

"The idea becomes power when it penetrates the masses."
—Karl Marx.

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SECOND SECTION
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December 13, 1924.

How One Should Not Write the History of October

(Comrade Trotzky's Book: "1917".)

The Fifth World Congress and the Thirteenth Party Conference of the Russian C. P. unanimously condemned the political line of the Russian opposition, with Comrade Trotzky at the head, as petty-bourgeois and opportunist. In spite of this, Comrade Trotzky is carrying on his struggle still further, but in a new form. Under the flag of Leninism, he aims at a revision of Leninism. His book on Lenin was the first attempt of this sort. Many comrades allowed themselves to be dazzled by the literary side of the book, but the scientific organs of the Communist Party of Russia and of the Communist Party of Germany immediately recognized its tendency and repudiated it with sharp criticisms.

There now follows the second attack. Comrade Trotzky has written a preface of about sixty pages to the recently published third volume of his work: "1917". As in their time, those who came after Marx sought, under the flag of Marxism, to revise Marx, so Comrade Trotzky here attempts a revision of Bolshevism in the name of "Leninism". The Pravda, the central organ of the Communist Party of Russia, replied to this attempt with the following article which we reprint in full.—Editor's Note.

COMRADE TROTZKY'S recently published book: "1917" which is devoted to the "Lessons of October," will soon become the mode. This is not to be wondered at, as it aimed at becoming an inner party sensation.

After the events of the past year, which have proved the incorrectness of the standpoint of our party opposition, after the facts, which have again and again proved the correctness of the leadership of our party, Comrade Trotzky again revives the discussion, altho with other means. The preface to the book (and it in this preface, as well as in the annotations, that there lies the "kernel" of the book) is written in a semi-Aesopic language, so that the totally inexperienced reader will fail to observe the hints and allusions with which the preface is interlarded. This peculiar cryptic language, for which Comrade Trotzky, in spite of the fact that he himself demands "critical clearness," has a strong preference, must be deciphered. For the work of Comrade Trotzky, which claims to be a guide to the "Study of October," threatens to become a guide for "every present and future discussion." It takes upon itself the responsibility to fight against the line of the party, as well as of the Comintern, in which it in no way bears the character of a theoretical analysis, but more resembles a political platform, upon the basis of which it will be possible to undermine the exact decisions adopted by the respective congresses.

Comrade Trotzky's book is not only written for the Russian reader; this can be recognized without difficulty. It is to a large extent written for the "information" of foreign comrades. Now, when the problem of "Bolshevizing" stands on the order of the day in a whole number of Communist parties when the interest for the history of our party is undoubtedly increasing, the book of Comrade Trotzky can render a great disservice. It is not only not a text book of Bolshevism, but it will much rather become a factor for "debolshevizing" the foreign Communist parties—so biased, one-

sided, and at times exceedingly falsely, does it describe the events, from the analysis of which it seeks to draw conclusions for the present.

This is what renders necessary a critical examination of this new book of Comrade Trotzky. It must not remain unanswered. One can only regret that Comrade Trotzky, who draws conclusions from "the teachings of October" which, it is true, are false, draws no conclusions from the more recent epoch of last year's discussion. The best test of different points of

Of course he bears the whole responsibility for it. Willingly or unwillingly, we must reply to this book, as the party cannot permit a propaganda which is directed against the decisions which the party adopted with such firmness and unanimity to remain unanswered. We will therefore examine the statement which Comrade Trotzky has now submitted to the party, the "lessons" which he has drawn from October and is now very kindly communicating to our young and old comrades.

general, and of the Russian in particular, and thereby to overlook the experiences of 1917. It would be as if we were to indulge in disputes over the advantages of various methods of swimming, but obstinately refuse to turn our eyes to the river, where these methods are being applied by bathers. There is no better test for a point of view over revolution than its application in revolution itself, precisely as a method of swimming can best be proved when the swimmer springs into the water. . . ." (page XVI.)

"What is the meaning of Bolshevizing the Communist parties? It means such an education of these parties, such a selection of the leading persons, that they will not run off the track at the moment of their October. Herein lies Hegel, the book-wisdom and the essence of all philosophies. . . ." (page 65.)

These sentences only contain half the truth, and one can therefore (as Comrade Trotzky does) draw totally false conclusions from them.

Comrade Trotzky says to the Communist parties; Study October in order to be victorious! One must not overlook October.

Certainly one must not do that. Just as one must neither forget the year 1905, nor the very instructive years of reaction. Who, and where and when, has recommended such a monstrous thing? Who, and where and when, has even ventured to advocate such an absurdity?

No one has recommended it. But precisely in order to understand the pre-conditions of the October victory, one must at all costs look beyond the immediate preparations of the revolt. But in no event must one be separated from the other. In no circumstances must one estimate groups, persons and tendencies by disconnecting them from that period of preparation which Comrade Trotzky compares to disputes over "the best method of swimming." Of course in the "critical period," when it is a question of a decisive struggle, all questions are faced in all their acuteness, and all shades, tendencies and groups tend to express on this occasion their most characteristic, inner, essential qualities. On the other hand, the explanation for the fact that they play a positive role during the flood-time of revolution, does not always lie in the correctness of their "standpoint."

"It is not difficult to be a revolutionary when revolution has already broken out, when everything is in flames,"—thus Comrade Lenin formulated this aspect to the question. (Collected Works Volume 17, Page 183, Russian Edition.) In another passage he says: "The revolutionary is not he who becomes a revolutionary on the outbreak of revolution, but he who defends the principles and slogans of the revolution at the time of the most furious reaction." (Ibid. Volume 7, Page 15).

That is not the same thing as Trotzky says.

Let us dot the i's. What determined the attitude of the party of the Bolsheviks in October? It was determined by the whole previous history of the party, by its struggle against all opportunist deviations, from the extreme mensheviks up to the Trotzkyites (For example the "August" Bloc). Can one however, perchance, say that the correct standpoint of Comrade Trotzky (because it coincided with the Bolshevik standpoint) in the October days resulted from his attitude in the preparatory period? Obviously one cannot say that. On the (Continued on page 8)

Decision of the Party C. E. C.

To all Party Editors:
Dear Comrade:

You will find attached hereto an English translation of a review of Comrade Trotzky's Book "1917" entitled "How One Should Not Write the History of October."

By decision of the Central Executive Committee all Party papers are instructed to reprint this Pravda Review within ten days time.

It is the further instruction of the Central Executive Committee that no Party paper shall reprint the book "1917" or any chapter thereof in the Party press.

The Central Executive Committee also instructs that in connection with the reprinting of the review attached the following statement by the Central Executive Committee shall appear in the Party papers:

"The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International and the Thirteenth Party Conference of the Russian C. P. branded the opposition in the Russian Communist Party under the leadership of Comrade Trotzky as 'petty bourgeois opportunistic.' Comrade Trotzky has recently published a book '1917' in which he reopens the discussion which was closed by unanimous decision of the Fifth Congress and of the Thirteenth Conference of the C. P. of R.

"The review of Comrade Trotzky's book herewith 'How One Should Not Write the History of October' shows clearly the method employed by Comrade Trotzky to again open the discussion.

"It is the view of the Central Executive Committee of the W. P. of A. that the publication of Trotzky's book in this country would be a detriment to the work of Bolshevizing the Workers Party which is the most important task before our Party.

"The Central Executive Committee regrets to note that the Volkszeitung has already begun publication of the book serially. It has instructed the Volkszeitung to discontinue the publication and further instructs all other Party papers that neither the book as a whole nor any chapter thereof is to be reprinted in the Party press.

"The Central Executive Committee has further instructed all Party papers to reprint the accompanying review of Comrade Trotzky's book which was originally published in the Pravda, official organ of the Communist Party of Russia."

"CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE W. P. of A.

"WM. Z. FOSTER, Chairman,

"C. E. RUTHENBERG, Executive Secretary."

Prompt compliance with these instructions is desired of all Party papers.

Fraternally yours,

C. E. Ruthenberg, Executive Secretary.

view is, as Comrade Trotzky himself admits, experience, life itself. Life however has shown that the ruling line which is recognized by the party, has not only not brought the country to "the verge of ruin," as the last year's opposition predict, which prophesied for the country all the plagues of Egypt, but in spite of events, which are independent of every "platform," as the bad harvest etc., has brought the country forward.

On the other hand a whole number of new tasks under new conditions have arisen: difficulties which are determined by the process of growth. The whole party desires, before all, concrete work under a leadership which has been tried by experience. For this reason it was not in the least desirable to reopen the old disputes, even in another form.

Comrade Trotzky saw fit to do this.

I. The Question of Historical Investigation.

The axle upon which the statements of Comrade Trotzky turn is the estimate of the importance of various periods in the history of our party. He sees things essentially as follows: the whole period of the development of the party up to October 1917 is a thing of very little importance. Not until the moment of seizing power was the question decided, it is this period which stands out before all others, only then have we the possibility of testing classes, parties, their leading cadres, and individuals.

"It would mean a piece of barren scholasticism, but in no way a Marxian political analysis, were we at the present time to occupy ourselves with an analysis of the different view-points of revolution in

Lore and the Comintern

By Moissaye J. Olgin

Second Article.

The Levi Case.—"Volkszeitung" in sympathy with Levi.—Comrade Lore and the Russian Discussion.

PAUL LEVI was a leading figure in the United German Communist Party. Paul Levi did not stand the test of Communist discipline. Paul Levi stabbed his party in the back in one of the most crucial moments of its history. And, Paul Levi was persona grata on the pages of the "Volkszeitung" both before and after he committed his act of treason against the German Communist Party. At one time it looked as if Paul Levi was the greatest authority on Communism and Communist tactics for the leading spirits of the "Volkszeitung." When Comrade Lore wished to find corroboration for his opinion on Serrati's refusal to comply with the decisions of the Comintern, he found no better authority than Paul Levi. When the crisis within the German Communist Party broke

while considering. The German Communist Party at that time led an "illegal" existence. Raids and arrests of Communists were rampant all over the country. Thousands of revolutionists were facing court martial. The brochure went to print on April 3, when the fight in many places was still going on. It was sent to print without the knowledge of the central committee of which Levi was a member. And it was published in spite of the fact that the enlarged executive committee had, by a majority of 44 to 5, rejected the resolution embodying the views of Levi's group. The German Communist Party could but expel Levi for such action which was more than a breach of discipline, which brought confusion and created a crisis in the German Communist Party at a most dangerous moment. The central committee excluded him from its own midst and from the party, as was stated in the resolution, for "crass breach of confidence and a grave injury to the party."

The executive committee of the C. I. took up the Levi case at its meet-

is sheer nonsense . . . Levi is putting his criticism in a non-permissible and injurious form. Levi who preaches to others cautious and circumspect strategy throws himself into the fight (against his party) so prematurely, so unpreparedly, in such a nonsensical, wild fashion. . . . Levi acted as an 'intellectual anarchist' instead of acting like an organized member of the proletarian Communist International. Levi broke discipline."


EARLIER still, at the session of the Third Congress of the C. I., July 1, 1924, Lenin, discussing the March action and Levi's attack, said: "It is important to have a critical attitude towards our errors. We have begun with that. If, however, after a fight in which hundreds of thousands participated, one attacks this fight and acts the way Levi acted, he must be excluded. And this we have done."

RADEK who severely criticised the position of the German Communist Party at the Third Congress of the C. I., had to say concerning Levi:

action was insanely begun, no man knew what the fight was for." "This action, this foolhardiness had to be stimulated, had to be enlarged. It was capable of enlargement. To the dead in the Mannfeld region and Hamburg were added the dead in Halle. But they did not bring the necessary 'mood.' After the dead in Halle came the dead in Essen. But the 'mood' did not arrive. After the dead in Essen came the dead in Mannheim. But there was no 'mood' as yet." "We wish our comrades to have no repentance for what they did. We would put only one punishment on them, namely, that they should never appear before the eyes of the German workers."

THIS and other excerpts were freely published in the "Volkszeitung" without a word of unfavorable comment as to the behavior of Paul Levi. On the contrary, the "Volkszeitung" continued to give Paul Levi full publicity as one of its favorites. On April 13, 1921, the "Vorwärts," weekly edition of the "Volkszeitung," reprinted in full Levi's reply to the ac-

THE LAST DEFENSE OF CAPITALISM



Jouhaux Albert Thomas Henderson Vanderveide MacDonald Gompers Kautsky Hilferding Adler

out, the "Volkszeitung" was in open sympathy with Paul Levi against the German Communist Party and against the Communist International.

Important Case For Comintern.

THE Levi case is still very fresh in the memory of all those who participated in the life of the Comintern. In March, 1921, the famous March action of the German proletariat took place. The movement was a failure. Partial insurrections did not lead to a general revolt of the German masses. The white terror set in. The German bourgeoisie, aided by the German social-democrats, filled the jails with Communists. Court martials were meting vengeance on the revolutionary proletariat. At this time Paul Levi, a member of the executive committee of the Communist Party and editor of one of its papers, published a brochure under the name "Our Way—Against Putschism," which in scathing words accused the party and the Communist International of having wantonly provoked the March action without any hope for success and with full knowledge that the action would bring only bloodshed and misery to the German proletariat.

Levi's Treason.

THE circumstances under which this brochure was published are worth-

ing of April 27, practically all members of the E. C. expressing a glowing indignation again Levi's brochure. The general opinion was that Levi became a traitor. In the name of the E. C., Zinoviev branded as an infamous lie the statement of Levi that the March action was initiated by the E. C. of the C. I. The resolution adopted at that session reads in part:

The executive committee of the Communist International, having detailed knowledge of Paul Levi's brochure 'Our Way—Against Putschism,' approves of the action of the United Communist Party of Germany in excluding Paul Levi from the party and thereby from the C. I. Even if nine-tenths of Paul Levi's judgment of the March action were correct, he would have had to be expelled in this case for a monstrous breach of discipline and because Levi's attack in the given situation represents a blow to the party from behind."

AMONG those who signed the resolution was Lenin. In a letter to the German comrades published subsequently in the "Communist International" for December, 1921, but written on August 14, 1921, Lenin, discussing the character of and the lessons to be derived from the March action, says about Levi:

Of course, Paul Levi's assertion that the action was a 'putsch'

"Levi's very behavior proved more than his argumentation the absence of any organic connection between him and the party. It proved that he was capable of throwing a bomb at the party at a moment when it was bleeding to death."

IT is evident that whatever the opinion of the C. I. might have been concerning the revolutionary action of March, 1921, in Germany, it was unanimous in considering Paul Levi's stand as non-Communist. Paul Levi's attitude had to be judged by every Communist quite apart from correctness or incorrectness of his view on the March action. Paul Levi's action could not have been tolerated in any revolutionary organization which meant action. Yet the "Volkszeitung" totally ignoring this side of Levi's demonstration and refusing to condemn Levi for his treacherous attack upon his party, gave full prominence to Levi's attacks on the C. P. and the international.

ON May 5, 1921, the "Volkszeitung" reprinted big excerpts from Levi's brochure. These excerpts contained such accusations as this:

"It is a total departure from the past that the Communists should work as somebody's errand boys, that they should provoke massacre of their brothers. The March revolution was 'the greatest Bakunist putsch of history up to date.' 'The

cusation of the executive committee of the Comintern that he supported Serrati. On April 16, the "Vorwärts" gave a full page to a speech delivered by Paul Levi in the German reichstag. On May 10, the "Volkszeitung" reprinted the protest of several local Communist groups against the central committee of the German Party for temporarily suspending the members of the Levi group from participation in the reichstag faction.

Levi Publicity No Accident.

THE favorable prominence given to Levi was by no means an accident. It was in full harmony with the "Volkszeitung's" view on discipline in the C. I. This view was expressed as early as March, 1921, in an article by a German comrade published in the "Volkszeitung" and expressing the view that, bluntly speaking, "Moscow" should not "dictate" to other Communist Parties the course of their action. The article, giving an account of a difference of opinion between some of the German comrades and the executive committee of the C. I., says in part: "After the Russian C. P., the German C. P. is the strongest and most important in the C. I. It has made proposals as to the organization of relationships between the individual C. P.'s and it was right in doing so. Communication with the E. C. was often deficient, in consequence (Continued on page 7)

The Discussion on Party Tasks

FARMER-LABOR OPPORTUNISM

By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

THE campaign of the Workers Party to establish a farmer-labor party was the major united front manœuvre of our party up to date. On the whole, despite some decided disadvantages which will be touched upon in this article, it was beneficial to our party. It put the Workers Party at the head of large masses of workers in motion and gained for it much prestige as the fighting party of the working class. It gave us an opportunity to acquire much skill in the handling of these masses and enabled us to make them at least partly acquainted with Communist principles and tactics. It gave our own party membership a realization that the Workers Party, altho a small party, can become a real factor in the class struggle by following a militant policy.

But this farmer-labor party campaign was carried out under exceedingly difficult circumstances. The sentiment for a farmer-labor party of industrial workers and poor farmers, distinct from a LaFollette third party, was weak and vague, and almost the entire trade union bureaucracy was opposed sharply to the farmer-labor party. The problem of driving a wedge between the "class" farmer-labor movement and the LaFollette movement proper, and of organizing a farmer-labor party in the teeth of official trade union opposition, was a great one. The burden of leadership in the movement fell almost entirely upon the membership of the Workers Party. Naturally many mistakes were made. Some of these were of an opportunistic character.

In their desperate efforts to breathe the breath of life into their dead "class" farmer-labor party slogan, the farmer-labor Communists of the minority, especially Comrades Ruthenberg and Minor, have singled out some of these incidents and, upon the strength of them, have denounced the Central Executive Committee as opportunist. They conveniently overlook far more serious mistakes made by themselves when they were the C. E. C. It is the purpose of this article to discuss the various mistakes in our labor party policy to place the blame for them where it belongs, and to draw the lessons from these mistakes for our future work.

The Chicago July 3rd Convention

The W. P. policy in this convention, mapped out by the present minority, which was then the C. E. C., was highly opportunistic. The basis of the convention was a united front from above, between the leaders of the Workers Party and the farmer-labor party. At the last W. P. convention comrades Pepper, Ruthenberg, and Lovestone made the welkin ring with complaints about the Chicago united front, but they themselves engineered this phase of it, the one section that was really open to serious criticism.

Perhaps the biggest mistake made at the convention was pressing to the point of a split the question of the immediate formation of a farmer-labor party. Experience later with the flimsy federated farmer-labor party, which was formed at that time, showed that this mistake originated in an opportunistic grasping for the masses. The former C. E. C., in their eagerness literally to grab off a mass party, over-reached themselves. For this they were censured in the latest decision of the Communist International on our labor party policy, as follows: "The Workers Party failed in developing sufficient pliability with regard to so-called progressive elements and did not devote, and does not yet, devote, enough attention to the work among the workers organized in the labor unions." Former endorsement of the split by the C. I. were based on reports that the split resulted in a party of 600,000 workers and poor farmers.

Other sharply opportunistic tendencies developed with regard to the program of the F. F.-L. P. A committee entirely controlled by the W. P. presented to the convention a program so conservative in character that it was acceptable to the most reactionary elements and was adopted unanimously. (Comrade Pepper was especially pleased with the "courage" of our party in supporting the petty-bourgeois money plank which was supposed to win for us the support of the farmers). Comrade Pepper was pleased over this incident, almost as much so as some months later when he heard that our comrades in Minnesota had decided to vote for Magnus Johnson. He declared that we must have such errors in the platform, because behind this confusionism stands great masses, and of course we had to cater to catch them. Another fine sample of the opportunism of the former C. E. C. at the Chicago convention was the failure to introduce a resolution for the dictatorship—it was feared it would pass and break up the show.

The August Thesis

Among the very worst opportunistic development of the W. P. labor party policy stands the so-called August thesis. This was the chef d'oeuvre of Comrade Pepper, a master opportunist, the shrewdest yet produced by the American Communist movement, and one who understood how to cover up his opportunism with a heavy mask of revolutionary phraseology. His August thesis, enthusiastically supported by the former C. E. C., proposed a sort of get-rich-quick scheme. It was a very seductive "short-cut" to the revolution. Its essence was that the Communists should, by a grand manœuvre, sort of sneak up unsuspected upon the labor movement, tear off a great section of it and become overnight the leaders of a mass-movement.

The August thesis proposed the wonderful and opportunistic scheme of two mass Communist parties in this country. One of these, the federated farmer-labor party, was to consist of a general mush of trade unions, singing societies, fraternal orders, hiking associations, self-advancements clubs, etc., and its function was to carry on an opportunistic campaign amongst the workers on the basis of their immediate demands. The other Communist party, the Workers Party, was to stand modestly in the background, serving to save our revolutionary consciousness and to propagate Communist principles in the abstract.

The present C. E. C., then the minority, fought the August thesis unrelentingly. They forced its advocates to lay it on the shelf. At the last W. P. convention, the defenders of the August thesis lacked the moral courage to make a fight for it. They evaded the issue. But they still have this thesis definitely in their minds. It is the basis of their labor party policy. Comrade Minor admits this frankly in a recent article.

Comrade Pepper's political stock gamble, as exemplified by the August thesis, was sharply condemned by the C. I. in its recent decision on the American farmer-labor policy. In the face of Comrade Pepper's vigorous opposition, Comrade Olgin and I made war against the August thesis in Moscow. The result was that the following paragraph in the decision, which is entirely in accord with the policy of the present C. E. C., was proposed by comrade Kuusinen and adopted unanimously by the presidium:

"7. The aim to strive at is not to split the left-wing from the labor party as quickly as possible in order to form this split off party into a mass Communist Party. But we must strive at letting the left wing grow within the labor party and at the same time at taking in its most

advanced and revolutionary elements into the Workers Party."

The Third Party Alliance

Another opportunistic sin on the political soul of the present minority was the so-called third party alliance. This was another product of Comrade Pepper's fertile opportunism. In common with many others, the present C. E. C. fell victim to it. It was my hard task to defend it in the Comintern. No sooner did I hit Europe and explain it to the first revolutionist I met than I encountered a drastic condemnation of it as most dangerous opportunism. And so it continued all the time I was on the continent. Never on my whole trip, in Russia and elsewhere, did I meet a single Communist who did not wholeheartedly repudiate this proposition. The action of the Comintern presidium was unanimous in rejecting it as a manœuvre unfit for the Workers Party to make. There is no need here to make further argument about the opportunism of the third party alliance. This is admitted everywhere except in the thesis of the minority. The corrective action of the Comintern in this matter saved our party from serious difficulty.

In passing it may be noted that the three grand labor manœuvres engineered by comrade Pepper and the former C. E. C., namely the Chicago convention, the August thesis, and the third party alliance, were all condemned by the Communist International in its latest decision on our labor party policy.

The Grab at the Farmers

Another opportunistic manœuvre by the former C. E. C. was the adventure among the farmers. The split at the Chicago July 3rd convention cost the Workers Party many valuable rank and file union connections in the various industrial centers. It dampened the labor party movement there very much. Just about this time comrade Pepper discovered the impending "LaFollette revolution," the backbone of which were the farmers, then in a strong state of ferment. Immediately in the policies and statements of the former C. E. C. the farmers emerged as a great, if not the great, revolutionary factor. The party turned its major attention towards working among them, the more difficult work among the trade unions being sadly neglected.

Largely forgetting that the industrial workers must of necessity be the base of our party activity, they shifted the center of gravity to the farmers. The trade unions were systematically minimized, the whole A. F. of L. being denounced as simply an organization of labor aristocrats, notwithstanding the great numbers of miners and other genuine proletarian elements amongst the unions. Efforts were made to minimize the importance of the working class itself in the revolution and to prove that the United States is more of an agricultural than an industrial country. In Moscow Comrade Pepper even went so far as to state that in respect to its industrial development the United States resembled Russia more than it did England.

The Workers Party must win the support of the poor farmers. They are essential to the success of the revolution. But this support must not be won by the sacrifice of real proletarian support. Realizing this, the present C. E. C., then the minority, carried on a ceaseless struggle to keep the heads of the former C. E. C. from being turned altogether by the "easy pickings" amongst the farmers and from neglecting the far more vital work amongst the industrial workers. The opportunism of the former C. E. C. ran riot in connection with the farmers.

The St. Paul Convention

Then we came to the St. Paul convention. In this connection the farmer-labor Communists raise loud outcries of protest. After having been guilty of the gross opportunism of the Chicago split, the August thesis, the third party alliance, and the grab at

the farmers they venture to call the present C. E. C. opportunistic. The situation at St. Paul was this: The elections were approaching and it was absolutely necessary to crystallize the farmer-labor party in order to make, or try to make, a campaign under its banner. The situation was difficult, with the LaFollette forces sucking the life out of the farmer-labor movement. Consequently the C. E. C. made extreme efforts to hang on to the disappearing masses. In some respects its policy verged into opportunism. This must be admitted. But the minority are disbarred from criticism. They endorsed the whole thing.

Comrade Minor blossoms forth with a speech I was supposed to make in St. Paul. The fact is the speech was imperfectly reported. But it was bad enough at the best. I make no apology for it. It represented only one of the overstrainings we made to retain contact with the masses. But the speech was in harmony with the point of view of the whole C. E. C., majority. Comrade Ruthenberg, who was on the steering committee that authorized it, pronounced it very timely. Not a word of objection was raised by the minority, altho the C. E. C. was meeting nightly. It was only a couple of months later, when word was received from Moscow, that the minority woke up to a realization, for factional purposes, that the speech was opportunistic.

Comrade Ruthenberg also voices a protest against our opportunism. He cites a motion that I am supposed to have made in the C. E. C. to the effect that we should support LaFollette's nomination. But Comrade Ruthenberg has developed much a penchant for writing the minutes in a factional spirit that the C. E. C. had to adopt measures for their constant correction. Months ago I definitely repudiated this motion. It unfairly stated my position. At that time the C. E. C. was committed to the third party alliance which tacitly if not actually, accepted the proposition that LaFollette would be the candidate of the third party. Any denial of this is sheer hypocrisy. The motion I made proposed in effect that if at the coming conference the question of nominations was forced upon the conference and the choice lay between Ford (who was then in the field as a progressive candidate) and LaFollette, that if it had to the Workers Party would support the latter as the lesser of two evils. This was bad enough, but it indicates merely the opportunistic tangle we got into as a result of comrade Pepper's beloved third party alliance.

Comrade Ruthenberg's manufactured indignation that we should tolerate the nomination of LaFollette comes with ill grace, especially after his militant support of the third party alliance. Time and again he gave Mahoney, of the Minnesota farmer-labor party, to understand that if the Workers Party made any opposition to the candidacy of LaFollette in the approaching conferences and convention it would be purely formal, to keep the record clear. It is interesting to note also that when I introduced a motion in the C. E. C. at St. Paul which would have precipitated a break with the LaFollette forces then and there, it was lost by one vote, the vote of comrade Ruthenberg. His "fight" against LaFollette's nomination was a fake. This was clearly shown by the following motion, introduced by comrade Ruthenberg and defeated by the C. E. C. on May 2, 1924:

"We shall nominate in the convention a candidate in opposition to LaFollette and cast our vote for such a candidate. We must, however, be careful to see to it that this manœuvre does not defeat LaFollette, for to nominate another candidate and permit LaFollette to become the candidate of the July 4 convention in opposition to our

(Continued on page 4)

The Discussion on Party Tasks

FARMER-LABOR OPPORTUNISM.

(Continued from page 3)

nominee would be to destroy the class farmer-labor party as a mass organization."

The Lesson to be Drawn

As I stated in the opening of this article, our labor party campaign has been waged under very serious difficulties, due to the lack of a more vigorous and definite movement for a party of industrial workers and poor farmers. Consequently, mistakes have been made, many of them verging into opportunism. But there is a fundamental difference in the way the present C. E. C. and the minority have reached to these mistakes. The C. E. C. majority went along with the third party alliance, but now frankly admits in their thesis that this was a mistake. They also recognize such opportunism as developed at St. Paul. More than that, they saw the opportunistic danger in making the election campaign under the banner of the skeleton national farmer-labor party, so they promptly cut loose from it and launched the Workers Party ticket. Likewise, now the C. E. C. perceives the opportunistic menace in continuing the use of the farmer-labor party slogan when there is no mass sentiment behind it, so they would avoid this disaster by dropping the farmer-labor party slogan.

But the minority are unregenerate in their opportunism. They have initiated and supported every opportunistic development in the labor party policy. They still support the Chicago split and the August thesis. They did not, in their thesis, admit that the third party alliance was a mistake. They supported fully such op-

portunistic tendencies as developed at the St. Paul convention. Nor did they justify our election policy of the W. P. running candidates in its own name. Comrade Lovestone was willing to see the Workers Party sacrifice this, its first opportunity to come before the workers nationally in an election campaign, in order that the beloved "class" farmer-labor party might be furthered, and they still try to minimize the results of the election campaign, of which every Communist should be proud. The minority now, in the face of the hostile decision of the Comintern, propose in their thesis that the W. P. follow a policy of penetrating the LaFollette movement. Their advocacy of the dead farmer-labor party slogan is calculated to plunge the Workers Party head over heels into the swamp of opportunism.

The meaning of this continued and unrelenting opportunism of the minority is quite clear. The majority has made mistakes. It admits them and corrects them. The minority admits nothing, corrects nothing. These farmer-labor Communists represent the real right-wing of the Workers Party. They are disappointed in the progress made so far by our party. They want quick results, and they are not particular as to what kind of results they get. Their plan is not to carry out the united front principles of the Comintern, but to establish a substitute opportunistic party in place of the Workers Party. The membership must repudiate this dangerous right-wing, liquidating tendency. The way to do it is to defeat overwhelmingly the thesis of the farmer-labor party Communists.

THE MINORITY THEORY OF FAKE UNITED FRONTS

By EARL R. BROWDER.

THE minority in our party discussion, led by Comrades Lovestone and Ruthenberg, pose as the defenders of the united front. But what kind of united front are they thinking of? What do they mean by a "united front on the political field"? We can find a part of the answer in a paragraph written by Comrade Ruthenberg in the *Liberator* for August, 1924, in which he says:

"As there was not in the United States any mass political organization of workers and farmers with which the Workers Party could join in common struggles over immediate issues, thus forming a united front, it was the task of the Workers Party to create such an organization on the political field."

There we have the minority theory in a nutshell. If there are no non-Communist political organizations of the workers which we can approach to offer a united front, then we must create such an organization, so that we can thereafter form a united front with it.

Not a United Front, But Political Self-Abuse.

Of course, this is not the united front at all as the Comintern explains that tactic. Comrade Zinoviev said at the Fifth Congress:

"But comrades, history plays pranks with this slogan (the united front) as indeed it does with many slogans. We adopted the tactics of the united front as the tactics of revolution at a time in history when the struggle had become protracted. Some comrades in our own ranks interpreted them as something totally different, as the tactics of evolution, of opportunism as against the tactics of revolution. . . . Some comrades endeavored to interpret them as an alliance with the social democracy, as a coalition of all 'labor parties'."

History does indeed play pranks with slogans, but history was never guilty of such a prank as that sponsored by Comrades Lovestone and

Ruthenberg, who would not only make the united front synonymous with a coalition of all "labor parties," but propose that we ourselves shall assume the task of creating those "labor parties" with which we should form the coalition. The minority proposal is not for a political united front—it is for a form of political self-abuse.

United Front Not a Parliamentary Combination.

"The Communist Parties alone defend the interests of the proletariat as a whole. The tactics of the united front do not at all imply the so-called 'election combinations' at the top, calculated to promote parliamentary aims of one kind or another. The tactics of the united front are nothing else but an offer made by the Communists to wage a common struggle with all the workers belonging to other parties or other groups, or not belonging to any parties at all, in defense of the elementary vital needs of the working class against the bourgeoisie. Any action taken even for the most insignificant demand. . . . These words of Comrade Zinoviev at the Fifth Congress seem to have been aimed directly at our farmer-laborites to refute their identification of the united front with the farmer-labor electoral combination, and, especially, to destroy their fantastic conception that we must create political parties in order to make a united front with them.

HELP! HELP! Give Us a Hand—

We are swamped again. There is just a load of work piling up in our office and our small force is struggling hard to get it done. If any comrades have a day, an hour or a minute to spare, COME ON OVER—GIVE US A HAND!

THE MAGIC SLOGAN

By ISRAEL BLANKENSTEIN.

THE united front tactic cannot be based on theoretically conceived issues and slogans. If its aim—to mobilize the working class masses against the capitalist class and to extend the influence of the Communist Party—is to be realized, it must be based on live issues and on slogans that find a widespread and active response among the masses of workers. Is the "class farmer-labor party" such a slogan at the present time? The minority contends, what was good in 1923 is good in 1925.

To be sure, in July, 1924, even the majority of the minority was forced to admit that the "class" farmer-labor parties were drowned in the "third party." This was not unexpected even to the minority. The Pepper-Ruthenberg thesis on the labor party policy adopted by the last party convention, and which the minority seems to have forgotten, declared:

"The workers and exploited farmers of the United States have for so many years supported the republican and democratic parties that any organization which breaks away from these old parties will have a tremendous appeal for them and they will not differentiate between such a general third party movement and the class farmer-labor movement. . . . There is great danger that. . . (the existing class farmer-labor groups) will be swept into the third party movement and thus the whole movement for a class labor party will be halted FOR SOME YEARS TO COME." This assertion is repeated over and over.

"Unless there is a national crystallization of the labor party movement. . . there will be NO HOPE for organizing a class labor party on a national scale FOR SOME YEARS TO COME." And again, more emphatically: "Unless such a class farmer-labor party is organized on a national scale for the 1924 election the whole movement will be dissipated and DESTROYED FOR YEARS TO COME." (Second Year of the W. P., pages 51 and 52.)

This prediction has come true despite the formation of the St. Paul "national farmer-labor party," not to mention the minority's miscarriage, the F. F. L. P. But to the minority "class farmer-labor party" has become a magic phrase that can at all times draw the workers close to our party. The minority thesis instructs us very profoundly:

"The experiences of the workers and poorer farmers in the struggle against capitalism will produce even a stronger movement for independent political action than has existed in the past."

Sure, sure. We know it. We even know that experience will teach the workers and poorer farmers that only thru revolutionary action and under the leadership of the Communist Party, etc. . . . That's very nice. But how will these Communist platitudes help us to find the correct policy to hasten this process? Comrade Ruthenberg expatiates on the theme of experience in a whole article, with equal results. The sharpening of the class struggle in the post-war period forced the workers and poor farmers to leave the old parties. There are new and intenser class conflicts coming in the near future. Therefore, concludes Comrade Ruthenberg, large sections of the workers and farmers will break with the LaFollette movement, and our agitation for a class farmer-labor party will hasten this process and will help build our party. Is the situation quite so simple as the minority tries to paint it?

The experiences of the workers in the struggles of 1919-1922 were the climax to similar experiences of many years which revealed the republican and democratic parties as the political instruments of the ruling class. In the struggles that are ahead of us the governmental powers that will be used to suppress the working class will again be wielded by the repub-

lican party, and this is more likely to strengthen the LaFollette illusion than otherwise. Yes, the disillusionment with the reformist middle class-labor bureaucratic combination will come, but it will be a much slower process than the minority is willing to believe and dictates to us an entirely different angle of attack than the "class farmer-labor" phrase.

The minority thesis finds evidence of a fundamental conflict between the "farmer-labor" movement and the "third party" movement in the fact that a number of farmer-labor parties in the western states, including the Minnesota farmer-labor party which they themselves have repeatedly characterized as a third party, ran separate tickets in the last election and in the organizational friction between the LaFollette machine and the state "farmer-labor" machines. All of which shows only that in some of the western states the third party movement has been more definitely crystallized than elsewhere, and that the middle class liberal politicians on one hand, and the labor bureaucrats and socialist politicians on the other hand, are fighting for influence and control over the third party movement. Comrade Lovestone tries to prove this "fundamental conflict" by quoting extensively. . . from Mr. Mahoney's editorials. But unfortunately for Comrade Lovestone's argument, the very issue in which his article appeared carried the news that the farmer-labor federation, the labor wing which we helped to organize in the Minnesota farmer-labor party, unseated the representative of our party by a two-to-one vote, and Comrade Hathaway correctly characterized this act as a complete surrender to the C. P. P. A. As to the farmer-labor parties which "maintained their independence of the LaFollette movement," the North Dakota farmer-labor party was already disposed of by its father, Comrade Manley. The mass class farmer-labor party of Denver, Colorado, I will leave to somebody who may know what it really represents from personal contact. But of the federated farmer-labor party of Washington county, Pa. I am in a position to inform the comrades of the minority that, whatever it may have been in 1923, or the early part of 1924, at least since May, 1924, it was no more than a name and a committee of five members of our party.

No, there is no indication of a mass sentiment for a party that would fill the imaginary void between the C. P. P. A. and the Communist Party. A "class farmer-labor party" would at best mean no more than a united front with new Mahoneys and Cramers, and we are under no obligation to create a haven for "left" socialists. Our field for the application of the united front tactics lies elsewhere, in the fight of the working class masses for definite daily aims and daily demands. We all agree that the near future will bring intense class conflicts. It is on these coming struggles that we must base our united front tactics, it is there, by exposing the unfitness and inability of the labor bureaucrats to lead the working class, that we will find "an entering wedge between the working masses and their treacherous leaders," including the C. P. P. A. leaders. The Comintern has repeatedly warned us that in determining the concrete tasks of the united front tactics we must take into consideration the condition of the section, how strong and homogeneous the Communist Party is. The tasks ahead of us, to bolshevize the party, to reorganize it on a shop nuclei basis, to put the party in condition for active participation and leadership in the movements of the unemployed and in the "outlaw" and spontaneous strikes that are sure to come, are big enough for any Communist Party. With our slender strength we have no reason to waste any energy on a phantom "class farmer-labor party." Let its ghost rest in peace. Let us put to the fore the Workers (Communist) Party.

The Discussion on Party Tasks

A Fighting Slogan in the Trade Unions— The Farmer-Labor United Front

By BENJAMIN GITLOW.

IN the Labor Herald of March, 1923, edited by Comrade Foster the following statement is contained on the national referendum on the labor party.

"Not to speak of the political necessity for a militant independent party of the working class, the Trade Union Educational League holds that it is impossible to have a successful trade union movement in this country until labor has declared definitely for a labor party. The Gompers political policy of rewarding our friends and punishing our enemies is fatal to labor unions. . . . The workers will never be able to think or act intelligently as proletarians so long as their trade unions are linked up with capitalist political parties. This is a fundamental of unionism. A labor party is one of the most vital needs of the American labor movement."

Now Comrade Foster and the other members of the majority that in 1923 sponsored the above sentiments propose that the united front in the unions on the basis of the farmer-labor party slogan be abandoned. In 1923 they said "The workers will never be able to think or act intelligently as proletarians without a labor party. A labor party is one of the most vital needs of the American labor movement." Now they say that the slogan of a farmer-labor party has lost its power of stirring large masses of workers. They claim that the farmer-labor movement which Comrade Foster in his article on the triple revolt stated was one of the issues that might break Gompers' control over the American labor movement is dead. They go even further and state that the whole movement for independent political action in the unions is dead. They now assume that as a result of that, that the only form the movement for independent political action can take is the form of the Workers Party.

The C. E. C. majority reiterates that the economic conditions which were the basis before for the farmer-labor party united front have not materially changed. The development of the farmer-labor party movement should therefore continue. The C. E. C. majority, however, does not reason with economic factors. It wants every one to believe that a movement that has its roots in the economic life of the country and a movement it admits had a big following among the masses and particularly among the organized workers, in a single day, was destroyed because the workers believing in a labor party who followed LaFollette were disillusioned when LaFollette received only five million votes. The majority wants to create the impression that a movement that has been developing in the United States for years, that a movement with a historical background and with an ideology that has permeated hundreds of thousands of the most militant workers in the unions can immediately cease to be a factor in the labor movement. The majority makes the mistake here of considering the labor party movement not as a development going thru a period of years, but as a phenomenon of only immediate importance. That is why they make the big error of considering the election results as the final determining factor ending the labor party movement and not an important event in its development.

The Comintern in its decision on the American question has correctly formulated the significance of the labor party movement in its relation to the Workers Party. It states as follows: "The first task of the Workers Party is to become a mass Communist Party of workers. It can fulfill this task only by most actively participating in the establishment of a labor party which will embrace all elements of the working class wishing to conduct a policy independent of the capitalist class and establishing a bond

with the farmers who are at present in a state of fermentation. These two independent tasks—the task of building around the Communist Party a broad class labor party and of establishing a bond between the labor party and the poorest elements of the farmers—have developed in the United States, thanks to the peculiarities of historical evolution as one problem. Namely, the building of a common party of workers and farmers." The Comintern demonstrates that it fully understands the nature of the farmer-labor party movement when it declares that it is the result of the peculiarities of historical evolution thruout the history of the American labor movement we can trace its development. It is true that the movement as such has not fully crystallized. That does not necessarily mean that the idea of the farmer-labor party is of no consequence. From a consideration of recent facts following the elections which the majority wants us to believe, has changed everything the direct opposite is true. The slogan for a farmer-labor party is of great dynamic value. First, the economic conditions driving the workers and poorer elements of the farmers to demand the organization of such a party exist today as never before. This even the majority admits. And second, around the slogan of a farmer-labor party we again find the militant and progressive forces in the unions rallying.

Let us go to the last convention of the American Federation of Labor recently held in El Paso in order to learn what took place there. Comrade Foster and the whole majority even before election day, considered the labor party slogan dead. That is why before election day when they drafted the resolutions for the A. F. L. convention they omitted a resolution on the labor party. As a result, the T. U. E. L. was put in the ridiculous position of publicly assuming the death of the farmer-labor party movement while Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor convention fought that movement with all the power at their command. The question then arises if the LaFollette movement swallowed up as the majority would have us believe the farmer-labor sentiment in the United States and killed it and if as they further say, the movement itself is insignificant and is organized only in a few states, why then was Samuel Gompers and the whole bureaucratic and reactionary officialdom so much afraid of the idea of a farmer-labor party? If the farmer-labor party movement is not a revolutionary development for the workers in the United States, then why did the capitalist press of the country in unison, spur on and support Samuel Gompers in his fight on the idea of a labor party in the United States?

It is up to Comrade Foster and the other members of the majority to answer these questions. But in doing so, they should stick to facts. They should not make the false charges that the minority is opposed to all other united fronts except the farmer-labor party united front. Not only does the minority include a whole series of united fronts on immediate issues in its thesis, but the minority is the one that has forced the present majority to accept after it had fought it bitterly at the last convention the idea of a united front on unemployment. It is true that the minority never agreed with the Foster idea of united fronts with leaders as the Fitzpatrick united front in the Chicago Federation of Labor. That is one of the reasons there is today such a principle difference between the Foster and Ruthenberg group.

The minority wants to build a Communist Party not a syndicalist Lore left social democratic sectarian party. The minority wants to develop the Workers Party into an effective revo-

lutionary political party of the working class. The minority wants a Workers Party that will go into the unions not one that will hold itself aloof from the unions, not one that will stand passively by watching the political consciousness that is developing inside of them. The minority wants to be the leader in developing this political consciousness instead of the Johnsons, Fitzpatricks, Mahoneys, Kramers, Hillquits, and Bergers.

That is why the minority is for the farmer-labor party slogan. The farmer-labor party slogan is a militant slogan. It is a slogan of the rank and file in the unions. The realization of that slogan can only be gained thru a bitter struggle on the part of the rank and file against all the agents of capitalism in the unions. What form does the fight in the unions against Samuel Gompers' policy of reward your friends and punish your enemies take? It takes the form of the labor party against the policy of non-partisan political action. But this special form Foster and the majority wants us to abandon. To abandon the struggle for a labor party is to abandon one of the most effective and special means for awakening the political consciousness of the American workers.

Because the fight for the labor party is a fight against Gompers, a fight against the petty bourgeois politicians who would convert the labor

party movement into a petty bourgeois party, against the socialist party betrayers and a fight against the big capitalist politicians the slogan for a labor party is a militant revolutionary slogan. In assuming leadership in the militant struggles of the rank and file for the labor party the Workers Party puts itself in a position where it can gain influence and leadership over the masses engaged in the struggle. And the more numerous the masses engaged in the struggle for the labor party the greater the prestige of the Workers Party among them the more sure is the Workers Party of its leadership over them. This will make it possible for the Workers Party to draw the best elements of this movement into its ranks and as a result of its wide influence of the broad masses involved to become the mass Communist Party that it is striving for.

The minority is therefore not composed of liquidators but builders of the Communist Party. The liquidators are the members of the present majority who have already in their alliance with the Loreites laid the basis for the contamination of the Workers Party with the 2½ sectarianism of the left social-democrats. We of the minority want a party not only of members but of active members who are Communists and who will loyally under all circumstances support the Communist International.

Facts for Communists

The Foster-Lore Alliance and the Communist International.

By JAY LOVESTONE.

Article I.

IN view of the instructions of the Communist International that the Ruthenberg and Foster groups should work together and carry on an active campaign against the ideology of the Two-and-a-Half International in our party as represented by Comrade Lore, the following first of a series of analyses of the voting record of the central executive committee should prove illuminating to the entire party membership in the course of the present discussions.

1. C. E. C. majority votes for or proposes measures in behalf of Lore (Two-and-a-Half International tendency).

Date.

No. 1—March 7, 1924. Council.

Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to censure Lore for printing in Volkszeitung item referring to conclusions of Workers Party observer at St. Louis conference for progressive political action as being an act in contradiction to declared party policy.

Vote.

Foster—Motion to refer to next central executive meeting. (Carried by majority.)

Date.

No. 2—March 7, 1924. Council.

Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to censure Lore for stating in Volkszeitung that Zinoviev's information regarding United States comes from unreliable sources.

Vote.

Foster—Motion to refer to next central executive meeting. (Carried by majority.)

Date.

No. 3—March 7, 1924. Council.

Motion.

Pepper—Motion to have central executive committee make public statement defending Comintern and Zinoviev against Lore's articles.

b. To endorse fully the old guard in Russian Communist Party.

c. To protest against Lore's statement that majority of central executive committee is for Trotsky's position.

d. That Pepper be allowed to write article in Liberator defending position of old guard in Russian Communist Party.

Vote.

Foster—Motion to refer to next

central executive committee meeting. (Carried by majority.)

Date.

No. 4—March 7, 1924. Council.

Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to instruct district executive committee No. 2 to investigate Lore's report on last central executive committee meeting to New York German group meeting in which he is reported to have said that Pepper would be one of the delegates to the Communist International and that steps would be taken to see to it that he did not return.

Vote.

Foster—Motion to refer to next central executive committee meeting. (Carried by majority.)

Date.

No. 5—March 17, 1924. Central Executive Committee.

Motion.

Pepper—Motion that Lore instead of Olgin should be delegate to the Communist International.

Vote.

Foster majority votes against motion and for Olgin.

Date.

No. 6—March 17, 1924. Central Executive Committee.

Motion.

Pepper—Motion to postpone sending of delegation to Communist International in view of inability of Ruthenberg to go at this time.

Vote.

Foster majority against motion.

Date.

No. 7—March 17, 1924. Central Executive Committee.

Motion.

Pepper—Motion to censure Lore and district executive committee No. 2 for praising help of New York police department at Lenin Memorial meeting.

Vote.

Cannon—Amendment—That central executive committee condemns their action and also action of all party papers which may have handled the matter in an incorrect manner. (Carried by majority.)

Date.

No. 8—March 17, 1924. Central Executive Committee.

Motion.

Pepper—Motion to send circular on this incident to all party branches.

Vote.

Defeated by Foster majority.

(Continued on page 6)

The Discussion on Party Tasks

FACTS FOR COMMUNISTS

(Continued from page 5)

Date.
No. 9—March 18, 1924. Central Executive Committee.
Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to have central executive committee issue statement in Volkszeitung and DAILY WORKER defending Zinoviev and Comintern policies.

Vote.
Foster—Amendment—To have central executive committee instruct Lore to write editorial correcting himself because of "certain erroneous statement that have appeared in the Volkszeitung relative to the Communist International." (Carried by majority.)

Date.
No. 10—March 18, 1924. Central Executive Committee.
Motion.

Pepper—Motion to censure Lore and to have central executive committee make public statement on the Communist International and Zinoviev misrepresentations by Lore.

Vote.
Foster—To refer to the next central executive committee meeting. (Carried by majority.)

Date.
No. 11—March 18, 1924. Central Executive Committee.
Motion.

Pepper—Motion to endorse the old guard in the Russian Communist Party controversy.

Vote.
Foster—Amendment—"In view of the fact that the controversy in the Russian Communist Party has been decided by a conference of the Russian Communist Party the central executive committee is of the opinion that it is not called upon to take a position on the merits of the controversy. The central executive committee will print in the party press all the documents bearing on the debate and encourage the membership to study them and to discuss the question in the columns of the party press. The central executive committee will condemn any attempt to make factional issue in the American party." (Carried by the majority.)

Date.
No. 12—March 18, 1924. Central Executive Committee.
Motion.

Pepper—Motion to reaffirm executive council decision regarding telepathy advertisement in Volkszeitung.

Vote.
Cannon—Amendment—"That in view of the explanation of Comrade Lore that lecture was before open forum as part of an effort to attract non-party members and the subject was psycho-therapy and hypnotism the apprehensions of the executive council were unfounded." (Carried by majority.)

Date.
No. 13—March 25, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Foster—Motion to remove Siminoff as eastern district T. U. E. L. organizer and replace him with Zimmerman. (Loreite.)

Vote.
Carried by majority.

Date.
No. 14—April 14, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to call attention of Lore and German district committee No. 2 regarding central executive committee action against their branches holding meetings on spiritualism and advertising the same in Volkszeitung.

Vote.
Voted down by majority.

Date.
No. 15—April 14, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Cannon—Motion that Poyntz (Loreite) be made educational director of New York school.

Vote.
Carried.

Date.
No. 16—April 14, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to accept Ruthenberg report on membership meetings in New York and Philadelphia

where questions arose over Lore's misstatements regarding the Communist International.

Vote.
Voted down by majority and carry Cannon motion: To issue special statement "in the name of the central executive committee on all questions including factional opposition in New York."

Date.
No. 17—May 3, 1924. Central Executive Committee.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to read letter from New York Workers' School regarding Poyntz and controversy over her educational work.

Vote.
Cannon—To refer motion to educational committee. (Carried by majority.)

Date.
No. 18—June 2, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to reject application of Gruss ((expelled Salutsky follower) to rejoin the party.

Vote.
Majority votes against Ruthenberg proposal and decides to defer action to next full central executive committee meeting.

Date.
No. 19—August 18, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Ruthenberg—Resolution acknowledging receipt of Lore's wire regarding Volkszeitung three-day advertisement of Admiral Horthy (Hungary) imperial loan bonds and reaffirming political committee's first action on this; pointing out stain on Comintern thru such an ad appearing in an organ of one of its parties; reiterating former censure of Volkszeitung and decision to expel any member responsible for same.

Vote.
Foster majority members vote down this resolution. Lost by tie vote.

Date.
No. 20—August 18, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Foster—Motion to take no further action on Volkszeitung-Horthy bond advertisement till we hear Bittelman's report.

Vote.
Lost by tie vote.

Date.
No. 21—August 18, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to have central executive committee report Horthy bond matter to Communist International and assure it of our taking proper action on same.

Vote.
Lost by tie vote. Cannon amendment to report when investigation is completed also lost.

Date.
No. 22—August 25, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to suspend Blohm from holding party office for six months because of his role in handling Horthy advertisement.

Vote.
Lost.

Date.
No. 23—September 29, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion to elect committee of three to draft plan for ownership of Volkszeitung and plant.

Vote.
Bittelman amends to put matter on agenda of next central executive committee meeting. (Thus deferring action.)

Date.
No. 24—September 29, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Ruthenberg—Motion to ask Lore what he did towards carrying out central executive committee decision regarding Volkszeitung ownership made in March, 1924.

Vote.
Majority defers action by referring to full central executive committee meeting.

Date.
No. 25—September 29, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion Lore be instructed to have Volkszeitung discontinue

advertising socialist party branch meetings as in Sept. 21 issue.

b. That Volkszeitung discontinue advertising movie announcements for Coolidge, Davis and LaFollette.

c. That party member charged with responsibility of going over Volkszeitung before it goes to press shall be censured for permitting such advertisements to appear.

d. That central executive committee issue a statement laying down Communist policy on advertising based on experiences with Volkszeitung ads of this character.

e. Condemnation of Volkszeitung reprinting article by Kautsky apologizing for traitorous role of German social-democracy during imperialist world war.

Vote.
Majority moves to defer action until next full central executive committee meeting.

Date.
No. 26—September 29, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Gitlow—Resolution outlining active ideological and organizational campaign against the Two-and-a-Half International tendency and for the central executive committee control of entire party press.

Vote.
Foster—Amendment—To refer document to Polcom as a basis for a statement and report to central executive committee. Despite minority's accepting this motion in good faith, more than two months have now elapsed and Comrade Bittelman, the secretary of the Polcom, has not yet taken this report up for action by the Polcom.

Date.
No. 27—October 14, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Bedacht—Motion that "district executive committee No. 2 reorganize New York educational committee on the basis of the reorientation of the central executive committee and the Comintern and submit the names of the new committee to the central executive committee for approval."

Vote.
Majority defeats Bedacht motion.

Date.
No. 28—October 14, 1924. Council.
Motion.

Lovestone—Motion that Bedacht motion be considered "as a preliminary to the complete reorganization of the school." (Poyntz, a Loreite, directing New York School.)

Vote.
Majority defeats Lovestone amendment.

Date.
No. 29—December 7, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Lovestone—Resolution pointing out that New York Volkszeitung of Nov. 22 carries interview with Grassman, reactionary German social-democrat and fraternal delegate to A. F. of L. convention, expressing appreciation of "the non-partisan help extended by the Volkszeitung to German workers' families and members of trade unions."

b. "That central executive committee calls upon Comrade Lore, as responsible party editor, to explain either what was the character of this aid or if there was no such aid as spoken of by the anti-Communist Grossman, to explain how this item got into the Volkszeitung."

Vote.
Cannon—To lay the matter over until Comrade Bittelman, representative to the German convention, reports.

Date.
No. 30—December 10, 1924. Polcom.
Motion.

Lovestone—"WHEREAS: Comrade Lore has officially registered his acceptance of the MAJORITY of the central executive committee election statement and has voted against the MINORITY of the central executive committee election statement;

"WHEREAS: The MAJORITY of the central executive committee election statement lays down a party policy which is the essence of and is reaffirmed by the MAJORITY of the central executive committee thesis now before the party membership;

"WHEREAS: It is now more than two weeks since the MAJORITY and

MINORITY of the central executive committee have placed their position before the party and Comrade Lore has not yet registered his vote on these proposals;

"THEREFORE: Be it resolved by the central executive committee that we call upon Comrade Lore to declare his position in the party controversy immediately.

"THEREFORE: We instruct Comrade Lore specifically to declare whether:

"1. He votes for the thesis submitted to central executive committee by Comrade Foster—the thesis of the MAJORITY of the central executive committee.

"2. Whether he votes for or against the thesis submitted to the central executive committee by Comrade Ruthenberg—the thesis of the MINORITY of the central executive committee.

"3. Whether he intends to submit a thesis of his own expressing a point of view different from those presented in either the MAJORITY of the central executive committee or the minority of the central executive committee theses.

"4. Whether he has definitely made up his mind not to vote for or against either theses presented and has decided not to present his own thesis.

"THEREFORE: We, the central executive committee, do hereby decide to impress upon Comrade Lore that the welfare of the party demands that he as a central executive committee member and the leader of an especially designated tendency by the Communist International, stop delaying his decision on the vital party problems and that he tell the membership without any further delay, exactly what position he takes in the controversy."

Vote.
Bittelman—Amendment to request Comrade Lore to register his vote on the theses proposed or to submit his own thesis within a week. Carried by Foster majority.

Recapitulation.
Total number of central executive committee majority votes for, or measures proposed in behalf of, Lore (Two-and-a-Half International tendency) is 30.

Views of Our Readers

A CORRECTION.

To the DAILY WORKER: We would like to call your attention to the "Editor's note" in your issue of Friday, Nov. 20, page 3, column 7, above the "Anise story," where you state that the Jewish Workers' Relief Committee is at present carrying on a campaign for funds to assist colonization work in Soviet Russia. We wish to correct this statement in so far as the campaign to which you refer is being carried on by the Committee for Jewish Colonization in Soviet Russia, 46 Canal Street, New York, which is an organization entirely separate and distinct from the Jewish Workers' Relief Committee.

We will appreciate if you will bring this correction to the attention of your readers. Sincerely yours, Committee for Jewish Colonization in Soviet Russia, Dr. E. Wattenberg, secretary.

To the DAILY WORKER: After reading the article by Anise in the DAILY WORKER on the Jewish land question I wish to make a brief statement regarding this matter. The Soviet government was very liberal in giving land to the Jews. On this land a group of Jewish radicals have organized a colony under the name of Commune Harold with our main office in New York. Last October we sent a group of members to Russia with machinery and other necessities for the building of the Commune. We expect to send another group soon.

The New York office will be glad to send any information to those interested in Commune Harold. Communicate with our secretary Comrade R. Korn, c. o. Brodeck, 867 Hunts Point Ave., Bronx, New York.—Jeanette C. Freedman.

Letters From Moscow

By Anna Porter

The session of the Central Committee of the U. S. S. R., (the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics), combining the R. S. F. S. R. with all the small Soviet states has just closed. The session was held in the great white and gold pillared Andreyevski Hall of the old palace. What they talked about, I shall know when I get the DAILY WORKER. But tho I could not understand, I could see the interesting place and the interesting people—rows of men whose names meant much to me and whose faces I could study thru my glass, and I had the honor of nearly trampling on Karl Radek in the corridor. That was as near as I got to any experience of distinction on this occasion. Aside from the session, it was an opportunity to go in and out of the Kremlin with my permit and stroll about in as leisurely a fashion as I pleased every day.

Over the great white bridge near the Comintern, we passed the Red

guards at the outer gate. The Kremlin enclosure stands high above the surrounding streets, and thru the crenelations of the bridge wall one looks right and left down thru the yellowing strips of parking that follow the high Kremlin walls. Passing by Red guards again at the inner gate, at the top of the tilted bridge, we followed lines of palaces around to the high drive that overlooks the river and sweeps by the stately front of the old palace.

Within, we climb a long broad stairway straight ahead in easy ascent, and at its top are confronted thru a doorway with an enormous hall crowded with people in a rather smoky atmosphere. I catch my breath. "It hardly seems real," I exclaim, and then suddenly I discover, it isn't real only a very life-like picture thru a doorway—a picture of a historic meeting, with portrait figures of all the prominent revolutionary officials, addressed by Lenin, who stands out vigorously in a characteristic speaking pose.

At the door of the Andreyevski Hall, we show our permits to the two unassuming young fellows in stunning uniforms, with bright red riding breeches—a uniform I have noticed in parades and have not been able to find out about. Here is my chance. My companion translates. "This American comrade wishes to know who you are," to put it as directly as I asked it! They are soldiers of the "Gay Pay Oo," the G. P. W., the State Political Police, which has succeeded the Cheka and has not quite its broad powers. They are friendly and amused. My curiosity does not cost me my head. Here at the entrance to the session, I leave the narrative to intelligent correspondents, who long since have covered it by cable.

After the session we wander quite freely about the palace, up stairway after stairway, and by round-about corridors and thru all the beautiful apartments of the czars with low-vaulted ceilings and subdued gorgeousness of decoration—semi-oriental or Byzantine—with gay-tiled stoves and deep win-

dow niches. Those rooms are familiar to all of us who heard Chaliapin in Boris Godonov, for the scenery of that opera was a very faithful copy of the rooms of this imperial palace.

Then a stroll about the Kremlin grounds among the groups of churches with their picturesque clusters of little golden domes shadowed with the black stains of ages, past lines of heavy barracks and palaces with their great connecting porticos, and lighter carved and decorated structures, past the lofty bell-tower, "Ivan Veleki," John the Great, past the huge cracked bell that was never hung because it fell to its ruin in trying to be too big and swing too high, past rows of captured cannon, and by groups of marching soldiers and soldiers with stacked arms. And so out of the gates again, past the Red guards and over the white Troitski Most (bridge) with its crenelations framing the yellowing trees of the parks, and home to wait for the DAILY WORKER and find out what it was all about!

LORE AND THE COMINTERN

(Continued from Page 2.)

of which the Russian comrades were often incorrectly informed of the situation in western Europe. Comrade Paul Levi writes about these as follows: "The Russian comrades judge events in a situation which is different from that of the rest of the world. They judge conditions in the position of owners of political power. To change their trend of thought from their situation to ours is difficult, and herein may lie the cause of misunderstandings."

COMRADE LORE thus allowed to spread thru the "Volkszeitung" the idea that the Communist International was a plaything in the hands of the Russian comrades, that the Russian comrades were uninformed as to the situation in Europe, that the mentality of the Russian comrades was entirely different from that of the rest of the world, and that herein lay the reason for discrepancies in the Communist International.

Lore's Peculiar Idea of R. C. P.

SOME time later Comrade Lore proved that he had peculiar notions about the Russian party itself. Not only were the Russian comrades, in his opinion, misdirecting the Com-

munist International, but even in their own party they created intolerable conditions. Comrade Lore expressed his idea in the course of the discussion with the Russian Communist Party a year ago, a discussion connected with the name of Comrade Trotsky.

IT was a severe discussion which shook the Russian Communist Party to its very foundation. It was a broad comprehensive discussion embracing all phases of party life. To use only the captions of Trotsky's book, "The New Course," which was the storm center of all the discussion, would suffice to realize the scope of the discussion. The captions are: 1—"Question of Party Generations," (the Old Guard and the younger Communists; the position of the Old Guard within the party and the state apparatus, etc.). 2—"The Social Composition of the Party" (Number of workers and number of peasants, number of non-workers; role of the students, especially the workingclass students, as a 'barometer' of party life.) 3—"Groupings and Factional Formations" (A hint at the possibility of forming groupings, an assertion that if the party proceeds in its course, groupings would be inevitable.) 4—"Bureaucracy and Revolution." 5—"Tra-

dition and Revolutionary Policy" (Necessity to adapt one's self to ever-changing conditions.) 6—"Lack of Appreciation of the Peasantry." 7—"The Main Problems of the Supply and Land Policy." 8—"Planned Economic Activities." 9—"Red Tape, Military and Other." 10—"Linking Town with Village."

Lore on Discipline.

IN all of these problems the question of discipline pure and simple occupied an almost insignificant place. It may be said that Communist discipline as such, apart from the question of the older vs. the younger generation, did not occupy the minds of the Russian comrades. However, Comrade Lore found the problem of discipline to be the pivotal problem of all the Russian discussion. Commenting on the Russian discussion in the "Volkszeitung" editorial, Jan. 6, 1924, he writes:

"Self-control and discipline will naturally be inevitable in a party which has to carry out such formidable tasks. But a rigid centralization which allows the member no right to raise objections, which makes the member a link in a large chain, moved and operated by invisible hands, such discipline, according to the opinion of Trotsky and many other

influential comrades, may gradually be loosened to be superceded by a sort of democratic centralization. Today Trotsky may still find himself in the minority in the Russian Communist Party, in the end he will prove to be right because it is simply unthinkable that the state of war should be maintained within the organization even under conditions of peace which are now being approached by the Soviet Republic."

THESE remarks proved Comrade Lore to be sharing at least part of the menshevik prejudices concerning the Russian Communist Party. According to Comrade Lore, a Russian Communist was not allowed to raise objections, was only "a link in a chain," i. e., a mute and obedient tool, manipulated by "invisible hands." According to Comrade Lore, the system obtaining within the Russian Communist Party was not democratic centralization. Comrade Lore thus misjudged discipline within one of the national parties as he misjudged discipline within the Communist International. Comrade Lore had a distorted view of the requirements of party discipline, and his distortions were akin to those made by the social-democrats of the Two-and-a-Half International.

(Third Article in Next Supplement.)

A CHILD OF HIS PEOPLE AND CENTURY

Editor's Note.—Every day until publication has been completed, the DAILY WORKER will publish a new chapter from the book, "Lenin: The Great Strategist of the Class War," by A. Losovsky, secretary of the Red International of Labor Unions. The twenty-third (concluding) chapter is entitled, "A Child of His People and Century."

LENIN was the child of his people and of his century. When called a Jacobin he would answer: "We, the Bolsheviks, are the Jacobins of the twentieth century, that is, the Jacobins of the proletarian revolution." Lenin was, as we have seen, the very embodiment of the idea of internationalism, and at the same time he was part and parcel of the mighty revolutionary movement that the oppressed masses of Russia have been carrying on for years and years. He was really one link in a long chain of struggles for the emancipation of the Russian proletariat and the Russian peasantry. From Radschev, thru Bellinsky, Dobroljubov, Bakunin, Tschernischevsky, Netschajev, and Jellabov, thru the party "The Will of the People" and thru the group of "Emancipation of Labor," and thru many unknown representatives of the workers and peasants, which have been populating

the prisons of the Czar and of Siberia, there runs the thread of struggle which unites Lenin with the Russian revolutionary movement. He was a man of an all-inclusive spirit; the press of our opponents would speak with irony about the utopian plans of Bolshevism. But in this irony there is to be found a profound truth. Lenin has been operating with whole continents. He was basing his policies upon the experiences of millions.

Only the limitless and vast extent of Russia could give birth to such a spirit. This youth, born to a family of state functionaries and adopted by the proletariat, embodied and gave expression to the hatred of the working class of Russia accumulated thru centuries. He also reflected in himself the hatred of the peasantry against its oppressors that accumulated thru centuries. He had a deep sense for the sufferings of the toiling masses, even when the masses could not give expression to those sufferings in words.

Lenin cannot be considered apart from the Russian workers and peasants and from the Russian history. Only within the social structure of Russia, the revolutionary struggles of whole generations, only by considering the achievements of the Russian revolutionary movement since the 18th century and up to the last day, can

IMPORTANT CHANGE IN RUSSIAN MOVIE DATES IN DETROIT

Owing to mistakes of the theater managers there is an important change in the dates for the Detroit showings of "Polikushka," "Soldier Ivan's Miracle," and "Russian Asbestos Industry." These pictures will be shown simultaneously at two theaters on Wednesday, Dec. 17. The correct list of next week's dates:

Medbury Theater, Tuesday and Wednesday, Dec. 16 and 17.
Caniff Theater, Wednesday and Thursday, Dec. 17 and 18.
Royale Theater, Friday, Dec. 19.

we locate the factors that have brought about the appearance of Bolshevism in Russia at the cross-roads of two centuries. Only by taking all this into consideration can we properly estimate the moral, political, national, and international physiognomy of Lenin. For us, his contemporaries, who have been living within the circle of his influence, one thing is clear. Lenin was one of those men by whom humanity marks its historical path, concerning whom legends are being told in his lifetime and the farther we go from the date of his death the clearer will stand before us Lenin's greatness and immortality.

Party Activities Of Local Chicago

Saturday, Dec. 13.
Y. W. L. dance, Northwest Hall, cor. North and Western Aves.
Saturday, Dec. 13.
Y. W. L. Dance, Northwest Hall, cor. North and Western Aves.

JUNIORS HIKE SUNDAY

Meet the bunch at Milwaukee and Western at 10 o'clock sharp on Sunday, Dec. 14. Bring lunch and carfare. Lots of fun ahead! League and party members invited.

St. Paul Readers, Attention.

A hard time dance will be given by the City Central Committee, of St. Paul at Commonwealth Club, 435 Rice St., Saturday evening, Dec. 13. There will be a kangaroo court and novelty entertainment. Come prepared for the occasion. The cow-bells begin ringing at 8 sharp.

Next Sunday Night and Every Sunday Night, the Open Forum.

Learn the International IDO Language

16-page pamphlet, giving outline of language, showing its superiority over Esperanto, etc., sent free.

The Workers Ido Federation
Room 5, 805 James St., N. S.
PITTSBURGH, PA.

Workers Party Educational Department

Conducted by James P. Cannon, Educational Director

"Without a Revolutionary Theory a Revolutionary Movement Is Impossible."

How to Organize and Conduct a Study Class

THE problem of educational work is many sided. Enthusiasm for this work among the party members must be aroused and maintained. A general recognition of its fundamental importance must be established. It must be organically connected with the life and struggles of the party, and must not become academic and sterile. And it must be conducted in a systematic manner, becoming an established part of the life of the party thruout the year. This last will not just "happen." It will take much work and the introduction of correct organizational and technical principles. All our theories will come to nothing if our educational apparatus does not function properly.

MANY classes have landed on the rocks because they were not conducted properly. One of the most frequent inquiries we have received from comrades who are undertaking party educational work is: "What is the best way to conduct a study class?"—It is the purpose of this article to give an answer to this question based on the collective experience in the field of educational work from which a few general principles can be extracted.

LET us begin at the beginning and proceed step by step. When the responsible party committee in the given localities has decided to establish a class, let us say, for example, in the "A. B. C. of Communism," the next move must be to appoint a leader for the class. This leader must understand that the class will not move of itself, but must be organized and directed from beginning to end, otherwise it will fall to pieces. The comrade in charge of the class must then proceed to enroll students, having them register for the class and making sure he has a sufficient number who agree in advance to attend the classes before he sets the time for calling it. As soon as a sufficient number of students have been enrolled, a date is set for the first class and all the students are notified.

AT this point we should speak a word about the danger of haphazardness in the attendance at the classes on the part of any of the students. The party committee must decide that the attendance at class once a week, or more frequently, as the case may be, is a part of the member's party duty and should excuse him from party obligations for those nights. The systematic and regular attendance at

class by all students must be constantly stressed, and the party committee and the leader of the class must constantly fight against the tendency, which always grows up, to regard the study class as a series of lectures at which one can "drop in" whenever he feels like it. Good results can only be obtained when the class is an organized body and is regularly attended by the same students.

Methods of Conducting Classes

THE methods of conducting the classes which have proved most successful from past experience can be roughly divided into two general methods. These methods may be modified and varied in many ways, according to local circumstances, experience and qualifications of the teacher, etc.

These two methods are:

1. The lecture-question method.
2. The method of reading from and discussing the text in the class.

THE Lecture-Question method. This is the method most frequently employed by experienced teachers, and one which yields the most satisfactory results if qualified comrades can be found to conduct the class along this line. The use of this method presupposes that the teacher, who is himself thoroly familiar with the subject matter of the text, possesses some ability and experience as a lecturer. It is not necessary, however, for him to be a professional. The average Communist who has a firm grasp of his subject will find that with a little practice he can succeed in holding the attention of a class.

UNDER this method the teacher delivers a lecture for the period of about one hour on some phase of the general subjects dealt with in the text. In addition he requires the students to read, outside the class, in connection with his lecture, certain portions of the text and sometimes portions of other books which deal with the same subject. When the class comes together for the second time it is opened with a question period of about thirty minutes during which the lecturer quizzes the students on the subject matter of the previous week's lecture and the reading in connection with it. It is best to have a short recess at the end of the question period in order to get a fresh start for the lecture. A lecture of about an hour then completes the evening's work. Again sections of the text are referred to the students for reading in connection with the lecture. The

same procedure is then followed at each successive meeting of the class until the end of the course.

WHEN this method is employed it is not advisable to have indiscriminate discussion in the class, as this will almost invariably divert the attention of the class from the immediate subject in hand and destroy the possibility of consecutive instruction. For a teacher to conduct a class according to this method he must take it firmly in hand, establish his authority at the very beginning, and maintain it thruout the course. Nothing is more fatal to the success of such a class than for the opinion to grow up amongst some of the students that the teacher knows less than they do about the subject. For he will then be unable to maintain the proper discipline in the class and hold it to its course. Whenever a study class, organized for the purpose of consecutive study of a certain aspect of Communist theory or tactics, begins to resolve itself into a group for general discussion or a debating society, its early demise can be confidently expected.

READING and Discussing the text. This method also works out very well, especially in elementary classes. In this method, as in all others, however, the first prerequisite is a class leader who takes a responsible attitude towards the work and who takes it upon himself to organize and lead the class and hold it down to the matter in hand. This class leader should by all means thoroly study the text before the class commences and make himself master of it.

THE class conducted according to this method proceeds by the class leader calling upon the students, one after another, to read a few sentences or a paragraph from the text. After each student finishes reading the part assigned to him, the leader asks the student who has read the passage to explain it in his own words. If he fails to bring out the meaning clearly or interprets the passage incorrectly, the question is directed to other students, the leader himself finally intervening to clarify the matter if necessary.

PROCEEDING along this line the class will cover a chapter or so of the text each evening. Before the reading commences each time, the leader should conduct a brief quiz of the class on the part of the text dealt with on the preceding evening in order to bring out the points clearly for the second time, refresh the memory of the students, and connect the

preceding class with the one about to begin.

IN the course of a few months, proceeding along this line, the class will get thru the "A B C of Communism" and will have acquired a grasp on the fundamental theories of the movement. Moreover, if the class has been conducted successfully, if it has had the good fortune to have a leader that can inspire confidence and enthusiasm and who can hold it together as an organized body in spite of all difficulties, the students of the class, or at least a large part of them, will emerge from their first course of training with a strong will and spirit to acquire more knowledge and thereby equip themselves better to become worthy fighters in the cause of Communism.

THE success of the study class work is to a very large extent dependent upon organization, leadership and class discipline. It should start on time and stop on time each evening. It must not accommodate itself to casual students or chronic late-comers. It should not degenerate into a mere discussion group over the general problems of the movement but must confine itself in a disciplined manner to the specific subjects dealt with in the course. It should be conducted in a business-like fashion from start to finish, students being enrolled and the roll called each evening. Above all it should have a leader who, notwithstanding lack of previous experience, will take his task so seriously as to thoroly master the subject himself. Then he will be able to establish sufficient authority in the class to lead it step by step to the end of the course.

Bronx Readers, Attention!

"A. B. C. of Communism," every Tuesday night, at 1347 Boston Road. Dr. I. Stampler, instructor. All members of Bronx Section, Workers Party, who have joined the party within a year, must attend this class. Others invited.

English, Elementary, Monday night, at 511 East 173rd St. S. Feishin, instructor.

Advanced English, every Friday night, at 511 East 173rd St. Ely Jacobson, instructor.

ATTENTION!

All friendly organizations are requested not to arrange any affairs on SATURDAY, DEC. 27, as the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia will give a performance on that date at the Soviet School, 1902 W. Division St. "Coal Miner Kort," a revolutionary drama, will be presented in the Russian language.

How One Should Not Write the History of October

contrary, had a historical miracle occurred at that time, and had the Bolshevik workers followed that which Comrade Trotzky proclaimed (unity with the liquidators, fight against the "secretarianism" of Lenin, menshevist political platform, during the war fight against the Zimmerwald Left, etc.) then there would have been no October victory. Comrade Trotzky, however, entirely avoids dealing with this period, altho it would be his duty to impart just these "lessons" to the party.

Let us quote another example. There fought side by side with us on the October barricades many left social revolutionaries. In the decisive moment of October they contributed their share to the cause of victory. Did that mean, however, that they had been "tried" once and for all by October? Unfortunately this was by no means the case as the post-October experience has shown, which to a considerable extent confirmed the esti-

mate given of these petty-bourgeois revolutionaries before October.

October isolated, therefore in no way suffices for the "test." It is rather the second moment which is of more importance, the moment which Comrade Lenin so categorically pointed out.

The statement of Comrade Trotzky, that the "Bolshevizing" of the Communist parties consists in such an education and such a section of a body of "leaders" that they shall not run off the track at the moment of their October, is therefore correct, in as far as it also includes the appropriation of the experiences of the "preparatory period." For even the immediate experiences of the Russian October can neither be understood nor made use of if we do not take to heart the teachings of this preparatory period. Comrade Trotzky, who regards the matter in such a way that the Bolshevik Party in its actual essence only began to exist after the October days, does not see the uninterrupted connection of

the line of the party in its entirety up to "the present moment."

And just in the same way he fails to see that after the seizure of power, even after the end of the civil war, history is by no means at an end. In the same way the history of our party is also not at an end, the history which is likewise a "testing of the party policy," for it not only contains discussions regarding the one or the other standpoint, but also the experiences of practical policy.

One had to take care not "to leave the track" in October, but the same applies to the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (when, as Trotzky admits, the "head," that means the life and death, of the Soviet power was at stake). One had also to take care not to leave the track in the discussion of 1921, for without the Lenin policy we would have endangered everything. It would also have been out of place to leave the track in the last year, for without the mon-

ey reform, without the economic policy etc., conducted by the party, we should have likewise arrived at a desperate situation. In all these critical situations, however, Comrade Trotzky has left the track, and in the same manner as in the pre-February period of his political existence, when he had not broken with the open opponents of Bolshevism.

"The tradition of a revolutionary party," writes Comrade Trotzky (page 62), "will not be created through maintaining silence, but out of critical clearness." Very true. The demand for "critical clearness" however, must not be raised only in regard to the actions which took place in October, but also in relation to the preceding and the succeeding period of development. Only in this manner is an actual test possible; for the party of the proletariat acts constantly and passes thru more than one "critical" period.

(To be Continued)