

"The idea becomes power when it penetrates the masses."  
—Karl Marx.

# SPECIAL MAGAZINE SUPPLEMENT THE DAILY WORKER

SECOND SECTION  
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## How One Should Not Write the History of October

(Comrade Trotzky's Book: "1917").  
(Review continued from last week.)

### II.

#### The Lessons of the Revolution of the Year 1917, and the Struggle Within the Party.

Shall silence be maintained regarding October and its prologue, the February revolution? Certainly not. That would show either a lack of conscientiousness or stupidity. But, quite in vain, Comrade Trotsky, with his hints and allusions as well as with open appeals, wishes to create the impression that the history of October is being dealt with in a "step-motherly" fashion, because in this respect some sort of mental reservations (a false, "half-conscious estimate") play a role. Such statements as: "Still more inadmissible . . . would it be to maintain silence, out of considerations of a personal character, which are of quite secondary importance, regarding extremely important problems of the October upheaval, which have international significance" (Page XII), are scarcely in place.

This statement is certainly correct.

But in the first place, Comrade Trotsky conceals the fact that no less has been written over October than over any other period. Lenin's writings contain a brilliant estimate of this period, from which the party will be able for a long time to draw all the essential teachings of October.

Secondly, Comrade Trotsky fails to mention that the persons in question have repeatedly admitted their errors as is well known to the whole party.

Comrade Zinoviev, in his "History of the Russian Communist Party" and in earlier publications, has spoken with all clearness regarding them, and has declared the same before the party and before the Communist International; Comrade Lenin also spoke concerning this, but at no time did he connect this error with the later, after October, activity of these comrades who took the wrong course in October.\*

Comrade Trotsky now seeks to make use of these errors in order to revise the whole party policy and to "correctly expound" the whole history of the party. Therein lies the kernel of the statements of Comrade Trotsky. The whole analysis of the events from April to October is so stated as if the differences of opinion, which "tore the party to pieces," had become more and more acute until they finally

\*It is necessary in this connection to refer to certain facts. In spite of differences of opinion, Kamenev, on the proposal of Lenin, was elected at the April conference to the central committee of the party, and in the moment of the insurrection, on behalf of the central committee, took the chair at the Second Soviet Congress. Already in November, 1917, Zinoviev, whose disagreements with the central committee only lasted a few days, on behalf of the central committee of the party delivered a report to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee advocating the dissolution of the constituent assembly. At the seventh party conference (beginning of March, 1918), Zinoviev, on behalf of the central committee, spoke for the Lenin policy against Trotsky and the "lefts." From this it is to be seen that the whole party regarded the October errors of these comrades as nothing else than a temporary difference of opinion. On the contrary they entrusted them with tasks of the greatest importance, in spite of the fact that they did not for a moment approve of the errors of these comrades.

broke out into a conflict which almost led to collapse, and that the revolution was only saved, thanks to the efforts of Comrade Lenin who had the courage to oppose the central committee and who was supported by Comrade Trotsky, who, so to speak, "anticipated" the fundamental idea of Lenin.

This analysis hardly contains anything which is in accordance with the facts.

In the first place, Comrade Trotsky totally ignores the party. It does not exist, its mood is not to be perceived, it has vanished. There stands only Comrade Trotsky, Lenin is visible in the distance, and we see a slow-witted, nameless central committee. The Petrograd organization, which was the real collective organizer of the workers' insurrection, is altogether absent. Comrade Trotsky's whole treatment of history revolves exclusively round

parliamentary fraction." (Page XXXVI.)

All this is extremely—"incorrect." For already at the time of the sixth party conference there had taken place a complete ideological consolidation of the party. The central committee elected at the sixth party congress stood unconditionally on the platform of the revolt. Lenin exercised an enormous influence upon the central committee, for Lenin himself was a leading member of the C. C. as is known to everybody. But to represent the matter as if the majority of the C. C. were, so to speak, almost against the revolt, means not to know either the party or the central committee, and means to sin against the truth. Was not the revolt decided upon on the 10th of October, with an overwhelming majority of the central committee? The tremendous energy, the

following picture: From April to October, there gradually disappear the remnants of vacillation in the party; in October they have been reduced to a minimum; the party is proceeding with firm ranks into the fight. Above there remain some comrades who are not in agreement with the general line of the party. But precisely because the party (that is no little thing, Comrade Trotsky) was united, precisely because the overwhelming majority of the C. C. went with Lenin, these comrades were also carried along by the general stream of the party and class, and immediately returned to their posts. They have been far more thoroughly "proved" than merely thru the October days.

### III.

#### War, Revolution and the Standpoint of Comrade Trotsky.

The "Chronicle" of Comrade Trotsky, as well as his annotations to the same, not only incorrectly describe the relations within the party, but also the preparation of the "Bolshevizing" of Comrade Trotsky himself. (We are solely interested here in his political attitude.) We learn from the annotations of Comrade Trotsky's book, for example, that in the articles written by L. D. Trotsky in America there was almost completely anticipated (!) the later political tactics of the revolutionary social-democrats. The fundamental conclusions of these articles agree in almost every detail (!) with the political perspectives, which Comrade Lenin developed in his famous "Letters from Abroad" (Page 370.)

We learn here that in the "course of time the differences of opinion between the standpoint of "Nashe Slovo" and Lenin became continually less. (Page 377.) On the other hand, we learn a whole number of details regarding the errors of the "Pravda" of a number of Bolsheviks, etc.

But after perusing the book we are little informed in what these differences of opinion, which grew continually less, consisted. And we are decidedly misled if we take it as correct that Comrade Trotsky had already anticipated the Leninist policy, as stated by that terrible-busy-body Comrade Lenzner, who was entrusted with the perusal of the book and with adding the notes. (Lenin did not know that he, according to Comrade Trotsky, had committed a plagiarism.) The question of the attitude during the war, however, gives the key to a number of other questions and leads us to the laboratory where the slogans were drawn up, which soon were to play such an extraordinary important, one might rightly say, world-historical role.


We will attempt to call to mind several things in this respect.

1. "Peace" or "civil war." This is the first difference of opinion, one which involves a considerable measure of principle, for precisely here is to be seen, who and how has anticipated the events, as well as the tactics, of the revolutionary social democracy. The slogan of the civil war which was issued by Lenin and the Bolshevik C. C. right at the beginning of the war was a specific Bolshevik slogan, a slogan, which drew a line of demarcation between true revolutionaries and, not only all shades of chauvinists, but also of the internationalists of a petty-bourgeois, pacifists, "humanitarian" color who sought to approach the centrist elements. Only by bluntly raising the question of civil war was there created the possibility to select the cadre

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\*"Our Word" at one time the organ of Trotsky.—Ed.

### WHEN BIG CROOKS SHAKE



"Cal" Coolidge, of Teapot Dome fame, meets the British premier, Baldwin, hero of the fake Zinoviev letter.

(By Denis in the Moscow Pravda.)

"the highest pinnacles" of the party structure. With regard to the whole party structure we look in vain in the artistically painted picture-puzzle of Comrade Trotsky: "Where is the party?" Is it permissible for Marxists to write history in such a manner? That is a caricature of Marxism. To write the history of October and to overlook the party means to stand with both feet on an individualistic standpoint, upon the standpoint of heroes and masses. Such a standpoint is not suitable for the education of the party membership. But also from the point of view of an analysis of the leading figures, the chronicle of Comrade Trotsky cannot be approved, for it distorts the facts. Let us see how Comrade Trotsky describes the course of events:

"The decisions of the April conference gave the party a correct attitude. The differences of opinion of the leaders of the party were not liquidated thereby. On the contrary.

"In the course of events they assumed a more concrete form, and they reached their acutest point at the most decisive moment of the revolution in the October days." (Page XXXI.)

After the July days:  
"The mobilizing of the right elements of the party increased. Their criticism became more determined." (Page XXXII.)

And finally before October:  
"An extraordinary party congress proved to be unnecessary. The pressure of Lenin secured the necessary turn to the left of the forces, both in the central committee and in the

truly enormous revolutionary passion, the ingenious analysis of events and the powerful magnetic power of Comrade Lenin gave a firm stamp to the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the C. C. Comrade Trotsky, however, wants at all costs to separate Lenin from the C. C., to oppose them to each other and to tear asunder the indivisible band, which in reality was not loosened for a moment. History must not be distorted in this manner. Were it not so, if that which Comrade Trotsky writes were correct, then it would be quite unintelligible, 1. why the party was not split by the conflict; 2. how it was able to triumph; 3. how the conflict (the resignation of some leading members of the C. C.) could be liquidated within a few days by the return of these comrades to their posts. This "miracle" (a miracle from the standpoint of the assumptions of Comrade Trotsky) as is known, was accomplished, and without much difficulty. It is true that one can hint here that after the victory there are many who are prepared to join the victors, as one does "sit in judgment" against victors.

But it must not be forgotten that the victory in Petrograd and in Moscow was merely the beginning of the struggle, the beginning of enormous difficulties, which was perfectly clear to every party member. These considerations do not help in any way to explain what is to be explained.

All this, however, becomes perfectly understandable if we do not consider the events from such an egocentric point of view as does Comrade Trotsky. In this case we get the fol-

# Lore and the Comintern

By Moissaye J. Olgin

## Third Article.

Comrade Lore and the October Events in Germany.—Comrade Lore and MacDonald.—Comrade Lore and the Communist International.

As early as May 15, 1921, the "Volkszeitung" expressed its opinion on the advisability of aggressive revolutionary action in times of a receding revolutionary wave in the following form:

"What happened in Italy after Livorno is known to us. The new Communist Party immediately began an aggressive offensive policy . . . and it accomplished by it that the fascist organization, previously insignificant, met the offensive with still sharper attacks and so drove the Communists from an offensive to a defensive position. . . Not the red, but the white terror now reigns in Italy."

These remarks may serve as a key note to Comrade Lore's attitude towards revolutionary action. Comrade Lore was averse to revolutionary battles of the working class, proceeding from a general assumption that Europe was not ripe for revolution. Comrade Lore considered appeals to revolutionary battles untimely and therefore, disastrous to the working class.

His attitude towards the October events in Germany is a point in case. It is now conceded even by the right wing of the German Communists that the situation in Germany in October, 1923, offered unusual revolutionary possibilities, that the bourgeoisie was in a state of confusion, that its power was weakened, and that the working class was only waiting for leadership to storm the mainstays of capitalism in Germany. It was lack of activity on the part of the central committee of the Communist Party of Germany, and it was an opportunist notion concerning the united front with the Saxony social-democrats in the government of Saxony that turned the October events into a defeat of the working class. This policy of inactivity was subsequently repudiated by the German rank and file Communists who at the Frankfurt convention (March, 1924) elected a left wing central committee, and also by the fifth congress of the Communist International. It is significant, however, that Comrade Lore, without directly communicating with the German Communists, maintained in New York the idea that the Communist Party of Germany should not lead the German workers into decisive battles, should, on the contrary, restrain the workers from spontaneous outbursts and revolts.

In an editorial entitled "Hunger, not Communism," in the "Volkszeitung" of Oct. 25, 1923, he expresses the idea that revolts in Germany are a result of hunger and not of a revolutionary plan conceived by the Communist Party, because, in his opinion, there are no objective possibilities of a revolution in Germany. The revolt in Hamburg, Bremen and other German cities he considered to be hunger riots which should be kept within limits. "The Communist movement works" he writes, "in Germany as elsewhere, for the social revolution. But it does not conduct a policy of adventurism. It chooses the most favorable time for its aim of social overthrow in order to be able to deal capitalist society the decisive blow. This is particularly true about the German Communist Party at present. It is hunger that drives the masses to despair. It is the intolerable misery which drives the masses into the streets, which compels them to plunder shops and warehouses full of foodstuffs and commodities of every kind. And when the natural impulse, the wish to live and not to starve, finally moves them to actions which, while certainly not bringing a liberation from under the capitalist yoke, still bring a momentary relief from the hunger, then it is only a self-understood duty of the Commun-

ists to put themselves in the ranks of the rebels, to aid them with advice and action, and to take the best care that the greatest possible advantage be gained with the least number of sacrifices. . . . The German Communists do not cause hunger revolts but they do not leave the hungry ones who are driven to despair in the hour of their greatest misery. At the same time, however, the Communists do not wish a revolution in Germany—because at present everything speaks against the possibility of a success of a proletarian revolutionary upheaval. They therefore concentrated their struggle against the fascist and monarchists, against the "constitutional" dictatorship and for securing the republic and supporting it thru a workingmen's government in the union and thru workingmen's governments in the individual states . . . The Communist Party of Germany is placed before immensely difficult tasks. It must keep the revolutionary fire alive, it must not, however, allow the flames to shoot too high. It must take account of the despair of the pauperized German working masses, it must, however, only educate for struggle those who are ready for struggle, knowing that the struggle will be fought out only when victory is possible." (Blackface mine.—M. J. O.)

Comrade Lore certainly was not in favor of a revolution in Germany when the time was ripe for such revolution. The fifth congress of the Communist International branded such attitude as opportunism.

Even after the October defeat, when its disastrous consequences were manifest to every observer, Comrade Lore defended the German Communists on the ground that they did not want a revolution. Commenting on the suppression of the German Communist Party, Lore writes in an editorial November 24, 1923:

"Even the German government authorities know that it was the German Communist Party which hitherto held the masses back; that it was the Communists who warned the despairing and pauperized masses against actions of despair, against useless sacrifices. They know that if it were not for the strong Communist movement in Germany, a guerrilla warfare would have long broken out in Germany."

Comrade Lore praises the German Communists for preventing guerrilla warfare against capitalism in Germany. Comrade Lore sees in this a particular merit of the German comrades.

Viewing the revolutionary movement in Germany from such angle, it was natural for Comrade Lore to maintain that the Russian comrades were also against decisive revolutionary action on the part of the German workers in October, 1923. In an editorial entitled "Russia and Germany," published in the "Volkszeitung" Oct. 26, 1923, Comrade Lore writes:

"What those bourgeois and socialist-reformist elements fail to understand, or claim to misunderstand, is that it is the Russian conception that the proletarian revolution in Germany should not be overestimated either from without or by the Communist Party. The proletarian masses must be spiritually prepared for it. They must know their aim before the real struggle begins. They must not again, as was the case in former years, step on the battlefield aimlessly and un-equipped."

Comrade Lore attributes to the Russian comrades his own aversion to a decisive revolutionary upheaval. On the other hand, he is most favorably inclined towards the left social-democrats, particularly towards the coalition government in Saxony. Commenting on the declaration in the Saxon parliament by the social-democratic prime minister Zeigner, a very mild and non-revolutionary declaration, Comrade Lore writes in the "Volkszeitung" of Nov. 14, 1923:

"Dr. Zeigner's declaration in the People's Parliament of Saxony which served to introduce the socialist-communist era, deserves a place of honor in the rank of revolutionary mani-

festations."

Comrade Lore seemed to believe in the constructive possibilities of a combined socialist-Communist government. This belief in parliamentary possibilities was even more pronounced in his attitude towards the labor government of Great Britain. Generally speaking, Comrade Lore maintained a benevolent neutrality towards MacDonald, considering his government an "interesting experiment," praising it for what Comrade Lore considered good actions, mildly criticising it for its hesitation, and spreading the illusion that the government of the Second International had a genuine wish to serve the interests of the working class but that it was thwarted by the opposition of the liberals who held the balance of power between the conservatives and laborites. In an editorial of January 24, Comrade Lore writes:

"We do not believe it necessary to emphasize at this point that every labor party and labor paper meets the new British government with great sympathy, even, when, as is the case with Communist parties and papers, they are from the very beginning of the conviction that we have to deal here with nothing but an experiment which in addition is being undertaken with entirely insufficient and unfitted means."

Having thus outlined his attitude of "great sympathy" towards the MacDonald government, Comrade Lore proceeds to find favorable indications in the first steps of the new government. Commenting on the release of Ghandi, who was freed by the new government after signing a declaration of renouncing the struggle, Comrade Lore writes:

"Here also the British prime minister conducts a policy which would like to sneak between two extremes without offending either. In this, however, the prime minister, who surely means well, will not succeed. It is not only a question of freeing a couple of political prisoners or to warn against excesses. The British labor party government will have to decide to declare itself either for or against the British imperialist policy . . . We know very well that the labor party government can not help but follow in the imperialist paths trodden by Lloyd George, Asquith, Baldwin, etc., otherwise the liberals will immediately tighten the noose whose end they hold in their hands. This being the case, the labor party men in the government should at least keep their mouths shut on such questions, as long as they insist on exercising a power which is based on the good or bad will of the capitalist politicians."

This rather pessimistic remark seemed to indicate that Comrade Lore had its doubts as to the possibilities of a radical course of the so-called labor government. However, subsequent articles showed that Comrade Lore was rather inclined to praise the activities of the new government. Commenting on MacDonald's discussion of foreign problems with invited press correspondents, Comrade Lore, in an editorial of Feb. 16, 1924, put what he calls "the open diplomacy" methods of MacDonald on the same level as the methods of the Soviet Republic. The article says in part:

"Soviet Russia had to conquer the confidence of the labor world and thus put the possible capitalist peace breakers in the wrong before the rest of the world. It is therefore that Tchicherin published all notes sent by him to the powers and all diplomatic papers, and it is therefore that it was impossible for the political clowns in high public and state positions to spread suspicion against the foreign policy of the Soviet Republic. Just the same is at present being aspired to by MacDonald. We do not put too great hopes on the success of MacDonald's foreign policy, altho MacDonald does not lack perspective and clarity of aims. He cannot achieve anything complete because the liberals only wait for an occasion to drive into the back of the labor party government the knife they have been holding in readiness for a long while.

Nevertheless, it will be impossible for the British government's policy under this administration to be anything else but the first attempt at reconciliation of the nations, at the greatest possible avoidance of war, at the sharpest fight against national hatreds."

But Comrade Lore saw a bright view not only in the field of the foreign policy. He believed the so-called labor government was opening a new era also in domestic policies. Commenting on the impending strikes in England, Comrade Lore says in an editorial of Feb. 20, 1924:

"Under the 'liberal' coalition of Lloyd George and under the recent conservative government, the strikes of the British workers for the most part ended in bitter defeats. This is easily explained by the fact that the representatives of the interests of large capitalists in the government caused all means at the disposal of the capitalist state without exception to be arrayed against the strikers. . . . This, however, is impossible under a labor government. MacDonald will not and cannot mobilize either the police or the soldiers or even the courts in favor of the employers. Just as little will his departments be able to utilize the unemployment doles as a weapon against the strikers and for the recruiting of scabs. It is therefore that the most favorable opportunity conceivable is now offered to the British workers for the conduct of their struggles against capitalism."

If this is not spreading parliamentary illusions, what is it?

Comrade Lore's conception of the history and the role of the Communist International was most clearly revealed in his article published March 5, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the Communist International. After reviewing the history of the Communist International, Comrade Lore proceeds to say:

"For the first time in the history of the labor movement we see a revolutionary organization at work, an organization knowing only one aim and constantly accentuating this aim before the entire world—the overthrow of the capitalist order of society, the construction of Communist society by means of the proletarian dictatorship; an organization which—and this differentiates it from similar organizations of previous times—uses all means capable of bringing it closer to its aim, not even stopping to ask whether it has not repudiated or even condemned the same means a day before. The Third International changes its tactics, nay, even its methods, every day, and if need be, even oftener. Heedlessly it strides over its own guiding principles, squashes these accepted yesterday and adapts itself in every country to new situation which may offer itself. The Communist International is, therefore, opportunistic in its methods to the extreme point, but since it keeps in its mind the one and only revolutionary aim, the reformist method works for the revolution and thus loses its opportunistic character."

If this characterization sounds more like a disguised mockery than like an appreciation of the work of the Communist International, the following paragraph is an open condemnation of all past history of the Communist International. The paragraph reads:

"The Third International has in the five years of its existence gone thru many an infantile sickness. It has swung itself up from the strictest rejection of parliamentarism to its utilization—always revealing the impotence of parliamentarism. It repudiated the creation of dual labor unions, altho at the beginning it preached the splitting of labor unions. It freed itself from the utopian conception that a small minority in each country, conscious of its purpose, could 'make' a revolution, and it taught that a majority of the proletariat must at least have a sym-

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# The Discussion on Party Tasks

## BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE GERMAN SECTION OF THE WORKERS PARTY

By ALEXANDER BITTELMAN  
(A report to the C. E. C. of the W. P. on the Convention of the German Section)

THE GERMAN SECTION of the party was the first of our language sections to hold a national convention since the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. It was, therefore, at this convention that the central executive committee of our party had its first opportunity to present its new thesis on the immediate tasks of the party and its program for the Bolshevization of the Workers Party. This convention was in many respects a test for the German section of our party, of its readiness and willingness to admit past mistakes as pointed out by the Comintern and by the central executive committee of our party, and to bring itself more closely in accord with the fundamental principles of Leninism. As will be seen from this report, the German section, thru its national convention, manifested a sincere desire and determination to break loose from old prejudices and to come into closer contact with the party as a whole and with the Communist International.

### Report of Bureau Lacks Aggressiveness.

It must be stated from the very beginning that most of our leading German comrades are working under a kind of psychological depression which makes them see things in a much darker light than they really are, and which paralyzes to a certain degree their initiative and aggressiveness. This spirit of depression was particularly noticeable in the report to the convention on the activities of the German bureau submitted by Comrade Lore as the secretary of the section. There was nothing wrong with the main facts of his report. His analysis of the situation among the German speaking workers of the United States was substantially correct. No one in the convention, not even the opposition minority, challenged the facts and the analysis of the report. The thing that was wrong with the report was its general spirit of hopelessness and pessimism. There was no sign of any attempt at all to devise political and organizational means for shaking up the German-speaking workers of this country and setting them in motion for the class struggle.

It was natural to expect that if there was any real minority opposition present in the convention it will direct its special criticism against this negative, passive, and fatalistic feature of the report of the bureau. This, however, was not done by the minority. It fell to the task of the representative of the C. E. C. to direct the attention of the convention to these objectionable features of the report, and to point out the error of such fatalistic attitude towards objective conditions. It is my opinion that if there is any single lesson that must be driven home to the leading comrades in the German section it is this; that it is the duty of Communists not only to study conditions but also to change them. More faith in the creative abilities of a Communist Party to hasten developments and to change situations is one of the things the German section of our party really needs.

Generally speaking the report of the bureau shows slow but continual progress of Communist activities among German-speaking workers. The membership is still very small, only about 600. The internal political life of the section is not as intensive as is desirable and necessary. But in spite of these drawbacks our German section took an active part during the period covered by the report in every important political activity of the party, such as our united front campaigns for the Michigan Defense, protection of the foreign-born, the farmer-

labor party, our election campaign, etc.

To the great credit of our German section must be placed the fact that Communist influence in the fraternal organizations of the German-speaking workers has made great progress. Within the last few months our German section and the Volkszeitung have carried on a successful campaign for leadership in the Krankenkassen, which resulted in considerable victories for our comrades and sympathizers. The situation in the Krankenkassen, thanks to these victories, is now such as will enable our German section to still further develop its influence and to win the masses of these organizations for the class struggle and for our party.

Criticisms were made at the convention by the minority opposition against the methods used by our German section in winning influence over fraternal organizations. The charge was made that the methods used were more of the nature of "tricks" than of open Communist propaganda. The opposition, however, failed to submit a single constructive idea as to the other means and methods that should have been employed in this campaign. The spokesmen for the bureau quite properly pointed out that the victories secured in the Krankenkassen are based mainly on the confidence won by our party members in these organizations, that this confidence was secured on the basis of capable leadership in these organizations, and that the "tricks" referred to by one of the delegates of the opposition were nothing more than the organization of the Communist forces for the winning over of the rank and file towards our leadership and point of view.

The general impression that was left by the report and by the debate on the report was that the German section really needs more fresh blood, healthy Communist optimism, and more aggressiveness in its daily work. A strong and militant left wing in the section could have done the job, but such a left wing must yet be born. It is not now in existence. The opposition at the convention, led by Comrade Bedacht, which in reality is principally an opposition to the C. E. C., is obviously incapable of carrying out this constructive task.

### Convention Pledges Support to C. I. and C. E. C.

The report of the central executive committee on past activities was accepted by the entire convention with the exception of four delegates from the opposition. The convention adopted a resolution pledging itself to carry out loyally the decisions of the C. I. and the party, and to make of the German section a real Bolshevik section of our party. (The report of the C. E. C. representative was published in full in the Volkszeitung and the DAILY WORKER.)

There was quite an extensive debate on the future policies of the party in which three points of view were presented. One was the point of view of the C. E. C. as expressed in its thesis on the immediate tasks of the party. The second point of view was represented by Comrade Bedacht in accord with the thesis of the minority. The third point of view was presented by Comrade Lore. Comrade Lore takes the position that a farmer-labor party will prove an inevitable phase in the development of the American labor movement. He believes the same as the minority that without a farmer-labor party it will be impossible to develop the independent political activities of the working masses of America. He differs with the minority, however, that he does not believe the present situation to be ripe for an intensive campaign under the slogan for a class farmer-labor party, and therefore favors retaining the slogan

in the program of the party for future use.

There is no need here to discuss in detail this question. The convention in adopting the report of the C. E. C. referred these three points of view to the German-speaking branches for thorough discussion. What deserves special attention in this report is the discussion of that section of the report of the C. E. C. which dealt with the necessity of combatting the remnants of the ideology of the 2½ International in our party. In that section Comrade Lore was referred to and criticized, and an appeal made to the German section to discard this ideology and to accept more completely the position of the Communist International.

The party will undoubtedly be gratified to learn that the criticism of the C. I. and of the C. E. C. of the W. P., directed against the ideology of the 2½ International as expressed in numerous articles in the Volkszeitung—that the efforts spent in this criticism were not in vain. Comrade Lore himself, as well as many of the comrades inclined to his point of view, are already admitting their mistakes. At the convention, discussing the report of the C. E. C. Comrade Lore specifically stated that his views of Levy, Serrati, and the nature of the labor government in England were wrong, and that the Communist International was right. The W. P. may very well be proud of the fact that it succeeded in bringing Comrade Lore more closely to the party as a whole and to the C. I.

However, it must be pointed out that the remnants of the ideology of the 2½ International, altho considerably weakened, still prevails to a lesser degree than before in certain sections of our party, and it will be the duty of the C. E. C. to continue its ideological campaign against these tendencies until they are completely liquidated. It must also be said that Comrade Lore failed to satisfy the party as to his views on one very important point, namely, his attitude towards the minority opposition in the Russian Party. Comrade Lore simply didn't mention this point, which is a very regrettable omission. It would seem to indicate that Comrade Lore is not sure of his position on this problem, and that he hasn't yet made up his mind as to where the correct position is. It must be understood, however, that our party is entitled to know where its leading members stand in this matter. So far as the party as a whole and its central executive committee are concerned, we are definitely in agreement with the Russian Communist Party and are determined to uphold the hand of the old Bolshevik guard in leading the working class of Russia and the Communist International to final victory.

In speaking on party discipline, which was part of the C. E. C.'s report on Bolshevizing the party, Comrade Lore and other comrades claimed to be fully in agreement with the C. E. C. But these comrades expressed a faulty view of discipline. For instance, Comrade Lore maintained that there may arise situations where Communist duty would demand not submission to party discipline but the violation of this discipline. He referred to Karl Liebknecht who, because of submitting to party discipline, unwillingly committed the crime of voting for military credits in the German Reichstag on Aug. 4.

This reference to Karl Liebknecht submitting to the discipline of social-patriots and betrayers as well as the general argument of Comrade Lore on this point, indicates that Comrade Lore has still a way to travel to a correct understanding of Communist discipline. The reporter of the C. E. C. pointed out to Comrade Lore at the convention that when a member of a Communist Party begins to feel that submission to party discipline is equivalent to betrayal of the working class (as was the case with Liebknecht in the Social Demo-

cratic Party) then it is time for this comrade not only to break the discipline of the party but to quit altogether.

Comrade Lore also raised his voice in favor of more democracy in our party. He failed to explain exactly what he meant. The representative of the C. E. C. pointed out to the convention that the Workers Party is built on the principle of democratic centralization which is the basic organization form of the Communist International. Also, that within the last ten months our party had plenty of opportunity to express itself on the major activities of our party. And that, our party now, if it is suffering at all, is not from lack of discussion but rather from an excess of it.

The convention accepted the resolution submitted by the representative of the C. E. C. which pledges the German section to the carrying out of the party policies all along the line. Specifically this resolution pledges the German section to Bolshevize the organization, to take all necessary measures to establish the complete party control over the German organ of the party, and to prepare the ground for the reorganization of the party on the shop nuclei basis. The resolution which was published in the party press definitely binds the German section of the party to break loose from every remnant of the ideology of the 2½ International and to follow loyally the leadership of the Communist International.

### Improvement in Organization

Upon the recommendations of the organization committee elected by the convention, the convention adopted a set of organization measures which will undoubtedly make the German bureau and the German speaking branches a more effective instrument for Communist propaganda. There were no material differences of opinion on the score of organization. The convention decided that the new bureau be organized on the basis of departmentalization with responsible head in charge of each department. It was also decided to devote more attention to organization work in those localities (such as Massachusetts) where there are large numbers of German-speaking workers that have recently arrived in the United States.

The convention elected a national bureau of nine members, consisting of Lore, Schuller, Wolf, Zander, Berg, Winter, Wendrich, Sanger and Le-man. Altho represented at the convention by only four delegates out of a total of 19 the minority opposition was given three seats on the bureau, chiefly because of the efforts of the representative of the C. E. C.

### Conclusion.

The result of this convention of our German section has been to bring the German-speaking membership of our party more closely to the party as a whole ideologically and organizationally. The prestige of the Communist International and of the central executive committee is now considerably higher than it has ever been in our German section. It can be safely stated that a continuation of the intelligent effort now made in our ideological struggle against what still remains of the ideology of the 2½ International will completely eliminate this tendency from our ranks and make the German section of our party a real Bolshevik organization.

(Discussion Continued on next page.)

## HELP! HELP! Give Us a Hand—

We are swamped again. There is just a load of work piling up in our office and our small force is struggling hard to get it done. If any comrades have a day, an hour or a minute to spare, COME ON OVER—GIVE US A HAND!

# The Discussion on Party Tasks

## THE WORKERS PARTY IS BECOMING REALISTIC

By MIKE ROSS.

STRIPPED of all hair splitting technicalities, misinterpretations and irrelevant matter the discussion within our party simmers down to the following main difference.

1. The majority of the C. E. C. wants to throw the whole farmer-labor party policy overboard because it is a dead issue for the present and near future as it was swallowed by the LaFollette movement, but specify that if it should get into life again our policy will be changed accordingly.

2. The minority claims that since the majority admit that it was a live issue formerly, the setback given it by the LaFollette movement can only be of a temporary nature and the policy is now as important as ever.

Most of the leaders on both sides will admit that a united political front does not only consist in a farmer-labor party, both sides did admit that if a mass movement for a class farmer-labor party does exist, that it would be our duty to fight with it on a united political front.

They also know that it is not absolutely necessary for our country to go thru a labor party period. It would therefore, be folly for us to organize it. We would only be kidding ourselves. It is only when it assumes the proportions of a mass movement that we can enter it in order to win the masses for Communism.

The difference therefore is not on a real principle, but rather on the advisability of the application of that principle at the present time.

To answer this would require a study of the thoughts, opinions and psychology of the masses within the unions.

Unfortunately we have no real data to answer this. The only way we could arrive at reliable results is by getting the opinions of all comrades that are active in the trade unions.

If this were done, I feel sure that the overwhelming majority would answer that there is no mass movement for a class farmer-labor party. That part of it which does exist was created and is largely controlled by our comrades and could be induced to support the Workers Party. That a very big percentage of what we understood to be a mass sentiment for a class farmer-labor party was simply a movement for LaFollette and the percentage that does stand for a class farmer-labor party and is beyond our control is so small that it is ridiculous to make an issue out of it.

It is argued that since the majority admit in their thesis that a mass movement for a class farmer-labor party did exist, how is it that it suddenly disappeared? History shows that mass movements based on economic class interests do not vanish as if by magic neither could they be swallowed by LaFollette.

If such a thing does happen it could only be of short duration.

If this really was the case, then it must be admitted that the minority of the C. E. C. has the best of the argument and are correct in their views.

The fact is that there never was a mass movement for a class farmer-labor party as distinct from a LaFollette party. The figures and facts brought to light during the discussion definitely prove this, and if this isn't sufficient, surely the results of this mass movement ought to convince anybody.

This fictitious "class" movement became fully developed in the mind of our once great theocrat John Pepper. It assumed gigantic proportions.

Every little incident was magnified and exaggerated until it became indisputable. This false or mistaken information was spread among the membership.

The party finally accepted the farmer-labor policy and when this movement went into the place where it belonged, namely in the LaFollette movement, it was only natural for our leaders to take the next step and advocate entering into the third party movement in order to win the masses away from LaFollette. Luckily the Communist International put an end to this opportunism.

It is peculiar that both factions of the present C. E. C. agreed to the above tactics and their difference now is that the minority still sticks to these illusions while the majority is beginning to walk on solid ground.

The majority, however, is hampered because it still clings to its former illusions thru apologies of former actions and by doing so they are working directly into the hands of Ruthenberg and Lovestone.

It will be asked why does not the majority admit that it was a mistake from the very beginning?

Well, not everybody could be a Lenin and admit before the whole world their mistakes.

Despite these short comings it is the duty of every Communist to get down to reality and support the majority of the C. E. C.

## THE MINORITY THESIS LEADS TO OPPORTUNISM

By HANS JOHNSON.

THE minority in their thesis and in all the articles supporting the minority thesis have exposed themselves as the real right wing of our party. Not only as a slight deviation to the right, but real right wing opportunism. In principle they are more the real farmer-laborites, farmer-labor parliamentarians, than Communists. They maintain that the majority of the central executive committee have discarded the united front on the political field, by ditching the slogan, "For a Farmer-Labor Party," under the present condition. By this they only prove that they do not understand the fundamental principles of the united front, and less do they understand the effective application of our united front slogans in their various forms. To the minority—so it seems—the united front politically cannot be carried on unless we use the slogan, "For a 'Class' Farmer-Labor Party." They do not take into consideration, that at the present time that slogan is less effective to bring about the political consciousness of the MASSES than any of our other slogans that can be based on the immediate needs of the workers in their

everyday struggles against the capitalist class.

To the minority the creation of a farmer-labor party, a "class mass" farmer-labor party, or what they choose to call it, has become an end in itself. A party based on parliamentarian reformism. They go on to say that, if there is no such a party it is the duty of the Communists to help in bringing about the birth of such a party, and Comrade Ruthenberg in several of his articles has the nerve to state that such a party will fight the CLASS STRUGGLE of the workers and poor farmers of this country. Who ever heard of such nonsense, from a Communist, an executive secretary of a section of the Communist International? What role is the Workers (Communist) Party to play, if a farmer-labor party is going to fight the class struggle of the workers and poor farmers of this country? There can be no other CLASS PARTY in America outside of the Workers (Communist) Party. That ought to be clear to every Communist.

And it is not the duty of the Communists to create such parties where none exist. The slogan for a farmer-labor party can only be used

for propaganda purposes, and only where there is a wide move towards such a party on the part of the MASSES, etc.—the industrial workers and poor farmers—and not where only a few so-called labor leaders are crying for it. If there were a wide movement in existence towards a farmer-labor party on the part of the masses of industrial workers and poor farmers, then it would be the duty of the Communists to assist in driving that movement to the left, before and after it crystallizes itself into an organizational form. But, when there is no movement on the part of the masses towards such a party, distinct from the LaFollette movement on the one hand and the Workers (Communist) Party on the other, then, indeed, it is time to discard that stale slogan, for a "Farmer-Labor Party," and come to realities. To push that slogan at the present time in an attempt mechanically to create another party outside of the Workers Party is pure nonsense. To quote Comrade Dunne, the attempt "is the inevitable outcome of an opportunist policy springing from a wrong tendency in the united front tactic." How true this is, cannot be overemphasized.

What's the matter with you, minority comrades? Have you lost faith in the Workers (Communist) Party? You maintain that by using the slogan, "For a Farmer-Labor Party," it will be possible for the Workers Party to

drive a wedge into the LaFollette third party movement, and break away from it the most militant and leftist industrial workers and poor farmers. If that is possible under the slogan, "For a Farmer-Labor Party," then what prevents it under the slogan, "The Workers (Communist) Party vs. the LaFollette Third (Bourgeois) Party"? Why give the farmer-labor sugar coating to those militant leftist industrial workers and poor farmers you speak about, if you have not entirely lost faith in the ability of the Workers (Communist) Party to take the direct lead of such left workers and poor farmers by bringing them directly into the Workers Party instead of some half-way party with a reformist program at its best?

The movement towards a farmer-labor party distinct from the LaFollette third party movement which the minority comrades maintain is still here, exists only in the metaphysical minds of Comrades Lovestone and Ruthenberg. Their innermost desire to create a "mass farmer-labor party" is directly responsible for their erroneous policy, which tends to lead our party into channels of opportunism. The movement they speak of is dead and every wideawake rank and filer is aware of that fact.

The rank and file of our party will accept the policy of the central executive committee as outlined in the majority thesis.

## A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC AFFAIR

By MAX BEDACHT.

A deep mystery was solved for me the other day. For a long time I was wondering why the central executive committee majority insisted on combatting not what the minority says or does, but what the majority would like them to say or do. But now I know. Comrade Bittelman enlightened me. And I thank him for it. In his recent article Comrade Bittelman said that the minority (albeit lacking in Communist principles and understanding) do not lack in ability to hide their shortcomings. Altho, as Bittelman says, the minority are opportunists, yet they are careful and successful in hiding that fact when they write or speak.

I have a vision. I see before me the capitalist prosecutor of Karl Liebknecht in the German supreme court at Leipzig. He has before the court as evidence a book written by Karl. The prosecutor reads from this book: "The period of army mobilization is the least opportune time for a proletarian rebellion." He asks Liebknecht: "Is it not a fact that you wanted to write the most opportune time?" Liebknecht answers in the negative. But the prosecutor insists that this is a typographical error and maintains that Liebknecht must be sent to the penitentiary. Since he was a capitalist prosecutor and pleaded before a capitalist court he got his way. Liebknecht was sent to the penitentiary for eighteen months not for what he wrote, but for what the prosecutor wanted him to have written.

I would advise Bittelman to apply for a job as prosecutor. He shows admirable qualities for such a position.

We, the minority of the C. E. C., are in a more fortunate position than the majority. Our criticism can be based on facts. When we charge the C. E. C. majority with opportunism we can accompany the accusation with conclusive proof.

The Communist International has instructed the C. E. C. of our party to carry on an ideological struggle against the tendencies expressed and led by Lore. How has the C. E. C. of our party carried out this instruction? In later articles I will have to say more about this. Today I will merely give a little incident to show the nature of the ideological campaign carried on by the C. E. C. majority against Lore and Loreism.

The place is the convention of the German language federation of the Workers (Communist) Party.

The time is November 30, 1924.

Bittelman speaking: "It is one of the greatest events in the history of our party, and, I can safely say of the Comintern, when a comrade like Lore admits his mistakes."

Bittelman is personified "logic." When he says that Lore is a good Communist now, he immediately follows it up with logical action. He moves in the C. E. C., first.

That the opposition in the German federation led by Bedacht is unfit to carry out the desires of the Comintern and our party, and, second,

That the federation bureau, elected at the convention and overwhelmingly controlled by Lore be approved—thus declaring that while Bedacht cannot be trusted with carrying out Comintern decisions Lore can.

What are the facts behind this farce over which we cannot even laugh because of the serious consequences it will and must have for our party?

Lore "admitted" that he made a mistake in his stand in the Levy matter. He said that while Levy was correct in his judgment of the situation, his method of criticism was criminal.

What does that mean to any one but to the representative of the majority, Comrade Bittelman? It means that Lore was right when he said that the March action in 1921 in Germany was a putsch, engineered by some Mullah from Chiwa (meaning a representative of the Comintern), and carried out by the Communist Party of Germany as a conspiracy, and not as a revolutionary mass action of the German proletariat. That is what Lore wrote at the time of the March action and the Levy incident. That is what Lore thinks today and even openly admits. Yet, the C. E. C. (majority) representative proudly declares that the admission of Lore that he had made a mistake in the matter is one of the greatest moments in the life of the Communist International.

Lore declared further at this convention that he had made a mistake in judging the English labor government. He, according to his own words, overestimated the class consciousness of the English socialists. Bittelman is enraptured by this declaration and in ecstasy he cries out: "Oh, what a wonderful moment in my life and that of my party!" Will any Communist please inform the Leninist-Marxian (pardon the generosity) Bittelman and his C. E. C. majority friends what Lore's declaration really meant? Will anyone show to Lore and Bittelman that the difference be-

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# The Discussion on Party Tasks

## A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC AFFAIR

(Continued from Page 4.)

tween the socialist and the Communist is not merely a degree of class consciousness; that the Communist is working class conscious, while the socialist is bourgeois class conscious. Lore's declaration in the matter was not an excuse but an admission of guilt, an admission that he is not a Communist. But Bittelman says: "Never mind, Lore is worthy to carry out the Comintern policies."

**Social Democrat Calls Bedacht "Moscow Agent."**

But aside from these "excuses" of Lore, there was the atmosphere of the whole convention. Before the eyes and ears of the convention a spectator, a member of the party, one Dr. Aronson, demanded to know from Bedacht what he gets "paid from Moscow." While I consider it an honor to be accused of being an agent of Moscow in that convention, an honor that might not be appreciated by Lore, still, the treacherous tendencies of the man making the accusation is obvious. The convention did not rise as one man to protest but calmly continued in its rut. When asked by Bedacht whether he was sent by Abe Cahan to ask this question, Dr. Aronson, a very close friend of Lore, answered with more truth than poetry, that he was a social-democrat for fifty years.

The only excuse that the representative of the C. E. C. majority at this convention, Bittelman, can now bring forward for the convention permitting to go unchallenged, the behavior of Dr. Aronson is, that Bedacht did not appeal to the convention for redress. I ask any comrade with common sense and with Communist spirit why I should bring to the attention of the convention a crime to which the whole convention was witness.

Every criticism of the Communist International was greeted with applause in this convention. Lore, when justifying his attacks on Zinoviev, by declaring that the president of the Comintern cannot claim the infallibility of a pope, was acclaimed with enthusiasm.

### Lore's Communism.

Lore's interpretation of Leninism and Bolshevism as less discipline and more democracy carried the convention with him. Almost every manifestation of the convention was a justification for the judgment that it was not a Communist but a social-democratic convention.

But the representative of the C. E. C. majority, in full agreement with the policy of that body toward Lore during the whole past year, stands serenely before the convention and before the whole party and declares:

"Lore had recanted. He is now worthy of our confidence. He surely can be trusted with the task of carrying out the policies of the C. I., a task that Bedacht cannot be entrusted with."

Lore has reformed!

Yes—he shows his reformed soul in all its beauty, in an editorial published in the New York Volkszeitung of December 12. Speaking about the attacks of the Herriot government against the French Communist Party he says that the French Communists prove that "their ostensible intentions of overthrowing the government would not serve the interests of 'Moscow' which is supposed to be directing them." If the Soviet government, as is constantly being contended by the capitalist press, is placing great hopes in obtaining a loan from the Herriot government, it would naturally do nothing to nip these hopes in the bud, especially as the French Communist movement is not yet strong enough to make an insurrectionary movement at the present time appear hopeful.

There you have it. From the Berlin international of Rocker to the Washington international of Hughes-Coolidge, the Soviet government has always been accused that the C. I. is nothing but its agent; and that the C. I.'s actions are directed by the commissariat of foreign affairs of the U. S. S. R.

Here is a member of the central executive committee of the American section of the Communist International openly adopting and applying this same argument to disprove any insurrectionary intentions of the Communist Party of France.

Of course, the majority of our C. E. C. will find that perfectly in order—because Lore has reformed!

But the halo of the reformed sinner and new saint, Lore, reflects sufficient light to bring out into relief the "loyalty" of the C. E. C. majority to the C. I. and permit the membership of the Workers (Communist) Party to pass final and decisive judgment on it at the next convention.

ists did not have any intention and did not want to become the leaders of a labor party. At that time the Foster-Cannon group did not argue that a farmer-labor party would be a competing party. Nor did the Communist International ever think that a labor party organized on the basis of the organizations of the workers with the Communists holding a strategic place in it could be a competing party with a Communist Party organized on the basis of the individual clear, class conscious revolutionists. Otherwise the Communist International would never have instructed us that: "The first task of the Workers Party is to become a mass Communist party of workers. It can fulfill this task only by most actively participating in the establishment of a labor party which will embrace all elements of the working class by establishing a bond with the farmers who are at present in a state of strong fermentation."

If a labor party of this sort can be said to be a competing party today it could as well have been said by the Communist International and would have been said by the Communist International a few months ago when this decision was made. Only a mechanical, un-Marxian and non-Communist can come to the conclusion, because the campaign for a farmer-labor party is like every other campaign—only a method to establish leadership. The Workers Party will not establish a farmer-labor party as the leader of the American masses, but it tries to establish its own leadership over these masses by means of such campaigns as that of "for a class farmer-labor party."

To show how absurd this trump card argument of the Foster-Cannon group is, it needs only to be applied to other campaigns and other slogans. Applying the logic of the Foster-Cannon group to the campaign for the relief of unemployment, the argument could be made that such a campaign is no good because it may bring relief and thus spoil our chances for further developing proletarian unrest against capitalism. Surely Foster and Cannon are not yet ready to say this openly. Perhaps this thought is really in their heads and has been the basis of their resistance to all campaigns on unemployment proposed by the minority members of the central executive committee.

**5. Question—The Central Executive Committee majority spokesmen are always shrieking: 'Where is the sentiment for a class farmer-labor party? Name any labor organization where there is sentiment for such a farmer-labor united front?'**

**Answer—**Now for some outstanding facts showing the strong undercurrent of sentiment for the building of an independent political party of the workers and exploited farmer—a class farmer-labor party—in the ranks of

the masses.

1. At the conference of fifty delegates representing approximately 10,000 progressive miners in the Pittsburgh bituminous district No. 5, of the United Mine Workers of America, held on Sept. 21, the plank "for a farmer-labor party" was unanimously adopted. On Oct. 5, the same plank was reaffirmed at another conference. The industrial organizer of our party, Comrade Foster, in Pittsburgh on Nov. 30, did not dare to blink totally this strong demand of the miners when he revised this plank of the program to read "independent political action by the working class thru a militant political organization of its own." Did Foster mean Workers Party or farmer-labor party? Or perhaps he meant the LaFollette party? Why did he not say what he meant?

2. In the conference for progressive political action of Massachusetts, the minority demand for a farmer-labor party as against a fraudulent liberal third capitalist party was strong and clear cut. Had our central executive committee given the party members in Massachusetts proper guidance instead of an overdose of phrases in a tapeworm manifesto, the party, thru this labor party slogan, could have struck an effective blow against LaFollettism and could have established our leadership amongst an increased mass of workers in the Bay State.

3. In California our party membership in the trade unions is faced with a similar situation where we will be compelled to throw away a splendid opportunity to lock horns with the labor fakers simply because the central executive committee majority has issued a bull against our comrades using the farmer-labor slogan even where there is a mass demand for it.

4. In Minnesota the demand for organization of a farmer-labor party is so strong that even the labor fakers and fake progressives like Mahoney are forced to pretend to talk for such a party and at the same time to insist that the Communists must be driven out of such a party. Here, the sabotaging activities of Mr. Sinclair, LaFollette's agent, have especially enraged many workers into insistence that a party of their own be organized nationally.

5. At the last American Federation of Labor convention, despite the fact that we failed to elect a single Communist or even a handful of militant delegates, the demand for a farmer-labor party was voiced in resolutions proposed by the Molders' Union, the International Potters' Union and the Stone Cutters' Association.

6. A perusal of the labor press convinces one that the demand for a labor party is increasing in strength and insistence. Typical of this demand is the declaration to be found in recent issues of the Upholsterers' Journal.

## A Communist Catechism

### Some Questions and Answers

By MAX BEDACHT and JAY LOVESTONE.

(We hereby begin the first of a series of questions and answers bearing on the problems confronting the party in the present controversy. We ask every Communist to study these questions and answers carefully.)

**1. Question—What is the purpose of Communist United Front Tactics?**

**Answer—**The objective of Communist united front tactics is to separate the working and poor farming masses from the reactionary leadership and to win leadership over these masses for the Communist Party.

**2. Question—What is a good Communist Slogan?**

**Answer—**The Foster-Cannon group maintains that the only criterion for the correctness of a slogan is its meeting an existing well developed general mass demand. The Bittelman logicians yell that at present nobody demands a farmer-labor party, and, therefore, the slogan of a farmer-labor party is no good now.

This reasoning is bad Communism. The best criterion for a slogan is not whether it meets a mass demand but whether it meets a mass need. In order to fit the requirements of our desire to wing working class leadership, our slogans must not follow mass demands, movements, but must precede them, crystallize them and give articulate expression to them.

**3. Question—Why ask for a farmer-labor party when the masses aren't demanding one?**

**Answer—**This is still worse Communism for a party which seeks to be the leader of the working class. The fact that the masses—the whole working class or a considerable portion thereof—are not clearly demanding a farmer-labor party does not mean that the Communists should discard this slogan. Why does the majority thesis contain the slogan, "For a labor congress?" Are any masses demanding it? Have you ever heard a single worker in your shop, mill or mine talk about a labor congress or even mention it? The masses know far less about a labor congress than they know about a farmer-labor party—a form of political organization that has an historical place and tradition in the American labor movement. The demand for a labor congress amongst the masses is insignificant when compared with the demand for a labor party.

**4. Question—Why organize a party to compete with the Workers Party?**

**Answer—**Only a few months ago the Foster-Cannon group was so anxious to form a labor party that they were begging the Mahoneys and Fitzpatrick to become the leaders of such a party and were announcing from the housetops that the Commun-

## WHAT'S THE USE OF A LEADER WITHOUT AN ARMY?

By THOMAS MYERSCOUGH.

**N**OW that the line is closely drawn on the C. E. C. of the party and the battle is to determine whether the majority or minority thesis shall be the guide of our immediate future activity, we, the rank and file (pardon the use of trade union phraseology) will do well to study the facts that present themselves so boldly.

The majority thesis, either summed up or boiled down, says "Build the Workers Party." The minority statement treated similarly means "Build the Workers Party," but reminds us of the necessity of "Reaching the masses," in order that we may accomplish that very thing. That is my understanding of what the minority means when they urge the slogan of "For a mass farmer-labor party."

No one can deny, that in order to build anything, either the Workers Party or any other essential thing, the material with which to build must first be assembled and molded to make for stability, otherwise the structure will crumble and fall. Hence,

I am with the minority.

Are we to conclude that the majority of the C. E. C. are in favor of isolating the Workers Party or of forming a "Holy Trinity" with the S. L. P. and the proletarian party. Perhaps they are desirous of turning it into a discussion club such as the two last named parties are, satisfying themselves with quoting Marx once in a while, maybe holding a debate with someone occasionally. One thing is certain and that is, if they are Communists, they cannot be quitters. They must recognize that we are not yet, by any means, enjoying Communism, that Communism is an end and that the Workers Party, the Communist movement in the United States, is a means to that end.

Comrade Manley says he has had his fill of farmer-labor parties, but I am located in a part of the territory that he will be called upon to visit in his new duties as eastern industrial organizer, where he will find a growing sentiment for such a party and

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# The Discussion on Party Tasks

## WHAT'S THE USE OF A LEADER WITHOUT AN ARMY?

(Continued from page 5)

where, he knows better than anyone else, with the possible exception of Jack and Ida McCarthy, that he can't get by with anything until he first wins the confidence of the workers and convinces them that the Communist movement, as represented by the Workers Party, is not what John L. Lewis and the rest of the capitalist class tells them it is.

Comrade Foster sarcastically remarked to me in Philadelphia the other day, that he heard that I was for a labor party "Dead or alive." Well, I am far from being sensitive, but I will say that I am not strong for anything that is dead and that is the reason that I never belonged to the S. P., the S. L. P. or the proletarian party, and I am ready to vote an emphatic NO against letting the Workers Party die, especially thru a desire on the part of the majority to isolate it from the masses. It matters not what actuated the majority in writing their thesis, the fact remains that the struggle for Communism must continue.

To hang a shingle on the door of our many district offices, as well as on the door of the national office, with the words, "Join the Workers Party" is not sufficient. We must go to the masses. By all and any means but surrender of our principle and leadership we must "Reach the masses" and win them to Communism. Surely, the majority does not think that the toiling masses are already knocking at the door for admission to our

party, yet, if that is not the case and they still believe what they say in their thesis, that the Workers Party has won its leadership, what is it going to lead? What's the use of a leader, if there is no following?

If the frequent meetings with those who are already in the party and with the few others that attend our many gatherings and are thus partly molded material for the building of the party, has led the majority group of the C. E. C. to believe that all the exploited toilers are ready to join and be assimilated in the Workers Party, then it is time to arrange their future itineraries thru the "sticks," "bushes" and "backwoods" where they will get a chance to meet the many millions that have never been reached. Pioneer work of this kind will tend to sharpen and keep keen, their knowledge of the real situation, they will thus become conversant with the facts and find plenty of real Communist work to do.

More real work where and when it is needed and less resolutions, especially of the unnecessary kind, will allow our party to grow and remain the fighting, revolutionary leader of the American working class and hasten the day for the decisive, successful proletarian revolution.

Let the S. P., the S. L. P. and the proletarian party have their fields of discussion to themselves, even unto their demise, that is not our funeral. What we must do, is form the proletarian army and march "ON TO THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION."

## WORDS AND DEEDS

By ABRAHAM JAKIRA.

COMRADE BROWDER in his article published in the Dec. 6 issue of the DAILY WORKER claims that among all the united front campaigns carried on by the party the labor party campaign was "the least successful in its practical and organizational aspects." This point of view is now shared by the "majority" as a whole judging from their discussion articles published so far.

The same "majority," however, only a short while ago was of an entirely different opinion. In "Our Immediate Work," a pamphlet published for the party membership mainly (there was therefore no need to exaggerate things), on page 5-6 the C. E. C. says: "We can also say, without being challenged that our party has made the greatest gains for itself thru this campaign for the Labor Party. It is thru this farmer-labor party campaign that our party has established itself as a political force in the U. S. . . . NOTHING has contributed so much to develop our party from a sectarian group to a recognized political force in the life of the labor movement of this country than our maneuvers in relation to the farmer-labor party."

So speak the majority after the June 17 and after the Cleveland conventions—it is a document which the majority can not erase from the records.

### Unemployment.

Both Comrade Ruthenberg and Bedacht well pointed out that it was under extreme pressure of the minority and of the Executive Committee of the C. I. that the "majority" was compelled to "do something" on the question of unemployment. The attitude of the majority towards this important question can best be seen from the "practical" steps taken by the C. E. C. in connection with this. As far back as Aug. 11 instructions were sent out to all district organizers to organize unemployment councils and to see to it that a resolution is introduced in various labor organizations. There the matter rested until Dec. 6. It was only on that date that another circular letter was sent out asking the district organizers to re-

port whether anything was done in connection with the unemployment question. For four months our C. E. C. was even not interested to know whether the districts carried out their instructions. A careful study of the "majority" theses will reveal that the majority hardly believes that there is an unemployment problem in this country at this moment.

### Loreism.

Under pressure of the minority the majority was also compelled to take up the fight against Loreism in the party. But . . . up to the present moment there exists a solid united front between the majority and the Lore groups (which also includes large sections of the Finnish Federation) both on the C. E. C. and way down the line. The real fight is carried on not against Lore and Loreism but against the left wing, the Marxian group, in the party. It is against the latter, and not against Loreism, that Cannon is ready to "fight till death." Certain representatives of the Finnish Federation are an integral part of the Lore group. One of these is one of the signers of the majority theses. The majority without the help of the Lore group is helpless. It must and will therefore continue its organizational and in effect, in practice, also political alliance with that group, despite of its pre-convention theses. Deeds and facts are stronger than words. The Marxian group must solidify its ranks to carry on a struggle for Bolshevization of the party in a real Bolshevik spirit.

### Various Forms of United Front.

The majority apparently believes that it discovered a new America when it says that there are various issues which can serve as a basis for united front tactics. Relief for Soviet Russia and protection of foreign born are the pet cases quoted by the majority in support of their new "discovery." It is needless to repeat here that the majority had little to do with initiating of these united front campaigns and that as far back as two years ago Comrade Cannon, while in Russia and immediately upon his return, carried on a most vigorous campaign for the liquidation of the Friends of Soviet Russia. Aside

from this, the fact that the farmer-labor party campaign presents the best and strongest possible basis for a united front campaign cannot be disputed. Suffice it to remind the majority of the attitude of the reactionaries towards the farmer-labor united front and to all other united front campaigns. It was precisely on the farmer-labor party issue that the bureaucrats in the labor movement really became excited. It was on this issue that the reactionaries split among themselves, and Communism was made the issue in the labor unions. It was precisely on these issues that many of the fake progressives could be unmasked before the masses of the workers. It was the issue of the farmer-labor party that a crystallization of a Communist sentiment took place in the labor organizations.

Comrades Manley and Abern made an "expose" that the Workers Party took a most active part in the farmer-labor campaign and that we spent a considerable sum of money in that campaign. Quite so. But, measuring the results of our work in the various fields by the Manley-Abern standards and arguments we may have no difficulty to show that much of our work was more than a failure. It is high time, however, for Comrades Manley and Abern to realize that Communist work cannot be measured in dollars and cents or by cheap demagogic "exposures."

### United Front from Below.

The majority yells at the top of its voice that it wants a united front from below. Quite so. But here again it was the minority that was always fighting the present majority to make the farmer-labor party campaign a united front from below and to a great extent the minority succeeded, too. It is Comrade Foster who now laments over the loss "of many valuable sympathizers," referring apparently to Fitzpatrick and Nockels. It is Comrade Foster who still lives under the illusion that a labor party will or can

be organized by Mr. Gompers and his associates. It will probably be only then that Comrade Foster intends to again revive the slogan of the farmer-labor party in order to "assume leadership."

The party membership must rally around the minority and "fight till death" to make the party a party of deeds and not of words.

## Bureau of Italian Section Unanimous For Minority Theses

At a regular meeting of the national bureau of the Italian Section of the Workers Party held in Chicago Monday, Dec. 15, after a reading and thoro discussion of both the majority and minority thesis, by a vote of 7 to 0 unanimously endorsed the minority thesis of Comrades Ruthenberg, Lovestone, Bedacht, Engdahl and Gitlow.

The bureau recognizes that the thesis of the majority is not in accord with the principles of the Communist International. The majority in its thesis fail to give the proper conclusions for the course of action which the Workers (Communist) Party of America shall follow in gaining contact with the masses in order to establish in America a mass Communist Party.

It recognizes that the minority thesis expounds correctly the position of the Communist International in relation to building a mass Communist Party in America, one of the most effective weapons being the united front slogan for a "Class Farmer-Labor Party."

It urges the branches of the Italian Section of the party to study carefully both the thesis of the majority and minority of the party so that they can properly express their views in the party controversy.—Signed: Enea Sormenti, National Secretary, Italian Section, Workers Party of America.

## Toledo Protests

Editorial Note: The following resolution is published by request of the English branch of local Toledo. The Central Executive Committee has replied thereto stating that it does not believe that the use of sharp language in a discussion in a Communist party a danger to the party.

Toledo, Ohio, Dec. 11, 1924—Workers Party of America, Chicago, Ill. Comrade Ruthenberg:

At our branch meeting last night the following resolution was adopted by the branch to the effect:

Local Toledo English branch in regular session assembled on Dec. 10 1924 do register a vote of protest to the Central Executive Committee of the Workers Party of the epithets and name calling that is being used in our party paper, the DAILY WORKER, on the party discussion and that this resolution be published in the next issue of the DAILY WORKER.—Yours for the cause. Comrade Buehler, Branch secretary.

Build the DAILY WORKER!

## COLD STEEL DISPLAY IN BOSTON

By FREDERICK VOSE.

THE workers of Boston were favored with a display of cold steel in the form of rifles, bayonets, revolvers and machine guns. This display of ruling class force was in the form of the annual police parade—a yearly event calculated to chill to the heart any upward looking aspirations of the workers to better their miserable living conditions.

The dejected looking workers who viewed this display of master class militarism were made to see very plainly that the "cold steel" with which to cool off a "hot temper" should it develop during the coming economic depression, was not lacking in the armament of Boston's legaliz-

strike breakers.

There were mounted cossacks, motorcycle police, machine gun crews in fivers, companies with rapid fire (riot) guns, besides row after row of awkward looking, common or back alley variety cops.

The class conscious workers of Boston need no interpretation of such phenomena as the armed police parade but the workers of this city who as yet do not realize the class significance of such displays, should realize that they are intended as a sinister threat to the entire working class, from the class of parasites who at present are the rulers in this country, to be used in enforcing continued working class enslavement.

# How One Should Not Write the History of October

(Continued from page 1)

of those revolutionaries who afterwards formed the kernel of the Communist Party.

Comrade Trotsky was most decidedly opposed to this slogan, which he considered as a narrow slogan, unsuited for mass propaganda. Is that perchance an "anticipation" of the Leninist standpoint?

2. Defeatism and the fight against it. The second distinguishing criterion of the Bolshevik attitude was the slogan that the revolutionary social democrats (we would now say Communists) must, in the imperialist war, before all desire the defeat of their own government. Comrade Trotsky characterized this attitude as an inverted nationalism, or nationalism with a minus sign. Now, however, the deep meaning of this Leninist attitude, whose roots form the chief source of the Bolshevik idea, is now perfectly clear. Yes, the chief source. One only needs to read, for example, the recently published polemic between Lenin and Plechanov over the draft program of the Russian social democratic labor party (Lenin's collected works No. 2) in order to perceive this. In this polemic with Plechanov, Lenin finds fault with the Plechanov draft on the ground that this is a text book and not a declaration of war; there we read about capitalism in general, whilst we require war against Russian capitalism—that is the essence of this polemic on the part of Lenin. Why did Lenin insist upon this? Precisely because he was a fighter and not a declaimer. The slogan of the defeat of one's own government was a declaration of war on every form of pacifism, even when it was hidden under the feather bed of noble phrases, on every one who advocated the defense of the fatherland, even when it was hidden under the cleverest mask. This was the most decided break. A real severance of all connections with one's own bourgeois state. It was precisely such an attitude which determined in reality, in actual practice, the international standpoint of Bolshevism. This was the second difference of principle between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks.

3. Unity with the menshevik fraction of Tcheidse. Even during the war Comrade Trotsky still advocated unity with such elements as the Tcheidse fraction, and he did not have the courage to declare for a definite organizational break which was the necessary preliminary to a correct policy. It was not without reason that Lenin greatly feared that many comrades would be misled by Trotskyism. It is interesting to note that Trotsky, even in May, 1917, did not perceive his earlier errors. Thus we read on page 380 of the book in question:

"On the 7th of May, 1917, there was opened the city conference of the United Social Democrats (Bolsheviks and Internationalists). The conference greeted Comrade Trotsky who was present as a guest. In reply to this greeting Comrade Trotsky declared that for him, who always stood for the unity of the social democratic forces (heavy type by the "Pravda") unity is not an end in itself, that this formula must be given a revolutionary content, etc. (Page 380)

From this it is perfectly clear that Comrade Trotsky does not only not condemn his fight for the unity of the liquidators, but makes this tremendous fatal error almost the basis, so to speak, of unity with the Bolsheviks, this time fortunately being prepared to give the formula a revolutionary content.

Unfortunately the same faulty estimation of his own mistakes in the organizational question is also observed at present, (it was clearly revealed by Comrade Trotsky in the last year's discussion). Comrade Trotsky justifies himself with regard to the accusations on the part of "some one of the deep thinking sextons of the type of Comrade Ssorin" on account of his fight against the Bolshevik sectarianism, by a more than strange method.

"My objection to the article was

the following: sectarianism still exists as a heritage of the past. But in order to reduce it the 'Meshrajonzy' must cease their separate existence." (Page 66)\*

Comrade Trotsky already therefore, when he advocated uniting with the Bolsheviks, condemned Bolshevik sectarianism as a bad inheritance of the wicked past.

But do we repudiate this heritage? Not in the least, for this so-called sectarianism was, as a matter of fact the method of the creation of our party, that is the organizational principle of Bolshevism. And when Comrade Trotsky writes on Page 6 of his "preface": That he has recognized his "great organizational" mistakes, and on page 66 justifies the charge of sectarianism directed against pre-revolutionary Bolshevism, this means that he has not yet drawn all the consequences and all the teachings from the history of our party. He can, however, not do this if he considers the birthday of the party to be the day of its union with the "Meshrajonzy," or even the glorious October days, in which Comrade Trotsky, not without birth pangs, was himself born a Bolshevik.

4. Fight against the Zimmerwald left. Finally, there must be mentioned the attitude of Comrade Trotsky on a "world scale." Comrade Trotsky who conducted the fight against chauvinists, social patriots, etc., was scornful towards the Zimmerwald left. He regarded them likewise as sectarians as a Bolshevik whim, quite unadapted for the conditions abroad. Already in America, where, as Comrade Lenin assures us, Comrade Trotsky anticipated the latter standpoint of Comrade Lenin, he conducted an active fight against solidarizing with the Zimmerwald left. Trotsky could not approve this "split" from the Zimmerwald centrists. The comrades who were entrusted with the editing of "1917" did not take any trouble to illuminate this part of our party history, which is quite as important for the international as the question of civil war, of defeatism, etc.; for here there is no less at stake than the choice between the Second and the Third International.

5. The conception of "permanent" revolution. Comrade Trotsky has, as is proved, not only "anticipated" Lenin's later standpoint, but he proved himself to be right in one of the most essential points of our revolutionary theory and at the same time of our revolutionary strategy, and that is, in the question of "permanent" revolution. Comrade Trotsky writes concerning this as follows:

"Lenin, immediately before 1905, gave expression to the unique character of the Russian revolution in the formula of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. This formula, as the later development showed, could merely be of importance, as a stage to the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the peasantry." (Page 17.)

What can be the meaning of that? In 1905 there was a fight of the Bolsheviks, who issued the slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," on the one hand and the Trotsky-Parvus group, whose slogan was "Down with the czar and up with a labor government!" on the other hand and finally with the Poles, at the head of whom stood Rosa Luxemburg, who issued the formula: "the proletariat supported by the peasantry."

Whose standpoint proved to be correct?

Comrade Trotsky evades giving a definite and detailed reply to this question. Indirectly, however, he finds the correctness of his formula confirmed: The formula of Lenin could

\*This refers to the so-called "Meshrajonzy," who existed side by side with the Bolsheviks and at this time stood for unity with the "left" mensheviks. After the July days they, along with Comrade Trotsky, joined the Bolshevik party.

"merely" be a stage to the formula of Trotsky. But to say that the standpoint of Trotsky proved to be correct is false. It proved to be incorrect, and the further development has proved its incorrectness. The peculiarity of Comrade Trotsky's attitude consists precisely in the fact that he wished to skip a stage which could not be skipped. (He forgot one trifle, the peasantry.)

"It is not sufficient to be a revolutionary and a follower of socialism or a Communist in general" wrote Comrade Lenin. "One must understand how to find at any moment the particular link in the chain which one must seize with all his force in order to hold the entire chain and to prepare a sure transition to the following link." (Collected works Volume 15, Page 223.)

It is precisely this which the slogan of Comrade Trotsky failed to give. He has "disregarded" that special link of the chain which should have been grasped with all force, he has underestimated the role of the peasantry and thereby practically isolated himself from the workers.

"Magnificent, catching, intoxicating slogans, which have no basis—that is the nature of the revolutionary phrase." (Lenin 15. Page 100.)

It does not follow from the fact that after many years, and after we have passed over a certain stage, the socialist revolution has set in, that Comrade Trotsky is right. Such an assertion would contradict the facts and would be based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the tactics of Bolshevism, of its, if one may so say, political methodology which unites a persistent march forward to the great aim with an austere soberness, which rejects all prejudices and all superficiality in its estimate of every concrete situation. Here also Comrade Trotsky is in the wrong. Here also his book entirely misleads the reader. Not to mention the fact that Comrade Trotsky remains silent as to how his "permanent" ultra-left phrase was wedded to an extremely right policy and a bitter struggle against the Bolshevik Party.

## IV.

The Lessons of October and the Communist International.

One of the practical foundations upon which the "Preface" of Trotsky is based is the endeavor, to put it mildly, to "dispute" the policy of the E. C. C. I. He sets out to take revenge for the discussion he lost in 1923 and thereby to oppose, not only the line of the C. C., but also the policy of the Comintern as a whole. For this purpose he has distorted the meaning of the most important epochs of the class struggle of the proletariat in Germany and in Bulgaria. In this he hints that the mistakes of several comrades in 1917 caused the failure of the Communists in Germany and in Bulgaria in 1923. The structure of this idea is very simple when we strip off the husk of words. XYZ erred in the Russian October, XYZ now leads the Communist International. The Comintern has lost the battles, a, b, c. It follows that XYZ are responsible for this, as they are carrying on their traditions of the Russian October. Briefly stated, that is the meaning of the long effusion.

The frame of this completely ridiculous syllogism has a concrete content. It is therefore necessary critically to illuminate this content, whereupon the whole complicated construction of Comrade Trotsky will collapse.

### Point 1. Bulgaria.

Comrade Trotsky writes: "In the past year we had two severe defeats in Bulgaria. First the party, owing to doctrinaire and fatalistic considerations, missed a most extraordinary favorable moment for revolutionary action (the peasants' revolt after the Zankov putsch). Afterwards the party, in order to make good its mistakes, plunged into the September revolt without having prepared the political and organizational pre-conditions therefor." (Page XII.)

As the reader will easily see, the reason for the defeat is here consider-

ed to be, first menshevik fatalism, and secondly unlimited optimism (no preparation, etc.). These two features are also mentioned in characterizing the types of October opportunism. The connection between the Russian October and the present Comintern leadership is therefore completely set up.

Let us, however, examine the facts a little more closely. The first defeat was the result of the fact that the Bulgarian party had dealt with the peasantry quite incorrectly, and did not know how to estimate their movement or the role of the peasants' league as a whole, or its left wing. They rather adopted the standpoint: "Down with the king, up with a workers' government." At the decisive moment, when it was necessary to take the leadership into their hands and to mount up on the crest of a powerful peasants' wave, the party declared itself neutral, claiming that the fight was between the town and the rural bourgeoisie, which was no concern of the proletariat. These were the "considerations" of the C. P. of Bulgaria. They have been committed to writing, and can be now proved by documents. If we wish to have an analogy with our October (we should, by the way, be more cautious with analogies), it would be much more apt to take the Kornikov days (Kerensky-Stambulski, Kornilov-Zankov). Here, according to the statement of Comrade Trotsky himself, too much support was given to Kerensky, and the distinction between the fight against Kornilov and the defense of Kerensky was not understood. In Bulgaria, however, the exact opposite error was committed.

Wherein therefore lie the "Lessons of October"?

Apart from this, the comrades who are at present members of the E. C. C. I. adopted during the Kornilov days a thoroughly correct attitude, and the whole E. C. C. I. exercised a thoroughly correct criticism of the C. P. of Bulgaria and urged them on.

The second defeat in Bulgaria is a fact, and Comrade Trotsky describes the conditions under which it took place. Will you be so good, Comrade Trotsky, to say, whether in this case you support the old formula of Plechanov during the time of the menshevik decay: "One should not have taken up arms"? Was it necessary or not for the Bulgarian Communists to take up arms?

Yes or no?

Comrade Trotsky does not reply to this. According to our opinion, it was necessary to take up arms, as only by this means was it possible to maintain contact with the peasantry who were entering the struggle with elementary force. But there was no time for preparation. That is the true picture of the events. The "Lessons" of Comrade Trotsky have nothing in the least to do with it.

### Point 2. Germany.

Still more interesting is the question of the defeat of the German proletariat in October last year.

"We have seen there in the second half of the past year a classical (heavy type by the "Pravda") demonstration of the fact that a most extraordinary favorable revolutionary situation of world historical importance can be missed."

According to the opinion of Comrade Trotsky therefore, the failure here consisted in the fact that a "classical" moment was missed. It was necessary at all costs to take up the decisive struggle and the victory would have been ours. Here Comrade Trotsky draws a complete analogy with the October revolution in Russia. There as here, we were pushed forward. In Russia, under the pressure of Lenin, we decided upon action and were victorious—in Germany, without the pressure of Lenin, no decision was made and the appropriate moment was lost. Now, however, under the influence of the Russian October revolution it is declared that the forces for the decisive struggle were not sufficient. That is the meaning

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# How One Should Not Write the History of October

(Continued from page 7)

of the "German events" according to Comrade Trotsky.

But here we have before us mere schematizing and grey abstraction. Comrade Trotsky elaborates how history would have been written if the opponents of the revolt had been in the majority in the Russian C. C.; it would then have been said that the forces were too limited, that the enemy was fearfully strong, etc.

All this is only outwardly convincing; yes, it is probable that history would have been written in this manner. But that is in no way a proof that the forces of the German revolution in October, 1923, were not overestimated.

It is false to say, the moment was a "classical" one. For the social democrats proved themselves to be far stronger than we thought. An analogy with the Russian October is quite out of place here. In Germany there were no armed soldiers who were for the revolution. We could not issue the slogan of peace. There was no peasant agrarian movement. There was

no such party as ours. But apart from all that it proved that social democracy has not yet outlived itself. These concrete facts had therefore to be dealt with. At the time of the decisive events the E. C. C. I. declared itself in favor of the October policy. Now as, owing to the objective conditions this suffered a defeat, and as, thanks to the right leaders, this defeat was "greater than necessary," Comrade Trotsky, who has in fact always supported the right opportunist wing which is inclined to capitulation and opposed the left, now gives a "profound" theoretical basis of his conception, and thereby launches a blow against the leading circles of the Comintern. Such lessons must not be drawn either from the Russian or the German October.

It is also quite inadmissible to cling to many errors to which Comrade Trotsky still clings.

One of the lessons, (the actual lessons) of the German October is, that before action the most far-reaching mobilization of the masses is necessary. This work has been greatly neglected. In Hamburg, for example, during the revolt there were no councils and our party organization was

not capable of drawing the ten thousands of strikers into the struggle. Throughout the whole of Germany there were no Soviets; according to Comrade Trotsky's opinion that was right, as the Soviets were substituted by the factory councils. As a matter of fact, these factory councils could not replace the Soviets, as they did not comprise the whole population, including the most backward and indifferent, as the Soviets do in the critical and tense moments of the class struggle.

The book of Comrade Trotsky calls for a study of October. This slogan does not contain anything new. It is appropriate for the members of our party as well as for our foreign comrades. Comrade Trotsky's book, or to be more correct, his preface, claims to be a guide in this study. To this we must say, in the most definite manner: it cannot fulfill this role. It will, however, mislead the comrades, who, behind the exterior fine style, will not observe the complete lack of proportion, the distortion of the true party history. That is no mirror of the party but a caricature.

The publication of this "caricature" is by no means a chance event. After what we have said above it is

not difficult to perceive to what the conclusions indicated by Comrade Trotsky lead.

In fact, if, as Comrade Trotsky falsely states, in October, 1917, something correct could be carried thru only against the C. C. is it not possible that such a situation may arise again? What guarantee is there that the leadership will be the right one? And whether it is correct at the present time? The sole "test" is October, 1917. Can one trust those who have not stood this test? And did not the Comintern suffer a defeat in Bulgaria and in Germany in consequence of these leaders? Is it not necessary to study the October in such a way that just these problems are more closely investigated?

That is the essence of those problems which Comrade Trotsky, after the failure of his frontal attack in the past year, brings forward for the attention of his readers. Comrade Trotsky can, however, be quite convinced that the party will understand how to judge rightly and in good time this quiet undermining work. The party wants work and no fresh discussion. The party desires true Bolshevik unity.

## MUSIC - LITERATURE - DRAMA

### COAL MINER KORT

Revolutionary drama in four acts by A. Chunin.

(Review)

By M. A. SKROMNY.

ALONG with political and economic advancement the Soviet Republic is also advancing in art and literature. It is true, the new art and literature of Russia is devoted mostly to the working class. But this is just what the world needs most today. Too much art has been devoted to satisfying the ruling class, to the sex question and other questionable things. The working class, more than any other class has been lacking attention from the artists and writers of today. The reason—there wasn't much money in it. Nowadays art and literature is in most cases the handmaid of capitalism. It is for sale to the highest bidder. And the working class did not have the price.

In Russia it is different. There along side with the new life they are creating new art and new literature.

Among the new plays produced in Russia during the revolution is that of "Coalminer Kort." It is a story of the class struggle with a thrill in it, as the story runs thru the civil war that raged in Russia until 1920.

The story begins in 1917, in a coal mining village of the Ural mountains. The owners of the mine want to raise the price of coal and for that purpose they cut down production, as many of the coal operators in this country are doing. Many people are thrown out of work and an attempt is made to cut down the wages of those who are working. The miners are forced to defend themselves. They present their demands to the manager. He flatly refuses to deal with them and telephones for a company of soldiers. He receives some bad news over the wire and hangs up the receiver with disgust. The October days are here and soldiers can no more be used for shooting strikers. The civil war begins. The "whites" capture the village. The old management with the aid of "white" officers are avenging themselves. The parents and families of the strike leaders are being subjected to insults and attacks. All the young people of the village are gone. They organized a partisan detachment and are fighting the "whites." Finally they recapture the village, but Kort's son is killed while leading his men. The workers take over the management of the mines and Kort, as the most experienced miner, is elected manager. He starts work on a new strip mine which the old management refused to exploit. That helps the workers a great deal. The workers' and peasants' government awards him

AZA NAMGOVA



Russian actress who will participate in the play, "Coal Miner Kort," to be given at the Soviet School, Saturday, Dec. 27.

the badge of the order of Red labor.

The play will be presented at the Soviet School, 1902 W. Division St. next Saturday, Dec. 27, at 8 p. m. under the direction of the well-known Russian actor, Anatoly Pokatlov and with the participation of Aza Namgova, an actress of the Moscow Meyerhold theater. The scenery for the mine scenes is being painted by Lydia Gibson.

By ALFRED V. FRANKENSTEIN.

JOSEPH BRINKMAN, a young local pianist, was soloist with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra at Orchestra Hall. The Society of American Musicians has, in the past two years, put on two contests for young musicians. Recently a sub-contest of the winners of the first and second prizes occurred, and Brinkman was chosen from the four to play as soloist in this concert.

He played the Liszt Hungarian fantasia for piano and orchestra. (We recently made the statement that this work is the first Liszt concerto under another name, an error produced by a lamentable confusion of two tunes.) This fantasia is practically an arrangement of the fourteenth Hungarian rhapsody, and, like the world famous and ever played second rhapsody, starts with a slow movement and ends up in a whirlwind, with a peculiar, wild Magyar flavor thruout. To say that Brinkman played it brilliantly would be putting it mildly. He got one of the longest ovations we have ever witnessed, and deserved all of it. He is a young man, and now his reputation is made. Which proves that contests do a lot more good than is popularly supposed.

Two French compositions opened the program, the overture to "Gwendoline" by Emmanuel Chabrier and Vincent D'Indy's second symphony. Like the "Bouree Fantasque" and the "Joyeuse Marche" that Mr. Stock so frequently plays, the Chabrier work is one bubbling over with liveliness and good spirits. It should be played oftener.

D'Indy's symphony is a work of a different sort. It consists of some exceptionally beautiful and moving themes worked out to a great length with every conceivable device in

musical science. But, unlike the symphonies of Brahms, to which it might be compared, it never gets dull and pedantic. The performance of it was superb.

The program concluded with a suite of dances from Stravinski's early ballet, "The Fire Bird." In a way this music is disappointing. Compared with the same author's "Song of the Nightingale," it is conventional and rather stale. But coupled with the fairy tale ballet for which it was written it probably is quite appropriate.

Two years ago the name of Igor Stravinski meant next to nothing in these parts. Within the last year Mr. Stock has played three of the composer's four major works. First there was "The Song of the Nightingale," then "The Rites of Spring," played quite recently, and then this repetition of "The Fire Bird." There remains only "Petrouchka" to be played, but "Le Sacre du Printemps" is said to be the masterpiece of this most important composer of the day.

### GRAND OPERA DATES

Next Week's Opera Program.

The repertoire for the eighth week of the Chicago Civic Opera opens Sunday matinee, Dec. 21, with the last performance of Tannhauser this season. In the cast will be Forrai, Van Gordon, Lamont, Schwarz, Kipnis, Oukrainsky; Mles, Elisius, Milar, Nemeroff, Sherment and corps de ballet. Conductor, Weber.

Monday night will bring a third performance of Traviata with Muzio, Hackett, Schwarz, Defrere, Oukrainsky; Mles, Milar, Sherment and corps de ballet. Conductor, Cimini.

Tuesday night, Lakme will be sung for the second time with Pareto, Schipa, Baklanoff, Oukrainsky; Mles, Elisius, and corps de ballet. Conductor, Lauwers.

Wednesday evening, Christmas Eve, the first performance of Louise will be given with Garden, Claessens, Anseau, Baklanoff and exceptional supporting cast. Conductor, Polacco.

Thursday evening the Barber of Seville will be sung for the second time, with Elvira Hidalgo making her debut with the Chicago Civic Opera company. Others in the cast include Claessens, Schipa, Rimini, Chaliapin and Trevisan. Conductor, Cimini.

Friday brings the first performance of Othello this season with Raisa, Perini, Marshall and Schwarz. Conductor, Moranzoni.

Saturday matinee, Faust will be presented with Mason, Claessens, Swarhout, Hackett, Chaliapin and Defrere. Incidental dances by corps de ballet. Conductor, St. Leger.

Saturday night's popular performance with be Thais, with Garden, Mojica, Cotreuil; Mlle Milar, and corps de ballet. Conductor, Moranzoni.

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