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EDITOR :: WM. PAUL

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REVIEW OF THE MONTH

CURZON'S CHANCE

FOR some time we have, in these notes, attempted to draw the attention of the Labour movement to the fact that the only safeguard for the international working class was to be found in a proletarian United Front. We have harped upon this theme with such persistence that it might seem to some of our readers to border upon monotonous and automatic repetition. We have shown, month by month, that the organised method of the capitalist offensive against the masses demands an equally well organised method of defence on the part of Labour. We have repeatedly emphasised the point that all the problems now confronting the Labour movement can be reduced to one root—"that of the organised and armed onslaught of the world-wide capitalist class upon the masses." We have contended that as long as the working class front is not united, the capitalist imperialist enemy will press ever forward and become ever more daring in its attacks upon the workers. We have even argued, in these notes, regarding the United Front, that "if any party does not give a clear lead upon this issue, it only adds to the difficulty and confusion of the working class, and thus plays *an indirect part in assisting the reactionaries who are successfully attacking Labour.*" Our plea for a workers' United Front was not inspired by any abstract formula; our continual repetition for its urgency was not the outcome of any doctrinaire fetish based upon some arid creed. We put it forward as the first practical move in arresting the ever-growing arrogance of the master class in its international war upon Labour.

Not only did the Communist Party demand an "all in" fighting front to help to consolidate the defensive power of the British workers; we also warned the middle class leaders of the Labour Party that their policy on international affairs was both wrong and dangerous. We vigorously protested against MacDonald's tactics in seeking to exploit the British Labour movement as an anti-Poincaré organisation. We sought to show that it was supremely reactionary, on the part of the leaders of the I.L.P., to concentrate attention on *French* imperialism. We adopted the attitude that the real struggle against aggressive imperialism imposed upon us, in this country, the sacred duty to devote our energy against the militarist tactics of the British Government in general, and the war-mongering policy of Lord Curzon in particular. We confess that it is poor consolation to the Communist Party to know that every point in our criticism of Mr. MacDonald's policy has been tragically vindicated by the events of the past few weeks.

Had the energy which has been expended during the past few months in scourging Poincaré been devoted to denouncing Curzon, it would have been impossible for the British Government to have sent its ultimatum to Russia. Had the MacDonalds and Snowdens devoted their matchless gift for vitriolic invective to the enemies of the British workers, instead of directing it against the leaders of the Moscow Government, Lord Curzon might have paused before thrusting a war upon the Soviet Republics. Every sneer and malicious taunt hurled at the Bolsheviks by the leaders of the I.L.P. was a direct encouragement to the British war-mongers to assail Russia. We know now how truly the Birmingham delegate spoke, at the I.L.P. conference, when he appealed to the leaders to drop their attitude towards Moscow, which, he correctly contended, was in practice assisting the White Guards and all the reactionaries who were fighting the Soviets.

We do not share the general opinion that Lord Curzon is a fumbling fool. As the leader of British imperialism, he has carefully chosen his moment to attack Russia. His attitude towards Soviet Russia has always been one of malignant hatred. He has been compelled to make concessions here and there to Moscow; he has only yielded those things which the Russian Government, backed up by the British workers, has been able to tear from him. When the Red Army had smashed Denikin, Koltchak, and the other subsidised heroes of the British militarists, Lord Curzon was a little unbending in his attitude towards Moscow. At the moment when it was thought that the Red Army had beaten the Poles and was on its way to enter Warsaw, Lord Curzon condescended to be courteous to the Soviet Republic; at this period there was a splendid feeling among the British workers towards Russia—a feeling which not even the poison of I.L.P. calumnies has been able to modify—and Kameneff was actually invited to London. When it was discovered that the Polish army, thanks to French and British aid, had compelled the Red army to retreat; when it was found that I.L.P.-ers, like Mr. Snowden, were now playing the reactionary game of exposing the "horrors" of the Bolsheviks—then Kameneff was kicked out of London on the usual trumped-up charges.

Lord Curzon showed his war-like intentions towards Russia, at the Lausanne Conference, when he insisted on the "freedom" of the Dardanelles for warships. Since that time he and his colleagues

have very cleverly worked up public opinion against the Soviets. Side by side with their war preparations, they gave wide publicity to every utterance, no matter how stupid, made by Labour leaders against Moscow. In this part of their preparation for attacking the Soviets they received valuable assistance from the anti-Bolshevik declarations of Snowden, MacDonald, Henderson, Clynes, etc. Then they organised the churches to perform their part in the anti-Soviet campaign. They were encouraged in their work because the whole Labour movement—with the sole exception of the Communist Party—was being told by its leaders to rise with indignation against the imperialist tactics—of France!

Lord Curzon is no clown. Those in the Labour movement who denounce him as a fool do so in order to cover up their own foolishness during the last five months.

HELPING REACTION

IT is very easy to understand why the present time has been chosen to begin the attack on Russia. The anti-Soviet campaign is only one part of the bigger struggle between Capital and Labour. Capitalism in its efforts to maintain its power must smash every weapon which Labour uses to defend itself. During the past year the propertied interests have been very successful in their attacks upon the working class. Not only have the masses been compelled to retreat in all the capitalist countries, but all the social-democratic governments, manned by the leaders of the Second International, have fallen. In Germany and Sweden, etc., the pressure of the capitalist class has swept Scheidemann and Branting aside. These governments were based upon the I.L.P. fallacy that a Labour majority in parliament wields political power. The sad experience of Scheidemann in Germany and of Branting in Sweden shows that a Labour majority, which does not break the economic power of the capitalists, can only enforce what the industrialists and financiers permit them to do. But in Russia the workers control the political, military, and industrial apparatus. They determine what concessions may be granted to this or that financial group. Having first smashed the political and economic power of the propertied interests; having beaten these interests time after time with the Red Army, they are now consolidating power on the economic sector. At the worst period of the famine an attempt was made to smash the Soviets, but the alertness of the Red Army made the reactionaries pause. Now that Russia is rebuilding her industries, now that her agricultural prospects are good—now is the time to strike before she gets too strong. If the coming harvest is a good one, the Soviet Republic will be able to dictate the conditions upon which she will permit the foreign industrialists to carry out her schemes of economic reconstruction. If the Curzons and the other agents of the international plutocrats want a victory over Russia they know that they dare not permit her to gather in one good harvest in peace. Hence the reason for British and French activity in all the puppet countries surrounding Russia. Hence the reason for the renewed enthusiasm on behalf of the Tsarist generals and the White bandit chiefs. Hence the interest shown by the British War Office regarding the preparedness of the Polish and other border state armies. Their plans are well laid, and their schemes of attack matured. Everything is

ready for the offensive, and only the proper moment for action has to be decided. The reactionaries are determined to smash Russia—the one stronghold of Labour that has successfully withstood every assault.

Lord Curzon has done everything in his power to show that the war upon Russia is one between the propertied imperialists and the working class striving to seize power. At the same time that the ultimatum was dispatched to Moscow containing its provocative insults, a message was sent to Mussolini, the leading Fascist of the world, congratulating him upon his achievements. And what were these achievements? The destruction of the Italian Labour movement, the smashing of the workers' co-operative organisation, the wrecking of the trade unions and the imprisonment and murder of the finest mass fighters in the revolutionary party. The heroic struggle of the Italian workers against the Fascisti; the stand of the German proletariat against their industrialists and the French Government; the resistance of the American trade unions against the brutal espionage system of President Harding and his attorney, Dougherty; the strikes and lock-outs of the Belgian, French and British workers—all these are part and parcel of the same class struggle that is beginning between the Workers' Soviet Republic and the international bandits of imperialism.

Let us review the forces of the international class war. The reactionaries the world over are rapidly unifying their power. The British creators of the Black and Tans are jubilant at the success of the Fascisti, which has done in Italy what they failed to do in Ireland. Whatever differences there are between Curzon and Poincare, over the Ruhr and the oil fields, they are both united in their admiration at the method by which Mussolini strangled the revolutionary movement in Italy. They both share the same admiration for the bloody manner in which Horthy dealt with the Hungarian Communists. Just as the Federation of British Industries unites all the industrial magnates of this country into one solid phalanx against Labour, so the international Fascisti is consolidating all the reactionaries in every country to launch an armed war against those who lead the masses.

The reactionary elements have been encouraged in their efforts to become bolder and more arrogant in their attacks upon Labour. They have received this encouragement from the fact that in all the capitalist countries the Labour movement, where the leaders of the Hamburg International are in the ascendant, makes no effort to close its ranks into one solid United Front. In Britain, for example, there was the almost unbelievable spectacle of the I.L.P. refusing to join forces with the Communist Party to hold a united protest demonstration in London against Lord Curzon's ultimatum to Soviet Russia; such an exhibition of idiotic and puerile sectarianism is like offering incense to the war-mongers of Downing Street. The international scene is no better. The Curzons, Horthys and Mussolinis are afraid of a world-wide United Front of the workers. They have received new courage to go on with their reactionary work. At Hamburg they saw the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals set up a united front—*against the Communists!* This Hamburg achievement may very well mark the date for the beginning of a new international offensive against the masses of the world.

CLUBBING MR. CLYNES

IN the columns of the Liberal weekly, *The New Leader*, there is a very fierce and clever attack upon Mr. Clynes for his stupid allegations against the Soviet government which he wrote in the *Financial Times*. We, too, on many occasions, have found it necessary to chastise Mr. Clynes for his anti-Labour attitude. We sought to show him how wrong he was when he, along with Mr. P. Snowden, persisted in advocating increased production—a policy which was decidedly reactionary. But there is something unique in the editor of the *New Leader* trouncing Mr. Clynes for his slanders against the Moscow Government, for this respectable middle-class journal is the official organ of the I.L.P. Some leaders of the I.L.P. have outclassed Sir Paul Dukes—the subsidised spy of the British Government in Russia—in their malicious reports regarding the Bolsheviks. Were it not for one or two honest Liberals in the I.L.P.—like Trevelyan, Buxton, Ponsonby and Brailsford—it would be difficult to convince many people that the old I.L.P. leaders, like Snowden and MacDonald, were not mere pedlars of the anti-Bolshevik dope that appears in the *Morning Post*.

While appreciating the very neat way in which the editor of the *New Leader* reduced Mr. Clynes' anti-Moscow nonsense to shreds, we cannot help feeling that he must have written his reply with his tongue in his cheek. We all know Mr. Clynes as an ally of Urquhart, the Russian financier; no one ever expected anything else but criticism from him regarding the Soviet Republic. Mr. Clynes, with all his faults, has been no hypocrite in his attitude towards Russia. He has always been a straightforward, honest and consistent opponent. Unlike I.L.P.-ers of the vacillating Wall-head brand, he does not blow hot and cold regarding Russia according to whether he is addressing a Red or a Pink audience. Unlike Mr. J. R. MacDonald, he has never urged the British Foreign Office to form a trans-Caucasian Federation in order to control the oil industry in Southern Russia, and thus deprive the Soviet workers of it. Mr. Clynes has not yet stooped to the reptilian abuse that so freely flows from the venal pens of the two Snowdens when they set out to chastise Russia. It stands as a potent fact, well known to every Labour lecturer in this country, that when any reactionary at a meeting wishes to throw filth at Russia he generally quotes some I.L.P. authority. At lantern lectures on Russia we have known proletarian I.L.P.-ers shout with rage at the mere mention of Mrs. Snowden's name.

It was not Mr. Clynes who sought to outrage the minds of the masses in this country by spreading malicious lies about the "heroic" social revolutionaries in Russia, and how they were treated by the Soviet Government; this odious task was enthusiastically undertaken by I.L.P. leaders. If Mr. Ronald MacNeil, during the debate in Parliament on the Russian Note, quoted Mr. Clynes as an opponent of Soviet Russia he made an even more devastating citation from the writings of Mr. Snowden.

It is all very well for Mr. Brailsford to jeer at the "uncritical patriotism" of Mr. Clynes. It is a thousand pities that the editor of the *New Leader* did not draw attention to the cowardly and "uncritical pacifism" of his own I.L.P. friends in Parliament. On no occasion, during the war, did the I.L.P. leaders vote against

the war credits. When the House of Commons was voting money for the Navy, a few days ago, it was the Communist Party member who voted against it; he was supported, we are glad to record, by one or two Clyde I.L.P.-ers, who voted over the head of their cowardly leader, who fumbled uneasily in his place. Mr. Clynes is a Labour jingo and a consistent imperialist. He scorns to play the knavish MacDonalidian rôle of mouthing pacifism and insisting upon the German workers being bled to provide indemnities to feed the insatiable maw of British imperialists. During the war Mr. Clynes openly appeared on recruiting platforms and stated his case without the slightest equivocation; this was a much more courageous and honest attitude than that of the I.L.P. leader who posed publicly as a pacifist, but who quietly sent an epistle to the Mayor of his constituency which was promptly used by the jingoes for recruiting purposes.

There are many non-I.L.P. Labour leaders who have written exactly as Mr. Clynes has done and who, nevertheless, have not yet felt the biting lash of the *New Leader's* criticism. Anyone who knows anything at all about the underhand methods of the parliamentary game understand why the I.L.P. always single out Mr. Clynes for attack. He was, it may be remembered, the leader of the Labour Party in Parliament prior to the last general election. He held the post which history and God Almighty had specially created for Mr. J. R. MacDonald. Mr. Clynes had to be removed. He was swept aside by a method which was as unscrupulous as it was characteristic of the I.L.P. And since then he has been the victim of several clever little stunts organised by the democratic and highly "conscientious" pacifist clique. As Mr. Clynes is still a warm favourite with the trade union element in the Labour Party for the coming Premiership, he is viewed, by the I.L.P., as standing in the way of the ambitions of Mr. J. R. MacDonald. This explains why the editor of the *New Leader* attacks Mr. Clynes and is silent regarding the blunders and shortcomings of those parliamentary Labour leaders who are as guilty as Mr. Clynes, but who are enthusiastic boosters of the Big Noise of the I.L.P.—Mr. J. R. MacDonald.

When the Communist Party attacks Mr. Clynes, or anyone else in the Labour movement, it does so for reasons which are purely impersonal. We have no ambitious careerists in our ranks; if one of these, by some chance, enters the Party, he speedily finds the exit entrance. We are never afraid to criticise when we see the interests of the workers threatened by any person or group in the Labour Party. We are ever ready to denounce any policy or line of action that is in conflict with the needs of the masses. We never withhold a blow in order to make a friend of one who is misleading the proletariat; and we never strike at anyone—no matter to which section of the movement he belongs—who is engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy or who is honestly seeking to consolidate the ranks of Labour. We are of the working class—bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. To us the Labour movement is not a place-hunting concern wherein individual leaders are eaten up with personal jealousies, or where self-styled statesmen try to over-reach one another. To us the Labour movement is an incipient army to be mobilised, politically and industrially, for purposes of struggle in the arena of the class war. And all our efforts are directed to that task.

WM. PAUL.

THE WORK OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES IN SOVIET RUSSIA



Extract from speech of Comrade N. A. Semashko, Commissar for Health of the R.S.F.S.R., at a conference of the Workers' International Russian Relief at Berlin.

(Translated by EDGAR T. WHITEHEAD.)

THE tasks of the Commissariat for Public Health have been extraordinarily heavy and full of responsibilities, but, in spite of all, we have succeeded in the main in overcoming the plagues and epidemics which had their cause in the famine, although in the Ukraine and in some of the eastern districts dysentery, typhus, cholera and small-pox are again breaking out.

But in every respect the worst consequences of the famine are to be seen in their effect on child life. In the cases of these plagues the organism of children has to put up a much greater power of resistance to enable it to recover than is the case with adults.

Russia has always had the sad notoriety of possessing the highest rate of infant mortality in the world. The death-rate in the case of young children is as high as 25 per cent. In consequence of the famine, this rose to 32 per cent. In the course of 1922, thanks to the energetic efforts of the Soviet Government and workers' and foreign organisations, we were able to reduce it to 20 per cent. Since the war, and especially as a result of the famine, a serious diminution in the population of Soviet Russia has occurred, though this is not the same in all districts. In Siberia it is much smaller than in European parts, largely due to the fact that in the latter there is a great shortage of food and suitable dwelling places, conditions which afford a fruitful soil for epidemics.

In our work for the public health we have to distinguish between two different categories of diseases—the plagues on the one hand, and social diseases on the other. Among the latter category we find two which have always reacted in a frightful way on public health—consumption and venereal disease. Unfortunately, the limited means at our disposal do not allow the majority of cases of the social diseases to be properly treated in sanatoria, so travelling dispensaries have been formed as the most ready makeshift. These travelling dispensaries do not wait until the sick come to them, but carry help and medical aid right into the factories themselves, seeking in every case to arrange for such a type of employment as will enable the disease to be successfully overcome. The travelling dispensaries, and also all other units of the Commissariat for public health, work in closest touch with the different workers' organisations.

In addition to the dispensaries, every effort is being made to provide a sufficiency of sanatoria for sufferers, especially for sick children, who are also being housed in forest schools and similar institutions. In order to bring this work to completion, a large-scale campaign has been undertaken. A special propaganda week for the struggle against tuberculosis and prostitution has already been carried through, with special emphasis on the question of additional relief for unemployed women.

A further field of work is mother and child protection. For this purpose advisory centres have been opened in every large town and district, which do not, however, limit their activities to giving advice to mothers and expectant mothers, but carry through practical work in this field. Special homes for mothers with babies, and lying-in homes have been set up in all districts. In proportion to the enormous mass of population, what has already been achieved only reaches relatively modest proportions.

In this connection one thing especially must be borne in mind. Formerly nothing whatever had been done in Russia in this direction, and the Soviet Government has had to break entirely new ground. To the Soviet Government belongs the credit for these important social innovations.

Child welfare is not by any means limited to babies and young children, but attention is also paid to the welfare of older children and the youth. All these activities find their best support through the planned work of the committees for dealing with the consequences of the famine, on all such committees both working women and youth having representation.

In the case of the youth special attention is paid to physical culture as a basis for proper mental and moral development. Monthly courses are given in every centre at which chosen workers from every factory and large undertaking attend. In this way general instructors in physical culture for the masses are provided. There are also more advanced courses covering a period of three years, which fits special youth instructors to take over educational work of greater responsibility.

In view of our tremendous needs in both a bodily and mental respect, what we have already been able to achieve may appear insignificant, but a good beginning has been made in face of great difficulty. War and famine have enormously increased the number of unprovided children. There are in Russia to-day about two million children for whose care and education nobody is responsible unless this is undertaken by the social organs of the State. Of these two million children about 1,300,000 have already been accommodated in homes. A further point that must be borne in mind, is that the majority of these children, due to the severity of famine conditions and the hardships they have suffered, are not only bodily, but also mentally, often abnormal.

What then, in view of these conditions in our country, can the Workers' International Russian Relief do to most suitably aid the work of the Health Department of the Soviet Government? One special activity presents itself at once. The Commissariat of Public Health is engaged in the preparation of small travelling dispensaries for service among the rural population. These dispensaries are being prepared abroad for introduction into Russia as complete units of medical aid, fitted up with the most important medicines for fighting plague and social diseases. This is especially a task in which the W.I.R.R. can share by materially supporting the supply of these travelling dispensaries. Anything that can be done to provide the dispensaries, sanatoriums and children's homes with the necessary material, food and clothing, will be a material help for Russia of the first importance.

With reference to the change over from pure famine relief work to productive economic relief, the Workers' International Russian

Relief can be of special service with regard to our work in the Crimea. The Crimea is the most healthy region of Russia, to which sick people go when convalescent. The People's Commissariat of Health yearly sends many thousands of consumptive workers to this region, because in its balmy climate they can find the best relief, and stand the best chance of recovery. Many sanatoriums and dispensaries have been set up in this area for the benefit of the sick workers of Russia, and not only that, but to enable partially recovered workers to remain longer in the Crimea until their health is once again established. We have set up farms, vineyards and similar undertakings in which these workers can be employed with profit to themselves and the Republic.

All comrades must realise that it is in raising the public health, lies the best basis for a sound rebuilding of Russian economic life. The rebuilding of Russia cannot be carried through by a sick nation, by broad masses whose hygiene, physique and sanitary requirements are not well developed. In the great and heavy work of rebuilding Russia, the health standard of the Russian masses is of the very first importance. It is to be hoped that the comrades who are creating and supporting the International Workers' Relief for Russia may bear these truths continually in mind so that we may go forward to a practical realisation of Socialism based on sound minds in healthy bodies.

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS *By M. N. Roy*

THE Thirty-seventh Annual Session of the All-India National Congress was celebrated at Gaya, an old pilgrimage town in the heart of the Province of Behar. It is one of the most backward provinces of the country, being the seat of powerful landlordism. Except coal-mining and several small ironworks and railway workshops, the entire province is predominantly agricultural. The great Tata Iron and Steel Works are geographically situated within the boundaries of this province, being at the farthest southern end. In short, the province of Behar is industrially backward, and therefore lacks on the one hand a progressive bourgeoisie, and on the other a newly-created proletarian mass in the throes of a spontaneous social upheaval. The peasantry is cruelly exploited, and supplies the labour forces for the far-off tea plantations of Assam, as well as for the jute and other industries around Calcutta.

The National Congress met at the end of a year which has been the period of the acutest crisis in its whole history. The social elements that control the Congress and that had to fight in the last session to maintain its domination could not have chosen a better place. The reactionary and politically bankrupt petty bourgeoisie, the standard-bearers of "pure Gandhism," were very anxious to go away from the dangerous influence of the two revolutionary factors behind the national movement, namely, the progressive

bourgeoisie and the militant proletariat. They took the Congress to Gaya, and placed it under the hospitality of and tied it to the purse strings of the landlords wearing the Gandhi-cap, which symbol alone is enough to cover their sinister economic character. The Reception Committee (a body entrusted with the organisation of the Congress) was composed of these landlords and their relations at the Bar. The chairman of the Reception Committee was one of the richest landholders in the province. Under such auspices did the Thirty-seventh Congress meet. The result has been precisely what was to be expected from those seeking such eminently reactionary patronage. "Pure Gandhism" has held its own against the onslaught of the Radical intellectuals from the Right and of the Utopians from the Left. The petty bourgeois religionists are so much encouraged by their victory at Gaya that the next annual session of the Congress will take place at Andhra, the stronghold of Brahmanic reaction.

Objectively, however, Gaya marks the beginning of a new period in the Indian national struggle. The apparent victory of petty bourgeois reaction is in reality its last gasp of life. Though the great political questions confronting the Congress still remain unsolved, the confusion reigning in its ranks ever since the fateful days when the mighty mass demonstrations during the visit of the Prince of Wales, as well as the revolutionary agrarian uprisings, were disowned and denounced under the personal leadership of Gandhi, is nearing its end. Social readjustment outside is reflecting itself upon the Congress, in which class demarcation can no longer be kept confused by sentimental effusions. The events of the last twelve months proved that the Congress could not continue as a heterogeneous body, united not by political expediency, but on the treacherous ground of sentimentality. What happened during the last twelve months has crystallised at Gaya in the form of a split which is the forerunner of the growth of cohesive political parties, reflecting the interests of the several social classes objectively antagonistic to British rule, and forming a fighting coalition inside the National Congress, and which can only be the organ of national struggle. So the process of political regrouping begun at Gaya sounds the death-knell of the non-political Gandhites, in whose hand the Congress lately came to be more of a prayer-hall and a conclave of theologians rather than the leader of a national struggle. It can be predicted, in the words of C. R. Das, the defeated President at Gaya, that "the minority of to-day will be the majority of to-morrow." That is, those who have at last raised the standard of revolt against the quietism of "pure-Gandhism" may appear to be beaten to-day, but the future belongs to them. They will initiate a new period of action in the national movement, and thus will capture before long the leadership of the Congress. This welcome eventuality was indicated by the split at Gaya, which therefore marks a step forward in the Indian National Struggle, the temporary victory of the petty bourgeois centrists notwithstanding.

Three social elements went into the composition of the non-co-operation movement from the very beginning, namely, the middle-class intellectuals with a Radical tendency, the petty bourgeoisie in a desperate economic condition, and the masses of workers and peasants in the initial stages of awakening. Taken as a

whole, the non-co-operation movement was a petty bourgeois movement. Fundamentally, it was not so much a struggle against imperialism as it was a revolt against the big bourgeoisie. It may sound strange, but it is the fact none the less. The gradual clarification process is proving it to be so. Towards the close of the Great War the situation in India came to such a state, the national struggle objectively became of such potentiality through the awakening of the proletariat and the wide-spread discontent among the peasantry, that imperialism found it imperative to accommodate itself with the aspirations of the native bourgeoisie. The Montagu Reforms were conceded, and the big bourgeoisie, which had so far been the leader of the national struggle, was placated and won over. The non-co-operation movement was initiated with the avowed object of wrecking the reforms which had given the native bourgeoisie a place in the sun. Divested of its metaphysical phraseology and sentimental effusions, the non-co-operation movement politically meant "the reforms have left the middle and lower strata of the bourgeoisie in the lurch: we won't have anything to do with them until they are so extended as to make provisions for us." The Swaraj of the non-co-operators, to which many a revolutionary interpretation has been attributed, never stood for anything more than such measures of self-government and concessions, which would transcend the limits of the big bourgeoisie. During two eventful years this petty programme was kept shrouded in bombastic phrases, and the movement was carried on, not on account of the attractiveness of the programme, but by a spontaneous revolutionary upheaval, with which the petty bourgeoisie and their moderate programme had not only nothing to do, but of which it has always been in deadly terror. It was not possible for the non-co-operation movement thus to ride always on somebody else's horse, especially when the wildness of this horse was not very agreeable to the rider. In the course of a movement, which was essentially an opposition to the big bourgeoisie coming to power, the class consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie, went on developing till it discovered the danger of playing with fire. Consequently, it severed all connection with the revolutionary workers and peasants, which separation, however, proved its own political impotency. Non-co-operation became a moral creed, a religious dogma, a metaphysical abstraction, and anything else that goes to strengthen the hand of social reaction, thus hindering the development of the political consciousness of the nation.

This degeneration of the non-co-operation movement naturally failed to win the approbation of the Radical intellectuals within its ranks. The latter revolted and demanded that "the object of the Congress should be material." They called for "political activities" as against the ethical vegetation and religious quietism of the petty bourgeoisie. So the Congress became the ground of battle between the two strata of the middle class, which originally had started the non-co-operation together. This battle was fought at Gaya. The Thirty-seventh Annual Session of the National Congress was engaged in deciding whether the Radical upper middle class or the reactionary petty bourgeoisie would lead the national movement in the next period. This otherwise harmless battle was, however, fought before an extremely revolutionary background, where were arrayed the mighty forces of the workers and peasants,

awakened, but still unconscious of their historic rôle, without leadership, and advancing with faltering steps. The presence of these revolutionary forces standing in the background was felt in the Congress through the medium of a Left Wing, which, however, had a very hazy outlook, and was actuated more by sentiment than by understanding. The voice of the workers and peasants was raised through the programme published by the Communist Party on the eve of the Congress, a programme which burst on the situation like a bombshell, created great consternation in the Congress, and helped very much the process of class-clarification. But we will not deal with that episode in this article. The Communists sought to strengthen the hand of the Left Wing, but only succeeded in frightening it. This was, however, a gain. It proved how unreliable is the sloppy sentimentality of those who talk glibly about "the masses."

C. R. Das, a renowned lawyer, who gave up his extensive practice at the Bar, who was clapped into jail on the eve of the Ahmedabad (1921) Congress, to whose presidency he had been unanimously elected, and the president-elect of the Gaya Congress, unexpectedly put himself at the head of the incipient Left Wing. Four months before the Congress met at Gaya he came out of jail, and, to its great surprise, the country came to know that the man who had been raised to the pedestal of Gandhi was advocating the abandonment of the path marked out by Gandhi. The evolution of Das in his post-jail days was rather interesting. It appeared that in order to feel the pulse of the country, he kept on talking vague generalities in the first months. Suddenly he came out with a statement couched in such phrases as: "We do not want bourgeois democracy," "Brown bureaucracy will not be any better than the white bureaucracy," "The middle classes have failed to carry on the non-co-operation," "The masses want Swaraj more than the middle classes," and similar other sentiments, which outraged the sense of propriety of the Congress, and brought upon the devoted head of Das the epithet of "Bolshevik" from the ruling class. Many of the sentimentally revolutionary elements within the Congress, who had been smarting under the ethical dictums imposed upon them by Gandhism, enthusiastically welcomed the leadership of Das. Thus, in addition to the Radical intellectuals, who had been for a long time demanding a change in the Congress programme, came into existence another factor advocating a change in the Congress activities. This latter had the appearance of a Left Wing Party, and, in fact, its rank and file did contain Left Wing, that is, revolutionary elements. But the leadership of this incipient Left Wing Party proved lacking in revolutionary vision. At Gaya, they identified themselves with the Radicals of the Right Wing, the change advocated by whom would mean practical repudiation of the method of non-co-operation and would lead the national movement back to the tactics compatible with constitutional agitation. Both the wings wanted a change and joined forces on this identity of issues. This tactical mistake proved suicidal for the growing Left Wing, which thus forfeited the adhesion of a considerable section of the lower middle-class sentimentalists who mean well, but do not possess the courage and vision to carve out a revolutionary path for themselves. The make-believe talk of the "pure Gandhites" about civil disobedience proved more fas-

cinating for these elements, who therefore remained attached to the Centre. The Left Wing forces failed to assert themselves on the situation and when the split came, they were found with the Radicals of the Right.

The split, which ought to have taken place on the issue of petty bourgeois politics versus mass action, was diverted to an internal quarrel for power between the Radical Liberals and the lower middle-class reactionaries. The latter have won, because the Left Wing was not yet developed enough to take the field alone. The new opposition party is a combination of two diametrically divergent forces which cannot be expected to operate in harmony. Therefore a second split is inevitable. This split will happen as soon as a sufficiently strong nucleus of a mass party is formed. The materials for such a nucleus are there. They are already in the process of accumulation. The publication of the Communists' programme has, on the one hand, exposed the real intentions of the petty bourgeois politicians, and, on the other, opened up an inspiring vision to all the elements revolutionarily inclined. Hopeful signs were to be seen even at Gaya, where reaction reigned supreme. In spite of the obstruction of the bureaucratic machinery of the Congress, the resolution calling for complete independence as the aim of the Congress received more support this year than the last one. More than 30 per cent. of the delegates voted for it. A great majority of the delegates came back disgruntled, looking for a new lead which can alone be given by a truly revolutionary Left Wing Party, whose rise is imminent.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY By D. Ivon Jones

THE Fourth Congress of the Communist International was as epoch-making as its predecessors. It was held after a year's experience of the New Economic Policy, or "Nepo," as everybody in Russia now calls it. That which a year ago was signalled as a serious retreat is now established as an inevitable transition period in the revolution. Comrade Zinoviev has declared that even some of the most highly industrialised countries will have to go through this phase. The New Economic Policy was a retreat for the Russian revolution in the relative sense, because in its onward rush it had made such sweeping conquests as to give it plenty of room to manoeuvre. For the revolution in the other countries it will be the way of the first advance.

If we compare the present conquests (with all the deductions involved in "Nepo"), with the programme adumbrated by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*, it will be seen that the Russian revolution has made all "the despotic inroads" on capitalist property contemplated in that memorable document. The *Notes on the Gotha Programme* are also interesting in this connection as showing the mind of Marx on the first phase of the revolution.

Although Comrade Lenin did not declare himself so definitely as did the President of the Comintern in regard to "Neпо," as the way of advance for all parties, he left no room for doubt that the lessons already learnt from it have enormously lightened the task of the revolution in the western countries. Since it has been decided by the Fourth Congress that all the Communist parties must submit a party programme it may be helpful to the British comrades to record the ideas which arise in the minds of a "Western" Communist, ever concerned about the results of Neпо, in moving about the streets of Moscow for several months, noting the application of the policy in one or two places in the provinces, and relying on the material to be found in the ample pages of that most wonderful of newspapers, *The Pravda*.

The lessons learnt from the New Economic Policy imposes upon us the duty of clarifying our ideas and those of the workers as to what is and is not involved in the capture of power by the proletariat. We all made propaгanda in the first two years of the revolution trying to show that the Russian worker, in spite of his Promethean suffering, was already better off than the worker in the West. We called upon the revolution to cash out immediate results for our propaгanda purposes, even with a war on nine fronts. Like the capitalists, we were too impatient to give long credits. Hence, when "Neпо" came, there was a stampede in the other direction, and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Western workers received a set-back. Trotsky, in an article on Red Military Strategy, refers to the necessity and difficulty of habituating the Red soldier to the idea of retreat as an essential condition of manoeuvring in war. And one cannot help admiring the steadfastness of the Russian Party in the retreat on the political front last year. As Lenin said, the retreat was carried out in good order.

The Communism of the Civil War period thus helped to create in our minds the illusion that the proletarian revolution involved the immediate socialising of every form of production and distribution down to the village shoemaker. And it appears as if the Russian leaders too, ever ready to take hints from history, thought that the Civil War, making necessary the wholesale expropriation of the revolting and sabotaging bourgeoisie, had liquidated the process of transition in the fierce crucible of the conflict. But as far back as 1918 Lenin had already declared that "State Capitalism" would be a more progressive form for the Proletarian Republic than the species of socialism then prevailing. Much of the Communism of the Civil War period differed very little in form from the "War Socialism" of the Imperialist States, except that the one was in the interest of the workers, and the other in the interests of the capitalists, which, of course, makes all the difference in substance. But both were war necessities.

"Mankind undertakes no tasks for which it has not had the proper training," declared Marx. Lenin, in his speech to the Congress, referring to the Kronstadt Mutiny and the peasant risings of the early part of 1921, said: "The cause of it was that we advanced too rapidly in our economic expropriations, before assuring for ourselves a sufficiently strong base. The masses already felt what we were not yet able to formulate, but which we very soon recognised, namely, that an immediate transition to pure socialist distribution exceeded our effective strength, and that if we did

not show sufficient capacity to make concessions and confine ourselves to less difficult tasks, we were threatened with destruction."

A year ago, during the Third Congress, we saw the New Economic Policy being introduced, into one domain after another, while remnants of "War Communism" remained. Long queues of workers were still to be seen waiting for their bread rations, while the new bourgeoisie passed by—for these no need to stand in that weary bread line. It was hard for many members of the Party to relinquish the old ideas. But Lenin was incessantly pushing forward to the new basis. "Any attempt to cling to the old forms is misplaced," he told the Party Congress. Now, after eighteen months of "Neпо," Comrade Varga comes to the Fourth Congress and emphatically declares that the Russian working masses in Moscow and Petrograd from his own observation are already better fed and better clothed than the workers in the Central European countries. And Russia is only beginning to rise. Comrade Zinoviev told the Comintern delegates that the enthusiasm of the working masses for the Communist Party, as demonstrated in the anniversary celebrations this year, exceeded anything seen since the great October days in 1917.

The Russian lesson teaches us once more that for every social advance there must be a basis for it in the experience of the people. It shows that the economic forms of Communism must grow in the friendly atmosphere of the Proletarian State power, rather than be instituted by decree. History is ever urging us forward, and ever telling us: "Young man, you've left something behind," and sending us back for it. The proletariat captures control of capitalist monopoly, the trusts, the mines, the land, etc., but retains bourgeois free trade and exchange as the only effective stimulus in the period of reconstruction; and thus, in return for a tribute in the form of profit, makes the petty bourgeoisie serve the community in the way they can function best.

How "Neпо" Leads to Communism.

The New Economic Policy puts to us again the old question: Why do social classes struggle for political power? Is it not in order to protect their interests? Nay, more! Is it not in order to provide a field for the further development of their special modes of production or property relations? When the revolutionary bourgeoisie in England and France fought for political power, it was not because they had no room to exist merely—indeed, they were very useful to the feudal nobility in their growing impecuniosity—but because they had no room to develop. They were yet but fledgling capitalists when Cromwell captured power. They needed that power in order to expand the capitalist mode of production.

Precisely so with the proletariat. It needs to capture power not only to protect its very existence, but also in order to develop its own appropriate form of production and distribution, the co-operative one. But this implies that it is not yet able, on the very morrow of the revolution, to apply its own forms of production and appropriation to all spheres of economic life.

Without large industry there can be no proletariat. Without a proletariat there can be no revolution. Without all these there can be no Communism. Under "War Communism" large industry languished, the proletarians were getting declassed, scat-

tering in all directions. To-day the industrial proletariat is on the increase, and with it increases the enthusiasm for Communism. "War Communism" was perforce a community of privation. The Communism we strive for can only come from superabundance. The first task of the Proletarian State therefore is to produce superabundantly.

The New Economic Policy mobilises the petty bourgeoisie of the towns into the smaller forms of trade and industry by the medium of free exchange. This petty trade is an auxiliary of the large state industry, helping the latter to expand, and inch by inch to squeeze out its small competitors, just as machine production inevitably squeezes out small production everywhere. And as large capitalist industry squeezed out handicraft gradually and almost imperceptibly (the victims only knew they were out of work), so large state industry in the Proletarian Republic, after a period of competitive training, will painlessly eliminate the petty producers as they become superfluous. Large state industry will expand to agricultural production. It is not Communism that introduces the machine. It is the machine that will introduce Communism. Lloyd George said that Bolshevism can't make locomotives. More wonderful things happen: locomotives can make Bolsheviks. No further decrees are necessary reversing the New Economic Policy. Though "Nepo" is a retreat, the advance does not involve its reversal by decree. The advance has already begun, via the New Economic Policy; we are marching around another way.

It is emphasised by Lenin that at bottom the New Economic Policy arose from the need for an effective economic link between the peasants and the town proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie cannot be separated as persons from the petty bourgeois mode of production. Capitalist industry is easy to capture because the capitalists take no part in the production. But the petty producers are a tangible economic mass which cannot be ignored as individuals. Unlike the capitalist class they represent an economic problem even when we have swept away their mode of production, and in Russia this mass is huge. Hence the imperative necessity to reckon with their traditional forms of production and distribution.

The Status of the Petty Bourgeois under "Nepo."

When the class-conscious worker walks the streets of Moscow and sees on all hands the shopkeepers busy displaying their wares, how does he feel about it? I fancy he feels just about the same about it as under capitalism—this small fry is not the enemy. There, back in the less frequented streets where there are few shops, are the great factories, owned and controlled by the proletariat.

While the shopkeeper is busy buying and selling, running to the country for stocks (each worker used to do it for himself in the old days), watching the rise and fall of the rouble, etc., we may be sure that he has all that his soul desires, that he is too absorbed in his pursuits to mix in political intrigue; and what is more, in the total account is producing values, at a profit to be sure, but values which would not otherwise exist. In the period of "War Communism" the large number of unwilling petty bour-

geoisie in the factories only served as sabotaging deadheads, demoralising the rest.

The contradiction of capitalist society, as Marx taught, is that production is social while appropriation is private. "Very well, then," declares the revolutionary proletariat, "we will take and hold those industries where production is social, and make the fruits of them also social. As for the rest of you, you petty producers, we will deal with you in kinder fashion later on."

Trotsky, in his masterly analysis of the New Economic Policy at the Congress, dealt with the dangers to the proletarian regime arising from free trade, and was disposed to make light of them. Lenin, on the other hand, when the policy of concessions to foreign capitalists and the new economic policy were launched, spoke a great deal about these dangers, and urged the party to eternal vigilance as the price of power. The writer had a talk not long ago with an old party member, a mine blacksmith, who had worked on the Urquhart concessions before the war; he said he was less afraid of industrial concessions, as they increased the numerical strength of the proletariat. This old proletarian fighter was strongly in favour of granting the Urquhart concessions, also because it would mean the economic regeneration of that area. It is generally the intelligensia idealist, who is fearful. Under the proletarian dictatorship, the merchant bourgeoisie is far more difficult to get at. An article appeared in a recent issue of *Pravda* on the extreme difficulty of imposing an effective luxury tax, in spite of all attempts to do so.

But Comrade Trotsky observed that so far no foreign capitalists have come for concessions. The chief danger from "Neпо" lies in the ideological influence of the traders upon the youth. A "Speculant," or illicit trader, under War Communism was regarded by the class conscious youth as a thoroughly undesirable type of person. Much of that healthy aversion to the trader remains, and the noblest profession in the eyes of the Russian youth seems to be the engineer. While the Proletarian Dictatorship does not tolerate a free press for the anti-proletarian parties, it allows non-political journals to be issued by private entrepreneurs; and in these, of course, it is unavoidable that the more subtle forms of anti-proletarian ideology should be disseminated. And the invasion of the cheap cinema film has proceeded to such an extent that Trotsky warned the Young Communist Congress against its sinister influence. The State Cinema Theatre has shown a few high class films, one a wonderful drama of the revolution; and no doubt in a short while the State monopoly will extend to this, the moving pictorial press, and will completely eliminate the odious drawing room melodramas of the decadent bourgeoisie which by some means have been dumped into Russia.

What about the economic menace? This will be the test of the extent of the ideological menace to the proletarian regime. Trotsky gave the number of workers employed in State industry, apart from the railways, as a round million; as against 60,000 employed in private concerns, mostly small works leased from the Government. Half of these latter again are in the hands of public co-operative societies, and the new type of share companies in which the Government is an important shareholder. As for distributive trade, private enterprise holds about half as much as the

Government concerns. If you walk down the Tverskaya in Moscow, and pick out the finest stores, you will notice that they are government concerns ; and no doubt a little trade rivalry ensures that the government concerns are carried on with the maximum efficiency. If state concerns cannot beat private enterprise for all round efficiency in the presence of the competitor, how much less so if the competitor is legally barred from entering the field. Thus Nepo fixes the tempo of efficiency for state industry.

Holding the state power, the proletariat has the scissors with which it can at any time clip off private trade, to quote the words of Trotsky. Not only this, it has the control of railways, coal mines, electric power, and raw material, by which it can throttle the new bourgeoisie at any time without resorting to decree ; just as the American railway companies, by means of tariffs, manage to get the last dollar of surplus earnings out of the western farmers.

"Land monopoly is the root of capitalist monopoly," said Marx. There is no comparison between the peasant land holdings of the French and the Russian revolutions. By 1852, as we read in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, the French peasantry were mortgaged up to the hilt to the Paris finance capitalists. But the Land Code recently passed by the Central Executive Committee affirms anew the state ownership of the land. The land is only for those who can use it. It is inalienable. Thus the chief means by which merchant traders may entrench themselves in the country's economic field is taken away from them. They cannot lay up treasures in the heaven of landlordism. They cannot lend out their profits on land security. The bonds could never be enforced so long as the proletariat is in power. Thus their spare cash is left to the mercy of a fluctuating market. Like autumn butterflies, their career as a class is a short life and a merry one, "for ever getting born and ever dying in the alien atmosphere of the Proletarian Dictatorship." The "Citizens' Code" has fixed the maximum inheritable estate at 10,000 gold roubles (£1,000) subject to taxation. Everything above this is appropriated by the State. Besides this, strict limitations are imposed upon the degree of relationship entitled to inherit.

All trade is of necessity based upon the surplus wheat in the hands of the peasants. After the Government has taken 200 million poods as tax (or land rent), there remains from last harvest a surplus for the market, says Trotsky, of 100 million poods. Half of this is bought up by the Government Departments. The balance remains for private traders. It will thus be seen that the proletarian state is firmly entrenched against any economic menace from the merchant bourgeoisie.

In this connection, however, it is worth recording that the "Citizens' Code" allows municipal Soviets to conclude agreements with private individuals for the leasing of building plots for terms not exceeding 49 years, for the purpose of house building. Here is a mode of investment for successful traders, on condition of supplying much needed housing. But the level of rents is automatically fixed by the State ownership of all the large buildings. The Ukrainian Soviet is itself forming a Soviet Company in which private individuals will be invited to participate to build houses under the terms of this clause.

The "Citizens' Code" guarantees to private traders State

enforcement of agreements among themselves, thus facilitating transactions. But the Code provides that, notwithstanding any clause to the contrary, no such agreement shall be valid which militates against the interests of the State industry. Thus on all hands the new bourgeoisie are "cribbed, cabined, and confined" within very definite limits.

Does not the capitalist class, by virtue of its holding large industry, rule England in despite of the workers and the small bourgeoisie? How much more so then can the workers themselves holding that industry, firmly retain power, even if the small bourgeoisie are left to function within the limits consistent with the interests of the Proletarian State power? The Russian bourgeoisie, owners of industry, failed to hold Russia, even with foreign aid. But the Russian workers, in possession of that same industry, hold Russia with a firm hand even against the furious attacks of the combined international bourgeoisie. This seems to indicate an enormous reserve of political power in the industrial proletariat even when, as yet economically weakened, it is only able to produce one-fourth as much as it did under the capitalist regime.

"To Everyone According to his Needs"?

The New Economic policy is not merely a retreat; it is a return to Marxism. How vehemently (in his notes on the Gotha programme) Marx objects to the formula, "To everyone according to his needs and from everyone according to his capacity," forming any part of a revolutionary programme. The revolution inherits capitalist forms; it is the State that is revolutionised. And these forms, under the Dictatorship, almost imperceptibly receive a new content. Zinoviev told the Comintern Executive last year that one of the lessons of "Nepo" was that the wage form of payment was still a necessary incentive for the large non-party mass for a phase after the revolution. But even though the wage form remains, no one can deny that the wage system has gone. The workers no longer are wage-slaves. They are the ruling class, although "Nepo" brings unemployment and sometimes even strikes.

Does this mean that mankind will never produce except for private gain? The bourgeoisie as a class, even in a world war, will only produce at a profit. But the working class of Russia has shown not only that it can die, but live and labour to exhaustion for its common cause. The heroism of the Russian workers will never be fully told. There is no more glorious example of this than the devotion of the Don Bas miners who, starving and cold, stuck to their machines to save the mines from being flooded, many collapsing, and carried away, but returning again to their heroic task. The Russian workers are suffering from the tremendous handicap of a technical staff inherited from Czarism, consciously or unconsciously, always sabotaging. But the new generation of "Red Managers," like the "Red Commanders," is arriving fast. Lenin has on several occasions lately charged whole sections of the State apparatus with active opposition, and warns them of the time when the thousands of Soviet youth, now in training, will be able to take their place. The personnel of the State apparatus is inherited from a feudal society. These old State servants are not likely to tune up to modern efficiency for a regime which has robbed them of their old respectability. The village post office

has a staff three times as large as its counterpart in England.

Thus it is Utopian to promise "to everyone according to his needs" so long as everyone does not give according to his capacity, and so long as, through the lack of modern industry, the production of the necessities of life costs far more than the "socially necessary labour."

"Strict Accounting and Control."

Lenin has named the present system in Russia a form of "State Capitalism" or "controlled Capitalism." He, like history itself, doesn't sugar-coat his pills! Nevertheless, at a Party Congress last year he had a good laugh at certain comrades who were trying to find a precedent for this "State Capitalism" in the text books. Since there never was a Proletarian Republic before this one, there could be no precedent for any of its subsidiary forms. The large industries are formed into "State Trusts." Here again is a name with a bad flavour to Anglo-Saxons. But these are called "Trusts" only because certain inter-dependent industries are grouped into one concern, somewhat on the lines of the I.W.W. chart with which we are all familiar. These "Trusts" enjoy a certain autonomy. They buy and sell in the market; but are under the control of the Supreme Council of Public Economy. Because they supply their products through the market, some are flourishing, others do not fare so well, while the heavy industries are faring very badly, and will require State subsidies to restore them. Don Bas coal mines, for example, after a period of revival, are again declining, and *Pravda* is again calling for aid to this front. It has not yet been cleared up whether the serious position of the heavy industries is due to technical mismanagement, or to the need for capital. Lenin's speech seems to indicate the latter.

The New Economic Policy provides a sure index of how far the Proletarian State is living on the fruit of its own labours. By overthrowing the capitalist State we do not produce a magic Pandora's box from which everyone can draw according to his needs. Although we destroy the capitalist system, capital still remains with us in the form of means of production. And those operations which figure on a capitalist balance sheet, so much for "Depreciation of Plant," so much for "Reserve for New Development," etc., are also necessary under a proletarian regime. That is to say: more than ever we have to preserve ("depreciation") and increase ("reserve for new development") the means of production, for this is the way to Communism. We must not eat into our means of production, or capital. This is what was taking place under "War Communism." Free housing, free trains, free lighting, free theatres—there was no means of knowing exactly at whose expense these socialist institutions were obtained, although Lenin had as far back as 1918 issued the slogan of "Strict accounting and control." The peasant risings, referred to by Lenin, soon showed that it was mainly at the expense of the tillers of the soil; and it was natural that they should demand in their own way that the account should at least be chalked up on the slate.

But "strict accounting and control" does not go well with a regime in which the destruction of money was a deliberate policy. Because, with all the anarchism of bourgeois society, we have the paradox that no other method of "strict accounting and control"

has yet been developed to replace the money form of payment and its corollary of free exchange. Hence it follows that we can only dispense with the money form of exchange when we have a superabundance of the means of life. Money is like fire, a good servant but a bad master. What a good servant it can be in the period of reconstruction is demonstrated by the first annual balance sheet of the Textile Trust which appears in the *Pravda* of November 26th. This balance sheet (it appears as an advertisement) is one of the most eloquent portents of a Russia resurgent. Here we have huge figures, but there is no self-deception; the final result is shown in gold values. In the place occupied on a capitalist balance sheet by the words "Capital Account" and "Working Capital," we have "Foundation State Fund" and "Circulating State Fund." The former is a sum of seven milliard odd 1922 roubles, covered on the credit side by "immovable property, machinery and tools," evidently the original assessment of the property on emerging from "War Communism." Then we have also on the credit side an amount of 139 million spent in new construction, "capital repairs and increase of plant," with a further sum of seven milliard odd allocated to the factory farms. The "profit" for the year amounts to over two milliard of 1922 roubles, or, in pounds sterling, about £300,000, after allocating an amount equaling 5 per cent. towards "Depreciation of Plant," this latter provision, much smaller than is usual on capitalist balance sheets for a plant that is already old. But in any event the clear profit remains for use by the State or for new development. That is to say, it remains in the hands of the workers. Thus we see that, in this as in many other instances under the Dictatorship, capitalist forms remain, but their contents have been revolutionised. The runaway horse of the "money system" has been put into harness. And meanwhile the proletariat is being taught by it how to keep "strict accounting and control," which in effect means: how to preserve and increase the forces of production, the conditions necessary for a Communist Society.

The Pranks of the Rouble.

Why does the value of the rouble fall? It falls because the size of the State apparatus, including, of course, the Red Army, is still beyond the productive capacity of the toiling community. Paper money has to be printed to make up the deficiency. It is an easy form of money-getting, but very expensive in the long run. It is resorted to just by those States who cannot afford to do it, by those States whose credit is too bad to borrow. The deficit in the Soviet budget is continually decreasing, but while it exists and paper money has to be printed, it produces instability. The new traders are not able to carry on productive forms of activity, as they do not know what the value of the rouble will be next month. Hence they rush into the market, and indulge in unproductive speculation. This defeats the purpose of trade in a Proletarian State. (The reader will have noted the reference to the 1922 rouble. The figures were getting so "astronomically" large that it was decided to cross out some of the noughts. An original 10,000 was counted as one rouble. Thus the million rouble note of the original denomination has only 100 roubles marked on it in the 1922 denomination. In 1923 there will be a further crossing out of noughts,

so that a million will count as one rouble, and we shall return to the kopecks of the old days again. Only the Proletarian State can do this. The Capitalist States cannot do it, as there are the "war loans" and other huge mortgages on the labour of workers, which no section of the bourgeoisie will agree to annul by crossing out the noughts as is done by the Soviet Republic.) The Soviet Republic also guards the workers against the evil effects of the fall of the rouble. In periods of heavy decline of the rouble, as in the early part of 1922, when prices doubled week by week, the workers were paid on the 20th of the month an amount equal to last month's wages, with which they ran to the traders before they raised prices. At the end of the month they received the balance due on the computation of the gold value of their wages as announced by the State Bank. This is only one instance of the way in which the Proletarian State weighs the scales in favour of the workers. Printing paper money is a form of confiscation. But it hits right and left. In a Capitalist State it hits worst those who have money invested in shares, war loans, mortgages, etc. But there are no such people in Soviet Russia. You see smart people and much finery on the Pushkin boulevard, but they have nothing in common with the dwellers in Park Lane. These Moscow traders put most of their savings on their backs in dress or articles of luxury, such as worry the soul of the *Pravda* leader writer. When the rouble is finally stabilised the probability is that they will invest more in industrial production, and thus help in the restoration of economic life. They are pretty severely taxed both centrally and locally. The chief aim, therefore, is to live within our means as a Proletarian State, and to this end the whole energies of the Russian economists are now directed. The final stabilisation of the rouble will be the bed rock from which will commence the first building of the future Communist society.

"The New Order in the Shell of the Old."

The *Pravda* offers to Western Communists an interesting view of the new order growing up. It is a herald of the new order. For Communists its pages are a whole university. The *Pravda* is ever calling the party to a new front. Although it is the party organ, it is merciless in its criticism of government administration, and though the *Isvestya* is the official government organ, no great administrative work, such as the collection of the tax in kind, can be undertaken without the lead of the *Pravda*. Its correspondents are the first to scent danger, to expose a wrong. The White Guard Press gets all the material it needs from the *Pravda*, for the bourgeoisie cannot understand that the Proletarian Revolution is the most merciless critic of itself. (Just now a competition is running in its pages, a kind of "competition" that could only take place in a Proletarian Republic. A prize is offered for information about the best and the worst factory manager. For weeks past reports from workers have been received telling of the merits or demerits of their managers. These reports are generally endorsed either by the Factory Committee or Party "Yacheka" (branch) at the works. Portraits are given of the progressive managers, so that the whole course of the competition presents the epic of Russia's heroic efforts at reconstruction.) Take the issue of November 19th. Here we have the account of an exciting factory meeting. A worker has

sent in to *Pravda* an unfavourable report about the manager. The manager resents. An open meeting of the Party "Yacheka" of the works is held to decide the case. Present: representative of the District Committee of the Party, the Factory Committee, the management and the general body of the Party members and non-party workers of the factory. The discussion is long and heated, but in the end the *Pravda* report is endorsed, and an enquiry instituted into the managers' doings.

The place of honour in this issue is given to an account of how "Red Manager" Tovarisch Shterengov, stepped in and brought a large lithographic works from the brink of ruin to its present flourishing condition. From these and other reports one is struck by the manner in which the whole life of the Russian worker tends to circle round his place of work. There is the factory club, the factory theatre, there is, of course, the factory Committee, and if he is a party member, the factory branch of the party, or the "Yacheka" as all Russia knows it; and even if he is not a party member, there are the open meetings of the Yacheka, which are becoming common, drawing large masses of the non-party workers into the party circles; then there is the factory co-operative, and, in many cases, the communal building, where all the factory workers are housed. For his young lads there is the factory school, where, in addition to the rudiments of learning, they are also taught their trade. It is the new order growing up in the shell of the old.

It is stated in the report how the timely arrival of Tovarisch Shterengov saved a couple of hundred workers from being thrown out of work. Thus we have unemployed under "Nepo." The first period of the revolution is a period of privation, and only the class conscious advance guard of the proletariat can carry on without the stimulus of the wage system and its concomitants of unemployment. Unemployment in the Proletarian Republic has features worth noting; it is steadily decreasing. The union, as well as the State, guard the unemployed from misery. The population of Petrograd, which was greatly reduced by the removal of the government to Moscow, is again increasing rapidly as a result of the influx of workers to the factories. The Putiloff works are expanding day by day. "Nepo" does not guarantee the right to work, but the workers fully understand that the causes of unemployment are due to the long years of exhaustion and that every nerve is strained to eliminate it. The Proletarian State has tens of thousands of little children in its homes. But it cannot yet provide for all. Many little children beg in the streets. But the November celebrations show that the air is full of hope, not in a distant future, a vague idea of amelioration such as liberal enthusiasms gave the masses, but of speedy conquest over all these evils by their own efforts day by day in the factories. They can hear the mighty throb of emancipation coming towards them with the speed of a steam engine. Such is reform under the proletarian regime.

The Army of the People.

Do the Russian workers feel that the industries are less their own because they are organised into trusts, which buy and sell, pay wages, issue balance sheets, and try to run at a profit? Not in the least. The writer was privileged to witness the last May day

celebrations at Petrograd. Everyone was amazed, including the Russian Party members themselves, at the vastness of the crowds of workers bearing innumerable flags, packed side by side with their beloved Red Army on the great Uritzky Square. Comrade Zinoviev addressed a portion of the crowd, a few thousand upturned eager faces. It was during the critical days of Genoa. "Shall we give them back their factories?" asked Zinoviev. Every doubting Communist should have heard that emphatic response from the thousands of workers.

During the military parade, a young proletarian officer was directing the arrangements on the square. He saw that the workers and their banners in a corner near the tribune were packed to suffocation. He rode up and addressed them. We could see by his gestures that he wished to transfer a couple of thousand of them to the other side of the square. Always for proletarian order, he turned his horse, uplifted his sword, and with a broad grin on his good-humored face, gave the order "quick march," and the crowd of working men and lads, and working women with shawls over their heads, stepped out gaily after their "Pied Piper," all hugely enjoying the joke. How it made one's heart warm for this great simple people who are showing the world how to do it.

This little incident serves to show in what a real sense the Red Army is one with the people in the Proletarian State. On that same day the massed troops took the oath of allegiance to the working class. At Nizhni Novogorod, for instance, the oath of allegiance was taken by the Red officers and the Commanders drawn up face to face with a line of working men, and each officer recited the oath, "I, a son of the working people, etc.," to the working man opposite him. This is the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which is not modified in any of its essentials by the New Economic Policy.

Lenin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky are even occupied in pointing out their own "mistakes." But if there are any mistakes, the world first learns about them from their own lips. It is the great spirit of science for the first time applied to politics. They personify the self-criticism of the proletarian revolution, which Marx, in the first pages of *Eighteenth Brumaire* takes pride in comparing with the bluster of bourgeois revolutions. It is the guarantee that the coming order which these leaders represent is so much higher than the old one, with all its humbug politicians.

"He who will not work, neither shall he eat." The aim of the revolution is to give effect to this decree of nature. But "War Communism" only affected it in form. We can see now that we do not turn a petty trader into a proletarian merely by taking away his stock-in-trade and putting him into a factory. The proletarian is a far more complex product than that. The virtue of the property less proletarian does not reside in being propertiless. Deprive a bourgeois of his possessions, and ten to one you will find a slum-proletarian. The New Economic Policy has restored the proletariat in sole occupation of the factories. The petty bourgeoisie have returned to where they belong. Under the progress of the New Economic Policy the proletariat will gradually assimilate them; and the Party will gradually assimilate the Proletariat. The Party is the advanced proletariat. It is not a passing expedient of the revolution. In the measure that the whole of the working

people became animated by the consciousness of the advanced proletariat, of the Party, in that measure will "controlled capitalism" disappear. The discipline and sense of solidarity of the advanced proletariat, that is, of the Party, is the discipline necessary to hold together a Communist Society. The open Yacheka grows apace. The party becomes co-extensive with the working people. The International shall be the human race. Then we shall have Communism. But the first step to it is ever and always the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

CANTERBURY CANT

By WILLIAM PAUL

"The English Church will more readily pardon an attack on thirty-eight of its thirty-nine articles of the faith than on a thirty-ninth part of its income."—Karl Marx.

IN the columns of our worthy contemporary, *The Worker*, there appears a most scathing history of the Archbishops of Canterbury, by Comrade Karl Radek. The article shows that in all the most critical moments of English history—up to Henry VIII.—the Archbishops of Canterbury always played a most prominent part in political struggles. Radek proves, by lengthy quotations from such standard works on English history as T. Roger's *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, that there was no crime too great for the Canterbury Archbishops to commit at the behest of the propertied interests. We shall extend the scope of Radek's enquiry and furnish further examples of the reactionary rôle played by these Archbishops.

We can now comprehend the sinister part the Archbishop of Canterbury played when he organised the recent agitation against Soviet Russia. He was, it would seem, the instrument used by the reactionary and propertied interests of this country to stir up an anti-Russian feeling among the British workers in order to prepare the way for the political groundwork for the launching of the Urquhart-Curzon imperialist ultimatum to the Soviet Republic. He performed the traditional policy of those Church missionaries who spy out the land for commercial ghouls, and who always blaze the way for the oncoming army. It was natural for a smirking and God-fearing hypocrite like Lord Curzon to "tune the pulpits" and to organise the black-coated regiments of the State before calling out the khaki-clad ones. Our worthy Archbishop is merely the meek Canterbury lamb of the present ruling class.

One can, of course, understand the feelings of such persons as the Archbishop of Canterbury regarding the position of his clerical colleagues in Russia. The Patriarch Tikon, as head of the Church in Russia, has been prevented from carrying on an agitation on behalf of the restoration of Tsardom; he has been stopped from helping to organise a further civil war in the interests of the old Russian propertied class; and he has been foiled in his plotting to destroy the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. Our reactionary clericals in this country who uphold the monarchy, the capitalist State, and who eloquently and blithely condemn to hell

all those who oppose the present system of propertied society—these are very much upset at the triumph of the Russian Soviets. And if Lord Curzon, and his imperialist dervishes, called up their soldiers to-morrow to make war against Russia the Archbishop of Canterbury would be the first to bless the colours and pray for their success. What binds the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Patriarch Tikon is not a religious bond at all—it is *their political one-ness*. One is a political reactionary at the head of the Russian Church; the other is a political reactionary at the head of the English Church. It is deep calling unto deep!

It is interesting to note that the Soviets have been in existence for almost six years. During all that time there have been committed the most outrageous murders by the bandits subsidised by the British Government. In the Ukraine, the tortures perpetrated by Petlura and his kind would make one reel with horror to hear about them from the people on the spot. And never a murmur from the English Church! Before the revolution hundreds of humble priests were imprisoned by the Tsar; even important dignitaries were cruelly persecuted. But because the government then was in the hands of political reactionaries, our good Archbishops and Rabbis were silent on the matter. Nay, more! When the soldiers of Bloody Nicholas moved to battle in 1914 our churches reverberated with the prayers sent up to Heaven on their behalf.

Two things urged our clericals to demonstrate against the Soviet Republic. First, of course, was the desire to prepare a good anti-Soviet atmosphere for the dispatching of the Curzon Note. But the second factor is worthy of notice. While the Soviets have been falsely accused of destroying religion since 1917—why is it that the English clericals have only recently made a big noise by way of protest? When the famine was at its worst period many hungry peasants wondered why the riches, which adorn all churches in Russia, were not turned into food to feed and succour the dying children. Because such a thing would have been a Christlike action the churches never thought about it; indeed, when the workers and peasants began to agitate upon the matter, the clerical bureaucracy opposed it. How truly has it been said that Christ died upon the Cross in order that Church dignitaries might live upon it. So intense, however, did the agitation grow in favour of using church treasures for helping the starving in the famine areas that the government decided to carry out the demands of the Russian citizens. The Soviet Government knew the extent of the wealth of the Church because one of the first acts of the revolution was to prepare a list of its treasures. When the committees set up by the government began to remove the valuables from the churches, in order to buy food, they discovered that a great part of these had been stolen by the reactionary clericals and spent upon counter-revolutionary propaganda! The religious hypocrites who had denounced, as sacrilege, the touching of any church treasure in order to feed dying children had all the while been devoting part of that treasure to assist the White bandit bands who had helped to create the famine! This revelation sealed the fate of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of all honest and decent religious people in Russia. Our religious enthusiasts never protested against this scurrilous act of clerical sabotage; they were as indifferent as badly cooked Canterbury cutlets. *They were only stirred into action against Russia when*

they realised that the Workers' Government had dared to meddle with Church property. Here, then, is the second factor that inspired our godly brethren to protest.

Scan the list of the black-frocted battalion which has raised its sanctimonious voice against religious persecution in Russia. How many of them are known as fighters against the persecution of the workers in this country? How many of them are known as allies of the Federation of British Industries? How many of them transform their pulpits into cowards' castles from which they thunder their *reactionary political propaganda*? They are not troubled about religious persecution in Russia. But they are keenly sensitive to any working-class government weakening the property, *the material basis*, of the Church. They know when a Church that upholds the propertied interests is impoverished that it becomes weakened as a source of *political agitation*. History proves that where a Church holds vast treasures and is allied to the State, that such a Church is a powerful political force. The Soviet Government, by refusing to allow the Russian Church to encroach upon its State sovereignty, and by utilising its property to assist the workers at a moment of cruel necessity, has not in any way interfered *with the purely religious function of the Church*; it has, however, by these actions, undoubtedly seriously impaired the function of the Russian Church as a political agent of Tsarism and despotism. Hence the canting cant of Canterbury!

Let the Archbishop of Canterbury remember the history of his illustrious predecessors during England's "glorious revolution." Does he forget Wm. Laud? We confess that Laud's career comes more within the scope of criminology than that of history. He lived at a revolutionary moment in English history. Like other distinguished Archbishops before him, and after, he had a passion for meddling with political affairs. And like his breed he always came down, very heavily, on the side of the prevailing ruling class. At a moment when the class struggle was setting in motion some of the greatest changes known in English history, it was this particular Archbishop of Canterbury who outraged the feelings of his fellow-men by defending King Charles with a passion worthy of a better cause. He pursued his political and religious opponents with a savagery which Torquemada never excelled. And yet Laud could be unbending—to the members of the ruling class; he it was who performed the marriage ceremony when the Duke of Devonshire married his mistress. But then, of course, the Duke was Laud's patron, and the Archbishop knew on which side his bread was buttered. So violently reactionary was Laud, so viciously did he oppose any change in the political *status quo*, that a sorely tried country was compelled to defend itself by executing him. Indeed, the number of Archbishops of Canterbury who have been either imprisoned, murdered or executed, by the English State, for meddling in political affairs makes that office rank as one of the dangerous trades. This grave element of risk may help to explain why the job carries such a large salary.

The summing up of one of the historians on Archbishop Laud is so apt that it reads like the pronouncement of the Soviet Government upon the Patriarch Tikon:—

"Spiritual influence, in Laud's opinion, was not enough for the Church. The Church, as the guide of the nation in duty and godli-

ness, even extending its activity into State affairs as a mediator and moderator, was not sufficient. Its power must be material and visible, embodied in great places of secular administration and enthroned in high offices of the State. Thus the Church, descending into the political arena, became identified with the doctrines of one political party in the State—doctrines odious to the majority of the nation—and at the same time became associated with acts of violence and injustice, losing at once its influence and its reputation.”

Laud was very much interested in the relation of the Church to the financial affairs of the State. He was, therefore, greatly pleased when his friend, Bishop Juxon, was appointed by King Charles as high lord treasurer of England. So well did Juxon manipulate the material interests of his masters that he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury. Another ardent Royalist who supplied funds to Charles II. during his exile was Sheldon; this active counter-revolutionary, who was imprisoned for his reactionary propaganda, was consecrated as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1663. The next occupant of this noble post, Sancroft, backed up a Roman Catholic monarch against the Protestant Dissenters, who rebelled along with the Duke of Monmouth. And so closely did this Archbishop of Canterbury cling to the old feudal idea of the Divine Right of Kings that he refused to take the oath of allegiance to William and Mary, and was suspended. The new candidate, Tillotson, was one who realised that the “glorious revolution” had to be accepted as something that could not be undone. He approached the sacred office through his political activity on behalf of the new monarchy. From this period the political and economic power of the bourgeoisie rapidly expanded, and the Archbishops of Canterbury served them as faithfully as they did the feudal barons and kings when they were the propertied and political ruling group in England.

During the eighteenth century the new propertied elements were consolidating their political power. At the opening of the nineteenth century, which ushered in the factory system—the modern proletariat came into being and brought with them new factors in the political conflict. And here again the Church becomes extremely active as defenders of the ruling political and propertied interests. The history of the rise of trade unionism and the growth of the political agitation of the masses is inseparable from the monotonous chant of the Church, that the workers should remember their proper place in society. The propertied interests utilised the Rev. T. R. Malthus to show the wage-earners that they brought poverty upon themselves by following the Biblical precept regarding the wondrous blessings of being fruitful. So cleverly did parson Malthus do his job that even the reactionary free-thinkers installed him as one of their popes. All during the ferment of revolt at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was the Church that acted as the bulwark of the capitalist exploiters. “Religion,” says the Hammonds, “was, in fact, part of the civil constitution of society. The English Church accepted that position. It knew its place in the domestic establishments of the State, and it took its colour for good and for evil from the world of the ruling class” (*The Town Labourer*, p. 275). At a moment when serious reformers were trying to introduce education, it was left to the Archbishop of Canterbury to oppose them unless they were prepared to place all education in the hands of the bishops of the diocese. At a time

when the landlords, who had enclosed the common lands—and who were not opposed by the Church in this brutal art of spoilation and robbery—were enforcing the death penalty against poachers; and when the law was sentencing men to transportation if found with poaching nets in any forest or chase—it was left for the Archbishop of Canterbury to enforce this cruel piece of legislation by prosecuting a man in 1831. At a time when a Bill was introduced into the House of Commons, where it was carried, to abolish the death penalty upon those found guilty of stealing five shillings—it was left for the Archbishop of Canterbury to help to get it rejected by the House of Lords. At a time when rampant poverty was blighting the lives of the masses, protests had to be made to the Archbishop of Canterbury to persuade him to renounce his famous Sunday parties, which were notorious; he refused to discontinue these exhibitions of excessive hospitality, until at last George III. felt compelled to forbid them. At a time when the conditions of the workers and peasants were most desperate, and when their protests were transformed into riots by the upholders of law and order, the Privy Council called upon the Archbishop of Canterbury to compose a prayer. One part of it stated:—

“Restore, O Lord, to Thy people the quiet enjoyment of the many and great blessings which we have received from Thy great bounty; defeat and frustrate the malice of wicked and turbulent men, and turn their hearts; have pity, O Lord, on the simple and ignorant, who have been led astray, and recall them to a sense of their duty.”

Can we wonder that the working class is no longer interested in the Church? Can we wonder that they chuckle to themselves at the antics of the Archbishop of Canterbury and his concern for the people of Russia? In the Soviet Republic one may hold what religious opinions one chooses. A man may go to any Church, say any sort of prayers and perform any religious rite; no obstacles are placed in the way of any form of recreation. But the revolutionary government of the Russian workers and peasants will not tolerate any prelate who seeks to use the Church for purposes of sedition. His collar won't save him. History shows that Churchmen have a notorious facility for mixing themselves up in political struggles; but when they receive a blow in the political conflict, they howl to the world and beseech heaven to look upon their bruises as the result of a blasphemous attack upon a holy servant working in the cause of the Church.

Revolutions do more than transform economic and political forms. Because these are modified great changes sweep through every phase of social activity. The bourgeois revolution developed hand in hand with religious upheavals. The revolution of the proletariat being more profound than any other revolution in history, it must necessarily react upon the religious institutions of the time. A great transformation is taking place in the Russian Church. The reactionary Patriarch Tikon, the religious support of political despotism and Tsarism, has been unfrocked by the new elements who are now guiding the religious emotions of those Russians who still cleave to the Church. The reformed Church has repudiated the old Orthodox policy and is seeking to appeal to the new spiritual needs of those who have been repelled by the conduct of the Tikon and his counter-revolutionary clericals. Whether the new Church is a better one than the old one, it is

not for us to enquire at this juncture. So long as the new elements stick to their ceremonies and ritual and don't throw political obstacles in the path of the government, their work will go on unmolested. The Soviet Government asks no favours from the Church and imposes no obligations upon it. The Soviet Government would scorn to call upon the head of the new Russian Church to further the policy of its Foreign Minister. Such odious tasks are left for the clerical and hypocritical menials of the capitalist States.

REVOLUTION & THE ARTS ❀ By Rutland Boughton

[The following article was sent to the "Daily Herald," and like many other good things sent to the same source, it was refused publication. This is all the more regrettable, because Rutland Boughton, the well-known composer of the "Immortal Hour," etc., is one of the greatest living musicians. He has done more than any other man in Britain to shield the flickering flame of Art, and his annual festival at Glastonbury is an example of what can be accomplished in music and the drama.—
ED., COMMUNIST REVIEW.]

BOURGEOIS Art is at the point of death. The Cubist and Futurist painters have shown its bony convulsions. Stravinsky and his friends have sounded its death-rattle. And some recently published verse fairly stinks. In fact, all the so-called "modern movements" in the arts are but the feverish experiments of artists who see no real hope for the sort of art they know. And they are right. Bourgeois Art has no future; but it is only a waste of time to mutilate and play tricks with its forms. For these modern experimentalists never get anywhere near the heart or the problem. They may produce "interesting" work, but they never move us. A dying art is not to be galvanised back to life. Bourgeois Art is played out because bourgeois life is played out. The art of the future—the art of the proletariat—will arise, not in strange inhuman and outlandish shapes and sounds, but simply and sweetly because life itself has been made simpler and sweeter.

It should therefore be the first business of all artists to align themselves with the only world force which can possibly be creative. We have to realise that the class-war is not (as represented in the Press) a threat from coarse people to refined people, but a simple fact of human traffic which has been developing all through the era of a bourgeois and profiteering decivilisation.

To become conscious of it is necessary before things can be readjusted in order that the class-war itself may be eliminated. That can only happen when all able men and women become workers; and if some of the crafty exploiters and shiftless investment holders refuse to become conscious of the sin of it, they also must be eliminated—with as little mess as need be.

But no real artist is likely to be in their predicament, for artists *are* workers, and the majority of them suffer as much exploitation as artisans. (Do not the very words "artist" and "artisan" proclaim brotherhood!)

Having realised, then, where move those forces which give to life, form and leisure and beauty and inspiration, the artist will at once know on which side he is bound to be—for if he is to do any work worth doing he must find a great human movement which, in turn, is on the look-out for just that expression which only he can give, the arts being the very best vehicles for spiritual apprehension and beautiful revelation.

How completely impoverished the bourgeois spirit is to-day is proved by the continuous wails we hear on "the hopeless state of the London theatre," "the dullness of the Royal Academy," and so forth; but it is proved even more by the fact that even the capitalist and the exploiter of the arts must seek for his material in the world of revolutionary thought. The present transition of Europe from a mutually hostile group of bourgeois States to a federation of friendly local committees has already produced examples of revolutionary art—revolutionary, not in the modernist or futurist sense of being distorted, meaningless and mad, but in the eternal sense of being shapely, original and very much to the point. "R.U.R.," at the Strand Theatre, "The Insect Play," at the Regent, and the performances of "The Machine Wreckers" by the Stage Society, are among the first-fruits of proletarian art. Their production under capitalist conditions before bourgeois audiences is not without a grim humour. Such audiences feel vaguely the tremendous, thunderous threat of "R.U.R.," the poetic irony of "The Insect Play" and the human pathos of "The Machine Wreckers"; but they do not realise the meaning of the plays as applied to themselves. Consequently they snigger when they had better be silent, feel pride where humility would be wise, and applaud the doings of the actors when they ought rather to be sensing the sword hissing about their ears. And while, at such theatres, the wrong audiences are listening to the right plays, in other places the right audiences are listening to the wrong plays. Does not the Leeds Industrial Theatre pride itself on the production of "Il Trovatore"!

Now it is up to us to get that state of affairs altered, for we *need* such plays as those mentioned above; we cannot afford to leave them to be rolled over by the bourgeois intelligence. It is like casting nuts before motor-cars. The wonderful production of Basil Dean, now largely wasted at the Strand, should be given at twenty great workers' theatres in the large industrial centres. The simple and economical production of Nugent Monck should be given, not merely for the delectation of a few students of dramatic art, but in a thousand little theatres throughout the country. And some day, perhaps in our time, the theatre will become the proletarian church, and the arts resume their right place as vehicles of divine worship and common joy. But meantime we cannot expect profit-making organisations to give such works under conditions that will be doubtful of profit, and certain to increase the revolutionary spirit of those who see them. So meanwhile, let us do a small thing, and incidentally a very pleasant thing: wherever Communists meet together let them give increased scope to their

propaganda by an occasional public dramatic reading of such plays as the above, with others like Glover's "Wat Tyler," Toller's "Masse-Mensch," and so on. Let us further press them upon the attention of local dramatic societies, and wherever possible form our own societies for the production of proletarian art in all its forms.

Russia's Reconstruction*

By G. H. ALLEN

BRITISH imperialism has launched a fresh attack on the Russian Workers' Republic. A ten days' ultimatum has been despatched, on a bunch of flimsy pretexts—fishing rights in territorial waters, the execution of a British spy in 1920, alleged violation of the propaganda clauses of the Trade Agreement, the so-called "offensive" tone of the reply to the British Note, which proclaimed in accents of fulsome hypocrisy the "affronted moral sentiment of mankind" over the just execution of the counter-revolutionary prelate Butkievitch. But these are merely pretexts. The issue is not so superficial: and it is perfectly clear.

The Government of "tranquility" is beginning to show its hand. The deluding fogs of the "reconstruction" period are dispersing. Capitalist society, its back to the wall, has renounced its hopes of arranging peacefully its difficulties and liquidating on liberal lines its vast and pressing problems. It is struggling for life, struggling with the desperation of decay: and it is using the weapons of desperation. Fascism, as the COMMUNIST REVIEW has very clearly pointed out, becomes the central issue of politics. A Fascist Government is barely six months in power in Italy, before the royal puppet of British imperialism pays a special ceremonial visit to Italy, and confers a G.C.B. on the Fascist Dictator. Visions of a former White Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath—ex-General Denikin—rise before one's eyes: and suddenly comes the news of the "ultimatum" Note to the Soviet Government. The reactionary forces of British imperialism, two years after the signing of the Trade Agreement, are seeking to smash the Agreement, and, under the thinnest of disguises, to pave the way for open hostilities with the Russian Workers' Republic—open hostilities, that is, as and when shall seem most suitable for British imperialist policy. Two years ago the signing of the Trade Agreement coincided with the adoption in Russia of the New Economic Policy. Outside the Communist ranks, Die-Hard and I.L.P.-er alike hailed the *Nep*, with much relief and not a little jubilation, as the end of Communist Russia and her return to capitalism. They forgot one little point: that Russia still remained a Workers' State. The partial return to capitalism, to private enterprise and trade, that the *Nep* signified was carried out under the careful supervision of the Workers' and Peasants' State. The Russian Revolution was not over; it had

* *The Industrial Revival in Soviet Russia.* By A. A. Heller. (New York, Thomas Seltzer, \$1.50.)

Russia Before Dawn. By F. A. Mackenzie. (T. Fisher Unwin, 21s.)

My Adventures in Bolshevik Russia. By Odette Keun. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, 5s.)

simply changed its ground from the military and political to the economic front. However the capitalist world might comfort itself with fairy tales of Lenin's "great surrender," the basic fact remained that Russia, workers' and peasants' Russia, was still the forerunner of world revolution. Consequently, the antagonism of the capitalist world and Soviet Russia remained as fundamental as before.

Last November the fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was celebrated by the toiling masses of Russia with great rejoicings: even the customary magnificence of Russian working-class demonstrations was far surpassed. Mr. Mackenzie, in the book under review, says—writing of October: "Despite all, Moscow looked better than I had seen it since the days before the war. The big shops were already beginning to decorate for Christmas. The fifth anniversary of the Soviet Republic was drawing near. Last year the occasion had been a day almost of mourning, on account of the famine. Now there were to be general rejoicings, illuminations, processions, parades. . . . All talk of rebellion against the Soviet Power had ceased. It had conquered militarily. It had established itself politically. All that now remained was for it to accomplish economic success, and to this task the leaders of the Republic were applying their energies" (p. 281). Slowly and painfully, but surely, Russia is struggling uphill to economic recovery. Somewhere at the back of their minds the imperialists realise this. They realise also that the economic consolidation of the first Workers' State, foreshadowing the future triumph of the international working class, is the crack of doom for capitalist society. Hence the British Note, which, together with the recent French subsidies to Poland and Roumania and Marshal Foch's visit to Warsaw, presages a fresh attempt on the part of the forces of world reaction to prevent, at all costs, Russia's reconstruction.

It is foolish to disguise the enormous difficulties which confront Soviet Russia in her work of reconstruction. It is equally foolish to depict in too rosy a hue the results so far achieved. But the remarkable fact is that the last year has witnessed a steady improvement over 1920-1921. A few percentages may be quoted (from *Russian Information and Review*); for instance, the output of coal increased 24 per cent., of oil 20 per cent., of pig iron 41 per cent., of iron and steel 90 per cent., of metal goods 66 per cent., of cotton cloth 243 per cent., of cotton yarn 180 per cent., of woollen cloth 32 per cent., of linen cloth 82 per cent. The importance of these increases lies, not in their actual amount (the average level of productivity of Russian industry, according to the calculation of Bogdanov, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, is only one-quarter of the pre-war level), but in the indication they give of a distinct upward trend.

It is therefore rather strange to find Mlle. Odette Keun speaking of the "utter failure" of the *Nep*, and relating this "failure" to the "invincible idleness" of the Russian worker. She alleges that the productivity of the Russian worker is only 10 per cent. of pre-war. Yet in some cases (e.g., certain printing works) the productivity of the individual worker is actually well above the pre-war level. However, a perusal of Mlle. Keun's book is sufficient to show that she is not to be relied on for accurate information

or any kind of analysis. Her book is another of those curious documents which so many of the liberty-loving members of the bourgeois *intelligentsia* have produced, after coming in contact with the Russian Workers' Revolution. She avows herself a Socialist—she sympathises profoundly with Communist “ideals”—just like Madame Snowden or Bertrand Russell: but the reality of the proletarian revolution is too hard for her soft heart, and so, like those other poor souls, she passes gibbering into limbo. Not that her book is without interest. Far from it. It is written in a racy style and is highly entertaining, particularly when she conducts a violent attack on British military authorities. But so far as her main thesis is concerned—which seems to be blaming the Bolsheviks because they did not create the earthly paradise overnight—she provides her own refutation when she says (of the Crimea): “Wrangel treated the country like an invading Hun. Precipitated from the tops of the hillocks, after the rails had been torn up, the engines lay mutilated and twisted where they had fallen—useless, at a time when Russia's vastest, most critical need was means of transport” (p. 113). And then she relapses into pages and pages of maunderings over the “horrors” of the Tcheka. She has no grasp of the significance of the *Nep*, and talks wildly about the “new bourgeoisie”: “It is growing up so rapidly that one cannot help thinking of the juggler's fruit tree, springing up in one second in the air” (p. 205). “It already far exceeds the Russian proletariat in number”!! She says of the Communist leaders: “Hypnotised by two or three fixed ideas, they stand stock-still in an unchangeable atmosphere; they have lost all elasticity . . .” (p. 200). Yet the very fact of the *Nep* is the most striking proof of the freedom of our Russian comrades from the cast-iron Marxism that is still to be met with in this country.

When Mlle. Keun emphasises the stability of the Soviet Government, and says that “in its totality, and in spite of a good many subjects for complaint, the rural population has, beyond doubt, accepted the Bolshevik regime and has no desire to overthrow it” (p. 175), she has not the faintest idea that she is expressing the political success of the basic economic conception of the *Nep*—free trade in grain and the Agricultural Tax.

Mlle. Keun quotes workers whom she questioned about the Soviet regime as answering (in 1921): “. . . this Government is *ours*; it is for us that they work. . .”—and then she tries to show that in 1922 this attitude has quite gone, by quoting a keen criticism of the Government from a Soviet newspaper—oblivious of the fact that she might have got a similar newspaper quotation in 1921, and that the most outspoken criticism of the Government is a common feature of the Soviet Press, a feature which shows the intense interest the masses take in all the doings of their Government, and not their alienation from it.

The emotional Odette gives a rather striking dialogue between a Communist and herself, portions of which are perhaps worth reproducing. She asked him what were the victories of the revolution. He replied:—

“We have overthrown the feudal system. Now the land belongs to all the peasants. They have learned much, and understood much. They have progressed in autonomy and independence; extended their co-operative system, and established their village powers. We have

made a thinking mass of the proletariat, and delivered it from the yoke of capitalism. . . ."

"But I see a country full of ruins. . . ."

"Not everyone can destroy. . . . It is better to die in the act of creating, of changing—in the explosion of old moulds, than to die by suffocation, in a bog, strangled by the slimy weeds of old institutions, like your putrefied societies in Europe."

" . . . there is a universal condemnation of your methods. . . ."

"Perhaps. But we had first of all to level the ground, so as to raise our house afterwards."

"Wherever you go, you leave sterility behind you."

"The apparent sterility of winter. The invisible forces persist, that will bloom forth in spring."

" . . . to remain in power, to reconstruct . . . a retrogression is unavoidable. . . . Then what will become of your attempt at Communism. . . . What do you represent after all?"

"In your eyes or in ours? There is, between us, an abyss which nothing will fill—neither intelligence, nor education, nor friendship, nor experience—not even goodwill. *Nothing!* . . . And that is because we, we go on hoping, and because you, you despair. . . . You only catch a glimpse of the details, you only explore an inch of the ground. You do not possess the faculty of conception. How irrevocably you belong to your class and to your civilisation! . . . You are nothing but a sentimentalist that has strayed in amongst us."

And that fairly disposes of the lady: she tells us that Bolshevik Russia has broken her heart, and so we may leave her.

Mlle. Keun is not to be taken seriously: and, anyhow, she only spent some three months in Russia, in 1921, before the *Nep* had come into full operation all over the country. The book of Mr. F. A. Mackenzie, *Russia Before Dawn*, is a record of personal impressions from September, 1921, to January of the present year. Mr. Mackenzie is a Canadian journalist who possesses considerable powers of observation and description, though, not being a Communist, his analysis is often superficial. Mr. Mackenzie has a tendency to let his journalism run away with him at times, when, for instance, he talks of the sufferings of the old bourgeoisie, or of the Terror. But it must be said to his credit that he is a man of too much sense to sink to the level of so many other journalists who have perpetrated stories of Bolshevik "horrors" on an eagerly receptive bourgeois world. Describing his arrival in Russia in the autumn of 1921, he expresses his agreeable surprise, not that things were bad, but that they were not infinitely worse. He found a dilapidated railway service, it is true—but the trains were clean, and the guard a model of attentiveness. He says, of Moscow, that "there was less distress visible on the streets than can be seen during winter time in the dock-side suburbs of London" (p. 18). "Tragic and difficult as the situation was, even towards the end of 1921, one realised that the suffering and the misery were but phases of a great national illness making, not for death, but for recovery" (p. 24). He reports a conversation he had with an old textile worker, who had been thirty-five years in the same factory; said the worker: "The difference in our lives between now and in the Czar's days is the difference between heaven and hell. . . . In the old days we were machines. Now we are men. . . . Now it is *our* factory. Every one of us is concerned with the whole of it. We have our meetings twice a month, when we discuss all that is done. We have a voice in organisation, in discipline, in arrangements. We choose our committees, which manage things. We have our own classes, our own theatre, our own big library. It is ours. We are men" (pp. 64-66).

Mr. Mackenzie has some very interesting sketches of the outstanding figures of the Soviet Government, notably of Trotsky (and also of the Red Army), as well as of the structure of the Soviet Government. It is profitable, too, to compare the opinion of this non-Socialist on the forces behind the Bolshevik Revolution, with the superficial puerilities (cheap sneers at the "little band of non-working class Communist intellectuals") that one has grown so weary of hearing from certain members of the I.L.P. Says Mackenzie: "The second Russian Revolution, of November, 1917, which led to the establishment of the Communist Government, was not the artificial creation of a small group of agitators, but was a spontaneous uprising of the working classes, more particularly of the factory workmen in the cities" (p. 81). He goes on to describe the period of military Communism, emphasising the continual fall in production, and seems to think that this automatically led to the adoption of the *Nep*. Apparently he realises, more or less, the significance of military Communism, but thinks that anyhow the machinery of State centralised control would have been a failure. In formulating the *Nep*, Lenin "did not intend, as some hasty observers have concluded, to abandon his ideas, but he would temporise. . . . He would restore private trade and co-operate with foreign capitalism in order to live, but equally at the same time he would endeavour to secure the gradual triumph of State management and State control within the Russian Republic" (pp. 86-87). The State "trusts," although lacking capital and therefore in financial difficulties, "have increased production and have improved the efficiency of factory management" (p. 94). Bureaucracy, as Lenin himself has said, is a danger: and Mackenzie also mentions bribery, but a story he relates of a station master convicted of accepting two bribes, totalling some £5, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment (the State prosecutor demanded the death sentence!), sufficiently illustrates the vigorous methods adopted by the Soviet Government to crush this evil.

It is interesting to notice how Mr. Mackenzie, in describing conditions in Russia towards the close of 1922, should emphasise chiefly the increased liberty of the individual: he has a chapter entitled "The Halting Road to Freedom," and concludes his book with an apostrophe to the Russian leaders—"enlarge the boundaries of freedom!" All this is an inevitable consequence of his lack of a Marxist outlook. But he has grasped clearly the all-important fact of the solidarity of the Russian masses with the Soviet Government—their Government; and he warns those fools who think that because the Russian workers have had to endure great hardships under the Soviet Government they are willing to take a hand in any attempt of White reaction. There are some very interesting quotations from Lenin's speech to the Metalworkers' Union in the spring of last year—the speech in which he declared that the economic retreat had been carried out with success, that the time had come to say "Enough!" and that the need of the moment was the new alignment of the forces of the Party and the working class in face of the new conditions; by the way, Lenin points out that all the so-called "workers' opposition"—the extreme Left in the Party—had achieved, was to introduce an element of panic into what needed to be, above all, an orderly and disciplined retreat.

The great work of Dzjerzhinsky in beginning the Herculean

labour of dragging the railway system out of the slough into which it has been steadily sinking since the outbreak of the imperialist war nine years ago, receives special mention from Mr. Mackenzie. The main line services are now vastly improved, though the transport problem is still far from solution—many branch lines in a disorganised condition. Mr. Mackenzie expresses the fear that some branch lines will sink into permanent disrepair, but he does not seem to be acquainted with the work of a special commission of investigation on this very point, which (on the evidence so far collected) will certainly report in favour of keeping the branch lines going, at all costs. Mr. Mackenzie has some criticisms of the "red tape" of the Foreign Trade Department, which he thinks tend to frighten off foreign capital: but the case of the Barnsdall Corporation, which he mentions (though he misnames it "Barsehall"), and which corporation, after a little patience, secured an important oil concession, shows that the reason why relatively so few concessions have been granted up to date is largely due to the touchiness of foreign interests, not to Russian "red tape."

There is only space here to mention Mr. Mackenzie's description of the S.R. trial (he was unfavourably impressed by Vandervelde, whose insolent opening speech for the defence he calls "scarcely a wise one, *unless Vandervelde had already made up his mind that the case was hopeless*" (p. 237), italics mine) and his impressions of the leaders of the Church Reform movement, Vedensky, the Petrograd priest, and Yevdokin, Archbishop of Nijni Novgorod. The words of Archbishop Yevdokin might be pondered by some of the deeply religious leaders of the Labour Party: "We are not going to have the Church used as an instrument of political reaction. It is not surprising that the Government is suspicious of the Church. During the Civil War the heads of the Church worked in open sympathy with the enemies of the Republic. . . . No administration can permit open or secret plotting against itself. . . . And had conditions been the same, your Government would have shot even archbishops" (p. 260).

Concluding, Mr. Mackenzie emphatically declares that, in spite of all disappointments and discouragements, with the autumn of 1922 "the return to normal seemed accelerated each day . . . one realised that Russia, as seen in Moscow and Petrograd, was getting back into its stride again" (p. 273). And the country, owing to the successful harvest, was equally recovering—the only exceptions being some of the worst of the 1921 famine areas, Pougachev and parts of Samara province. The *Nep* had restored the peasants' confidence in the Government. Winter grain sowings were extensive: and everywhere in the small provincial towns the revival of peasant prosperity had brought a sense of relief, a lifting of the clouds.

Mr. Mackenzie gives a glowing description of the potentialities of Siberia, and of the reconstruction energies of the Siberian Soviet authorities: and so does Mr. A. A. Heller. The first part of Mr. Heller's book deals with his observations and experiences in Siberia and the Urals—in 1921—but in the nine chapters of the second part (Book II., "Industrial Reconstruction") he gives by far the best account of the origin, significance and development of the *Nep* that has yet appeared from the pen of a non-Communist writer. Mr. Heller is described by his publishers as "a well-known

business man who speaks the Russian language and has an intimate knowledge of Russia of long standing." He is also very evidently a profound sympathiser with the Russian Revolution. His sketch of the period of military Communism is admirable, and he shows clearly how, after the liquidation of the military front, came the adoption of the *Neft* as the best, and in fact the only, tactic for the new struggle on the economic front. "The Communist faith of the leaders of the Russian Government is quite unshaken. They recognise, however, that Communism requires for its successful functioning a development of large-scale industry which simply does not exist in impoverished and disorganised Russia. Consequently they are deliberately using capitalism as a means to the attainment of the material conditions under which Communism will become a realisable ideal" (p. 104). "But capitalism in Russia, under Soviet power, is as different from capitalism in pre-revolutionary Russia as political freedom in the England of Victoria was different from that of Elizabeth. The Soviet authorities recognise the disadvantages of bureaucracy and excessive State regulation. They are willing to afford a fair scope to private initiative; but they are determined that private initiative shall not express itself in the form of unlimited exploitation. Private employers are bound by the labour laws of the Republic; and special workers' courts have been set up in the large cities to see that these laws are enforced" (p. 132). Far from the wicked Bolsheviks having wantonly destroyed Russian industry (a myth which has been erected by the Really Nice People—including Mr. Snowden—into a convention, "the Soviet Government has been the main factor in preserving and keeping alive Russia's shattered industrial system during the last four and a half years. From the very beginning, when its policy of nationalisation proved the only effective check upon the elemental mob impulse to destroy and smash up everything that was associated with the old slavery, it has worked constantly, in the face of innumerable obstacles, toward the reorganisation and reconstruction of Russia's industrial life . . . the Soviet economic administration is learning and improving through experiment. Much can be said of its defects and shortcomings, but it must be admitted that it has learned much, and its efforts at construction are beginning to show results in the improved state of industry" (pp. 134-5).

The older technicians, managers, administrators—whom Mr. Heller dubs "industrial Mensheviks"—are eager for more commissions, more plans, much aid from foreign capital. Wonderful schemes, like Krijanovsky's monumental electrification scheme, tend rather to distract their attention from the immediate problems of production. While seeking a rapid route to recovery, they are apt to let things drift. Mr. Heller's opinion is firm on this point: "After travelling through Russia and Siberia," he says, "inspecting many factories and talking with government officials, technicians and workers of varied viewpoints, I am convinced that there is no single short cut to Russia's industrial recovery. Every department of Russian industry and agriculture has suffered, and revival must proceed along gradual and natural lines. . . . Russia would be well advised to forget Europe and America, to postpone big plans, to drop elaborate researches and settle down to work on the basis of available resources" (pp. 152-3). And this gradual revival, "on

the basis of available resources," is precisely what is happening. Of course, the co-operation of foreign capital would greatly hasten the process of reconstruction (and Mr. Heller gives statistical details of Russian raw materials, so important to world economy), but Russia is prepared to face the future alone, if necessary.

The State Trusts, the local "Economic Conferences," the participation of the trade unions in the administration of industry, with all these subjects Mr. Heller deals admirably. And in his final chapter on "The Significance of the Russian Revolution," he gives the most effective summary of the work, actual and potential, of the Revolution that has so far been penned by a non-Communist. His whole book is the more attractive because he is so obviously a man of affairs, an acute-minded practical man. It is very much to be hoped that the book will be made available in this country. The constructive period of the Russian Revolution, since 1921, is not the least interesting and significant of the phases of revolutionary development: and we in the British Party know all too little about it.

One last word on the flamboyant nonsense that has been, and is being, talked about the growth of the new bourgeoisie, the "Nepmen." It is true that "Nepmen" are doing very well out of speculation: it is true that they are able to indulge in luxury on a quite reasonable bourgeois scale. But, as an article by an American journalist, Mr. W. H. Chamberlin, in the *New York Freeman*, pointed out—the "Nepman" has no political power, no power in the Press, no financial power: and the watchful Workers' State prevents him getting any real grip on industry. The "Nepman" may possess some of the outer trappings of wealth, but, in Mr. Chamberlin's words, "he is pretty effectively shorn of the power which goes with this wealth in other countries. He has no comforting sense of kinship with the Government." Admittedly the fight is on, on the economic front. The struggle is less obvious than the military struggle of 1918-1920: but it is no less desperate and vital. Our comrades of the Russian Party are putting all their energies into the struggle, carrying out Lenin's slogan, "Work and study unceasingly: otherwise you will perish." The reconstruction of Workers' Russia is a slow and difficult process; but all the facts are now pointing to the steady advance of this reconstruction.

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Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists

By I. STALIN

[Comrade Stalin wishes to make the observation that this article lays no claim to originality, but is to be regarded as a collective and schematic survey of Comrade Lenin's fundamental views.]

I.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS.

1.—THE TWO SIDES OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT.

POLITICAL strategy and tactics alike deal with the labour movement. But the labour movement itself is composed of two factors, the objective or elementary and the subjective or conscious. The objective, elementary constituent is that group of events which take place independent of the conscious or regulative will of the proletariat. The economic development of the country, the development of capitalism, the decay of the old power, the elementary movement of the proletariat and of the classes surrounding it, the class war, etc.—all these are phenomena whose development is not dependent on the will of the proletariat. This is the objective side of the movement. Strategy has nothing to do with these processes, for here it can neither create nor alter. It can only reckon with these processes and utilize them as a starting point. This is the sphere of the theoretical study of Marxism and of the Marxian programme.

But the movement possesses another side, the subjective, the conscious side. The subjective aspect of the movement is the reflection of the elementary processes in the heads of the workers, it is the conscious and systematic movement for the attainment of definite aims. This side of the movement is subject to the fullest extent to the regulative effect of strategy and tactics, and is for this reason of special interest to us. Although strategy is unable to change anything in the objective processes of the movement, here in the subjective, conscious side of the movement the field of action opened out to strategy is wide and manifold, for strategy can accelerate or retard the movement, indicate to it the shortest path, or the path strewn with difficulties and sacrifices; all this depends on the perfection or shortcomings of the strategy itself.

To accelerate or retard the movement, to facilitate or hinder it—this is the sphere of political strategy and tactics, these are the confines of their possibilities.

2.—THEORY AND PROGRAMME OF MARXISM.

The study of the objective processes of the movement is not incumbent on strategy. But one is none the less obliged to be familiar with these processes, and to take them into consideration, if grave errors are not to be committed by the leadership of the movement. The theory of Marxism, and then the programme of Marxism, are especially occupied with the study of the objective processes of the movement. Hence strategy must rest entirely on the existing theories and programmes of Marxism.

The study of the objective processes of capitalism, its development and decay, brings the theory of Marxism to the conclusion

that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the proletariat, the replacement of capitalism by Socialism, are inevitable.

Proletarian theory can be called Marxian only when it is based on this main conclusion of Marxian theory.

As the programme of Marxism proceeds from the given theories, it determines the aims of the proletarian movement, and formulates them scientifically in the points of the programme. The programme may be valid either for the whole period of capitalist development, in that it holds in view the overthrow of capitalism and the organisation of Socialist production, or only for a definite phase in the development of capitalism; for instance, the destruction of the vestiges of the feudal absolutist state of society and the creation of the pre-requisites of the free development of capitalism. This programme may consist of two parts: of the maximum and of the minimum part. The strategy proceeding from the minimum part of the programme must naturally be different from that based on its maximum part; but a strategy can only be named Marxian when it is guided by the aims of the movement formulated in the programme of Marxism.

3.—STRATEGY.

The most important task of strategy is to ascertain that main line to be followed by the working-class movement, the line most advantageous for the purpose of enabling the proletariat to strike its enemy that main blow required for the attainment of the aims established by the programme. The strategic plan organises this decisive blow in such a manner that it can yield the greatest results within the shortest time.

The fundamental lines of political strategy could be laid down without particular trouble by drawing an analogy with military strategy, for instance, from the civil war at the time of the struggle with Denikin. All Russian comrades will recollect the end of the year 1919, when Denikin stood before Tula. At that time there were interesting controversies among the military leaders as to the best point at which to deal Denikin's army the decisive blow. Some of the military leaders proposed that the main attack be made on the line Tzaritzin-Novorossisk. Others suggested the Voronesh-Rostov line, as this would enable the breach in Denikin's line to be followed by a division of the hostile army into two sections which could then be treated separately. The first plan doubtless had positive advantages in so far as the occupation of Novorossisk would cut off the retreat of Denikin's army. But it had the disadvantage of entailing an advance through districts hostile to the Soviet power (Don province), thus involving great sacrifices; on the other hand it was dangerous, for it left the road to Moscow, through Tula and Tzerpuchov, open to Denikin's army. The second plan for striking the main blow was the only correct one; in the first place it proposed an advance of our main forces through a district in sympathy with the Soviet power, thus eliminating exorbitant sacrifices; and in the second place it hindered Denikin's main army in its advance on Moscow. The majority of the military experts were in favour of the second plan, and the fate of the whole war with Denikin was thus decided.

In other words: The determination of the direction of the main blow signifies the pre-determination of the character of the

operations for the whole period of the war, and with it, nine-tenths of the outcome of the war. This is the task to be accomplished by strategy.

The same must be said of political strategy. The first serious controversies among the leaders of the Russian proletariat with regard to the main lines of the proletarian movement occurred at the beginning of the present century, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. As is well known, one section of our party (the Mensheviks) were at that time of the opinion that the main line of the proletarian movement in its struggle against Tzarism should be the formation of a *bloc* between the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie; this plan completely, or almost completely, excluded the most important revolutionary factor, the peasantry, and placed the leading rôle of the whole revolutionary movement in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie. The other section of the party (the Bolsheviks) maintained that the main blow should be carried out by means of a *bloc* between proletariat and peasantry, and that the leading rôle of the whole revolutionary movement should be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the liberal bourgeoisie being neutralised.

If we compare our whole revolutionary movement, from the turn of the century until the February revolution of 1917, it becomes clear that the fate of Tzarism and of the landowners depended in a high degree on the acceptance of the one or the other strategic plan (the Menshevik or the Bolshevik), from the acceptance of the one or the other main line of revolutionary movement.

Just as the military strategy at the time of the war with Denikin, by choosing the main lines of the blow to be dealt, also determined nine-tenths of the character of all further operations until the complete annihilation of Denikin, in the same manner our political strategy, by deciding to carry on the revolutionary movement in the spirit of the Bolshevik plan, determined the character of the action taken by your party during the whole period of open struggle against Tzarism, from the Russo-Japanese War until the February revolution of the year 1917.

It is the chief task of political strategy to correctly determine the main lines to be pursued by the proletarian movement in each separate country, and to do this on the basis of the theory and programme of Marxism, at the same time taking into consideration the experience gained in the revolutionary struggle by the workers of all countries.

4.—TACTICS.

Tactics are a part of strategy, and subordinate to it. Tactics are not occupied with the war as a whole, but with its separate episodes, with the battles and skirmishes. While strategy seeks to win the war, or, let us say, to bring the struggle against Tzarism to an end, tactics, on the other hand, aim at winning this or that battle, or successfully carrying through some campaign, some course of action, by means of greater or lesser adaptation to the concrete fighting conditions at any given moment.

The most important task of tactics is to determine those ways and means, those forms and methods of fighting, best suited at the given moment to the concrete conditions, and offering the best prospects of strategic success. Therefore the results of tactics are not to be judged by themselves, not from the point of view of their

immediate effects, but from the point of view of the task and possibilities of strategy.

There are moments when successful tactics facilitate the fulfilment of the strategic task. This was the case, for instance, at the end of 1919, in the war against Denikin, when Orel and Voronesh were liberated by our troops, and the success gained by our cavalry at Voronesh and by our infantry at Orel created a favourable situation for dealing a blow to Rostov. This was the case in August, 1917, in Russia, when the workers' councils of Petrograd and Moscow went over to the Bolsheviki, and created a new political situation greatly facilitating the blow struck by our party in October.

There are other moments when tactical successes, although of brilliant immediate effect, do not correspond to the strategic possibilities, and create an "unexpected" situation disastrous for the whole campaign. This happened to Denikin at the end of 1919, when he allowed the facile success of a rapid and effective march against Moscow to induce him to extend his front from the Volga to the Dneiper, and thus to pave the way for the ruin of his army. The same was the case in the year 1920, in the Polish war, when we—under-estimating the force of the national movement in Poland, and dazzled by the easy success of an effective advance—set ourselves a task beyond our powers—that of penetrating as far as Warsaw or further. By this we roused the great majority of the Polish population to united resistance against the Soviet troops, and thus brought about a situation which nullified the successes gained by the Soviet troops at Minsk and Zhitomir, and undermining the prestige of the Soviet power in the West.

And finally, there are moments in which it is necessary to neglect tactical successes, and to consciously acquiesce in tactical losses for the purpose of securing future strategic gains. Thus it frequently occurs in war that one of the fighting parties, anxious to save its troops and to withdraw them from the blows dealt by the overwhelming forces of the enemy, will begin a systematic retreat, and abandon whole cities and districts, in order to gain time and to collect its forces for new decisive battles in the future. This was the case in Russia in the year 1918, during the German attack, when our party was forced to accept the Brest-Litovsk Peace, which, regarded from the standpoint of immediate political effect, signified a gigantic minus, but was none the less necessary in order to enable us to maintain the alliance with a peasantry hungry for peace, in order to gain a breathing space, to create a new army, and thus to gain a strategic plus in the future.

In other words, tactics must not be subordinated to the temporary interests of the moment; they must not be influenced by considerations of immediate political effectiveness, and still less may they desert the solid earth and build castles in the air—tactics must adapt themselves to the tasks and possibilities of strategy.

The main task of tactics is to determine the forms and methods of the struggle, to choose those best adapted to the concrete premises of the struggle at each given moment; the lines laid down by strategy are to be followed, and the experience gained in the revolutionary struggle among the workers of all countries is to be utilised.

5.—THE FORMS OF THE STRUGGLE.

Methods of warfare and forms of war are not always the same. They vary with the conditions of development, above all, with the development of production. War was carried on differently under Jenghi z-Khan than under Napoleon III., and differently in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth century.

At the present day the art of warfare consists in a thorough knowledge of every form of war, and the mastery of every scientific advance in this sphere, utilising this knowledge sensibly, and combining it skilfully, applying this or that form at the right moment and in the right manner.

The same is to be said of the forms of struggle on the political battlefield. Here the forms of struggle are much more manifold than in warfare. They vary with the development of economics, of social life, of culture; with the position of the classes; with the mutual relations of the fighting forces, the character of the ruling power and the international conditions. The illegal form of struggle as carried on under absolutism, in combination with partial strikes and workers' demonstrations; the open form of struggle under "legal possibilities," with political mass strikes of the workers; the parliamentary form of struggle such as we experienced in the Duma; the extra-parliamentary mass action frequently resulting in armed rebellion; and finally the state forms of struggle after the seizure of power by the proletariat, when the latter has succeeded in obtaining complete control of all state means and forces, including the army—these are in general the forms of struggle which have been produced in actual practice by the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat.

It is the task of the party to master every form of struggle, to combine these on the field of battle, and to skilfully intensify the employment of those forms of struggle most adapted to their purpose under any given circumstances.

6.—THE FORMS OF ORGANISATION.

The forms of organisation of an army, the kind of troops employed, are generally adapted to the forms and methods of warfare. These factors vary with the modes of warfare. In a war of manœuvre an extensive use of cavalry is often decisive; in a trench war cavalry plays no rôle whatever, or only a secondary one. Here the heavy artillery, aviation, gas, and tanks are decisive.

The task of military science is to have every description of troops ready for use, to perfect them, and combine their actions.

The same applies to the forms of organisation in the sphere of politics. As in the sphere of military warfare, the forms of organisation must also adapt themselves here to the special form of struggle. Conspiratory organisations of daring revolutionists during the epoch of absolutism; enlightenment and action by the aid of trade union, co-operative, and parliamentary fractions (Duma fraction, etc.), during the epoch of the Duma; shop stewards, peasants' committees, strike committees, workers' and soldiers' councils, revolutionary military committees, and a broad proletarian party which combines all these organisatory forms during the period of mass actions and risings; finally, the state form as the organisation of the proletariat during the period of concentration of power in the hands of the working class—these are in general the forms of organisation which, under certain conditions, can

and must aid the proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

It is the task of the party to master all these forms of organisation, to perfect them, and to be capable of combining their work at any given moment.

7.—SLOGANS AND DIRECTIONS.

Skilfully formulated resolutions, expressing the aims of a war or of its separate battles, and becoming popular among the troops, are frequently of decisive significance as a means for rousing active enthusiasm in an army, of strengthening its morale, etc. Suitable commands, watchwords, and appeals, issued to the soldiers, are as important in a war as superior heavy artillery, or superior and rapidly moving tanks.

In the sphere of politics slogans are of even greater importance, for here we have to deal with tens and hundreds of millions of human beings with manifold demands and needs.

The slogan is the concentrated and clear formulation of the immediate or ultimate aims of the struggle, and is issued by the leading group—in the case of the proletariat by its party. There are various slogans, according to the different aims of the struggle; they may be applicable to a whole historical period, or only to separate sections or episodes of the historical period in question. The slogan, "Down with despotism," first issued by the "Group for the Emancipation of Labour" in the eighties of the last century, was a *propaganda slogan*, for its object was to gather together the most persevering and bravest fighters and fighting groups in the party. During the period of the Russo-Japanese war, when the instability of despotism became more or less obvious to the broad masses of the working class, this slogan was transformed into an *agitative slogan*, for it could already assume the sympathy of millions of workers. In the period before the February revolution of 1917, at the time when the final bankruptcy of Tzarism became evident to the masses themselves, the slogan "Down with despotism" changed from an agitative slogan into a *slogan of action*, for now it was able to induce millions of workers to storm Tzarism.

To confuse slogans with directions, or slogans of agitation with slogans of action, is just as dangerous as premature or too retarded action—which can become more than dangerous, actually catastrophic. In April, 1917, the slogan, "All power to the Soviets," was an agitative slogan. The famous demonstration in Petrograd in April, 1917, before the winter palace, was a premature and therefore catastrophic attempt to turn this slogan into a slogan of action. The party was right in condemning the initiators of this demonstration, for it was aware that the pre-requisites for the transformation of this slogan into one of action were as yet non-existent, and that a premature action on the part of the proletariat may lead to a collapse of its forces.

On the other hand, cases occur when the party is confronted with the necessity of withdrawing or altering, "within twenty-four hours," mature slogans (or directions) which have already been accepted—in order to save its members from falling into some trap set by the enemy, or in order to postpone the execution of the directions to a more favourable time. This was the case in Petrograd in June, 1917, when a carefully prepared workers' and sol-

diers' demonstration intended for July 9 was cancelled by the E.C. of our party.

The task of the party consists in the skilful and timely conversion of the agitative slogans into slogans of action, or of the latter into definite and concrete directions—or, if conditions demand it, of possessing the elasticity and determination to desist from the execution of this or that slogan, even if popular and mature.

II.

THE STRATEGIC PLAN.

1.—HISTORICAL UPHEAVALS. STRATEGIC PLANS.

The strategy of the party is not something permanent, something fixed once and for all. It changes with historical revolutions, historical movements. These changes are expressed by the circumstance that an independent and specially adapted strategic plan is worked out for every historical upheaval. The strategic plan determines the main line of action to be adopted by the revolutionary forces, and the diagram for the corresponding distribution of the millions of workers on the social battlefield. It goes without saying that a strategic plan applicable to one historical period, and possessing its own specific characteristics, is not applicable to another historical period, distinguished by quite different peculiarities. For every historical revolution there is a strategic plan necessary for this special revolution, and adapted to its tasks.

The new history of Russia knows three main historical upheavals which called into existence three different strategic plans in the history of our party. A brief description of these upheavals will be in place here, in order to illustrate in what manner the strategic plans of the party generally change in accordance with the latest historical movements.

2.—THE FIRST HISTORICAL UPHEAVAL AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA.

This upheaval began at the commencement of our century, at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, when the defeat of the Tzarist army and the great political strikes among the Russian workers aroused all classes of the population, and thrust them on to the battlefield of political struggles. This upheaval culminated in the days of the February revolution of 1917.

During this period two strategic plans opposed one another within our party: the plan of the Mensheviki (Plechanov-Martov, 1905), and the plan of the Bolsheviki (Lenin, 1905).

The Menshevist strategy struck the main blow at Tzarism on lines of coalition between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As this plan was based on the then prevailing idea that the revolution was a bourgeois one, it assigned the leading rôle in the movement to the liberal bourgeoisie, and gave to the proletariat the rôle of "extreme left opposition," the rôle of motive power to the bourgeoisie, while the peasantry, one of the most important revolutionary forces, was completely or almost completely excluded from the scene of battle. It is not difficult to comprehend that this plan, ignoring as it did a many millioned peasantry, was bound to be a hopeless failure in a country like Russia; and in laying the fate of the revolution in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie (the hegemony of the bourgeoisie) the plan was reactionary in character, for the liberal bourgeoisie was not anxious for the

complete victory of the revolution, and was always ready to bargain with Tzarism.

The Bolshevik strategy (see Comrade Lenin's book, "Two tactics") aimed at striking the main revolutionary blow against Tzarism on lines of coalition between the proletariat and the peasantry, the liberal bourgeoisie being neutralised. As this plan was based on the view-point that the liberal bourgeoisie is not desirous of the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and that it prefers to bargain with Tzarism at the expense of the workers and peasants, it assigned the leading rôle of the revolutionary movement to the proletariat, this being the sole class in Russia consistently revolutionary in character. This plan was not alone distinguished by its correct estimate of the motive forces of revolution, but by bearing within it the germ of the idea of the proletarian dictatorship (the hegemony of the proletariat). In a flash of genius it foresaw the next and highest phase of revolution in Russia, and facilitated the transition to it.

The next stage of development of the revolution, up to February, 1917, fully confirmed the correctness of this strategic plan.

3.—THE SECOND HISTORICAL UPHEAVAL AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IN RUSSIA.

The second upheaval began with the February revolution of 1917, after the overthrow of Tzarism, when the imperialist war was exposing everywhere the deadly wounds which capitalism had suffered; when the liberal bourgeoisie found itself incapable of taking the real administration of the country into its hands, and was forced to confine itself to clinging formally to its authority (provisional government); when the workers' and soldiers' councils into whose hands the actual power fell, proved to possess neither the capacity nor the will to use this power; when the soldiers at the front, and the workers and peasants in the interior of the country, were thrown into despair by the severity of the struggle and the economic devastation; when the regime of the "double power" and of the "contact commission," eaten up by internal antagonisms and capable of neither war nor peace, entangled the situation more and more. This period ended with the October Revolution of 1917.

Two strategic plans opposed one another at this period within the Soviets: that of the Mensheviki and S.R.'s, and that of the Bolsheviks.

The strategy of the Mensheviki and of the S.R.'s which at first vacillated between the Soviets and the provisional government, between revolution and counter-revolution, assumed its final form at the time of the opening of the democratic conference in August, 1917. This final form was the gradual but certain deprivation of power from the Soviets, and the concentration of the whole power of the country in the hands of the "Constituent Assembly," a model of the future bourgeois parliament. The solution of all questions on war and peace, of agrarian and labour questions, and of the national question, were postponed till the convention of the Constituent Assembly, and this convention was again postponed indefinitely. "All power to the Constituent Assembly!" was the slogan of the S.R.'s and the Mensheviki. This was the preparatory plan for a bourgeois dictatorship, which, though

combed and brushed into "perfect democracy," was none the less to be a bourgeois dictatorship.

The Bolshevik strategy (see the "Theses" of comrade Lenin, April, 1917) aimed at the destruction of bourgeois power by the united forces of the proletariat and the impoverished peasantry, based on the *dictatorship of the proletariat* in the form of Soviet republics. The rupture with imperialism and with war, the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities of the one-time Russian empire, the expropriation of the landowners and capitalists, the preparation of the ground for the organisation of socialist economics—these were the elements of the Bolshevik plan at that period. "All power to the Soviets!"—was the slogan of the Bolsheviks at that time. This plan is important, not only on account of its correct estimation of the motive forces of the new proletarian revolution in Russia, but because it facilitated and accelerated the revolutionary movement in the West.

The subsequent development of events until the October upheaval, fully confirmed the correctness of this strategic plan.

4.—THE THIRD HISTORICAL UPHEAVAL AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN EUROPE.

The third upheaval began with the October Revolution, when the death agony of two imperialist groups of the West attained its highest point; when the revolutionary crisis in the West plainly showed its development; when in Russia the bourgeois power, bankrupt and entangled in antagonisms, fell beneath the blows of the proletarian revolution; when the action taken by the new Soviet government in the peace question, in the confiscation of land, the expropriation of the capitalists, and the emancipation of oppressed nationalities, gained for it the confidence of millions of workers the world over. This was an upheaval on an international scale, for the international front of capital was broken through for the first time, the question of the overthrow of capitalism unfolded for the first time in actual practice. Thus the October Revolution became transformed from a Russian national revolution into an international force, and the Russian workers from a backward section of the international proletariat into its vanguard arousing the workers of the West, and of the oppressed lands of the East by their self-sacrificing struggles. This upheaval has not yet reached its apex, for it has not fully unfolded on an international scale, but its general trend and significance are already determined with sufficient clearness.

At that time two strategic plans strove against one another in Russia's political circles: the plan of the counter-revolutionists, who drew the active section of the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s into their organisations, and the plan of the Bolsheviks.

The counter-revolutionists, and their active S.R.'s, and Mensheviks, united all discontented elements in one camp: the old officers at the front and in the interior, the bourgeois-nationalist governments of the border states, the capitalists and landowners expropriated by the revolution, the agents of the Entente who were preparing an intervention, etc. They maintained their course towards the overthrow of the Soviet government by means of rebellions or foreign interventions for the restoration of capitalism in Russia.