coast of France. Kautsky cites, as evidence that this is David's real thought, the following passage:

"England lies before the European Continent like a bolt; it rules the Channel and the Northern passage and everywhere beyond has the approaches to the sea in its power."

Kautsky makes the following bitter comment in *Die Neue Zeit*:

"Such expressions, which mean nothing less than an attempt at the conquest of the world, even before the war brought the result that Germany's foreign policy was everywhere distrusted and that she had no friends but Austria and Turkey. All the smaller sea powers, for whom Germany is to win the freedom of the seas, whom she is to free from the sea-despotism of Great Britain, take the side of this despot in their sympathies.

"In his latest writings David creates the impression that he is writing for

the Party. Certain external signs strengthen this impression. So we must ask, Where does the road lead? What do David's ambiguous speeches mean and how far are they endorsed by the bodies that represent our Party?

"Are the decisions of the International Congresses merely problematical formulas without binding power over the Social Democracy in a world war?"

"Does it regard its opposition to armaments as a mistake to be avoided in the future?"

"Has it abandoned its previous conviction on the colonial question?"

"And finally, what are we to understand by 'the goal of the security of the country' (in the declaration of the Socialist Reichstag Group on the fourth of August 1914). At the time it was

understood as meaning the protection of the frontiers from the enemy. Must we no longer interpret it in this way today, but regard it as meaning *the gaining of such superiority on land and sea as would prevent all interference with German trade in (future) wars, that is, a superiority sufficient for the conquest of the world?*"

In a word Kautsky says that David, voicing the pro-war faction of the Socialists, has come to take the same position as the pan-Germans, the ultra-reactionaries.

World conquest under the name of Socialism—is this the present course of the German Party organization? This is the question, raised by Kautsky, that now seems definitely to have split the German Socialists.

Kautsky's Criticism of the New Socialist Imperialism

CUNOW, having long been an editor of *Vorwaerts*, being known for his radicalism, and having a high standing both as a political economist and a sociologist, has become the leader in the new imperialistic current which has developed entirely since the war. This school of imperialists may be called "revolutionary," as against the old nationalistic school represented by Heine and the revisionists (with the exception of Bernstein). Cunow, Lensch and Haenisch advocate imperialism as being the most developed form of capitalism, and as preparing the ground most rapidly for the social revolution.

The arguments they use, though, are the old arguments, and differ very little from the bourgeois defences of imperialism. Cunow does not want to see the backward countries develop too rapidly for fear that they may become competitors of the European countries. This, of course, is the very reverse of the older Socialistic position, which wishes to see capitalism develop as rapidly as possible in all parts of the world. But it presents precisely the attitude of the Australian Labour Party and the British Labour Party and the American and German labor unions. Cunow claims that the development of capitalism, in Asia and elsewhere, might be "premature" and might bring the capitalistic system to an end before these countries were ready for the Socialistic system. Kautsky points out that this same argument could be used against any policy which promised to hasten the end of capitalism in any country; but that, on the contrary, any development which hastens the end of capitalism also hastens to the same degree the preparation of the people for

Socialism. Kautsky points out that "every step which opens Eastern Asia to capitalism means one step more towards Socialism in Europe."

Cunow also attacks the right of each nationality to independence, which he admits had been recognized even in the declaration of the conservative majority of the Reichstag Socialists in voting for the first war loan on August 4th. Cunow believes that the process of history has consisted in the forceful amalgamation of small nations to form large ones. Kautsky points out that while there has been such a tendency in some cases, there has also been a tendency in the opposite direction, towards the separating of small nations. Cunow admits this to have been the case in the Balkans. Kautsky points out it is also the case in Bohemia, in Russia, in Scandinavia and other parts of Europe.

When we look more closely at Kautsky's position on this question, however, we find it is not essentially different from Cunow's. Kautsky contends that the main tendency is one for the autonomy of nationalities *within* large nations—as seen in present-day Austria. He interprets the Party's declaration of the 4th of August as demanding the autonomy and not the independence of nationalities. That is to say, Kautsky takes the position that Austria should not be divided up and that none of Germany's alien provinces should be taken away from her—no matter what may be the desire of the subject peoples.

Kautsky goes further—in the backward direction—for he thinks that it is possible that even the degree of autonomy enjoyed in Austria might be tem-

porarily abrogated until some future period:

"It is possible that a case may occur in which *this* tendency might interfere with the progress of the international proletariat. Even then it would not be necessary to reject it unconditionally, but it could be demanded only that it should be postponed until the working class has reached power. Then the latter will and must—according to the very conditions of its existence—give to every people independence and self-government."

A Socialist Split

PAUL Axelrod, one of the leading Russian Socialists, believes that the division between nationalist and internationalist Socialists will be much more serious than was the former division between radicals and opportunists. He believes the war has shown the majority of all the Socialist parties to be nationalistic at the present moment. Therefore, the great task before genuine Socialists is to internationalize these parties which have so long claimed to be international.

Axelrod does not hesitate to say that the differences between these two factions are irreconcilable:

"The tactics of Internationalism and the tactics of Nationalism as they have appeared in the present war are mutually exclusive to the degree that their common existence within a single party appears absolutely impossible.

"The war and the crisis of the International have shown the complete incompatibility of the old ideology and psychology of patriotism and nationalism with the principles and interests of the proletarian movement as a whole. The question of the day concerns the ways and means by which the proletariat may free itself from the power of this ideology and psychology. This task can only be accomplished by the internationalization of the policy of the labor movement. If new splits and struggles of various factions arise before the International these will not be on the field of the old antagonism between revisionism and Marxism, but through the deepening and broadening of the international basis of the Movement."

It may be pointed out, however, that anti-nationalism means an abandonment of revisionism insofar as revisionism means the "co-operation of classes." The pro-war Socialists in Germany are practically all revisionists, Bernstein in recent years having virtually repudiated his former revisionism.

The Socialist split is coming; and the new *Socialist* movement based upon the *international class struggle*.

The British Pro-War Socialists

THE *Clarion* has conducted a symposium on the terms of peace including the opinions of H. G. Wells, Anatole France, Upton Sinclair, George D. Herron, Maurice Hewlett, and many others. The most typical and matter of fact statement is that of Victor Fisher, Secretary of the Socialist Defence League. He says:

"The Kaiser and Kaiserdom must go. It does not matter much where he does his "time," for it will have to be a life sentence. St. Helena or Devil's Island would do nicely.

"A liberal Constitution offered to the several German States, plus the Code Napoleon in place of archaic, aristocratic laws. Full Cabinet responsibility and a broad democratic franchise.

"The South Germans or Catholic Germans are much more akin to their Austrian brethren than they are to Prussia, and I should, therefore, set up a Central German Confederacy with its capital in Vienna. Prussia would not be permitted to join this Confederacy for a minimum period of ten years, even if invited to do so then.

"A generous indemnity should be granted to Belgium for all she has suffered, and a lien should be made on all the German Customs for ten years for payment of such indemnity. A smaller allocation should be made to the northern departments of France devastated during the war, *in addition to the repayment with interest of the indemnity wrested from France by Germany in 1871*. Prussia should cede the whole of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark and Alsace-Lorraine to France. Her fighting fleet, as to 50 per cent to Great Britain, as to 25 per cent. to France, as to 25 per cent. to Russia. The Kiel Canal should be for all time neutralised. Hungary should be given the choice of joining a Balkan Confederacy to include Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, or remain an independent kingdom, with a port, as now, at Fiume. Russia should set up a national Constitution for Poland with a king feudatory to the Imperial Russian power. Great Britain should grant definite Home Rule to Egypt under a British suzerainty. Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles should be neutralised."

The proposal to divide Germany is also made by Maurice Hewlett. It must be noted that there is no demand for any greater division of the Germans than at present. There are still to be two great states, Germany and Austria. But Austria is to have part of the Germans now attached to Prussia. The strength of the two countries is to be equalized.

As might be expected, the contribution of Wells is both condensed and brilliant. It emphasizes that same problem, that of weakening Prussia. Wells says:

"Socialism has no Foreign Policy; it knows nothing of Nationalism. It is human just as science is human, and can have no lesser boundaries. In Socialism as in Science the World State is implicit. But this war is no fight of nation against nation; it is a fight of the most diversified allies against the ambition of Prussia-led Germany to Germanise the world by force.

"This war, if it destroys Austria and does not destroy the mental and moral dominance of Prussia, will mean, not defeat, but victory for all that is evil in Germany and the world. There is no chance for Germany, for the noble, gentle, and splendid qualities that Prussia has obscured, while Prussia grips schools and universities, and all the organs of spiritual life."

If Austria and Prussia draw closer together than ever after the war, as seems probable, this remedy is evidently futile. And since these pro-war Socialists have no other cure for Prussian militarism, it would seem to be incurable by any *external* pressure.

In that case internal pressure will have to be relied upon. And this could be encouraged only by peace terms directed as far as possible against the Government and as favorable as possible to the people. This is a phase of the peace problem the British pro-war Socialists do not discuss.

Socialist Secession?

ETHER the Socialist Party must allow Socialists to vote for non-Socialist candidates when there are no Socialists in the field, or the California Party will secede—and will doubtless be followed by every state organization where there is a non-partisan primary. The State Executive Committee says:

"Under the laws of the State of California, our party, in order to have a candidate at any general election, must have received in the preceding primary election the highest or next to the highest number of votes cast for all candidates for a certain office."

This is the law that seems likely to be introduced in all progressive states. The California Committee describes its workings as follows:

"Owing to the extension of the non-partisan law, and the excessive filing fees, our comrades in the majority of the counties of the State were unable to put a ticket in the field, with the

consequent result that party members voted for other than Socialist candidates. This was general throughout the State.

As a result comrades in the various centers, acting upon the provisions of the national constitution, proceeded to prefer charges against such members. The locals were divided into warring groups, sometimes one and sometimes the other in the ascendancy. The condition was unusual. It was something that we had never been called upon to meet before."

The Committee has therefore recommended for referendum the following resolution threatening secession:

"That we recommend to the locals that, relative to the expulsion of members in all cases of offenses covered by said Section 3, Article X, they attempt to enforce only the provisions of the State constitution of the Socialist Party of California, until such time as the National constitution shall be amended so as to meet the situation, said provisions of our State constitution being as follows (Section 2, Article V):

"A member must be expelled or suspended for a period not exceeding three years for the following offenses:

"(a) For voting or supporting or aiding in the election of any candidate for any office, in either a primary, special or final election, in opposition to the regularly selected candidates of the Socialist Party.

"(b) For accepting the nomination or endorsement of any political party or organization, or by petition, other than that of the Socialist Party."

Apparently the referendum will pass. T. W. Williams, the State Secretary, is personally against voting for non-Socialists even when there are no Socialist candidates, but he thinks it unwise to make this a compulsory rule for party members:

"If the National Constitution is to be emphatically and rigidly enforced, then a great portion of the present membership in the State must be expelled. Are we ready for this? I venture that our most radical comrades will hesitate before saying 'Yes.'"

"Understanding the conditions of the party better, possibly, than any other man in the State, because of the close touch I have had with each local, I unhesitatingly affirm that our difficulty is organic. It is not sporadic or temporary. It is not superficial. It involves our party vitals. Tearing down the bars will not save us. Heresy trials will not avail. We must go deeper and farther back than this.

"Men do not become loyal through authority. Arbitrary discipline is ineffective. Coercive loyalty is a misnomer. True devotion is always voluntary."

Correspondence

A Withering Criticism of German Socialism

To the NEW REVIEW:

THE very serious Bohemian Socialist monthly "Akademie," published in Prague, in discussing intrepid attitude of Liebknecht, makes the following remarks about the German Social Democracy in the present crisis:

"The German Social Democracy was placed before a historic decision of world wide importance. Very seldom does history give the attitude of a party more significance. How the party decided is known. Those who expected it would arouse the masses against a declaration of war were disappointed. The German Social Democracy believes that it performed its duty in protesting against the war, and when war could not be prevented, in joining the general movement toward war in Germany. Whether or not its position may be compared with the situation of the French and Belgian Social Democracy, for instance, is in the International the subject of heated discussion, which can be decided only after the war.

"The German Social Democracy insists with extreme vehemence that her actions do not differ from those of Socialists of other warring states. In that sense the parliamentary faction explained its vote for the war budgets demanded by the German government: with the imminent terrors of a foreign invasion and the defense of German 'Kultur' and independence against Russian despotism. The declaration was insincere in so far as it masked the real spirit of the party with useless dialectics. The party has been for a long time in sympathy with the world aspirations of Germany and in its essence has ceased to be anti-militaristic. If it has joined the war movement in Germany, it has done so not to defend Germany, but to fight with Germany, in order to help it to victory and to maintain German hegemony in Europe, the loss of which a German Social Democrat fears as much as many another German citizen and as much as Bethman-Hollweg.

"When last year the matter of a war tax was debated in the German parliament, it was even then apparent what would be the attitude of the German Social Democracy in case of war. Under the incense of grand Marxian mottoes, expressed at various congresses, the whole being of the party

has changed. The theory has been different than the practice. Only a practical test was necessary to show this.

"Only by bearing these things in mind can we understand the independent attitude of Liebknecht. It seems to him that the spirit of the party is not the same as was the spirit fostered by the traditions of the pioneers of the German Social Democracy. His action was not the separation of an individual but a thoughtful demonstrative attempt to force a classification of minds in the party. How far he will succeed cannot now be determined. With Liebknecht are Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg. There is an endeavor to found a new Socialist party in Germany."

It must be remembered that Bohemian Socialists have had their experiences with German opportunism when they demanded autonomy for their movement within the Austrian labor organizations. They know therefore that German opportunism and desire to compromise is part and parcel of the same policy which in Austria especially has joined the German bourgeoisie in its attempts to Germanize the Bohemians and other Slavs and denied even elementary schools for 400,000 Bohemians in Vienna. This, by the way, is to matter that would deserve more attention than it has had in the past among American Socialists. The fact is that the vote for the war budgets is but one manifestation of a policy which for a long time has been dominant in the German Social Democracy, as well as its Austrian offshoot.

Cresco, Ia. CHARLES PERGLER.

Don't Fight!

To the NEW REVIEW:

It really seems a good time to pitch on the dump heap "class struggle and class consciousness", now that Socialism all over the world is surrendering to capitalism with barely a struggle.

By becoming "practical" and dropping fighting tactics altogether, in order to make our program more attractive, we shall achieve great results. Even as matters are now "it is among the middle class that the Socialist propaganda in America is making its best advance to day", and with a non-fighting program we could invite all of our capitalist friends to join us, they being "workers" like the rest of us.

And as there are few people who do not work at all we could have a big

party, with large contributions, high school officials and a splendid staff of professors to work out a new program, which would avoid a great many words, especially the word "Socialism", because it has a bad sound in the ears of any of our "workers".

Everybody admitting that there is a conflict of interests theoretically, between buyer and seller even on the market of labor, we can base our new party on this principle and embrace humanity, if we only avoid transforming this theoretical conflict into the reality of fighting which would mean the lining up of persons and not of principles or forces.

Propagating the new idea in Europe, we may expect that even the Kaiser won't object being an honorary president of the reorganized German party.

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
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