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Full Report.

Continuation of the Discussion on the Reports of Comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky.

Ninth Session.

8th July, 1929 (morning).

Comrade FREIER:

One of the main features of the so-called third period consists in a sharp accentuation of differences between the imperialist world and the colonies. This accentuation of differences finds expression not only in the powerful growth of the revolutionary movement in India, with which I will deal later, but also in another extremely important phenomenon — the appearance on the international arena of the proletarian struggle of new detachments of the colonial proletariat.

In the last year after the VI. Congress there was a big strike in Korea which was energetically supported by the whole Korean proletariat; the May Day demonstration-strike in the south of Persia, on the oil fields of the Anglo-Persian Company in which, according to newspaper reports, about 22,000 workers participated, and finally, a big May Day demonstration under revolutionary slogans in the Philippines. The latter was the first demonstration of this kind in this Far Eastern colony of the American imperialism. This was the first time that the united front was established between Philippine and Chinese workers between whom a certain amount of antagonism had hitherto existed. Over 30,000 workers and peasants participated in this demonstration. Collisions took place with the police with the result that Philippine and Chinese workers distributing revolutionary leaflets with the workers' and peasants' demands and the demands of Philippine independence, were arrested.

At the peasant congress in the Philippines held on the same day (May 1st), resolutions were passed on defence of the

U. S. S. R. in the coming war, on affiliation to the Peasant International and the Anti-Imperialist League, and a series of revolutionary demands in regard to the peasantry were brought forward.

It seems to me that the appearance on the international arena of new detachments of the colonial proletariat should be mentioned also in the theses.

I will deal now with the situation in India.

There was a dispute at the VI. Congress as to whether the policy of British imperialism in India is contributing to the industrialisation of the country, or if it is, on the contrary, impeding its industrial development. We had at that time only a very limited number of facts at our disposal. In connection with the specific conditions of the war and post-war period, British imperialism was compelled to make a series of concessions to the native bourgeoisie which facilitated the development of the native industry. But approximately since 1927, when the main reasons of this temporary change in the policy of British imperialism ceased to exist, the latter began to resume, so to speak, its "normal" policy in India. At the VI. Congress we could speak mainly of these latest measures of the British government, but we did not see their reflex on the economic life of the country. At present we know the results of this policy. We can see that there is a serious economic depression in the country which is developing into a crisis in some branches of industry. The textile industry, especially in Bombay, is experiencing a chronic crisis; the pride and glory of the national bourgeoisie — the Tata Company — which is the monopolist producer

of steel and the most important metallurgical enterprise in the country, is in great difficulties. The situation in the local coal industry is also getting worse. It is decreasing its output while the British mines which are favoured by the government and a whole series of privileges, are increasing their output.

The deflation crisis is compelling the Anglo-Indian government to have recourse to expensive short-term loans in London, to keep up the currency which was artificially raised in the interests of the British importers. The output of agriculture is rapidly declining. At present, the only flourishing branch of the national economy is the jute industry. The jute companies paid last year on an average 50% dividends, and in this year they are paying 100 and even 140%. What is the explanation of this? The monopolist position of India in the production of jute raw material is sufficient explanation of this exceptional case. But in the jute industry, in spite of the fact that in the last years 70% of the shares were transferred to the native bourgeoisie, the hemp contractors who pocket the biggest part of the profits are still the British firms which manage and control the jute factories. In connection with chronic economic depression, we notice a very curious phenomenon, the flight of capital from India, something which has never happened before in colonial countries. According to the figures of the British periodical the "Economist", £37,500,000 were exported from India in the last few years, this export amounting to £10,000,000 in the first 10 months of 1928 alone. If you take into consideration that in the same year (1928) £8,700,000 were imported into India including £7,500,000 government loan, you will realise the meaning of the chief argument of the adherents of the decolonisation theory, i. e. the theory that the growing export of capital to the colonies means their more rapid industrialisation.

What I said just now about the Indian industry does not, of course, mean that no further growth of industry is possible in the colonies. In a number of colonies industry continues to develop, partly because it is in the interests of foreign capital, and partly as a result of the native industry asserting itself in spite of imperialism. But in India the industrial development of the country has reached a point when further progress is possible only by destroying the imperialist-feudal fetters which shackle the productive forces of the country. Even the native bourgeoisie is beginning to understand this, at least to a certain extent. A very interesting pamphlet published by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce contains the following statement:

"Our primitive system of landownership provides a too narrow and unstable foundation to be able to construct on it the edifice of contemporary industrialism which we need."

The serious economic depression which I have briefly described, constitutes the objective conditions under which a revolutionary revival is developing in India. A direct impetus was given to the strike movement which constitutes the most important feature of this revival, by the capitalist rationalisation which is being introduced in all the big Indian enterprises. With only a few exceptions, this capitalist rationalisation is not accompanied in India by a change in the productive apparatus, by the introduction of more perfect machinery. In India, rationalisation is introduced solely at the expense of the workers' muscles and by the speeding up system.

It should be pointed out that the present Bombay strike is not only a new stage in the class struggle of India when the Indian proletariat is no longer fighting for its immediate economic needs but for its revolutionary organisations which gives this strike a political character, but that it is being waged in an atmosphere of increasing hostility on the part of bourgeois nationalists and social-reformists. Already at the time of the first strike in Bombay, the native capitalists demanded its suppression. By their silence the Swarajists practically supported the government anti-strike and compulsory arbitration Bill which was recently passed in the Indian Legislative Assembly. However, the bourgeois nationalists have never opposed strikes as openly as now in regard to the Bombay strike. The press of the Indian National Congress is accusing the strikers of lack of patriotism, on the plea that while Gandhi

and the Congress are carrying through a boycott of native goods, the strikers, by stopping the production of native goods — so it is alleged — encouraging the import of cotton textiles. The press of the Indian National Congress is publishing vile articles against the strike leaders, accusing them of receiving bribes from the British capitalists who are interested in the destruction of the National Bombay industry. Even the leaders of the Independence League, the organisation which some comrades were inclined to consider as a petty bourgeois organisation, are beginning to oppose the strike.

What influence has the Bombay strike on the proletariat and to what extent does it bring the Indian proletariat as a whole nearer to its vanguard, the Bombay cotton operatives? I must say that the development of the strike movement in other districts is much slower than in Bombay. However, according to the latest newspapers, new detachments of the Indian proletariat are getting nearer the firing line under the influence of the heroic struggles of the Bombay cotton operatives. In this respect, of particular importance is the development of a militant spirit among Indian railwaymen. According to the latest news, a delegate conference of the biggest railway took place at the end of May. 53 delegates from all parts of the country attended this conference. I will give you some of the resolutions which were passed at this conference and I would like to point out that, as far as one can judge by the newspapers, this conference was held entirely free of reformist control.

The first resolution is as follows:

"The conference of the railwaymen of the All-India Peninsula Railway send fraternal greetings to the Indian national proletariat and promises effective support in its class struggle against the common enemy — capitalism which has brought poverty and ruin into the world. Another part of the resolution is: "Only through international proletarian solidarity will it be possible to achieve the liberation of the working class from exploitation."

Here is the second resolution:

"This conference supports wholeheartedly the militant position taken up by the Bombay cotton operatives who are defending so energetically the interests of the working class against the Bombay manufacturers. It condemns emphatically the attitude of the government and the employers who are endeavouring to destroy the solidarity of the working class by shooting down workers and other repressive measures."

The conference also decided to organise a strike fund. Although there is as yet no direct decision re strikes, I should like to recall that only last November one of the British comrades working in India, Bradley proposed to establish a strike fund at the All-Indian Railwaymen's Conference, which rejected this proposal by a small majority. As you see, this decision has been adopted now. However, the example which I have just given and a number of small strikes in the provinces certainly not a sufficiently active support of the Bombay proletariat which, unlike last year, is completely cut off from international aid and whose strike funds are infinitesimal. In the meantime, our comrades in India — as far as we can judge by the material at our disposal — have not taken and are not taking the necessary measures for the extension of the strike movement beyond Bombay, for the organisation of active support to the Bombay strike on the part of the whole Indian proletariat. It seems to me that this constitutes one of the fundamental defects of the leadership of this political strike like of which is unknown in the history of India.

The characteristic feature of the present political situation in India is not only a more distinct division of class forces and political parties but also a simultaneous consolidation of the bourgeois and reformist anti-revolutionary camp in the country. The first indication which confirms this, is the ideological struggle against Communism started by the bourgeois and the reformists. The signal was given already at the session of the All-Indian National Congress. Motilal Nehru, chairman of the Congress, made last December a virulent

on Communism After this, the leaders of the Congress Independence League do not allow a single big meeting conference to pass without warning their audiences of the pernicious influence of Communism and against letting oneself to be carried away by it. The Indian reformists are more determined in such attacks. This is what one reformist organs published in India "Indian Labour" has to say. The journal responds to the proposal made by the political circles to the trade union leaders to put an end to dissensions in their own ranks and to show solidarity in the leadership of the labour movement. The reformist organ writes: "The union of these people.

"Do these well-intentioned people know" — asks the journal — "how serious and fundamental these dissensions are? Trade unionism, as generally understood, and Communism preached by Moscow, are as far from one another as the two poles; the two cannot exist together. Sensible Communists are fully aware of this."

While urging the expulsion of Communists from the All-India Trade Union Congress and the basic trade union organisations, and justifying in vile manner the reactionary law against the Communists, this journal denies the "possibility of the establishment of a united front, and calls it empty talk and waste of energy. The necessary thing is — so it declares — to begin struggle, mainly of an ideological character, but also to use more drastic means which will clear the atmosphere".

We know that the Indian government soon came to the assistance of the Indian reformists in regard to clearing the atmosphere. — it has sent to prison the most revolutionary leaders of the Indian labour movement. Comrades, we must insist that in this ideological struggle our Indian comrades, by not taking up the offensive in the small press at their disposal, are not even reflecting with the necessary determination the attacks of their class enemies.

Another indication of the consolidation of the bourgeoisie is the attention which the bourgeoisie is paying at present to organisational questions. Until quite recently, there were practically no bourgeois political parties in India such as exist in the capitalist countries. Even the best organised party of the Indian bourgeoisie — the Swarajists have degenerated in the last year into a group which is merely a parliamentary group and has no organisational hold on the masses beyond the legislative institutions, except that it holds in its hands the leadership of the Congress.

The Moslem League, another bourgeois organisation, had only about 2,000 members, but these members are not commanded by any kind of discipline or by any political programme. Wherever such discipline — even if it be of a formal character — is required, as for instance, in the volunteer corps attached to the Congress, the League was hardly able to secure any recruits in the whole of India.

The situation is not very much better in the Indian National Congress. According to the statistics given at the last session of the Executive Committee of the Congress, the Indian National Congress has about 100,000 members in all the provinces. According to the report, the situation in these organisations is very unsatisfactory from the point of view of bourgeois leadership. Most of these small organisations are not functioning, there are no meetings. Apart from paying a quarter of a rupee per month as a membership contribution, the members do no work whatever. The more the labour movement grows, the more the revolutionary ferment penetrates into the rural districts, the more the bourgeois parties try to get under their wings the rebellious masses. Agitators of the National Congress tour the provinces with reports on the labour movement and instruct local leaders how to get hold of the trade unions.

The secretary of the Anti-Brahmin Party in Bombay which is usually more to the Right than the Swarajists and supports the government, is proposing now to change the name of this party into peasant party and to demand Dominion rights.

The Indian bourgeoisie is once more beginning the struggle against the masses because, after the revival of 1919—22, it had to touch with the mass movement. One must on no account

treat these facts with contempt. The Indian bourgeoisie will not surrender its positions in the national movement without a fight. The Indian Communists have already succeeded in placing themselves at the head of the vanguard of the working class — the Bombay cotton operatives. Their influence on the masses is no doubt growing. It is also true — as Comrade Kuusinen said in his report — that the leaders of the Indian proletariat, the Indian Communists, are growing as the movement grows. But we must admit that the development of the Communist Party does not only lag behind the tempo of the revolutionisation of the Indian proletariat and of the whole situation in the country, it even lags behind the process of the ideological and organisational consolidation of the bourgeois and reformist forces of the country, and this is what makes the situation in India dangerous.

In the meantime, India is making history more rapidly than anticipated. The inference to be drawn from this cannot be other than the influence drawn by the other comrades. It is incumbent on the Executive Committee of the Comintern together with our brother parties and especially the British Party, to take the necessary measures for giving adequate help to the Indian Communists in their efforts to develop their organisation, because the establishment of a mass Communist Party which is ideologically and organisationally independent and stable, is the most important, nay the only guarantee of correct leadership in the struggles against British imperialism which are bound to take place in India.

Comrade SEMARD (France):

Comrades, we express our accord with the reports made by Comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky. We will propose only a few slight alterations, especially in the thesis which constitutes the basis of the reports. The general line of the reports and the theses brought forward consisted in pointing out the development of capitalist differences and their growth since the VI. World Congress.

At present when the young plan has been hardly accepted by the experts, we witness an accentuated struggle for markets which calls forth a reply from America: tariff war, and it is "prosperous" America which begins hostilities. I will not be far wrong in saying that there is an ever growing struggle for markets between America whose over-production and saturated internal market compels it to look for more outlets, and Germany which under the regime of the Young Plan, just as under that of the Dawes Plan, will be compelled to increase its exports in order to meet the reparation payments.

The universal economic crisis is mostly due to the ever growing disproportion between the capacity of producing goods and the capacity of absorbing them.

I want to go into the effects of this disproportion in France, where they have been particularly felt lately. We have now in France symptoms of another economic crisis. There has been a constant growth of production. Let us take cast iron: 774,000 tons in 1927 and 841,000 tons in 1929. Steel: 689,000 tons in 1927 and 780,000 tons in 1928. There are many signs of shrinkage of external outlets. The commercial balance is decidedly passive. While in 1928 the deficit amounted to 2,500 million, in the first 5 months of 1929 it amounts to 7,000 million francs. In the same period, the export of goods has decreased by over 7 million tons. There has been a diminution in the export of manufactured articles, that is to say, of the type our industry produces, whereas the import of similar manufactured articles has increased. This is what "Journée Industrielle" has to say about the deficit of the commercial balance which it is impossible to make good.

"The present rhythm of our commercial deficit means — if it continues — a debit balance of 12,000 million at the end of the year which the classical invisible exports (that is to say the money spent by foreigners in France) cannot certainly make good."

Comrades, I am therefore justified in saying that the French industry is at a turning point and that it is in greater danger than in the preceding period, at the time of inflation, through

international competition even on its own market. Thus, wholesale and retail prices are steadily increasing, to an extent not foreseen by our economists and the Government; the cost of living is rising, house rent is four times as big as before, the official indexes show an allround increase of 40% compared with 1925. An honest index should double this figure, which means an increase of 70 to 80% since 1925. Comrades, we do not have Varga's respect for the statistics and official indexes of the bourgeoisie, especially as our own bourgeoisie admits that the standard of living of the working class has been lowered in France. Our best statistic of the standard of life is that of strikes for higher wages and salaries. We have had 1400 strikes in one year, 85% of which were strikes for higher pay.

If the internal market is still satisfactory, one must say that this is greatly due to orders for war material; for the air service, the navy, etc., and also to orders of machinery and implements which are bound to accentuate rationalisation and increase production.

As to the financial situation, although France has at present great opportunities from the financial viewpoint, the settlement of debts is a great worry to the French bourgeoisie, notably the 10,000 million due to America which it must pay on August 1st. The Chamber has asked for a postponement of the settlement of this debt of 10,000 million. The majority of the Chamber is inclined to ratify the debt under certain conditions. I think that the French bourgeoisie will have to give in to American imperialism, which has moreover peremptorily refused any postponement of the settlement of this debt, declaring: ratification first, and then we shall see. One can assume that the Government will ratify the debt, and the result will be — increased exploitation of French and German workers. In view of the seriousness of the present situation and the possibility of a crisis, Poincaré has become an advocate of ratification and has secured the support of the more reactionary elements, for instance, members of the "Marin" Federation who were hostile to it. De Kerilis gives the reasons for this in "Echo de Paris":

"Today it is, on the contrary, the nationalist press which is behind M. Poincaré and is anxiously demanding ratification, in order to save France from paying the fifth of its debt on August 1st., and in order to save it the unpleasantness of finding itself once more in an atmosphere of world hostility, grappling with negotiators as hostile as Messrs MacDonald and Hoover."

Comrades, such is the position of the Right parties in the National Union. The position of the bourgeois Left, that is to say, of the Socialist Party is practically the same as that of the Right parties. The Socialist Party is in fact for ratification of the debt, and it supports at present Poincaré's policy which is for ratification of the Young Plan by decree, before any discussion in the Chamber. The Socialist Party is of the opinion that the arrangements and treaties since Locarno and up to the Young Plan, taken as a whole, can be considered as a means of bringing about capitalist stabilisation. Blum when speaking of reparations, speaks of **legitimate reparations**, and Breitscheid, of the German Socialist Party, agrees with this, and will ask the German workers to pay up in order "to clear the poisoned political atmosphere". Thus, one can assume that the debt will be ratified by the French imperialism because it is linked up with the Young Plan which the French bourgeoisie, in spite of its lamentations, willingly accepts because it gives it after all the lion's share.

As to the Rhineland question, it is nothing but a means of blackmail on the part of the Government and the social democrats. In reality, the Communists alone have been for immediate and unconditional evacuation of the Rhineland.

The Party made recently a mistake in regard to its estimate of the Young Plan and the role of the International Bank. Some comrades look upon this plan as a means of ameliorating the differences between the imperialists, others again have interpreted the vote of the Chamber against immediate and unconditional ratification of the debt as a manifestation against finance capital, against High Finance, as if finance capital is not as dangerous in Paris as in New York. Our Party has

publicly remedied this error by a manifesto published immediately in "Humanité". It has pointed out that the Young Plan, on the contrary, aggravate the differences between imperialist powers; will increase the enslavement of the workers and will accentuate still more the class differences and the struggle in France, as well as in Germany. It has been pointed out that in France finance capital plays the same dominating role as American finance capital, and that neither the Government nor the French Chamber are fighting finance capital, but are carrying out its policy.

For several weeks our French capitalists have been furiously denouncing protective tariffs which are threatening the French industry, first and foremost, in regard to manufactured articles. They are threatening America with reprisals. The employers' organisations, the Chambers of Commerce, have placed their grievances before the Washington Government. Seven European Governments are supposed to have sent protests against protective tariffs. This attitude of imperialism, these protests against American decisions immediately after the Experts Committee show how serious are the capitalist differences, which are becoming more acute in France and because of the Young Plan and will continue to do so instead of being alleviated.

In this connection, it is correct to say that as far as France is concerned, the differences have become more serious since the VI. World Congress. We witness an accentuation of rationalisation, an increase of employers and governmental repression against the workers and the revolutionary organisations which dare oppose the policy of French imperialism.

We can see that the antagonisms between the powers are becoming more acute as the struggle for markets develops.

It is clear that the fundamental contradiction is between the two systems, the capitalist world and the U. S. S. R. and that this contradiction is growing as capitalist stabilisation declines while the consolidation of the Soviet regime is effected through the construction of socialism.

It should be pointed out that in some cases the bourgeoisie appreciated more correctly than the social democrats and the Trotskyist elements the possibilities of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Thus, the "Bulletin Quotidien" of the Comité des Forges has made a thorough study of the five-year plan. It has emphasised its importance for the development of Soviet economy. It has come to the conclusion that the realisation of this plan will enable the Soviet Union to take its place among the big industrial nations. The Comité des Forges declares that such a plan must be taken seriously and that, in spite of enormous difficulties, it has every chance of being carried out in its broad lines.

Our imperialism estimates at its right value the plan of socialist construction in the U. S. S. R. It is struggling for the Russian market. This is one of the main reasons of the attitude prepared by the imperialists who are thirsting for outlets. This is the reason for the consolidation of the anti-Soviet front, the intense preparation for war in which our imperialism plays an important role. This role has been already emphasised here as well as the role of its ally — Great Britain.

The intentions of our imperialists are clearly manifested in the military treaties made in the course of the last year, and especially in the course of the last months, with Poland and Rumania; in the financial and military support — in all forms — given to the states adjoining the Soviet Union: constant dispatch of war material, of French instructors and organisers for their armies. We think that France has something to do with the present realisation of the Baltic Alliance which is intended to consolidate the anti-Soviet front. The declaration made by General Lander, President of Esthonia, leave no doubt on this subject. What is the meaning of these declarations? He says: "We, Esthonian and Latvians, work the best we can for the establishment of an iron front against Russia." One would think that a French statesman is saying this, especially if one recalls the declarations made by M. de Jouvenel in a periodical of the German industry with the object of bringing pressure to bear on Germany and of drawing it into the anti-Soviet bloc.

Comrades, it is this world situation, this danger of war which are the cause of the growing repression of the govern-

and we are justified in saying that the capitalist states becoming more and more fascistised and that certain governments are gradually adopting fascist methods under the name of democracy and legality, as for instance, in France. We will deal here with some of these methods which concern our country: considerable development of police forces, development of nationalist and fascist organisations in accord with the government in order to take repressive measures against the revolutionary organisations; more repression, introduction of the system of preventive arrests before any charge is made, which is something new, sentences of one, three and five years imprisonment just for an article, for distributing leaflets, suppression of the revolutionary press, more repression in the colonies. In Indo-China, sentences of labour and imprisonment are passed on hundreds of thousands for the slightest reasons: opposition to imperialist domination. The regime of the French socialist Varenne, has done much in Indo-China to promote such repression. Then there are also atrocious laws. Just now it is proposed to introduce a law which will permit repressive measures against propaganda which might threaten "the integrity of the country". This law is aimed above all at the Communist Party which is struggling against imperialism in the colonies and in Alsace-Lorraine. There is the draft law according to all those who are State officials are to be tried in criminal courts instead of by assizes where trial is by jury.

Measures are also taken by the employers in the form of spying organisation in the factories connected with the spying organisation of the government. One can judge the progress made in regard to repression and fascist methods by the following: it has been proposed to outlaw our Party. I think that in France this act will take a peculiar form: there will be no mere re-outlawing of the Party, but a series of measures which are tantamount to such an act.

The social democrats participate of course in this repressive policy. It is a well known fact that they have voted the credit funds for the reinforcement of the police and the gendarmerie. Our "social-flics" (socialist gendarmes), as we call them, openly applaud repressive measures against Communism, they have passed a vote of confidence in Chiappe, the Police Prefect of Paris. Two municipal councillors who must be stigmatised: Ancette and Levillain play in our country the role of little big game hunters. I will describe some of the features of this social democratic policy. Although under different forms, this policy really differs in the various countries from that of the German social democrats. German social-democracy in power has indicated very clearly at the Magdeburg Congress its orientation towards social fascism and social imperialism, it has spoken openly of social-democratic dictatorship to defend "bourgeois democracy", which means simply the bourgeoisie. Severing has reiterated his threats in the Reichstag. French social-democracy which has not yet been directly in power, does not lag behind the German social-democracy in its social-fascist policy. The French social-democrats are still on the door mat, but their grip is sometimes as effective as in the Cabinet. There is certainly not much to choose between Boncour-Renaudel and Herrmann Müller-Severing. French social-democracy, by its collaboration in the war preparations of our imperialists, is probably even more dangerous than the German social-democracy.

Our social-democracy co-operates actively in the capitalist rationalisation; it pursues the policy of "industrial peace" stigmatised in the programme and theses of the VI. World Congress; it works in close contact with government institutions. Although not in power, it is in the National Economic Council and in the Supreme Council of National Defence where capitalist rationalisation measures and all military measures in connection with the next war are considered. Its role cannot be mistaken if one considers its betrayal of the strikes in the textile industry of the Northern region where it openly urged the workers not to down tools. One must lay more stress in the thesis on the role not of social-democracy taken in general but seen through its leaders, but on the role of social-democracy as a whole, from its basic cadres right to the top: in its leading basic cadres, as well as in regard to its working class elements who constitute the reformist labour aristocracy and who betray openly as the leaders of the Socialist Party. This is im-

portant in regard to the change which we have already made in our united front tactic, because there are still in our ranks relics of Right deviations on the part of comrades who still think that the united front consists in pourparlers between Communist and Socialist organisations, between unitarian and reformist trade unions. The role of social democracy is also very clear in regard to "industrial peace", in their presentation of a plan of compulsory arbitration which aims at torpedoing the right to strike. Capocci of the C. G. T., was the advocate of a plan of compulsory arbitration which served as a basis to the law of compulsory conciliation which the French Chamber has just passed. This law is the fruit of collaboration between the C. G. T. and the Government.

One must examine the perils of compulsory conciliation from the viewpoint of the peculiar position of the seceded trade union organisations. I believe the law provides for a fine from 16 to 1000 francs for employers' organisations and from 16 to 10,000 francs for labour organisations which refuse to appeal to the arbitration court prior to initiating a lock-out or strike movement. What is the aim pursued? To break the will to fight of the workers, to prevent strikes and to bring about "industrial peace" without which capitalist rationalisation is not possible.

This collaboration policy of the social-democrats is supplemented by a regular tactic of destruction of Communism. By rather clever manoeuvres attempts have been made hitherto to denounce our "secessionism" by declaring that we are not caring a rap for workers' demands, and are only for the barricades. The Socialist Party hoped to isolate our Party from the toiling masses when we applied the "class against class" tactic, they hoped to cause a split not only between the masses and ourselves, but also in the ranks of the Party. At present, when it realises that through the application of our tactic, our Party is stronger and more homogeneous, it is adopting the tactic of total destruction of our Party by an attack which aims not only at Communists, but at those who express sympathy with the Party and who work in the parallel organisations, trade unions, the I. R. A., etc. Renaudel has reiterated his threats at a recent socialist banquet when he said:

"The whole audience must pledge itself to fight Communism which has a pernicious demoralising effect on the proletariat. It is the Seine Federation which must initiate the attack which will lead to the downfall of Bolshevism."

We are sure that these traitors will come to grief. Not we alone will take up the challenge, but the working class of the Paris district and of the whole country.

But this policy demonstrates the parallelism and identity of the aims pursued by the social-democrats, the bourgeoisie and the government against Communism.

What obsesses the French Socialist Party, is the question of power under the capitalist regime. At the same socialist banquet, all the "big wigs" of social democracy, Albert Thomas, Boncour, Renaudel, Paul Faure, etc., made themselves heard. All these orators defended the thesis of participation in government. Blum made a big political speech in the course of which, after announcing the probable fall of Poincaré who "having accomplished his mission has no longer any right of existence", and after bringing forward various conditions for socialist participation in the Government, said:

"Here I will go further. I assert that a socialist party must never refuse to exercise power when it is offered, it must never hesitate to grasp it whenever possible, regardless of political conjectures, majority conditions and chances of duration."

The parliamentary socialist group has been a long time for participation. There were certain basic cadres which were against, but today the decisive step has been made.

Today, the "Left" also is for participation. The "Left" elements will go in for demagoguery just as at the time when it was a question of Boncour as a representative in the League of Nations. On these "Left" elements devolves the role of keeping in the Socialist Party the workers who are veering towards Communism.

Rather interesting were Blum's conclusions, which show easiness in regard to social-democratic exercise of power simultaneously in several countries. Blum declares:

"I confess that apprehension accompanies hope and joy when I visualise the moment when socialists will simultaneously exercise power in all the big European countries, unable to throw completely overboard the ballast of the fundamental absurdities and iniquities of the capitalist regime, unable to escape completely the charge of faults accumulated in the past. In negotiations and at conferences, through force of circumstances they will probably have to encounter the still antagonistic interests of their respective nations, in spite of their desire to serve peace and civilisation. The various Sections of the International will meet face to face on the field of national interests; for 10 years we have had sufficient luck and courage to avoid such a cruel spectacle. May material and spiritual progress of the International, may the development of the idea of internationalism spare it us in the future."

This shows that Blum is fully aware that it is impossible for socialism to have a policy which conforms to the promises it makes to the masses, which conforms, for instance, to the promises MacDonald made during the General Election campaign. It has been proved that socialism in power cannot help defending capitalist interests. On the eve of the international experiment, Blum feels that it is the decisive step which will hasten the rupture with the working class which will understand better the role played by social-democracy, and he is already taking precautions. It is a question of making the workers realise, as MacDonald is making them realise now by refusing trade union control and suppressing the meetings of the parliamentary group of the Labour Party, that the social-democracy in power cannot accept any control of the working class because it is carrying out the policy of the bourgeoisie in the name of the interests of all.

The advent to power of social-democracy in France cannot mean anything but a more virulent struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and its organisations. It is clear that our bourgeoisie will appeal to the social-democracy of our country when its difficulties become too great, when it will have to face a revolutionary outbreak.

Our conclusion is as follows: by bringing forward, as our main task, intensification of the struggle against social-democracy, and especially against its Left wing, the X. Plenum will confirm the orientation of the VI. World Congress applied to present conditions: social democratic participation in Governments. This will permit the Sections of the C. I. to wrest broad masses of workers from social democratic influence and to draw them into revolutionary action.

I will describe now very rapidly the development of the industrial struggles in our country. One can say that in France as in all big capitalist countries, there has been an increase of industrial struggles since the VI. World Congress. From the defensive, the workers went to the counter-offensive, and this counter-offensive is the prelude to a bigger and more violent struggle of the proletariat. The protest strikes against capitalist repression, against the spying system in the factories, against the dismissal of militant workers and their imprisonment, gives these strikes a political character. There are certainly wage strikes which show that the workers do not understand their connection with the political situation. I think that the policy of rationalisation and repression applied with particular force by our imperialists in the last months, will make the workers realise the political character of these strikes. The industrial conflicts assume a political character because the whole bourgeois and social democratic apparatus comes into play. Certain labour movements in France are directed simultaneously against the employers, the government and social-democracy. We had in the North the important strike in the textile industry which was directed just as much against the treachery of the social-democrats as against the employers. The intensity of the struggle in our country can be gauged by the resistance of the Limoges workers against the Light Guards, by the conquest of the street by the Paris navvies; the struggle of the soldiers and reservists can be lin-

ked up with the workers' struggles. The simultaneous actions of the workers and those of the soldiers and sailors is alarming the bourgeoisie; also the workers' and peasants' struggle in Alsace-Lorraine, which is not, as some of our Party members think, only a struggle led by the autonomist leaders, but a real mass movement of the workers and peasants against imperialism.

In the colonies, the resistance of the native masses is increasing. In the Latin America wing, there are gigantic strikes in Colombia and in the Brazil. There is a regular revolt in the Congo, the Negro workers have been struggling already 6 months against forced labour, against the terrible exploitation which destroys them by the thousands. In Algiers and Morocco the rebellious tribes in the Atlas Mountains are offering armed resistance to the penetrations of French imperialism.

In our country labour struggles are on the increase. These struggles are of a more virulent character. Movements are developing also in the colonies, not always at the initiative and under the leadership of our Party. We have no Party organisation in Morocco, only a few correspondents. Nor have we a Party organisation in Madagascar where the natives are rebelling. No Party organisation in the Congo and the West Indies. Nevertheless, we witness in the colonies an increase of struggles and insurrectionary movements.

The conclusions to be drawn from this examination since the VI. World Congress, parallel with the accentuation of the antagonisms between the various imperialisms, with the accentuation war preparations which are mainly directed against the U. S. S. R., we witness a constant growth of the workers' struggle (the number of strikes and their violence are on the increase), and growing resistance among the native masses which is linking up the mass struggles in the mother country with the colonial movements. One can therefore say that the international movement has reached a higher and more revolutionary plane, and that we are going towards great struggles.

In conclusion I will deal with the situation in our Party.

We are justified in saying that most of the Sections of the Communist International have increased their influence on the masses, but we must also admit that this influence has not been organised itself. This is one of the weakest points in all our Sections which we must endeavour to remedy. In the Parties where the Executives have consolidated themselves, have become more homogeneous and politically stronger. This consolidation has been secured not only by a more correct policy, by more intensive work among the masses, but also by a more vigorous struggle against opportunism, against Right and conciliatory elements. Such is the case in the Party of Czechoslovakia in spite of its present difficulties, such is also the case in the German Party whose recent Congress marked a decisive step in its rectification and in its struggle against the Right and the conciliators.

Such is also the case in our own Party which has been working at its own rectification for over a year and a half.

Our Congress was a decisive step on the road of rectification. During the Congress, the political struggle was cleared and political differentiation more pronounced. During the several months of preparation our Party has been ridding itself up opportunism. It has vigorously combated the social democratic and conciliatory tendencies within the Party. We have no organised conciliatory tendency in France, but we have conciliatory elements.

The attitude taken up by Crozet has been designated as a purely social-democratic attitude. But it would be a mistake to think that this is a personal attitude. In reality, Crozet represents a considerable number of elements who, when making use of their opportunist talents in the Party, make use of them in the revolutionary trade union organisations.

For a considerable time, Comrade Doriot has played a conciliatory role. It was he who rallied all the turbid elements more or less in discord with the line of the Party, and all the opportunist tendencies.

The Party has compelled him to acknowledge his Right errors, the Party and its Congress have compelled him to

ulate, have induced him to affirm his agreement with the tactical line of the Party. But a reservation was made by the Party: the sincerity of this political accord can only be proved by practical work.

It is only to the extent that Comrade Doriot will apply the tactic of the Party and will make others apply it, that we will be able to gauge the sincerity of declarations in accord with the line of the Party and the C. I.

The Congress has also combated those who were playing the role of conciliators, who have attempted to constitute a rally of the malcontents, of the oppositional elements of all shades. It is rather characteristic that it is precisely a member of the extreme Left, Vilatte, former secretary of the district, who has attempted this rally of all those who are opposed to the line of the Party and the Communist International.

Comrades, our Congress has consolidated the Executive of the Party. It has consolidated it not by the proportional system, but by a system of representation of diverse political currents in the Executive, it has rather established this Executive on a practical basis, and after a political struggle which has lasted several months. Factory workers have become members of our Central Committee.

I must also say that the Young Communist League has played an important role in the discussion which took place to clear up problems, as well as by participating in the work of the Executive in the higher and lower organs, by its more active co-operation in the revolutionary trade union movement.

But the danger of opportunism has not been removed, opportunism still exists in our Party, it is manifest in the strikes and in the preparation of the trade union Congress. I want to say a few words on this point. In the trade unions, we do not witness only opportunist mistakes, but reformism is also present and simple. There is on the part of some comrades an under-estimation of the proletariat's capacity to resist, to start an offensive; an under-estimation of the process of radicalisation among the masses. This takes the form of pessimism and defeatism in the labour struggles. Certain comrades expelled us during the strikes, after a public political discussion before the strikers, adopted an attitude which did not differ from that of the social-democrats in regard to betraying the movements. As this is a very serious matter, we must say frankly that such currents are manifest not only in the basic masses, but even in the leading circles of our organisations, in our industrial federations. For instance, the reasons which made us replace comrade Kirsch in the miners' federation, indicate the great danger of reformism in the leadership of our revolutionary movement. The struggle carried on lately in the railwaymen's federation where reformist elements stand up for social democracy, shows that there is in our revolutionary trade union organisations the danger of a development of reformism. These deviations exist even in the E. C. of the C. G. T. U. It is therefore impossible to say, when dealing with the situation in our Party, that an opportunist platform does not exist. Crozet has openly propagated it.

In conclusion I want to say this: If the Party is to grapple successfully with the tasks imposed on it by the accentuation of the class struggle, it will have to clear out the opportunist, right and conciliatory elements, conciliatory elements who, as in the Germany Party, are clearly adopting the line of the Right.

We associate ourselves completely with the conditions of the political thesis and think that this is the supreme warning to the conciliatory elements. Our vigorous struggle against social democracy demands the same vigorous struggle against those who represent the same tendency in our ranks, and this struggle against the Right and the conciliators is bound to lead to the consolidation of our Party and the Communist International.

Comrade VARGA:

Comrades, my task is to speak on the reparations question. Permit me, however, before proceeding to the proper theme of my speech, to pass a few remarks on the criticisms which have been levelled here against me. The comrades here have fairly unanimously objected to my formulation of the question of the living standard. Under the peculiar circumstances of my work, having the misfortune during the last ten years to be detached from direct mass activity and to depend entirely on printed sources, the objections raised by those comrades who are doing mass activity, who are directly observing the life of the workers, are certainly of great importance, and will urge me to re-examine the question.

Between myself and Comrade Kuusinen as chief reporter, and the comrades who have spoken here, there is no difference in regard to the fact that the conditions of the working class have grown absolutely worse. On the other hand, I do believe that on the question of the real wages, i. e. of the living standard in the narrower sense as shown by statistics, the arguments raised here are inadequate to demonstrate that the workers who are fully employed today are able to buy less commodities with their weekly wages than they were a year or two ago. I am going to examine this question more closely. I believe that I was right. Should it turn out that I was wrong, I shall have the courage to admit my mistake.

I should like to emphasise, however, that I have never said that the living standard had risen, as was ascribed to be by some comrades here. This I have never said. Of course, there are some categories of workers whose real wages have been strongly brought down in recent years, e. g. the miners. The problem of the real wages, of the living standard, and of the conditions of the working class, is a very complex one; we must study it very closely, and naturally, should take into consideration in our further discussion of this question those hints and suggestions which have been made, as for instance, the allusion made by Comrade Remmele to the statistics of national insurance.

In Comrade Remmele's speech it was stated that the rate of consumption in Germany has shrunk by one-third as compared with the pre-war rate. Comrades, I positively believe this to be a mistake on Comrade Remmele's part, and on closer examination of the data he will find out the source of his mistake. Comrade Remmele has spoken here about two lines: the line of Comrade Kuusinen, and my own line of argument. I believe this to be wrong. To my mind, there is no profound difference whatsoever between Comrade Kuusinen's argument and mine. Comrade Kuusinen gave us a statement on the general line of development. He spoke about technical improvements, about rationalisation, about the appraisal of the capitalist situation by sundry ideologists of capitalism, and so on. I have limited my argument to the last year since the Congress. And what have I demonstrated? I have demonstrated that during the last year, although there was a certain upward trend in the leading capitalist countries, there were already in evidence the sure signs of a new economic crisis ahead. I have pointed out that we are passing through a new agrarian crisis, that we are having an international crisis of credits, that there is extraordinary stock exchange gambling going on, that a crash is quite imminent. I have pointed to the tremendous fact of unemployment, predicting that during the next year, during 1930, there would be a fresh revival of the labour movement and even greater fights between capital and labour. I have even stated concretely that Great Britain would be one of the chief countries involved in this struggle. Hence I do not see, comrades, where is the difference in the line of argument between myself and comrade Kuusinen.

The polemics against me, as usual, gradually increased and step by step it led to the charge of revisionism against me. It started with a gentle hint by Comrade Bela Kun; Comrade Khitarov referred already to a deviation, and it reached its climax in the pathetic utterances of Comrade Kolarov. I must tell the comrades this: Comrade Manuilsky in his speech has mentioned various kinds of opportunism. To the fourth kind of opportunism he relegated those people who had arrived at certain convictions on the grounds of study and observation, but kept back such convictions from the Comintern for fear

of being charged with opportunism. This mistake I have never committed, neither shall I do so in future. (Khitarov: "This does not mean that you are rejecting the other kinds today".) If I should become convinced that something new has taken place in the international situation, in world economy, in the labour movement, which does not exactly tally with the picture so far considered correct by the Comintern, I shall always submit such convictions to the Comintern, even if I should run the risk of being accused once again of opportunistic transgressions. To my mind, it is the greatest opportunism to keep silent because of fear to clash with the prevailing line of thought. This is the most dangerous kind of opportunism unworthy of a Communist. (Neumann: "Not the prevailing, but the Bolshevik line.") I shall do so even more readily, bearing in mind that that which I brought up and which was at first considered opportunistic, became subsequently the line of the Comintern. Permit me to remind you of the last but one Plenum before the Congress, when I advanced the thesis that Great Britain was faced with rationalisation on a large scale. The British comrades got up then and declared that this was impossible. Many comrades declared it to be opportunism even to think that British capitalism was still sufficiently strong to carry out rationalisation. The comrades here have listened to the speech by Comrade Campbell who has admitted here the process of rationalisation going on in Great Britain, and has even criticised the previous attitude of the British comrades.

I should also like to remind you of another case which occurred at the Fourth Congress. At the Fourth Congress I was described by Comrade Bukharin as an opportunist because I believed that the partial demands should be included in the Comintern Programme. Please recollect that a few days afterwards Comrade Bukharin, on behalf of the Russian delegation, was bound to make a declaration in which the charge of opportunism was withdrawn. The third case to which I wish to allude is even more striking, because it shows that the people who accuse me of opportunism are not necessarily full-blooded revolutionaries themselves! This happened in 1921 at the Third Congress when I pointed out for the first time that the general crisis of capitalism did not imply a lasting phase of crisis, but that within the general critical period of capitalism there was a possibility for an upward phase. At that time I was branded by a group of comrades as an opportunist, and the spokesmen of this group were: Friesland, Thalheimer, Fröhlich, Pepper, and Bela Kun! Friesland became a few months later a "Vorwärts" editor, Thalheimer and Fröhlich went by way of the Social Democracy, Pepper is at this very moment upon the edge of the Comintern. The only one whom I still have the joy to see in our midst is my friend Bela Kun!

(Bela Kun: "But at that time you were at one with Trotsky!")

But also with Lenin on this question!

This means that quite often opportunist views are presented by people who utter Left radical phrases and accuse others of opportunism. I must say that Comrade Kolarov's speech here was the most opportunist speech ever made in the Comintern. I must say that I am ashamed that a comrade seated at the Presidium table of the Comintern should make such an opportunist speech clothed in radical phraseology. What did Kolarov say. I will translate from the Russian into the German:

"If capitalism today is able to raise the living standard of the working class, this means the liquidation of the revolutionary period."

What does this mean, comrades? It means liquidatorship of the purest brand. It is precisely the same as was asserted then in 1921 by Thalheimer, Friesland, Pepper, and others, that if the downward grade of capitalism should be checked anywhere, it would mean the end of revolution. And those erstwhile comrades drew the logical conclusion and went over to the Social Democracy. Kolarov goes on to say:

"Comrade Varga speaks of the inevitable rise of an economic crisis, but it is strange, how should the crisis come when we have a rise in the living conditions of the working class. What does this mean? It means a rise in

the consuming capacity of the proletariat. A rise in the consuming capacity of the proletariat means an increased demand, and consequently, a reduction in the causes leading to the economic crisis."

What is said here is nothing else but the old vulgar theory of under-consumption which was ten or twenty times seen and ridiculed by Marx in his works. It was pointed out by Marx in this connection that the wages of the workers, the purchasing power of the working class was highest exactly immediately before the crisis, during the period of prosperity. There was no reason whatever why there should be no crisis.

In fact, this is politically the theory of social-fascism. I should advise Comrade Kolarov to peruse Tarnow's book entitled "Why Be Poor?". What does Tarnow suggest to the capitalists? Give the workers higher wages and you will have no crises! The theory of high wages being advantageous to the capitalists themselves is the economic ideology of social-fascism, of the common interests of the classes, of social-fascism. This is what was said by Kolarov in his speech, and he has the temerity to accuse me of revisionism! What is the political significance of Kolarov's speech, when he says that the Balkans are a semi-colonial area? On another occasion, in the Balkan Secretariat, he said that Rumania was not an imperialist power although it had annexed millions of Magyar, Bessarabian and other inhabitants by force of arms. If Rumania is a semi-colony naturally it cannot be an imperialist power. Politically it means that if we consider Rumania as a semi-colony, our attitude toward the Rumanian bourgeoisie should be the same as that to the bourgeoisie of a semi-colonial country, i. e. that there should be certain common anti-imperialist aims between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; an utterly wrong, a thoroughly opportunist political position. I wanted to mention this merely as an example how in some cases the pathetic charges of revisionism are the cloak for political and economic opportunism of the worst kind.

What is said in the Theses on the reparations question is correct, but it lacks concreteness and conclusiveness. I believe a more elaborate statement should be given in the Theses. Before I proceed any further, permit me to read to you the way I should like to see this point formulated in the Theses:

"The substitution of the Young Plan for the Dawes Plan means no solution of the reparations question, but a rotten, contradictory compromise for a short time. The intensification of the imperialist contradictions, for whose decision by war none of the leading Powers considers the present moment opportune, has dictated the attempt of temporarily shifting the contradictions to the partial ground of the reparations question. The Anglo-French bourgeoisie thereby pursues the aim of accelerating Germany's transition to the anti-Soviet front, while at the same time drawing away Germany from the American orientation to the front of the European debtor countries as against the United States. The attempt of the German bourgeoisie to take advantage of this occasion to shake off some of the fetters hindering its imperialist development was frustrated by the Allied bourgeoisie. The efficacy of the Young Plan will lead only to a necessity to a strengthening of the international position of American capital through the instrumentality of the Reparations Bank, to transfer difficulties, and to the excessive investment of foreign capital in German industry. The withdrawal of the protection of transfers will force the German bourgeoisie — regardless of reduced reparations payments — to an increased offensive against the working class. With the further intensification of imperialist contradictions, the problem of reparations is equally going to emerge in an intensified form again."

I believe, comrades, this formulation contains all the essential points.

(A voice: "This is not the same formulation!")

It is fuller than the formulation I gave at the Presidium meeting.

Now to the problem itself. First of all, it should be emphasised that the substitution of the Young Plan for the Dawes Plan is not due to an acute crisis of the Dawes Plan, an acute

in the sense that it would have been impossible to make further payments under the Dawes Plan; although transfer duties might have been anticipated in the near future. But comrades know that the Dawes Plan provided for the acceleration of payments up to 5 million marks. The revision on foreign political grounds. You will recollect that Germany asked for the evacuation of the Rhine district, and to this she replied: first, commercialise my claims so that I get money immediately, and then we shall be able to talk of evacuating the Rhine. Thus originated the famous formula in September 1928 about "the necessity of complete and final solution of the reparations problem".

What were the foreign political grounds that led to a revision of the Dawes Plan? All the comrades know that the present world-political situation is distinguished by three contradictions: Soviet Russia versus the capitalist world, England versus America, and the colonial world versus the capitalist world. And Comrade Lapinski justly pointed out in the Advisory Commission that the nearer the maturity of the solution by force of arms, the more likely will the imperialists list their minor local differences within the cardinal contradiction. The cardinal contradiction is, as emphasised in theses, the contradiction between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union; next comes the contradiction between Europe and America. Now then, the weakest point in the anti-Soviet front was always Germany. Why, comrades? Because Germany was defeated, plundered, forced to pay reparations, only to be plundered again by the strongest imperialist powers. Under these circumstances Germany tried to manoeuvre and to rely somewhat upon the support of the Soviet Union. This sentiment was strongest at the time of signing the Rapallo Treaty. And to the extent that capitalism, and consequently also imperialism was strong in Germany, the German bourgeoisie and Germany's foreign policy moved away ever further from the Soviet Union and approached the anti-Soviet front. Nevertheless, comrades, Germany was not yet entirely enlisted in the anti-Soviet front, and one of the chief aims of the British and French bourgeoisie in substituting the Young Plan for the Dawes Plan is to get Germany firmly ranged on the side of the anti-Soviet front. You should bear in mind that in the event of a war against the Soviet Union, which would be waged in the first place by the immediate neighbours, Germany would play a tremendous role both in the delivery and transit of arms. Besides, it is exceedingly difficult to goad Poland into a war with the Soviet Union without first securing Poland's rear, hence the great importance attached to Germany's participation, at least benevolent neutrality towards our enemies, i. e. the disguised participation of Germany in the war against the Soviet Union.

Secondly, comrades, upon the other front, upon the Anglo-American front, upon the front of the European debtors against America, upon this front, too, Germany was the weakest link. Comrade Kuusinen has pointed out that among all these countries Germany is most dependent upon the importation of American capital. One of the aims of the new regulation of the reparations question is to enlist Germany in the united front of the European debtors against America. Allow me to give a few interesting quotations on this question. Three years ago, on March 26, 1926, Churchill said the following:

"It seems to me that an extraordinary situation has developed when through all these ramified channels 50% of the German reparations are extorted from the defeated and devastated countries of Europe in order to flow in a constant stream across the ocean to the rich and flourishing republic."

And shortly after the introduction of the Young Plan it was declared by Stresemann in a speech made on June 24:

"It is asserted by German nationalists that under the Young Plan, Germany would be turned into a British and French colony. As a matter of fact, the whole of Europe is in danger of becoming a colony of those who have not equally suffered from the war."

The American press reacted quite sharply to this utterance of Stresemann. You see therefore that in a certain sense, to a limited extent, the united front of the European debtor

countries against the United States has already been formed. Comrades, in the famous article in the "Kölnische Zeitung" it was quite clearly said that it was England's ambition to force Germany into the anti-Soviet front. The "Kölnische Zeitung" is a semi-official organ which writes nothing unapproved by the Foreign Office. This is what the newspaper wrote on September 19, 1928:

"Chamberlain will take advantage of the question of Rhine evacuation to force Germany into the anti-Russian front, and to punish her with permanent occupation if obdurate."

It is characteristic that the newspaper, while decrying the pressure brought to bear by England, at the same time asks: "What will England offer us for this?" Clearly, to the German bourgeoisie it is merely a question of the price for joining the anti-Soviet front. Here we have in a nutshell the foreign political grounds which led to a revision of the reparations question and to the Young Plan.

Of course, the Young Plan is a compromise. And it cannot be anything else. When the imperialist robbers meet to discuss any questions, the Conference can lead to nothing but a compromise; if no compromise be achieved, it would mean war amongst them. In this sense the Young Plan is an attempt at bridging over the differences for the time being. Have thereby the differences been eliminated? Will the struggle not be continued even under the Young Plan? To be sure, it will; nevertheless it means a postponement in the sense that the imperialist robbers do not fly at each other's throat right away. For a compromise is nothing but a temporary bridging over of the differences. I believe this could not be construed into any deviation. I fail to see why Comrade Khitarov finds anything wrong in this observation. It is so simple that there can be no dispute about it. (Neumann: "Too simple!"). If we read the Young Plan we find every part of it to be a compromise. We have here the original French text. I can show you that each sentence contains some compromise, that each chapter contains the temporary bridging over of acute contradictions. (Neumann: "Temporary -- for 59 years?")

What did Germany get through this compromise? Firstly, it got the fixation of its debts. Hitherto it was absolutely unclear how much Germany was to pay. Secondly, a reduction of its debts. Thirdly, the abolition of the prosperity index by which, under the Dawes Plan, the annual payments were to be automatically increased to the extent of the growing economic prosperity of Germany. Finally, and this is particularly important (this is also the answer to Comrade Neumann's rejoinder), Germany got a considerable reduction in the payments for the first 10 years! One is free to assert, but one cannot reasonably maintain that it is not a certain concession to Germany when instead of 2½ millions plus prosperity index, Germany will have to pay only 1,700,000.

Why do I emphasise the point of 'the first 10 years'? Because all of us here are convinced, no less than the German capitalists, that the Young Plan is not going to be in force for 59, nor for 19, and perhaps not for 10 years. And the Germans have accepted it because they speculate on the intensification of the imperialist contradictions which will lead to a war with the Soviet Union, or between England and America, and then they will be able to sell themselves at the price of the reduction or the total abolition of the reparations payments. It is the first 10 years that are of importance to the German bourgeoisie.

Nevertheless Germany had also to assume onerous obligations under this Plan: the abolition of the protection of transfers, the compulsion to mobilise a portion of the debts so as to bring in 600 millions interest annually. This is a serious matter. For as long as Germany is directly indebted to the hostile governments, she can constantly try to get further reductions of the debts by new negotiations under better circumstances. But if these obligations are sold to private interests, it will mean State bankruptcy if Germany does not pay! This means a great burden. (Neumann: "If there is such a heavy burden, where is the bridging of the contradiction?") I have mentioned both the advantages and disadvantages of the Young Plan to Germany. Nevertheless it is a bridging of the

differences, or at least an attempt in this direction. We shall watch the further developments. (Kuusinen: "You have taken the Young Plan too literally, noticing only the bridging of differences.") It is an attempt at bridging the differences, this is unquestionable.

France gains the advantage that the payment of the inter-Allied debts will be systematically shifted on to Germany. Furthermore, France will get immediately a large sum through the mobilisation of Germany's debts. By way of compensation, France had to forego a good deal of her previous demands in connection with reparations.

Another gain to the Allies from the introduction of the Young Plan is that Germany's subsequent payments will be made dependent upon the payments which England, France and Italy will have to make to America. If America should relinquish its demands, there will be a reduction of two-thirds of that amount for Germany. Thus, Germany as well as England and France are interested in this proposition — to the extent of one-third and two-thirds respectively — for the reduction of the inter-allied debts. In this manner an organised united front of the debtor countries against America has been formed! This is unquestionably England's diplomatic success over America.

Germany's attempt to take this opportunity to break its fetters was vigorously frustrated by the Allies, and in this they were helped by America. You will recollect how the negotiations broke down when Germany, through Schacht, demanded political concessions.

Now, comrades, during and after this crisis in the negotiations the following things happened: the transfer agent continued to exact German payments in foreign currency, although the German currency had dropped already below the gold parity. The comrades know that during the first months of this year the German Reichsbank lost approximately 1000 million in gold and notes, while the reparation agent continued the money transfers. He wanted to demonstrate to Germany that even the protection of transfers provided for in the Dawes Plan did not afford any real protection to German currency against severe blows. How did the German bourgeoisie react to this? It reacted, among other things, by the blood bath of May Day in Berlin! By this blood bath the German bourgeoisie wanted to demonstrate to the negotiators in Paris, besides the inner political reasons which have already been mentioned here, that there was still danger of a proletarian revolution in Germany and that therefore her back should not be strained too much.

On May 2nd Schacht returned to Paris. Three days afterwards the understanding was actually reached!

Now, comrades, what did America get from it? America has brought no sacrifices, but it has created the instrument of the Reparations Bank which will give it even greater influence and great power in the international money market.

The negotiations about the acceptance or rejection of the Young Plan are still in progress. They are closely connected with the question of ratification of the settlement of debts between France and America. You have seen how the American government has placed the knife at France's throat, how it would allow no delay in the ratification of the debt settlement, insisting that France should pay immediately 400 million dollars of "commercial debts" (for American war property left in France) in the event of failure to ratify the settlement by August 1st. Such is the pressure of America on France, which is again a factor contributing to the creation of an anti-American front of the European debtors.

What will be the effect of the adoption of the Young Plan in the realm of foreign politics? First, I believe it will mean the further and more rapid going over of Germany to the anti-Soviet front; secondly, a rapprochement between Germany and the Anglo-French bloc in the sense of the united front of the debtors against America.

Comrade Kuusinen has mentioned that in spite of all the forces he thought it likely that in the near future the foreign policy of Germany would be based more upon America than upon the Anglo-French bloc. His chief argument was that

Germany was largely dependent upon American capital. America was the principal creditor, and that therefore Germany was dependent on America. To be sure, there is a grain of truth in these arguments. Unquestionably, the present position in the external political position of Germany is exceedingly complicated. Nevertheless, comrades, one must bear in mind that in the near future (and partly already today) the influx of French capital on short terms is going to replace American capital in Germany to an ever larger extent. In recent years the big German banks have largely replaced with French credits the short term capital withdrawn by America.

(Thälmann: "This is an exaggeration.")

Neither myself nor Comrade Thälmann have gone through the books of the German banks; but since this is repeated both by the French and the German press this must be the case, apparently. I might draw attention to the fact that these are economic features which lead to increasing rapprochement between Germany and France: the International Steel Cartel, the understanding among the chemical manufacturers, and so on. The typical expression of this rapprochement was seen in the sharpest form by the tendency advocated by A. Rosenberg in Germany for an alliance with France and a struggle against the Soviet Union. Of course, there are very acute contradictions between France and Germany, but under no circumstances should we consider the rapprochement between them as the deciding factor!

I might sum up the foreign political position of Germany as follows: **Germany will continue the policy of manoeuvre between America, the Anglo-French bloc and the Soviet Union. Yet the tendency for joining the Anti-Soviet camp will go on at an accelerated pace.**

On the whole, the economic consequences of the Young Plan will be the same as those of the Dawes Plan. This is, in the first place, an increased offensive against the German working class. This question is dealt with in an article by the editor of "Wirtschaftsdienst", Kurt Singer, in No. 24 of the Review in which he says:

"If the reconstruction required by the Young Plan should be carried out by the German economy, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to go on paying to the workers the amounts hitherto paid either in visible or invisible wages (the so-called social burdens). No doubt there can be no rise in the wages for some considerable time, however great the technical progress of industry, because everything will be needed to pay interest on capital investments."

Comrades, this is written by an ideologist of the German bourgeoisie who, by the way, does not belong to those who urge speeding up industry. He speaks quite clearly of the further increases in the wages and of the necessity of cutting down the wages! (Neumann: "Then the living standard does not rise!"). The reparation demands under the Young Plan, as compared with the Dawes Plan, are particularly likely to force the German bourgeoisie to attempt the cutting of wages. Why? Because Germany can pay only by exporting mercantile goods, and essentially by exporting industrial products. The total capacity of the world market for such goods is at present somewhere around 40,000 million marks. Germany has at present a passive balance of 3,700 million marks on the payments. To be able to pay, Germany would have to increase her export of manufactured goods by about 5000 million marks. Was 5000 million and not 3,700? Because Germany, in order to be able to export more, would have also to increase the importation of raw materials. She would have to import copper, metals, iron ore, textile material, in order to be able to export. She would therefore have to increase her export of goods by 5000 millions annually. This is approximately one-eighth of the capacity of the world market; Germany would have to deprive her competitors of one-eighth of the world volume of trade. This seems to be impossible. True, in recent years the export of German manufactured goods has steadily increased, by about 500 million marks annually. But we must say this: America has made great advances in late years in the exportation of manufactured goods. America has increased its export by 1000 million marks in 1928. The export of manufactured goods

year of prosperity! Now you can imagine how vigorously American industry is going to attack the world market during the next crisis. Secondly, comrades, there is rationalisation going on in England on a large scale, and in the next years German industry is going to be ousted by British industry on the world market to a greater extent. Thus we see, comrades, rationalisation in England (for the prediction of which the comrades accused me of opportunism) is going on at a considerable pace, contributing to the aggravation of the world situation, of the crisis of world capitalism in general.

Under such difficult conditions the German bourgeoisie has to try to export goods. What can it do? It will go on with rationalisation. It will attempt to increase the intensity of its exploitation of the workers; it will attempt to increase the working hours. It will attempt to do away with social insurance. It is precisely one of the tasks of the present fascist Government to do these things in the interest of the bourgeoisie, the same as it is the task of the MacDonald Government in England to curb the resistance of the workers to rationalisation. This is what the English bourgeoisie expects from the MacDonald Government. What does the transfer of the Reichsbank mean? It means that Germany has to pay in foreign currency regardless of the exchange rate of the mark. It means that the Reichsbank, to protect its gold reserve, is compelled to raise the bank rate. It means that the German industry will be compelled to hand over a far larger share of the surplus value extorted from its workers to financial capital, to its competitors in the world market. At the present time a manufacturer in France pays interests at the rate of 4-5 per cent, on deposits, whereas the German capitalist pays 10, 12, and even 15 per cent.

Why then did the German bourgeoisie consent? Because, as I already said, it is hoping that the Young Plan is not going to stay for very long, that in a few years time the imperialist contradictions will reach such a climax that Germany will be able to get a fresh revision of the Young Plan, that the reparations payments will be abolished altogether.

To sum up, — I believe that in the draft which I have read are contained all the important features of the reparations problem. In conclusion, I should like to repeat what I have said: there are no differences in the general line between myself and Comrade Kuusinen; there are no two lines, there are only certain differences (Thälmann: "deviations?") in the appraisal of individual questions of the international situation. Yes, comrades, I do not believe there is a single comrade in this hall who would undertake to present and formulate the present extraordinarily complicated international situation so as to meet with unanimous agreement of all the comrades without exception (laughter). Of course, this might be done by concentrating oneself to very general features! But if one wants to examine the situation concretely, it is so complicated that there are bound to be some differences of judgement. But this by no means implies any difference in the line of policy, and still less any revisionism, as has been so pathetically claimed by Comrade Kolarov. (Applause.)

COMRADE MOIROWA (Women's Department of the E. C. C. I.):

Comrade Varga's speech suffered from a fundamental defect, and that is the fact that it has not even been once mentioned that the attitude of the working masses has increased, that they are moving towards the Left; there is no mention in it concerning their attitude towards the efforts of the bourgeoisie to prop up the crumbling edifice of capitalist stabilisation, to keep it up as long as possible. For us there is no doubt that the Young Plan must not be regarded from the viewpoint as to whether it will help the capitalists to get out of the difficulties which they are in at the present moment, but from the viewpoint as to the extent to which it will contribute to the further revolutionisation of the masses.

Germany is now confronted with an immediate revolutionary situation. This is incontestable. Essentially the Young Plan is a declaration of Civil war on the German proletariat. That is so, not merely because the German working class

cannot sacrifice any further for the payment of all kinds of reparations, but also because the working class of Germany knows quite well that the toilers can manage without paying anything at all. The role of the U. S. S. R. in the matter of non-payment of debts is widely known by the working masses and this factor can by no means be obliterated in the consideration of the Reparations question. It is necessary to make a thorough study, not only of statistics and other matter, but also of the position and sentiments of the working masses and their attitude towards political events. There is no doubt that we are at the present time confronted in a whole series of countries with revolutionary events of extraordinary magnitude. I do not know, but the impression I got from the May-Day happenings and from what has recently happened in Poland is that they contained some elements reminiscent of the July Days in Russia. The fact that the Communist Parties had to hold back the advanced detachments of the working class gives one the right to speak of a rapidly approaching revolutionary situation. This great process now going on in the midst of the working masses cannot be explained away. As far as ideological work is concerned much has been accomplished, but we have very serious organisational defects to record. The question of organisation of the masses, the question of leading the masses, the question of getting a firm hold on the masses, the question of factory nuclei, is now of colossal significance. It is from this angle that I should like to take up the question of the movement of the working women.

I believe that some progress has already been made in this respect. But opportunism pure and simple, which is the attribute of the social-democratic parties, has not been entirely as yet eliminated in our ranks. Much work is still required to accomplish that. Individual women communists or women's departments can do nothing in this respect by themselves so long as the Communist Parties as such do not lay greater stress on this work and do not direct it along the channels of leading the economic and political battles of the working masses.

In discussing the question of female labour one should correct some of the data given by Comrade Varga with regard to the standard of living of the working masses. There are statistics to show that female labour has increased in all industries and that this increase is to be recorded not only in the performance of work which is by tradition done by women, such as in the textile and clothing industries (in these branches there is in fact even a diminution of female labour), but also in such industries as the chemical, machine building and even mining. (Great Britain.) In Germany the number of women in industry has increased by three million since the war. If we take the Berlin-Brandenburg district alone we find that about 50 per cent. of the workers in the Chemical industry are women, in the electrotechnical industry they constitute about 40 per cent. In France the number of women employed in the chemical industry has increased 8 times and in the metallurgical industry 6 times. There are now 3½ million women workers in France, i. e. one million more than before the war. In Great Britain, America, and all other countries, there is everywhere to be observed an increase in the number of women in industry. The growth in the employment of women, it should be observed, is accompanied by stationariness in the general of workers and in some cases even by a decline. As you know the earnings of women regardless of their skill are almost everywhere only about 50 per cent. of the earnings of men. Is this not a lowering of the general standard of living of the working class? There can be no doubt that this is so.

Interjection: (Hear, hear.)

Interjection: (This is opportunism.)

The figures for 1928 clearly and definitely show that wages of working women are being cut. For example, this is the case in the German textile industry where wages were falling from month to month. It is true the men's wages have been somewhat increasing from month to month. But if the two processes are balanced we find that the fall in the wages of women is not compensated by the rise in the wages of men. Comrade Varga's idea that the standard of living is not falling is wrong, as this is to be judged not by the position of various groups of workers but the position of the working class as a whole. The answer of the working women to the lowering

of their standard of living is a struggle and a rapid revolutionisation.

In all countries we see women at the most outstanding posts. I do not want to enumerate the facts of working women's action, as all of you know them. You also know the part played by working women in the **May-Day events in Berlin**, you know the part played by the working women in the demonstration to the Wall of the Communards in **Paris**, you know about the women tobacco workers in **Bulgaria**, the cigarette makers of **Greece**, the textile workers of **Bombay**, the workers of the same industry in **Lodz**, the **Polish rural women**. What have these actions shown? What roused the working women to action? They acted because their standard of living was being depreciated. Here is what a working woman of **Czechoslovakia** said when threatened to be evicted unless she went back to work: "Of what good are your threats? All the same we have to die. And we have a world to gain."

The attitude of the working women to the Communist Parties has revealed itself during the mass struggles.

At the time of the strike in **Lodz** a mass meeting of working women took place organised by the women themselves. At that meeting they threw all reformists of the P. P. S. out of the hall and listened to the Communist deputies only. There were many interesting speeches made by the women themselves at that meeting. They must be heeded. A working woman turned to the Communists and said: "you speak excellently, you properly express our feelings and our demands, but the trouble is that you Communists do not work enough amongst us."

Not only comrades, do we underestimate the role of the working women. We have not yet completely overcome the petty-bourgeois idea with regard to female labour. From the report of the Congress of the French Party we know that a French communist, addressing a meeting of working women on March 8 in Lyons, said: "Your place is not the factory but the hearth." It would be interesting to know comrades what position the French Party took with regard to that Communist, as to whether he was reprimanded for it by the Party, as to whether he was given to understand that one cannot belong to the Communist Party by holding views which are at variance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin on a question which is of no mean importance. What did Lenin say on this question?

"The working women must be taught to fight together with the men against the tyranny of the capitalists, to fight for social legislation, for a shorter working day, for better wages. The working and peasant women must be taught to fight together with their brothers and husbands against Czarism and against capitalism for their full emancipation. That lesson is taught first of all by the factory itself which unites the working men and women into one family of labour."

That is exactly also what is said in the Programme of the Communist International.

Lenin further says:

"It is the business of the bourgeoisie to develop trusts, to drive women and children into the factories, to torture and debauch them, to condemn them to dire need. We do not demand such development, we do not support it, we fight against it. But how do we fight?"

And here comes the gist of the matter:

"We do not want to revert back to handicraft and to women's domestic work. We want to go forward through the trusts and onward towards socialism."

Lenin spoke many a time of the progressiveness of drawing working women into industry. It would have been superfluous to mention this at our Plenum were it not for the speech mentioned above.

The growing activity of the working women is not yet adequately reflected in our Parties' work amongst the women. In general it is possible to say that we are more or less following the working class, this cannot be fully said about

the working women. In this connection we must emphasize our work in this sphere has throughout the ten years existence of our Parties not proceeded as it should be. It has been misdirected. We have lost many years and have practically done nothing to win over the masses of toiling women.

Who are the women that belong to our Communist Parties? The best women's composition we have, of course, in Germany. But even there it is not quite what it should be. Let us take Berlin where we have about 4000 women. We find that about 23% of the women members of the Party are workers, the rest being housewives. In the North Western district 20% of the women are workers, in the Ruhr, 18%. For the Ruhr this is more or less comprehensible as the female proletariat of that region consists exclusively of miners' wives and it cannot be helped. In the Lower Rhine 17% are workers, in the Central Rhine, 16%. The percentage is not high but there is at least some percentage of working women. In view of the new course which has been taken on work among the women in Germany, which finds expression not only in the resolutions but in actual life.

As to France, the unchanging figure concerning the women in the Party given prior to the VI. Congress and after it, is again at the recent Congress of the French Party, is unimproved. There are in the French Party, 1100 women members, all of these only 180 are workers. But do you think that the French Party troubles much about that? Nothing of the kind. At the last Congress an interesting and striking feature was revealed which threw some light on the attitude of the French communists to the question of bringing women into the Party. It was discovered that on March 8, communists ended their speeches at mass meetings with an appeal to the men to join the Party, while urging the women to join the Women's Anti-War League.

Women, of course, should be told to join the mass organisations. That something is wrong here is quite clear from the fact alone that in such mass organisations as the I. R. A. for example, which should be based chiefly on the women, only 15% of the members are women.

But that is not the question. The circular letter of the E. C. C. I. concerning March 8, pointed out that March 8 should be made good use of and that a series of measures should be worked out for the recruiting of women into the Party. But apparently that letter was not read by the French Party and not discussed, otherwise one cannot see why the French comrades should have appealed to the men to join the Party and to the women to join the Anti-War League, when the E. C. C. I. issued clear instructions that working women must be drawn into the Party.

(Interjection: Division of Labour.)

I am not going to speak of the number of women in our Parties as those of Norway and Sweden. There most of them are housewives. The situation is different in this respect in the Polish and Finnish Parties. There, they are primarily working women, although the percentage of women in general is small, 7% in Poland and 14% in Finland. As to England and Czechoslovakia without going into the social composition of the women in the Parties (the majority there also being housewives), it is interesting to note the following: With regard to the fluctuations of the Party concerning which we have some figures, we find that women do not leave the Party as quickly as men. The percentage of women in the British Party has increased — in 1926 it was 18% and in 1929 it is 21.25%. True the absolute number of women has somewhat increased lately, but the percentage has risen chiefly because women have not withdrawn from the Party to the same extent as men. The slow process of women leaving the Parties is to be observed also in Czechoslovakia. Speaking at the Soviet Women's Congress on the significance of drawing working women into the Party Comrade Molotov said that the ideological and political educational work of the Communist Parties is more effective among the women, that the working women follow more loyally the leaders, the Communist Parties, than the other sections. This assertion, as we see, has been corroborated by the experience of the British and Czechoslovakian Parties.

But comrades, the unsatisfactory and insufficient composition of women in the Communist Parties is not the only

I should give you an outline here of all the difficulties we have to encounter in capturing the working women. After the VI. Congress we worked out a broad programme of work with a view to winning over the mass of working women. In actual practice we met with obstacles which had to be overcome before our work could be started. Women's work is still conducted by our Parties in the old social-democratic traditional way. These traditions have not yet been rooted. Very often this is so, not because the Parties have not overcome themselves of Right tendencies, but because they do not attach sufficient importance to work among women a fundamental importance. How else could we explain what has happened in the Polish Party?

We experienced in Poland an absolutely intolerable proceeding — the organisation of separate women's nuclei. This was caused by the fact that the women communists are so backward that they cannot belong to the general Party nuclei. A remarkable explanation. But is not the Party called upon to capture the most backward rank and file members regardless of sex and to provide them with a necessary network of Party schools? Is that a justification for the organisation of separate women nuclei? And these women nuclei were guided by the Women's Department. Here we have a complete lack of understanding why and for what Women's Departments are organised. Are Women's Departments organised in order to work amongst Communist women? Women's Departments are organised merely as an apparatus within the Party apparatus in order to attract the non-Party women to the Party, in order to bring these women to the side of the Party. Yet we have in Poland, not only nuclei of Communist women, but also Communist women's Conferences which elect the Women's Departments. It looks like a Party within the Party, represented by the Women's Departments. This other Party discusses not so much questions appertaining to Women's work, as questions of a general Party character. There are cases in which Women's Conferences discussed the political nature of one woman Communist or another not belonging to the Women's Department, bringing the question of their expulsion from the Party before the Central Committee. This is a distortion of our idea of work among women which must be put a stop to. Matters are still worse in Norway. There we have actual women's fractions in the Party, uniting all women members. If some Parties work with the assistance of Women's fractions within their own organisations, other are trying to work among women with organisations standing near to the Party, as is done by the French Party, for instance.

But that is not all. The Parties do not realise that their work is of an opportunist character. The Right wingers have cultivated and planted opportunism in our Parties' work among women.

(Interjection: Hear, hear!)

We had in Germany many Right deviations previous to the reorganisation of our work.

The institution of delegate bodies was there practically broken up. When the first women Delegate bodies were organised in Germany, one can see even from the Minutes of their meetings of what significance they were and what enthusiasm was expressed by the delegates. What did the Right wingers do with those organisations in Germany? They deprived them of their proletarian spirit, they tried to give them a character which killed the interest of the working women in them. In times of big economic conflicts they took them to botanical gardens, spoke to them of electrification of the home, but did not tell them about the wage problem. I could give you dozens of examples showing that the work amongst women was done in such a way as to keep them away from the struggles of the working class.

And that was not done just at random. When we pointed out the hard facts of opportunism, deliberate ideological opportunism, we were told that there is no need to "attach any labels" and that these were simply mistakes. But we have now a document at our disposal showing that these were not mistakes, that this was a political system. One of our women

conciliators recently wrote on the question of her past work in the Women's Department as follows:

"Inasmuch as I never regarded my work among women as non-political official work, but rather made my political position the basis of all my theoretical, as well as practical work, my alleged 'opportunist' or 'conciliatory' deviations unconditionally had to assert themselves in that work."

No doubt, they did assert themselves. We see now that the German Party has to overcome these old opportunist mistakes.

If we take for example the question of shifting the centre of our work from the housewives to the working women, we find that this too met with the greatest resistance from the Rights. We have been passing decisions all the year round in all Parties concerning work amongst working women, but each time we could hear arguments to the effect that our delegate meetings based on the working women may take the place of the trade unions and therefore our attention must be directed towards the other strata. Such arguments we heard in the Finnish Party for example, where work amongst working women is carried on properly. Instead of backing up the correctness of this line, they urge that attention be paid to other strata. In some countries we were told in reply to our insistence on work among women that "what can be done if there are more housewives and if the working women are backward and tired." By this they expressed their doubt on the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in the struggles of all toilers. That was the substance of the manner in which they dealt with the question. All the year round we had to work hard in combating these opportunist mistakes, these rotten opportunist ideas. The Parties helped us in this respect especially in connection with the struggle against the Right wingers. We have now sound women's departments in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and a correct theoretical position on this question.

Working women are being drawn into leading positions in many countries. After the removal of the leaders in the Czechoslovakian unions, our Party for the first time put forward a woman as president of the Central Committee of the Textile Workers' Union. Not even in the Soviet Union is the president of the textile workers' union a woman. The same process is to be observed in Austria. There they made grave opportunist mistakes. The comrades organised some kind of a League for the protection of motherhood together with the heads of the Social-Democratic women "as a means of contact" with the masses, despite the instructions of the E. C. C. I. (Org. Department) that this is wrong. This "method of contact with the masses" did nothing but discredit our work. But the League still exists. When it became perfectly clear to the women's department of Austria that work must be carried on amongst the working women (there is in the Warchalowski factory a Party nucleus with 90 women), the leaders of the women's department began to enquire as to how to work among the working women. Having realised that the course must be directed towards the working women, they do not know how to set about this task. In time of strikes, they are absolutely helpless in the matter of guiding the women. They advance slogans which are in no way distinguished from the Social-Democratic slogans. They demand higher wages, "necessary" improvements but entirely forget to mention the real needs of the working women. That is why they have been unable in the past to lead strikes which chiefly concerned women. How is work amongst the working women to be done? How is Communist influence to be spread amongst the working women? We have made certain suggestions along these lines. But the solution of this problem depends on the general state of affairs in the Party's work amongst the workers. In order that activity amongst the working women may be successful, the Party must gain a footing in the factories, as only then will intensive work amongst the working women be possible. As long as we have no factory nuclei, the question of work among working women will be left hanging in the air.

To our question as to whether there are women organisers in factory nuclei, not a single Party has answered. We discovered that not only the nuclei, but even large industrial centres where chiefly women are concentrated, are totally void of leadership, while the slightest efforts of the Parties to assist the women give the most interesting and most effective results. This is to be observed in Germany. When the Central Committee sent out special people to the Ruhr and other districts where

strikes were in progress, when the Polish Party for example sent a special instructor to Lodz during the strike, the results were excellent. But usually they send no instructors, circulate no leaflets, and even refuse to call conferences or meetings on the pretext that there is no money or no time. What money is needed in order to call a conference of working women of several neighbouring factories? Or how can we explain the excuse that there is no time? If there is no time to lead the working men and women, what do the Communist Parties need time for? Most of the time of our Parties must be devoted to leading the workers. All the rest is merely overhead expenses. The desire of the women's departments to establish contact with the masses must be supported and not hampered.

One more question. Lenin urged that working women be boldly advanced to leading posts. But if you take the British Party for example, you find that they are looking for somebody to be the head of the women's department and that they advance a man from the polit-bureau for the post. That is strange. Are there no working women in Great Britain, can you not find working women and teach them to guide that work? What do you think, does skill come from the skies? Some Parties do not want to put any women into the Party committees. But how else can they learn? The Parties must by all means have women in their committees and commissions, and draw them into the schools. Women advanced to such positions must be present whenever mass struggles and actions are discussed. They must be everywhere, because it is their task to conduct mass work, because no one else can approach the masses of women as closely as they. In some of the most important districts, Lodz, for example, there is not a paid women's organiser because there is no money. There is money for everything else but for that, Czechoslovakia is the only country where there is a paid women's organiser in the district where female labour predominates. We certainly welcome the start made by the Czechoslovakian Party as this is the first step towards giving real guidance to and real organisation of the working women.

What is the position of the women's press? Where have we got any good working women's papers except in Germany and Czechoslovakia? Our Parties always complain that they have no money for the publication of women's journals. What is more, the publication of such journals is being discontinued. But the Social Democrats, and all anti-working class parties issue special women's journals in hundreds of thousands of copies. Before the elections in Great Britain when there was the question of reaching the five million new women voters, the Party discontinued the publication of the only women's journal it had.

How are we to explain that? There is something profoundly wrong. How could a thing like this be done? Is it possible that there was really no money for the upkeep of the publication? How can the question of money be raised before even an attempt is made to surmount the difficulties? Take for example the French Party which ever since the VI Congress has been promising to issue a women's journal. The first journal was stopped on the ground that it had a wrong ideological tendency, it had a circulation of 5 to 6,000. Instead of giving it a different ideological direction, they closed it down and for a year the Party remained without the main instrument of influencing the working women, without its press. True, the French comrades say that by July 15th the new journal will be out, but since so many of their promises have never been fulfilled, it is doubtful whether this promise will be carried out.

I believe that the cleansing of our Parties at the present time in the struggle against the Right wingers, in the reorganisation and Bolshevisation of the Parties, will necessarily bring forward the question of reorganisation and support of our work among the women. Look how the C. P. S. U. works among women. Take the latest circular on the tasks of work among working women. If you have read nothing else reading of this circular will give you a thorough understanding of these tasks.

In our present work among women we must not only shift our attention to the working women, but must be able to lead that work a Communist character. This must be done so as to make the tasks of the Communists understood by the women masses. We must use plain ordinary language and not simply

use hackneyed formulae. This is absolutely necessary now as we are entering a period of mass struggles, when we are entering a period of new imperialist wars. The working class will have new duties in time of war, they will make bullets and will become the soldiers of the rear. That is why we must make these masses understand what the Communists stand for. On the other hand, their demands must be raised to the level of the general demands of the working class.

At the Congress of the German Party, Comrade Thalman said on the question of work among women the following:

"The social reconstruction of the factories, the tremendous difference between the various categories of wages, the attraction of millions of unorganised women and girls in the factories, in other words, the drawing in of the lowest paid categories to the struggles, lends the struggle considerably greater activity. There are about 7.5 million women in industry. The Party must effect a decisive breakthrough reaching this great mass of workers. The Party must improve the omissions in this sphere. The number of women in our organisations in the districts where female labour predominates does not correspond to the percentage of women in industry. Let us take for example such a district as Chemnitz where there are about 250—300 thousand textile workers. Most of these women are more revolutionary than the men. That could be seen during the cigarette workers' strike in Berlin after May 1st. That is why we bring most seriously the demand before the Congress to heed the appeal of the Party and to concentrate more than hitherto their efforts on the mobilisation of the working women, as in the past most of our work was done amongst housewives."

This will play a colossal role in the organisation of women's work in Germany.

Comrades, a decisive course must be taken on work among working women. With this in view, it is necessary to proceed with the organisation of delegate bodies. That is precisely the form by means of which we can reach the widest sections of working women. In the delegate assemblies we gather representatives from all factories and after the meetings they go back to those factories. Through the delegate assemblies we connect our feelers to all factories. The conferences which are being held in the various countries must revive the work among women. On the basis of these conferences delegate bodies should be organised which should become the foundation of women's work. A sharp turn is necessary in that work. The opportunist social-democratic traditions must be definitely discarded.

COMRADE LEO (Y. C. I.):

Comrades, my subject will mainly be how the Young Communist Leagues have carried through the line of the V. Congress of the Young Communist International. Comrade Khitarov has already spoken on the attitude of the C. C. of the German Y. C. L. during the Wittorf affair. The then vacillations could only benefit the conciliators (interjection by Thalman "And the Right") and the liquidators, and they did benefit them. These mistakes resulted in a change in the leadership of the C. C. Y. C. L. effected by the national conference. But even after this conference, matters did not right themselves. Although a violent struggle was carried on in the Y. C. L. of Germany against the liquidators and conciliators which showed that nearly the whole German Y. C. L. is for the Comintern line, vacillations and hesitations still made themselves felt. A typical example of this is the situation in the district executive of the Berlin Y. C. L. In what did these vacillations consist? They consisted in an under-estimation of the rate of the revolutionary development and of the degree of the development of the labour opposition in the S. P. G. The Berlin secretary spoke, for instance, of the danger of over-estimation, whereas the real danger was that of under-estimation. Secondly, they consisted in a wrong estimation of the situation in general and in pessimistic moods among the leading comrades. Thirdly, in hesitation with regard to the trade union line of the Party and in its inadequate carrying out. Fourthly, in the uncritical attitude to the situation in the organisation of the Berlin Y. C. L. and its Executive.

Only by energetic struggle against these vacillations, hesitations and mistakes could their development into conciliationism, serious opportunist errors be prevented, and a complete liberation from them achieved. Well, the C. C. was dilatory regard to such an energetic struggle. However, at the instance of the Party and the representatives of the Executive, as well as of a Section of the C. C., an end was put to this hesitation. There is no doubt whatever that insistence on admission of mistakes accelerated the recuperation process. This process is not yet at an end, it must be continued by means of sharp struggle against any signs of doubt and hesitation concerning Party line.

If the struggle is conducted in this way, we will be able to achieve results such as could be recorded in the activity of the Comintern Y. C. L. during the May struggles. When I say this, I do not certainly intend to excuse the politico-organisational mistakes made during the May days which have shown that the C. L. of Germany has still much to learn in regard to the mobilisation of masses of young workers.

After its last Plenum and the XII. Party Congress, the Comintern Y. C. L. has come to the conclusion that, not only in Germany, but throughout the country, the League must guard itself against covert opportunism and must struggle energetically against all its forms.

The inadequate work in the carrying out of the decisions of the V. Congress of the Y. C. L. is closely connected with the nature of affairs I have described in regard to opportunist dangers. The main problem of the decisions of the V. Congress of the Y. C. L. is the taking up of mass work, in the mass organisations, enterprises and trade unions. The problem consisted in adapting the new tactic to work among the youth and to putting an end to the old state of affairs, namely, absence of mass youth leagues. This absence of mass youth leagues was the main obstacle to the wide application of the new tactic in the Young Communist Leagues.

This absence of mass youth leagues explains also the slow revolutionary development of the Young Communist Leagues. The development of the Communist Parties has also been slower. In this process was more noticeable in the Young Communist Leagues, especially in Germany. The situation in the Y. C. L. G. is very unsatisfactory. First of all, the Y. C. L. G. has not been active enough in regard to our most important task, i. e. struggle against war, just when the bourgeoisie is taking serious measures for the militarisation of the youth and its preparation for imperialist war. Another sphere is penetration into enterprises. In this respect too, the Y. C. L.'s have not made much progress. We have made several good moves, such as the creation of a factory-instructors' staff, formation of committees of action of the youth during industrial struggles, organisation of young workers' congresses at which a considerable number of unorganised young workers were as a rule got hold of. We have initiated a young factory workers' representatives' movement, which runs parallel with the formation of a revolutionary workers' representatives' body in enterprises by the Party. But these few measures are not the main thing, which is as follows: The establishment of mass young leagues presupposes a change in the methods of work of the youth leagues, the reorganisation of the whole system of work into a system of Bolshevik mass work.

What is to be the character of this change? First of all, every member of a Young Communist League must be made an active member. The present system of work is not conducive to this; today, the state of affairs is — a small energetic overburdened body of functionaries, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those who are listeners, spectators, appendixes and do no useful routine work for the Y. C. L. Another point is application of self-criticism as a regular method of ascertaining defects in our work, this self-criticism to be used in regard to all comrades regardless of name and rank. The third point is change in the structure of the organisations. The Young Communist Leagues are, so to speak, social organisations, and not Bolshevik organisations organised on the factory principle. We noticed in Germany the development of a certain amount of tolerance towards the actual sabotage of the reconstruction

of the Leagues on a factory nucleus basis. This must be put a stop to. This reorganisation demands at the same time a change in the structure of the present residential organisation. Street nuclei must continue to exist, but we shall have to reorganise them into Bolshevik fighting units capable of doing mass work. The fourth point is change of methods and character of leadership. Concrete leadership is required. It does not yet exist. The fifth point is renewal of the functionary cadre. The existing cadres must be re-educated. The functionary cadres must be extended through the inclusion of elements familiar with mass work who have proved that they have an understanding for the new tactic and real Bolshevik work. Finally, an energetic purging of the functionary cadre is necessary. No tolerance of saboteurs and comrades unable to understand the change which has to take place.

What are the main difficulties in connection with this change?

One of these difficulties is that comrades frequently agree concerning the necessity of a change in the system of work, but offer in reality passive resistance to such change. There is also the danger of active resistance to this very necessary change, as for instance in Czechoslovakia. This resistance must be radically broken immediately, regardless of organisational consequences. Another danger is tolerance towards inability to carry through the change. Finally, there is also the danger of attempts being made to carry out the change in an abstract manner, whereas it can only be effected on the basis of economic and political struggles.

What are the tasks of the Parties in regard to this important problem which the Young Communist Leagues have to solve? The first and most important task is guarantee of correct political leadership, a firm and uniform leadership. That this is very necessary could be seen especially in Germany. Secondly, Party comrades should interest themselves in the problems of the Y. C. L., they should study the conditions of the struggle for the youth. Without it, we shall never get beyond generalities concerning the necessity of work among the youth, and the important task, i. e. orientation towards the new important sections of workers, namely the proletarian youth, will be neglected. Thirdly, change in the mode of co-operation between the Party and the Y. C. L. In this respect, the German Party has already made a step forward and has created a few new forms. One of these new forms is based on experiences in the Soviet Union. It consists in calling special conferences of Party members to discuss the work of the Y. C. L. and the struggle of the proletarian youth. Not members of the Y. C. L. are to meet and confer, but mainly Party workers from the districts in order to make a serious study of the problems of the youth league. Another branch of this work is organisation of youth weeks by the Party. In this connection, proposals will be sent to the Parties.

In conclusion, I want to draw a comparison between two Parties, one of which carries out its tasks, whereas the other one does not. The Czech Party is a Party which has not yet realised the necessity of change and has not carried it out. On the other hand, the German Party has supported this change in the C. C. of the Y. C. L. G. by its politically correct attitude which helped the Y. C. L. to understand the necessity of the change. Who knows where we would be today, how much time we would have wasted if the German Party had not been so completely on the side of the E. C. Y. C. L. representatives in regard to his problem. I do not mean by this that the German Party has done everything it could have done in regard to the Youth problem.

The fact that a new revolutionary wave is upon us, does not only make it easier for us to create mass youth leagues, such a situation demands peremptorily the solution of this problem. The Party must take upon itself the responsibility of making good the enormous retardation of the revolutionary development of the youth leagues. They must energetically support and further mass work, so as to enable the Youth Leagues to develop in the political and industrial struggles into mass organisations capable of deciding the struggle for the working youth in favour of Communism.

Tenth Session.

8th July, 1929 (afternoon).

Comrade ULBRICHT (Germany):

Comrades, the resolution submitted answers fundamentally all the problems that stand in the centre of the analysis of the situation and of the immediate tasks of the Communists International.

According to my opinion, however, it is necessary to work out a number of questions still more clearly in the theses:

1. **The question of social-fascism**, in such a way that a coherent description is given of the nature of social-fascism.
2. **A clear presentation of the forms of the united front tactic**, especially of the delegate conferences, committees of action, etc.
3. In the paragraph dealing with the **May struggles** there must be a concrete explanation of the political character of the May struggles and an emphasis of the significance of the political mass struggle.
4. With regard to the **struggle against the conciliators**, it does not suffice to demand that they should renounce their factional activity, and conduct the struggle against the liquidators, but they must abandon their political standpoint and openly recognise their political mistakes.

In the application of the resolutions of the VI. World Congress, it was evident that in the majority of the Sections of the Comintern, these resolutions were carried out with great hesitation, and that a large proportion of Party functionaries had to be turned out of the Sections of the Comintern in connection with this struggle against opportunist deviations. The open liquidators were removed from many Sections of the Comintern, but the opportunist dangers still continue to be significant. This was evident during the industrial struggles and particularly during the May Day struggles.

The change of our policy has been in the main determined by the following factors:

1. **Functional change of reformism by its development into social fascism.**
2. **Abolishment of democracy in the trade unions** and in other mass organisations of the workers. Thereby the winning over of the trade union membership for our revolutionary policy without violating the statutes and reformist dictates is impossible.

Radicalisation of the working masses, whereby particularly the active progressive role of the majority of unorganised is of great significance.

4. **Increasing mass influence of the Communist Parties.** This finds its expression in the establishment of organs of proletarian mass struggle in the economic and political struggles (committees of action, delegate conferences, self-defence bodies, etc.).

In contrast to our tactic during the second period, the character of our present tactic consists in organising the struggles of the workers from now on **on an independent basis**, and in winning over the organised as well as unorganised workers for independent leadership in the struggles. **The independent drawing in of the working masses to the struggles by the Communist Party is the decisive characteristic of the present period.** The work in the mass organisations has the purpose of winning over the working masses for our independent leadership!

In this situation the principal danger lies in legalism, particularly in trade union legalism. Observance of the laws of the capitalist State and the laws of the Social Democracy as they are set forth in the resolutions and statutes of the trade unions and other mass organisations and the subordination of the Communist policy to these social-democratic laws is the chief danger in this situation. **The bourgeoisie is utilising the**

trade union apparatus as a transmission, while it is attempting with its aid to rule not only the trade union members, but the unorganised workers. We must cut through this transmission belt and thus isolate the reformists.

Under these circumstances, the application of the united front tactics consists primarily in uniting the widest possible working masses under Communist leadership by the establishment of independent organs of struggle through the calling of delegate conferences on the basis of proletarian demands. It is of great significance for the Communist Parties to understand how to lead a part of the working class to independent struggle. **By such a formation of the proletarian front workers who sympathise with the reformists are faced with a clear question: for or against the class front of the proletariat. Only by such an independent policy will we be able to isolate the Social-Democracy.**

The conciliators have struggled against this tactic with particular sharpness. Especially in the Ruhr struggle they stand against the Party organising the unorganised workers in factories on an independent basis in order to utilise the action of the unorganised for pressure on the trade union members in order to confront the workers who sympathise with the Social-Democrats with the question which front they wish to join.

In carrying out this change in our tactic, in the independent organisation of workers' struggles, we see most clearly that deeply opportunism is still rooted in the Sections of the Comintern. The Section of the Comintern which has most neglected the struggle against opportunist deviations, is unquestionably the Swedish Section. Only a few months ago Swedish comrades were not in a position to recognise the opportunist dangers in the Swedish Party lie. Meanwhile we have observed from oral reports and from official statements that in this very Party where for a long time opportunism was alleged not to exist, opportunism is most deeply rooted. At the Session of the Swedish C. C. the question of application of the united front tactic in the trade unions was discussed among others. Comrades in the C. C. there held the view that it is necessary to liquidate the platform of the Swedish-Russian Miners' Committee in the interests of the formal maintenance of this committee. What is the meaning of such a proposal? In practice it means that the Russian workers come in very handy for financial support of movements in Sweden, but the class struggle policy represented by the Russian miners, which is in accordance with the policy of the R. I. L. U., is not needed in Sweden. Another question is the struggle against the reformist split policy. In connection with the sharpening of the class struggle in Sweden, the question of the method of struggle against the reformist expulsion policy is of great significance. What are the views of the Swedish comrades? Comrades declared at the Session of the C. C. that it was not correct to hold open mass meetings against the split because then "bourgeoisie and unorganised workers" participate in such meetings. According to their judgment, the unorganised workers are even worse than the bourgeoisie. It seems to me that there are a number of people on the Swedish C. C. who are apparently more bourgeois than the unorganised workers who participate in these meetings. What is the meaning of such views? The meaning is that such comrades do not see that it is a question of a frontal attack of the reformists against the Communist Party and that the Communist Party must be isolated and discredited in the interests of carrying out the industrial peace policy of reformism. A number of comrades believe that the difficulties could be avoided by an "ostrich" policy. The result of such a policy would be the isolation of the Communist Party, for the workers would justly say -- what is the difference between this "Communist" trade union opposition and the reformists if in every situation they capitulate before the demands of the reformists?

In the elections in Switzerland we saw a typical example of an opportunist interpretation of our united front tactic. Let us take the united front tactic in Switzerland as it has been

plied under the protectorship of Comrade **Humbert-Droz**. In pamphlet of the Communist Party, which deals with the election for the canton elections, we read among other things the following:

"Both Parties of the workers shall advocate that in place of a few bourgeois councillors there should be Communists or Social-Democrats, in which situation neither Party knows who will derive the greatest benefit from this election agreement".

In this document we read also the following:

"A limitation of the controversy to the more important questions of policy and tactic could be regretted by no one."

Thus, renunciation of the struggle against the Social Democracy and further it says:

"The proletarian bloc can, however, be established in such a way that apart from the election agreement both parties adopt a common municipal programme of action." And in closing, the following main slogan is given:

"This is a call to all workers to struggle for what is possible today."

This is the fraternisation of the Communist Party with the Social Democracy. One cannot help asking why the Communist Party exists, what justification there is for its existence with such a policy?

Why do I bring up this example? Because the representative of the C. P. of Switzerland at the VI. World Congress gave special support to that group of conciliators which wishes to change in an opportunist sense the policy of the Comintern because the executive of the Party up to a short time ago was the only Party executive to associate itself with the policy of Comrade **Humbert-Droz**.

Of particular importance is the question of the tactic of our British Party. The British comrades attempted to answer the question, how it happens that the election results did not come up to the expectations of the British comrades themselves. I believe that the causes lie mainly in the vacillations in the tactic towards the Labour Party. It is a fact that among some comrades and — insofar as I have been informed — also among the majority of the Polit-Bureau the opinion prevailed even a short time before the General Election that in cases where the putting up of our own candidates was not possible for financial reasons, the workers should vote for the candidates of the Labour Party. We have discussed this question here in the Polit Secretariat, and it was Comrade **Ewert** who declared that the Resolution of the Polit Secretariat, not to give the Labour Party a single vote, meant a revision of the resolution of the IX. Plenum. I must say that these conciliatory views, as expressed by Comrade **Ewert** in the Polit Secretariat, have had a fairly favourable ground in our British Party. (Interjection by **Thälmann**: Even on the eve of the General Election this view prevailed among the British comrades!) It is quite clear that with such an estimation of the Labour Party one cannot struggle on principle against social democracy in the election campaign. But if a struggle on principle is not carried on against the Labour Party, the question arises: what is the difference between the policy of the Communist Party and that of the Labour Party? At the same time, the great similarity of the policy of the Labour and Liberal Parties is disguised. I believe that these vacillations involve serious dangers for the British Party. If such a false estimation of the policy of the Labour Party is held, if it is treated as a workers' party, then it is very easy to adopt towards the MacDonald Government the tactic "force the MacDonald Government", "Force the officials" This appears to me to be the greatest danger at the present time. That this danger really exists is evident also from the various documents of our British Party.

About two weeks ago there was a conference of miners' unions of South Wales. At this conference our Communist fraction moved a resolution in which it was said that our fraction called for "all necessary action to attain nationalisation of the mining industry and its by-products without compensation and with workers' control". This gives rise to the illusion that workers' control can come about by other means than

through the armed proletariat and the Soviets. This alleged "unmasking" tactic upholds the illusions of many workers who believe that the MacDonald regime can bring about nationalisation. I ask what is the difference between this stand and the policy of Maxton? I believe, there is no difference. If propaganda is spread by our comrades for such views, then it is impossible to win over the miners of South Wales for the Communist Party. Many comrades have raised the question: How does it happen that countless workers who have struggled with us in the lockout of the miners, have left our ranks and have not even voted for us? I believe that the principal reason is — that our British Party has not carried on the struggle against the Labour Party and the Maxton people on the basis of principles.

It goes without saying that these hesitations of the British Party have their effect also on the inner Party course. Some comrades have attempted here to convince us that the change in the composition of the Polit Bureau is an entirely subordinate matter which has no political significance. Comrade **Campbell** declared that the comrades who do not agree with this change in the Polit Bureau are, so to speak, insulting the majority of the Polit Bureau, and are wrongly assuming that they are Rights. Comrades, there is no point in exaggerating in this way. We are not of the opinion that the comrades in the British Polit Bureau are Rights, but we are of the opinion that it is necessary not only to correct the course of the Party from the political standpoint, but also to correct to some extent its inner-Party course. This correction must consist in ruthlessly struggling against all attempts to conceal the opportunist danger in the British Party and to suppress criticism of the opportunist deviations. If the comrades remove from the Polit Bureau two leading officials, comrades who have upheld the tactic of the Comintern in a relatively consistent manner, this shows that in the whole inner-Party course there are definite sources of error. I believe that in the interest of a consistent application of the change in the policy of our British Party, in the struggle against the Labour Government and the Independent Labour Party, it is necessary to promote new active labour elements to leading positions to a greater extent than hitherto and also to make such a change in the Polit Bureau that it should include again not only those two comrades, but also other revolutionary workers who can be counted upon to carry out consistently the line of the Comintern (Interjection: Which two comrades?) Comrades **Gallacher** and **Murphy**, I believe that it is necessary for us here at the Plenum to determine quite openly and in a comradely manner the errors which exist in the Sections, and through collective work to find the way which guarantees the effective application of the resolution of the Plenum by all Sections of the Comintern.

I began by making certain remarks on the situation in our Swedish Party. I should like to say a few words in regard to the May Day tactic. In the Swedish Commission the comrades brought up very many important problems, and I must say that in the theses of the C. C. life is represented to be much more complicated than it really is. For this reason, I should like to raise a simple question, a question which will be of interest to the entire Plenum:

1. Is it true, that leading officials of the Stockholm organisation bargained with the Social-Democrats on not carrying out the demonstration on May 1st?

2. It is true, that in spite of the fact that there were 800 to 1000 demonstrators on the street, our comrades refused to put up speakers because an agreement had been made with the Social Democrats that no demonstration would be held?

3. Is it true, that the Secretariat of the C. C. has so far not taken any stand on this question?

4. Is it a fact, that the Secretary of the Stockholm organisation is still in office?

I try to reduce the question to the simple formula, which, so to say, brings out sharply and in concentrated form the far-reaching proportions of the opportunist danger. As commentaries I should like to say the following with regard to these four questions:

1. The request made to the Social Democracy to renounce the demonstration means that these Swedish Social-Democrats

are considered by our comrades as a brother Party, in fact, as a big brother with whom we conclude an agreement that no demonstrations will take place. For these comrades then it was not the directive of the Comintern which served as a guide, but the opinion of the Social-Democrats.

2. That while in Berlin and Warsaw the workers were struggling in the streets against social fascism, in Stockholm the Communists were flirting with the Social Democrats.

3. That there are comrades who, up to the present time, have not had the courage to admit that this opportunist policy is a very great detriment to the Party. I should like to put the question from this point of view to those 800 to 1000 workers who, in spite of the understanding with the Social Democrats came to the demonstration, namely, the question of whether they believe that this policy of their Stockholm leaders corresponded to the class interests of the Swedish and international proletariat, or to the interests of the Social Democracy.

The question of the application of the resolutions of the VI. World Congress, and the adoption of the corresponding inner-Party methods, have produced differences also among the leaders of the Comintern.

The Bukharin, Humbert-Droz and Ewert group began at the VI. World Congress their attempt to change in an opportunist sense the line of the Comintern, and have continued this attempt after the VI. Congress.

At the VI. World Congress there were differences of opinion with the conciliators on the following principal questions: first of all there were comrades who believed that our view that the third period involved a sharpening of the capitalist contradictions which must necessarily lead to an undermining of capitalist stabilisation was false. (Interjection by Neumann: Ultra-Left.)

Secondly, the comrades have a somewhat different view of the estimation of the "Left" S. P. G. I believe that events, especially the resolutions of the Magdeburg Party Congress of the S. P. G., have meanwhile made it clear that our estimation of the "Left" S. P. G. were 100% correct.

Thirdly, there were differences of opinion in the estimation of the significance and progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. As is known, in the draft theses of Comrade Bukharin this question, which is of the greatest significance for world revolution in general, was taken up in a very incidental manner. In this question important additions had to be made by the Russian Delegation.

Fourthly, there were differences of opinion on the question of trade union policy. Not only the out and out conciliators, but also certain comrades from the Central Council of the Russian trade unions attempted, during the VI. World Congress, to set down in the Commissions the erroneous tactic of "force the officials" as the tactic of the Comintern. I must say that, unfortunately, there has not been any success in rejecting in the proper manner this opportunist attempt at changing the line of the Comintern with regard to the trade union question.

Fifthly, the comrades around Bukharin were of the opinion that the term "conciliator" or "tolerance with regard to the Right danger" was not appropriate. For this reason, such a formulation was not contained in the original draft theses of Comrade Bukharin.

Sixthly, that the important passage on the significance of Party discipline in the present situation was characteristically lacking.

At the VI. World Congress it was possible — after the Russian Delegation had corrected and completed the draft of Comrade Bukharin — to overcome to some extent these differences of opinion and to bring about a certain amount of unity which was expressed in the statement of the Russian Delegation in the Standing Orders Committee.

After the VI. World Congress, Comrades Bukharin, Ewert, Humbert-Droz and Serra attempted to enforce the conciliatory views which had been rejected by the World Congress. In the Presidium of the Comintern we have had discussions with the representatives of the conciliatory attitude on all important questions, Comrades Bukharin, Humbert-Droz and Serra were against the Open Letter and for the support of the conciliators

Ewert, Gerhard and Co., against the expulsion of the liquidators Brandler, Thalheimer, etc. During the struggle in the Ruhr the conciliators rejected the independent mobilisation of the organised and took a stand against the establishment of independent bodies of struggle for the organisation of political and economic action. In the factory council elections, they opposed to the setting up of independent lists of candidates for the struggle for ballots within the limits of the trade unions. On the trade union question their stand was expressed in the formulation "force the officials". A few comrades in the apparatus of the Soviet trade unions also took this stand. We attempted to uphold this conciliatory attitude in the Secretariat of the Comintern.

We as the German Section, are pleased that the C. P. G. has decided to make the necessary changes in the apparatus of the trade unions so that the spreading of all opportunist views will be made impossible.

Comrades, in view of the group policy of the conciliators after the VI. World Congress, it is not sufficient that in the theses submitted three conditions are submitted to the conciliators. This paragraph must be written in sharper terms: the conciliators must be called upon to renounce their political standpoint. Why is this necessary? We have already had very many statements on the carrying out of Party resolutions and we had to face the experience of having such a group undertake a situation presenting particular difficulties to the Party. Therefore, I consider it necessary that the conciliators be called upon in clear terms to renounce their opportunist standpoint.

Allow me to make a few more remarks with regard to the May struggles in Berlin.

We have noted that the chief characteristic of the May struggles lay in the fact that the workers for the first time in several years fought the capitalist State power there and then. The masses resorted to the weapon of the political mass strike, organised street demonstrations in spite of prohibition, and proceeded to the building of barricades.

Some comrades were pessimistic with regard to the carrying out of the political mass strike movement. There were comrades who asked what kind of a political mass strike was that — only 75,000 workers were on strike and the Berlin street car workers were not immediately involved in the struggle. This view expresses the erroneous stand which can be described by the saying: "Hannemann, you go first!" The comrades do not see that the carrying out of such a political partial strike was the premise for greater masses adopting the weapon of the political strike in coming struggles. I place this question in the foreground because, also in the other Sections of the Comintern, the enhancement of the political struggle will not begin by the majority of the working class in all big factories going on strike immediately. It must be recognised that it is necessary to carry out the strike wherever it is possible because only experience can teach the masses and fit them for adopting this tactic on a broader basis. It is natural that in a situation when the workers go over to immediate political struggle the movement has an unequal character. Part of the workers go on strike and other elements of the working class begin by merely sympathising with those who are in the struggle. The great danger consists in our comrades basing their stand on the most backward attitude, in considering those elements who are most completely under the pressure of trust capital and the reformist apparatus.

The second question brought up was the carrying out of the demonstration. In this connection, the question of the organisation of proletarian self-defence is important. I should like to say here openly that the establishment of self-defence organisations in this situation is difficult because our Party organisation is not sufficiently rooted in the factories. But self-defence organisations must be established in the factories. In times of sharp police terror, the demonstration as a rule can only be carried out from the factories. Therefore, the question of the organisation of self-defence bodies depends on the work of our factory nuclei. The self-defence bodies must be real united front bodies. When should we establish self-defence organisations? In connection with strikes, when the class enemy protects the strike-breakers, when the reformists protect the strike-breakers with

air apparatus and attempt to crush strikes, when Fascist bands attempt to break up factory meetings and when demonstrations are being prepared — these are the most favourable occasions for establishing the self-defence organisations on the broadest possible basis.

Comrades, above this it is necessary to make the mass of the proletariat conscious that these organised demonstrations can be carried out successfully in spite of prohibition. But certain premises must be created to enable the workers to resist police terrorism. The experience gained by the police in the demonstrations is described in a police report on the Vienna struggles. I think that we should popularise the contents of this police report among the workers. It is said there that the workers, even when they had no arms, found means to carry on a successful struggle against the police. They isolated groups of policemen and disarmed them. According to the report, iron bolts, clamps, screws and parts of iron railings were used as weapons against the police. The rebel crowd had disabled the police by throwing sand in their eyes.

In another report, salt and pepper are mentioned as weapons against the police:

“The rebel crowd extracted liquid fuel from the street pumps reserved for motorcars and lorries, in order to set buildings on fire.”

These are only a few examples which show what means were used in the struggle against the police. The workers in Wedding and Neukölln went even further, they erected barricades as a means of struggle against police in this area: the barricades were a means of resistance and self-defence in the face of police terrorism and pursued the object of thwarting the manoeuvres of the police, carrying disintegration into the camp of the camp of the enemy, strengthening the self-confidence of the workers and making the masses realise that the police are not invincible. Although the situation was not ripe for an armed insurrection, we must make the mass of the workers conscious of the fact that measures of police terrorism such as were used in Warsaw, Berlin, etc., will become the rule in the present situation, and that this will compel the workers to use corresponding means of struggle against police terrorism. The means of struggle to be used will depend on the character and strength of the mass movement and on our estimation of the situation.

“Vorwärts” tries to confuse the workers by asserting that there is no acutely revolutionary situation and that the policy of the Comintern is senseless. It speculates on the illusions of some workers, those who are alleged to be waiting for the great day of the final struggle, but meanwhile prefer to play Nap. In the face of this our contention is that the struggle for the street, the organisation of proletarian self-defence against police terrorism, the application of the weapon of the political strike are indispensable premises for the creation of an acutely revolutionary situation.

The policy of the police was no doubt a provocation. I think that we must frankly say that as long as the enemy has the power, he will try again and again to provoke the workers, to determine himself the moment of the struggle, in order to isolate us, to weaken the organised strength of the working class and to impede the progress of the Communist Party and the working class. Our tactic must be such that the enemy does not isolate us, that we rather isolate him. In this we have succeeded. The social democrats have been to a certain degree isolated as a result of police terrorism. This is to the credit of our Party. The police have suffered a defeat. Why? The workers would not give up their right to the street in spite of police terrorism. The police had to retreat because the workers used methods which interfered with the actions of the police. They smashed street lamps, plunging whole districts into darkness, they erected barricades. These methods of struggle raised the self-confidence of the workers in Wedding and Neukölln, they made workers realise that, in spite of armoured cars, the police are not invincible. The struggle against the destruction of the proletarian organisations, against the suppression of the Red Front Fighters League must be carried on by us just like the struggle for the street on May Day. If the Party had issued some other slogan instead of “the R. F. F. L. must exist in spite of

suppression” it would have meant encouragement to the class enemy, because the suppression of the R. F. F. L. is the preparation of the suppression of the Communist Party. Our struggle against the suppression of the R. F. F. L. is at the same time a struggle against the suppression of the C. P. G. and will create more favourable premises: when it comes to the suppression of the C. P. G., the masses will know that we will continue to struggle in order to organise and lead the mass struggles even in such difficult circumstances.

Comrades, what were the main mistakes? Firstly, a certain underestimation of the class struggle among some comrades, expressed in certain illusions that the May Day demonstrations would perhaps go off without bloodshed or without sharp collisions with the police. Secondly, there was a certain difference between the political tasks and the organisational premises for the carrying out of these tasks. It is clear that when we have to organise struggles, we must pay more attention to the organisational question. Our organisational apparatus was not quite up to the mark on May Day.

In conclusion: the experience gained in the industrial and political struggles of the last months shows that industrial struggles are assuming an ever-growing political importance, it also shows that the workers are already taking up the weapon of political struggle against the capitalist State under the leadership of the Communist Party. We can see in all industrial and partial political struggles how much bitterness there is among the workers. This shows us that we must not only be prepared for systematic and long preparation of definite struggles, as was the case in connection with May Day, but that the Comintern must also be prepared for an unexpected outbreak of big political and industrial struggles. The Sections of the Communist International must be prepared for the organisation and the unexpected outbreak of partial struggles in individual enterprises which we must develop and extend, because they are the premise for the carrying through of the revolutionary mass struggle. The Berlin experiences show that we must learn to link up more effectively concrete questions of the daily struggle with the political struggle, with the struggle for the ultimate aim, — the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat. These slogans must be given greater prominence in our propaganda (hear, hear!). This makes it incumbent on the Executive of the Communist International to make its apparatus react more quickly to any even's than this was, for instance, the case in Germany during the Ruhr struggle and the Berlin May struggles.

Comrades, the questions of our leading role among the workers, our leadership of the struggle, struggle against social-fascism and application of higher forms of political struggle, of application of the weapon of political strike against organised police terrorism, etc., must be the questions which give a special imprint to the X. Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. They must be the main questions in the report on this Plenum.

Comrade ERCOLI (Italy):

I believe comrades, that it does not need many words to point out that the delegation of our Party is in agreement with the general line of the political theses submitted at this meeting of the Executive, and with the details of these theses both as regards the analysis of the objective situation and relationship of forces in the capitalist world at the present moment, and as regards the tasks which confront the C. I. and its different Sections.

After the VI. World Congress, we witnessed a number of discussions which developed in the different Parties. These discussions had at times a swift and tumultuous development. They caused some of the Sections of the C. I. to pass through difficult moments, moments of acute struggle as was the case in the Communist Party of Germany, in the French Party and in the American Party, while in other Sections they did not become fundamental, as was the case in the British Party and particularly in our Party. Most of these discussions had as their point of departure the analysis of the international objective situation and the determination of the relative weight which

should be given within the limits of this situation to the various elements making up the world situation to-day.

Why these discussions and what have they taught us?

I believe that they have shown us first of all that in certain of the formulations which were submitted in the discussions of the VI. Congress there were points which called for more precise definition in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding or false interpretation. But above all, they have shown that at a time when very great transformations are taking place, when the tempo of development is increasing its pace to an often feverish degree, when the quantitative increase in weight specifies various elements of the situation, and particularly when the increase of internal contradictions in the objective situation takes on such a character that it begins to become a transformation in "quality", that is to say, in the general character of the situation -- at this time the slightest error made in the evaluation of the different elements of the situation and of their relative value cannot help having extremely serious consequences. Every error of this nature inevitably leads to a misunderstanding and false interpretation of the entire character of the period through which we are going.

This is why the points of departure in some of the discussions which developed after the VI. World Congress were apparently small, apparently secondary, but they were such that the discussion on these points by their logical development, were bound to give rise to the existence of two different political lines.

To this circumstance must be ascribed a very important moment in the internal struggle which had developed in the Communist International since the VI. World Congress.

This internal struggle has taught us to see big things in little things in the shadings which may arise in the interpretation of a fact or a number of facts; it has taught us to see the roots of a political divergence which in the course of the development of events must become insurmountable because it is the divergence which separates opportunism from the correct Communist policy and because it signifies the open or hidden passing over to the position of the enemy, or else to positions from which it is no longer possible to carry on the struggle against our class enemy.

This ability to see big things in little things is one of the principal abilities of Bolshevism. In the development of the Russian Party this ability played an enormous part. It suffices to recall the manner in which Lenin, in the course of theoretical discussions with Struve, succeeded in pointing out the roots of a development which was to lead Struve to take an openly reactionary stand. It suffices to recall the point of departure of the divergencies between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, a point of departure which apparently was concerned with a secondary question of organisation and which, in reality, concealed a divergence which at the most acute moment of the struggle, was to lead the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks to struggle against each other from two opposite sides of the barricade.

This is why, after the VI. World Congress, great strides have been made in the Bolshevisation of the principal Sections of the International. Consequently, we are in a position to bring out with much more evidence and force in our analysis the fundamental characteristic line of the present period.

It is in this sense that we have carried on not only the struggle against the openly opportunist elements, but also, and in particular, the struggle that we have carried on against the conciliatory elements -- against the elements which were attempting to conceal very serious political divergences under the outward appearance of a divergency of detail, and who attempted to mask their fundamental divergence from our political line by declarations of so-called adherence and hypocritical reservations. To have succeeded not only in recognising the danger of the openly opportunist position, but in recognising the danger of this intermediate position and the necessity for overcoming it, -- this is, I believe, the fundamental cause for the progress which the political struggle has brought about in our ranks, and for the improvement of the general situation which has been produced since the VI. World Congress.

What was the point of departure of all the discussions which we have had with the openly opportunist elements and with the conciliators? The open opportunists, and the conciliators, in particular, have shown from the very start that they were unable to keep themselves from the influence of what is habitually called the "positive" elements of the relative stabilisation of capitalism. The extension of the technical basis in certain branches of industry, the increase of production in other branches, the result of capitalist rationalisation and the elimination of the most acute aspects of the currency and exchange crises -- these facts and similar facts have exerted on the opportunist and conciliatory elements an influence which has led them to misunderstand the fundamental character of the present period of development of the post-war crisis of capitalism, to see the partial and transitory character of capitalist stabilisation, and to give to this term "relative stabilisation" of capitalism a sense which is quite different from that which we give it. For the opportunists and for the conciliators the stabilisation of capitalism becomes an accomplished fact, something solidly established, on the basis of which the new period of the progressive rise and development of capitalism is to take place.

Comrade Serra on our Central Committee has presented this thesis in a fairly consistent manner, in a manner much more consistent than many other opportunists or conciliatory elements. He presented this thesis declaring that the stabilisation of capitalism is something solidly established in the national field and that the contradictions of the capitalist regime are developing to-day only in the international field, and only at a later date will they be reflected in the national field in each country. On this basis, Comrade Serra, in discussing the economic situation of Italy, developed in our Central Committee a somewhat strange theory of the crisis of capitalism at the present time. He declared that after the solid stabilisation which would take place in each national unit, the crises of the capitalist regime would take on a character similar to the character which they had before the war, that is to say, that they would be crises giving rise to a shattering of the equilibrium, after which the equilibrium would be re-established to a higher degree than formerly. I have no need to emphasise to you the anti-Marxist character of this thesis. In fact, where would the aggravation of external contradictions come from if not from an aggravation of the internal situation in each country, which drives us to seek a solution in a more bitter struggle on the International arena? But what I should like to emphasise is not the anti-Marxist character or merely the stupid character of this theory, but the fact that when the debate with the opportunists and conciliators has reached this point, it is no longer a question of tactic, but the programme itself that we are discussing -- it is one of the fundamental statements of our programme which is subject to attack. If the stabilisation of capitalism is something solidly established, if the crises of capitalism are to-day what they were before the war, that is to say if they are in any sense, of a "progressive" character, then it is the whole character of the period through which we are going that is changing; we are no longer in a period in which the crisis brought on by the war is developing and becoming accentuated -- we are in a different period, and the third period spoken of by the VI. Congress in order to emphasise the accentuation of the contradictions of the capitalist regime, becomes something fundamentally different, something which we cannot admit unless we revise our programme on one of its fundamental points. The point of departure was small, but the point of arrival is large. In the discussion of many other points, we observe this tendency to pass from the sphere of discussion of tactics to the sphere of discussion of programme.

This is the deepest significance of the discussions which have taken place since the VI. World Congress -- this is the significance of the struggle that we have carried on and that we must continue to carry on against the opportunists and the conciliators. But apart from opportunist and conciliatory elements, we can observe even among comrades who declare themselves to be in agreement and who probably are in agreement with the fundamental statements of our programme, the tendency to make statements which have at bottom, the same meaning as those of the opportunists and conciliators. In general these comrades follow the method of taking into con-

an isolated fact — a fact the existence of which is not always properly ascertained, — and of building up on its basis laws which are in contradiction to the fundamental characteristic of the period through which we are going. Do not insist upon this point. In the discussion against the various statements made by Comrade Varga many comrades are already spoken of it.

For all these reasons it was necessary after the VI. World Congress for all Parties to make a thorough examination of the objective situation in their countries, and the results of this analysis constitute a great step ahead in the direction of the complete analysis, the importance of which was emphasised by our delegation at the Congress as an indispensable basis for a correct policy.

In order to make some contribution to this work, I should like to take up the analysis which our Party made of the objective situation in Italy. If the theory of the opportunists and conciliators were to be considered true, that is to say, if the extension of certain branches of production really meant that the stabilisation of capitalism no longer has a transitory character, but must be considered as something definitely acquired, our country must be considered as one of the countries in which capitalism is most stabilised. If we take into account the so-called "positive" elements of stabilisation, we observe in Italy a number of interesting facts.

In the period from 1924 to 1927, there was an increase in production in almost all branches. More than ten thousand million lire were absorbed in the reorganisation of the industrial apparatus, and if we consider the main branches of production, we notice considerable increase both in the amount of investments and in production. In the electrical industry in 1924, the investments amounted to 555 million; in 1926 — to 2,200 million, in 1928, to 10,000 million. The production of electric power, which in 1921 amounted to 3,000 million kilowatts, was in 1927, 9,000 million. In 1927 new power stations were made amounting to 2½ million kilowatts, and in the first ten months of 1928 alone, 3,100,000 kilowatts. The tempo of development of the electrical industry has been in Italy in the last years more rapid than the development of this industry in the United States. We observe likewise a very remarkable progress in the production of raw material. For aluminium one third of the demand of the market is covered by national production. The Italian chemical industry has taken fifth place in world production. The production of nitrogen is almost equal to the amount necessary for national consumption. For cast iron the production has risen from 426,000 tons in 1913 to 481,000 tons in 1925, and 529,000 in 1926. For steel it has risen from 846,000 tons in 1913 to 982,000 tons in 1922, and to 1,616,000 in 1926. The mercantile marine has developed to such an extent that Italy has taken one of the leading places in the world. We find a tonnage of 1,921,942 tons in 1913 as against 3,383,362 in 1927. The investments in stock companies have risen from 5,683,000,000 of gold lire in 1914 to 11,186,000,000 in 1920 and to 14,006,000,000 in 1927.

If we gave all these figures as much weight as do the opportunists and conciliators, we should have to come to the conclusion that there is a process of permanent stabilisation of the capitalist regime in Italy. But if this is so, how then can we explain what has taken place in this country — the civil war which tore it to pieces for three years, the open and brutal dictatorial power which was established after the civil war, the regime of exceptional laws which has lasted for three years, the persecutions, the sentences to 20 and 30 years of imprisonment and the death sentences? Where is the key to this paradox? The key to this paradox is to be found in the fact that the method employed by the opportunists and conciliators for determining the character of stabilisation, of taking as a basis its so-called positive elements, is an incorrect method. Attention must be centred, on the contrary, upon the contradictions which exist and are becoming more accentuated in the very course of development of these so-called "positive" elements. The greatest of these contradictions for our country also is that which exists between the productive capacity and the extent of the markets, leading to a continuous deficit in the commercial balance which is rising to more than 7000 million lire annually with a tendency to increase. Furthermore, the balance of payment is an

adverse one. The invisible income, which in the past contributed to covering the deficit of the trade balance is, as a matter of fact, on a constant decrease. The influx of money from emigrants have in the past year fallen off by 400,000,000. The income from tourists is also on the decrease, as well as the income obtained for freight on Italian ships in the commercial service of other nations. This is one of the significant symptoms of the economic crisis in Italy. But there are other symptoms which are also very serious. Among them I point to the permanent acute crisis in a number of branches of production, automobile and textile production among others, a continuous increase in the number of bankruptcies etc.

The fundamental contradiction which I have pointed out is moreover expressed in and accompanied by a number of other contradictions, the most important of which are the following:

1. The contradiction between the importance which the foreign markets should have, considering the continual shrinking of the home market, and, on the other hand, the policy of low wages.

2. The contradiction between the increasing budgetary burdens and the development of national income.

3. The contradiction between the slow development of savings and the capital requirements of Italian industry.

From all these contradictions there arises an economic situation characterised by the continuous tension between the various spheres of economy, between industry and finance, between industry and agriculture, etc. The Italian situation which is closely bound up with the international situation and the situation in the principal countries such as the United States, France, Germany and England, is taking on a very unstable and even feverish character with very frequent oscillations. Towards the end of 1928 there were signs of a better situation, which disappeared very quickly, and now in relation to the aggravation of the international situation there is a bad situation which is reflected in the system of credit, and tends to have very serious effects on the stability of the currency and on all branches of national economy. The general perspective which we have is then one of an aggravation of contradictions and of the objective situation in general.

If we consider the situation of the workers — and here I cannot find a single argument in support of Varga's thesis — we note a decrease in the real wages of the workers which from 1922 to 1928 was from 30 to 40%. The real monthly wage of the average workers is 335 lire, but there are wages of 160 to 170 lire a month. The decrease in wages is accompanied by the tendency to an increase in the cost of living to such a degree that there has been in Italy an absolute decrease in the standard of living of the great masses of the working population. One of the characteristic traits of the economic situation in Italy with regard to the wages of the workers is that wages are the only factor which is being subjected to a constant pressure in order to diminish the symptoms of the industrial crisis by lowering the cost of production.

There are other very important factors to be observed in the Italian situation, the most important being, I believe, the interference of the State in industrial life. But I should like to say something to refute the false idea that this interference of the State in industrial life is based on a definite economic plan. If we are to read and believe what is said in the speeches of Mussolini and the fascist leaders we may arrive at this conclusion, but if we examine the facts of economic life, we arrive at the conclusion that quite to the contrary there are not any attempts at planned economy in Italy, but we find that the economic policy of the State is nothing else than an ever-increasing interference in the economic life of the country in order to ward off the growing contradictions and difficulties which are constantly rising from an inner extremely tense situation.

It is on this economic basis that a political regime of open, ruthless and brutal dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is being built up. It is only or almost exclusively, by the ever-increasing pressure exerted on the entire working population

that the very heavy and costly apparatus of the Fascist State succeeds in preventing sharp collisions of the contradictions and in saving Italy from a period of open class struggle such as that which developed in 1919 and 1920.

We have heard many comrades speak on the character of the fascist dictatorship in Italy, and one comrade from our delegation will speak on this point to express our standpoint on the question of fascism and social-fascism.

But there is one question which I should like to put to all the comrades who, in speaking of fascism have attempted to draw comparisons between fascism in Italy and fascism in the other countries. Of which Italian fascism do you speak? Is there but one Italian fascism? On the contrary, there are several Italian fascisms. And we cannot speak of Italian fascism as of something general, because it has developed and changed. If I consider fascism in the years 1919—1924 and 1929, for example, in these different periods I find three regimes which are united by the continuity of historic development, but which have very different characteristics. In 1919 fascism was essentially a reactionary movement with its basis in the petty-bourgeoisie, and slum proletariat, and whose function it was to disrupt and destroy, at the orders of the big bourgeoisie, the organisations of the workers in order to make it possible to establish a regime of open capitalist dictatorship. In 1924 fascism was a regime of coalition parties in which a basic nucleus — linked up with the most reactionary elements of the country and basing itself on an active political organisation, namely the fascist party — was attempting to destroy all remnants of political and economic organisations of the working class and even the political organisations of the bourgeoisie. Now not only do we find the exclusive domination of a single party but very interesting processes are taking place within fascism, so that the entire regime tends to assume a new aspect.

It is a question of fundamental modifications in the political organisation of the fascist State and of important modifications in the social basis of the regime, as well as modifications in the very policy of the regime in the narrow sense of the word. The most important point is perhaps that which concerns the modifications of the political basis of the regime, and essentially the modifications in the fascist party. The fascist party, which in 1924 was still an active element for the realisation of the governmental policy, is tending to-day to lose this character. The most important fascist federations, particularly those in the big industrial towns, have been completely demobilised; all remnants of internal democracy have been suppressed and their complete bureaucratisation has been accomplished.

I should like to point out the example of Milan, where, during the past years we have witnessed a very interesting episode. At the head of the fascist federation of Milan there was a black-shirt of the earliest days, one of the founders of the fascist party, who had begun to develop the fascist federation of Milan in the sense of providing fascism with a "popular" basis by the organisation of groups in the factories, real factory nuclei, and by the establishment of district groups in which an attempt was made to draw in working class elements. The attempt resulted in complete failure. The Government had to intervene in order to put an end to the affair, and everything which had been done in this direction was destroyed. The leading cadres of the Milan organisation were all replaced. The membership of the fascist party was subjected to a very rigid cleansing. The whole fascist organisation of Milan was radically changed. A similar process took place in all the big industrial centres, and the result is that the fascist party is no longer the active political basis of the regime. It is no longer an active instrument utilised by the regime to determine and carry out a definite political line, but is becoming merely an apparatus which subjects to a very rigid discipline the great mass of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. This process is of course accompanied by a change in the cadres of the fascist party. To-day the cadres are no longer what they were three or four years ago. The petty-bourgeois elements are eliminated from the leading positions; the leaders of the Party are basically industrialists, landed proprietors, clerical aristocrats, etc. Naturally, this process is accompanied by a number of contradictions and class differentiations which are at times

manifested in a very acute manner. For example, at the moment of the fascist organisation of Bologna, wealthy elements, landed proprietors and industrialists gathered on one side, and the poor elements met separately. The bureaucratisation of the fascist party has been accompanied by the bureaucratisation of the trade union apparatus and by this apparatus becoming an integral part of the State. The other day a decision was made according to which officials of fascist trade unions are employees of the State. The transformation of the fascist apparatus is being accompanied by modifications in the structure of the State. The exceptional laws are becoming normal State laws because their provisions are being carried over integrally into ordinary legislation. The last vestiges of parliamentarism are liquidated. The actual power is exercised by a secret body — the "grand council" which is formed from the union of all the leading forces in capitalist society, the big industrialists, bankers, the financiers and the big landed proprietors.

At the same time a process is taking place which can be defined as the "search for new social bases". The transformation of fascism into an absolutely reactionary regime, into a regime of open dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, tends to remove from the party all the petty-bourgeois elements "of the first hand" of its origin. In order to replace them, and in accordance with its whole political evolution, fascism is now seeking contact with all the reactionary forces of the country and with the remnants of the bourgeois parties of Italy which it has formerly combated and destroyed. Consequently, the trade union bureaucracy is playing an ever-increasing part in the cabinet of the government, and the Catholic organisations which have been left in peace and which embrace hundreds of thousands of peasants, are now, after the Vatican Agreement, becoming a strong basis for the regime. Finally, preparations are being made for an agreement with the reformists. A part of the social-democratic party (the Rigola group) is already collaborating actively with fascism, and has, relatively speaking, freedom of propaganda and press. But recently fascism has directly addressed itself also to the reformists who have emigrated abroad, and who have not refused to come to terms with fascism on principle, but have merely asked to discuss the conditions.

The circle which was broken when part of the Italian Social Democracy emigrated is in the process of being closed again, and in the course of this development the Italian fascist regime is revealing tendencies which will make it resemble more and more the reactionary regime, the development of which we observe in countries where a social democracy exists which has a fairly broad basis among the masses.

There are of course contradictions in this process. The masses on which the fascist regime attempts to base its support are subject to the pressure of the economic situation, and are driven to revolt against the regime. The inevitable result of the development and deepening of this fundamental contradiction is the overthrow of the whole reactionary regime in Italy.

But there are comrades who ask us: well, when is fascism going to fall? The question is interesting not from the point of view making prophecies, but from the point of view of political analysis. That is to say, that if we cannot answer "when" fascism will fall, we must and we can determine "how" it will fall. In this connection, three factors must be taken into consideration:

1. All the mass movements in Italy, even the smallest ones, are leading the masses into conflict with the State apparatus, and the basis of the whole regime.
2. There is no perspective of development of a great mass movement which does not bring up the problem of armed struggle and general insurrection of the working masses against the fascist regime.
3. It is becoming more and more evident that in Italy the historic, political, economic and social premises for the proletarian revolution are prevailing. The intermediate positions are inexorably disappearing. The historic task of the proletariat — the overthrow of the capitalist regime — be-

res the main problem of the stage through which we are going.

The reformists and the democrats, when they analyse the development of the situation in Italy, maintain that our perspective — which is the perspective of the development of the proletarian revolution — is utopian and declare that Italy is regressing to the Middle Ages. This is the idiotic formula which Social Democracy is attempting to explain the actual situation in Italy; the idiotic formula an echo of which is found presented by Comrade Serra at the last meeting of our Central Committee, the character of which we openly denounce. This formula is historically and politically incorrect and shows a total lack of comprehension of the period through which Italy is passing, and of the nature of fascism. The proletarian revolution is on the order of the day in Italy because proletarian capitalism is being torn from the contradictions of the imperialist phase. The proletariat is setting up its candidacy as successor of fascism because the historic dilemma which faces Italian society is not the dilemma between a progressive imperialism, and a capitalism reverting to the Middle Ages, but it is the dilemma between the dictatorship of capital, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Other comrades have shown how the same process of aggravation of the contradictions which we observe in Italy is developing in other countries and on an international scale in the sphere of the objective and subjective elements of the situation; how it is shown by the radicalisation of the working class; and how it is accompanied by the passing over of the masses to forms of struggle which assume a more offensive and more pronounced political character — struggles of which the May events in Berlin have furnished an example to the proletariat of the entire world. All these facts constitute the characteristic traits of a new situation in which new tasks confront all our parties.

I want to examine these tasks from the point of view of the general political orientation, that is to say, the necessity for the struggle against opportunism, and from the point of view of practical work.

As for the struggle against opportunism, how has this struggle arisen and developed in our Party? One comrade pointed out to me that the Italian Party had the prerogative, that in its ranks the deviations from the political line always took a "pure" form. Just as in the past we have had to struggle against the consistent extreme Left conception of the Bordighists, we have found ourselves in these past months face to face with the consistent opportunist stand of Serra.

I have heard Comrade Serra called a conciliator. We have not defined this stand in the manner. We have described Comrade Serra as a comrade who proceeded from the standpoint of the conciliators which he adopted at the Presidium of the C. I. on the occasion of the vote on the Open Letter to the German Party, but who developed the whole position of the conciliators in a logical manner, showing that this whole position is "pure" opportunism. This is why, in developing his position to a number of points, the principal ones of which I should like to mention, Comrade Serra has come to formulate what we have called an attempt at revision not only of our tactic and of the policy which we must carry out to-day to be at the head of the working masses, but a revision of the Programme of the Communist International.

I have already touched upon the analysis of the objective situation. For the subjective situation, the manner in which Comrade Serra denies that a process of radicalisation exists among the working masses, leads us also to the tactical field, and to the field of our Programme. The radicalisation of the working class which we observe to-day is not merely a phenomenon of the present situation, but one of the fundamental characteristic traits of the period through which we are going. Anyone who denies this is bound to misunderstand the whole character of this period.

All the errors made by Comrade Serra in the field of tactics in rejecting the trade union tactic established by the IV. Congress of the R. I. L. U. and the VI. World Congress; in

giving a false estimation of the economic struggles and of the present role of the Social Democracy; in denying the existence of the Right danger; and in denying that the war danger is imminent — all these errors, which, taken as a whole, constitute a political line which is totally different from our own, are the consequence of divergencies arising with regard to the points "of programme" which I have indicated.

But the point at which the fundamental character of the discussions which we have had with Comrade Serra is brought out most clearly, is that which concerns the Russian questions.

In what Comrade Serra tells us there is immediate connection between these two types of questions. What we have in the capitalist world, and what Comrade Serra does not see, is a continuous appearance of contradictions, a reactionary transformation of the State, and a reactionary concentration of counter-revolutionary forces. But at the same time, according to Marx "reaction creates revolution" — the accentuation of the bourgeois resistance is linked up with the increase of resistance and capacity for offensive struggle of the working class. The result of this is a rapid accentuation of class contradictions, and the advance towards an acute situation.

What do we find in the U. S. S. R.? We have a similar process, but reversed. The splendid successes of Socialist construction are accompanied also by a development of contradictions. Here it is not reaction which creates revolution, but revolution which creates reaction, that is to say, the accentuated resistance of the capitalist classes who continue to exist in the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The fundamental characteristics of this situation, and above all, of the dialectic connection which links up the process of development of Socialist construction with the contradictions of this process, and with the possibility of aggravation of the contradictions in the given circumstances, are no longer seen by Comrade Serra. This is why, when he brings up the problems of Socialist construction in Russia, he confuses everything. He is no longer either a Right nor a conciliatory, but passes over to a position which can be called liberal, because it no longer has anything to do with Marxism, but is merely the formulation in pseudo-socialist terms of the aspirations of social classes and elements which not only do not understand, but which are opposed to the development of Socialism in Russia and are ready to struggle against this development with all weapons. Comrade Manuilsky has already recalled the criterion which Serra employs for judging questions of Russian agriculture. This criterion is that of absolute comparison between the degree of development of agriculture in Russia with the degree of development of agriculture in other countries. Considering this point of departure, the solution cannot be other than that which Serra has reached. That is to say, that in order to solve the problem of agriculture in Russia, there is but one thing to do: to enrich the rural districts throughout. The originality of Leninism with regard to the peasant question, which consists in the capacity for making a differentiation of classes in rural districts, and to differentiate our policy on the basis of this class differentiation, — this originality thus completely disappears, and along with it every perspective of class struggle also disappears.

It is no longer recognised that the conception of rich peasant and poor peasant is a conception which is related to the whole economic life of the country, and consequently, it is no longer recognised that "kulak" agriculture in Russia, although poorer than middle peasant agriculture in Sicily, is in reality a basis for the development of capitalism. But what is also not recognised is that the development of this field of agriculture, which is exclusively in the domain of quantity — of quantitative reinforcement of private peasant economy — can never succeed in clearing the barrier which separates capitalism from Socialism. To clear this barrier a plunge is necessary from quantity to quality. This plunge is represented under the rule of the proletariat by the intervention of a conscious factor in the policy of the working class in the rural districts with its plan of building up collective farms and going over from private farms to collective farms. If this element is lacking, we can no longer speak of socialist development in the rural districts.

but merely of capitalist development "under the control of the working class".

But if the perspective of Comrade Serra for the development of Russian agriculture are those of a capitalist development under the control of the working class, what is Comrade Serra's perspective in the field of industry? It is the same as for agriculture. He says to us: the textile industry in Italy has made great progress in spite of the fact that it has bought textile machines abroad, or else because of this fact. Why cannot Russia do this same thing? And again: If you buy a machine abroad for 100 roubles and if it costs two hundred roubles in Russia, it is better to buy it abroad and use the 100 roubles for developing working capital. As in the preceding case the criterion of judgment is clearly bourgeois — pure liberalism. If we accept it, the perspectives of development in Russia will be those of development not of a socialist system but of a system controlled on the one hand by the workers and on the other hand by international capitalism.

I believe, that I do not need many words to show that we have now left the discussion with deviations of a "tactical" character and that we have entered upon discussion of the programme. What is under discussion here is no longer a question of detail of fundamental character of the proletarian revolution and its requirements, and of the meaning of the economic policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If applied in a consistent manner, the conceptions of Serra lead us to a conception of the proletarian revolution entirely different from that which we have established in our programme. According to this conception, the result of the proletarian revolution must not be to establish the conditions for the development of a socialist system on a new technical basis of production and on the basis of the collectivisation of agriculture, but must be the development of a capitalist system allegedly controlled by the proletariat. We could discuss the point which this control can reach without this structure falling under the clash of forces which we ourselves contributed to develop. But the question is clear for all. To give the proletarian revolution this meaning, amounts to condemning it in the sphere of socialist construction to sure defeat.

Comrades, after seeing the conclusions which are reached by logically developing Serra's conceptions in the sphere of the Russian question, it is perhaps interesting to make an analogy with what he said on the problem of the conquest of power; with his theory of transitional slogans; with the manner in which he presents his slogans of the workers' and peasants' government; and with the manner in which Serra has presented the slogans of workers' control as the economic meaning of a so-called socialist revolution which will not nationalise industry but which will limit itself to exercising a "control", by various means, on an industry which has remained capitalist. It would also be interesting to compare these conceptions of Serra with that strange political conception that Serra had when in 1920, at the time of the seizure of factories, when the problem which arose was the problem of the seizure of power, he made the proposal of asking the State to organise the factories which had been seized into a big co-operative for the workers. This proposal already contained the germ of the conception that the conquest of power can be replaced by the development of a capitalist system controlled by the proletariat.

As you see, there is some logic in this madness. It is the logic of an attempt to revise the programme of the Communist International plus an attempt to revise our whole method of Marxist thought and to substitute for our dialectic thought a so-called dialectic without stumbling blocks — a "dialectic" by which the rich peasant, merely by becoming rich, becomes without any hindrances a socialist peasant — a "dialectic" by which the power unnoticeably passes through a transitional period from the hands of the bourgeoisie into the hands of the proletariat, etc. etc. Here there is a revision of the fundamental basis of our whole conception of historic and social development.

Comrade Manuisky asked us in his report: Do you consider that the propaganda of a conception such as Serra's is compatible with membership of a Communist Party? This is a rhetorical question which Comrade Manuisky has asked us. He very well knows that we are aware of the fact that propa-

ganda of Serra's conceptions is incompatible with membership of a Communist Party. Manuisky very well knows that another comrade better known than Serra, began to carry on propaganda for revisionist ideas of Marxism, namely Comrade Graziadei, we expelled him without any hesitation and without discussion. Manuisky very well knows that when it is a question of our fundamental ideology, we do not play at democracy. But Manuisky would like to know something else from us. The real question which he asks us is this: why have we not taken disciplinary measures against Comrade Serra? Let me reply to this question: 1. Because we wished to subject Comrade Serra to a more rigid discipline and because he accepted what we imposed on him, namely, to cease carrying on propaganda for his ideas either in the Party or in the Central Committee; 2. Because we feel the necessity for the struggle against Serra not only in our Polit. Bureau and in our Central Committee but among the rank and file of our Party, and if it becomes more acute we want it to be in relation with the possibilities of bringing it to the rank and file of the Party where it is very possible that roots of this ideology exist. We have not been able to carry out this extension of the struggle to the rank and file of the Party, and this is why we have kept Serra in the C.C., at the same time carrying on a campaign against him in the Party review, in the meetings, etc. In the development of this campaign, we shall take all the necessary measures against Serra.

It can be said that we should have foreseen what has happened, because we know comrade Serra and because some of us have known him for a long time and have struggled against him very vigorously in the past. This is true. But since 1920 when we lost a great part of the leading elements of our Party we made attempts to find out if it was possible to collaborate with comrade Serra in order to avoid his developing a Right current in the Party, and in order to enlarge the basis of our Polit. Bureau. Finally, if we have left Comrade Serra on the Executive in Moscow, it is because at the VI. World Congress he followed the delegation of the Party in its attitude of unreserved approval of the line of the VI. World Congress.

Experience has shown us that we were mistaken. As Stalin said, at rapid turns there is always someone who falls out of the carriage and remains on the ground. We do not regret this experience and we shall carry on the struggle that must be carried on against all manifestations of opportunism and against every attempt at revisionism of our Programme, and in the manner in which it must be carried on.

The struggle against opportunism and the conciliators is the greatest positive element in the development of the Communist International from the VI. Congress up to now. The results attained are very remarkable; if we examine the French Party, for example, we must say that today, now that the C.P.F. has succeeded in freeing itself from opportunism, under the leadership of the C.I., it is no longer the same as compared with what it was four years ago. The same thing holds true of the German Party. We recognise that the present situation of the C.P. of Germany is quite different from what it was before the VI. World Congress; it is much more satisfactory, and furthermore the German Party has made a great stride ahead. We expect this Plenum to assist the other Parties also, particularly the British Party, to accomplish similar progress. We recognise the necessity for the bitter struggle of which Remmele spoke in his speech, and we recognise that without this bitter struggle there is no possibility for a revolutionary policy nor for conquest of the masses. But I believe, that the most interesting point in this Plenum is perhaps not this one on which we are all in agreement. The most interesting point consists in the individual effort to overcome all resistance to the application of a tactic in agreement with the premises which we set ourselves when we speak of the general situation. This is the most interesting point because it is also the point of departure for our future action.

And this is where the problem comes up of the daily life and daily activity of the Parties. In coming to this problem let me say a few words on the life of our Party:

One thing of fairly great importance took place in our Party after the VI. Congress. We "rebuilt" our Party which at the time of the VI. Congress, was practically disrupted by

e blows that had been dealt by the reaction. After 10 months hard work we succeeded in re-establishing our organisation all the big industrial centres, in regions inhabited by national minorities and in the agricultural regions of the Po, and we are now beginning to re-establish it in the agricultural regions of the centre and the South. We shall give more exact details in the commissions, but we feel that when we submit these results to the Plenum, we are submitting extremely important results. It is not merely a basis which we have today for our work, but concrete work which we have already been carrying on for some months.

During the elections which were carried out on the plebiscite system, we achieved a partial mobilisation of workers and peasants in the principal centres of Italy. We succeeded in making our slogan known and followed, which was the slogan of voting "no", while the others said "abstain". Our slogan was followed by surprisingly broad elements of workers and peasants. We have grouped around us all the active and courageous elements of the Italian working class.

Comrades, it is true that in order to obtain these results, we have for several months had to concentrate our attention on organisational and technical work. Many of us, I shall even say all leading elements, have during the last ten months had to carry on organisational and technical work. This is perhaps why the political activity of the Party leadership has fallen off a little. We do not deny this fact, but the organisational experience which we have had, is an experience which at this moment can be useful to the whole Communist International.

Comrades, we speak of the approach of war. We say that the perspectives of war are immediate and the problem of war arises as a problem of tomorrow or of today. We speak of the contradictions which are becoming sharper, and of offensive struggle and a revolutionary day which is already at hand. What is the perspective which we must link up with this general political perspective as far as Party work is concerned? There is no doubt but that it is the perspective of **illegality**. We must therefore bring up and discuss this perspective. It is not a simple thing. We see that for all Parties the transition to an illegal status means the breaking up of cadres, the loss of membership and a far-reaching crisis. Even our Party has not escaped this rule. For one year we vigorously resisted, but then we also went through this serious crisis from which we are now emerging. I believe that there are too many comrades who look upon illegality as a rest and who think: no more meetings, now we can study. We shall become professors of Marxism when the Party is on an illegal basis. This attitude must be combated. Illegality is not rest. Illegality under present conditions is the transition to a more acute form of struggle. A struggle to break the machine which is seeking to oppress us and to smash the bonds which prevent us from winning over for the revolution the majority of the working class. This struggle is possible only on condition that we have contact with the masses which can be maintained under conditions of illegality. What legal Party of the C. I. can say today: — I am sure of my future?

I wish to say to the comrades of the French Party — when you are on an illegal basis, when you have no longer any "L'Humanité" and when the unitary trade unions are outlawed by a complete application of the law of compulsory arbitration, what contact will you have with the masses? What will you do in this situation? I bring up the problem to the C. P. of France, because France is perhaps the country where the working class has the least tradition of organisation and where the Party has the least organised contact with the masses. But I say, that the problem is a general problem, that all problems of organisation brought up by Comrade Piatnitsky must be thoroughly examined, and that it is only by solving the tasks which confront us that we can succeed in accomplishing what the situation calls for, not only in being active in legal agitation but in being active in the struggle to break through the limits of capitalist society; not only in succeeding in bringing the masses into the streets but in being in the factories and on the streets, as the leading force able to guide the masses in revolt.

One year has gone by since the VI. World Congress. During one year the development of events has been very swift;

not only the development of objective events, but also the internal life of our Parties; many things around have changed, as well as many things among us. It is impossible, I believe, for such changes to take place without hindrances and difficulties at very turn. Yes, difficulties like those referred to by Comrade Remmele, in connection with the session of September 26, 1928 of the Communist Party of Germany; we, too, have had such difficulties and they have largely contributed to determining the attitude of our Party at a certain time. These difficulties are not related to the political line of the C. I. of which we have always been convinced and sure, but they arise from concern that at the head of the greatest Party of the Communist International next to the Russian Party there should not be a group of men capable of seeing the danger in time and warding it off, and of seeing in time the direction in which the struggle must be carried on without losing sight of the final aim, and also that there should be men who do not understand our policy any longer and who fall away. Men do not count. What counts is the solidarity in our ranks and the clearness of our vision, our determination in action, and the courage and political clear-sightedness which we need in order to advance when the storm approaches, at the head of the masses that seek in us the revolutionary leadership which will guarantee their victory.

Comrade LOZOVSKY:

I.

The first question is in regard to India. I think that everyone here realises that revolutionary events and collisions are developing rapidly in India. We can see the approach of revolution there, and the peculiarity of the Indian situation is the rapid differentiation of internal class forces which is mainly noticeable in important proletarian centres. Insofar as India is a very big country which consists of regions with different social-economic conditions, this differentiation does not affect the country as a whole, but preeminently the more economically advanced regions and provinces.

The keynote of the last 12 months in India has been struggle against Communism. In regard to this, a united front has been established there between the native reformists and the national bourgeoisie of all shades. Struggle against Communism is no longer merely a subject of discussion and polemics; this struggle has been carried into the masses, as vividly shown at the last trade union congress, when Nehru, one of the most prominent nationalists, was elected chairman by a small majority against the candidature of a Communist. This was also reflected in the **Bombay strike**. The keynote of everything the reformists and nationalists are doing, is struggle against Communism. Suffice it to point out, for instance, that the delegation which is now in Geneva headed by Joshi (to attend the International Labour Conference) has confirmed with Citrine and Sassenbach re-afiliation to the Amsterdam International. The delegation has also asked Citrine to induce the British Labour Government to release two of the arrested (out of 31 arrested in India) who are known as non-communists. As to the remaining 29, it seems that the delegation, far from asking their release, is doing just the contrary. We have also other more serious facts. We witness the consolidation of the forces of Indian reformism in the form of struggle against the R. I. L. U., connection with European reformism and establishment of a united front for struggle against the Communist International and the Red International of Labour Unions. This change in the orientation of the Indian Trade Union Congress is due to the accentuation of class struggle in India, and especially to the accentuation of the struggle of the Left wing for leadership in the recent industrial movements, the Left wing succeeding in getting leadership into its hands and in ousting the reformists. During the strike, a Left cotton operatives' union sprang up in Bombay which has 65,000 members, whereas, the reformist union has only 8 to 10,000.

The united front between Indian and European reformism rests, on the one hand, on the Amsterdam International, and on the other hand, on the idea of a Pan-Asiatic "Labour" Inter-

national headed by Bunji Sudzuki, the Japanese Gompers. This idea has the support of the International Labour Office and its director, Albert Thomas, who has contributed a great deal to the establishment of this united front. But simultaneously, with the establishment of this united front against Communism, against the Comintern and the R. I. L. U., we witness in India an enormous accentuation of the class struggle. That is why the national Indian bourgeoisie is concentrating now on struggle against Communism.

In the whole sphere of foreign and home policy, the national Indian bourgeoisie is turning against the working class and the revolutionary labour movement. The recent strikes have sharpened this process, and everyone present here is confronted with the question: if differentiation is proceeding so rapidly that the ideologists of the Indian bourgeoisie are already assuming the language of the Kuomintang, if differentiation is really so rapid, then is the line laid down by the VI. Congress of the Comintern concerning the Indian bourgeoisie, correct?

A year ago, at the VI. Congress of the Comintern, our point of departure was — that the Indian bourgeoisie was not very hostile to labour (not as hostile as it is now), that it was not as openly counter-revolutionary as now. A decision was made then that in certain cases, in regard to definite, concrete, tactical questions agreement with the bourgeoisie was admissible.

In principle, this question was correctly put at the VI. Congress. But at present we have to decide the Indian question not only from the general point of view, we must say if one can visualise now in India a situation in which the Communist Party could support nationalists, Swarajists, I mean, concretely support the present Swarajists in India. It is with the solution of this question that the Comintern is concerned now. It seems to me that this general line which is no doubt correct in principle, is inapplicable now in India. It is inapplicable because the Indian bourgeoisie has openly gone into the counter-revolutionary camp, because it is throttling the labour movement, is making common cause with British imperialism, is openly declaring war on the revolutionary movement, in the press, in the legislative assemblies and in the daily political life. That is why it seems to me that in regard to India and in connection with the rapid political differentiation there, as well as in connection with the growing differences, the imminence of serious revolutionary upheavals and of mass struggles, we must consider there not the possibility of agreements but rather the adoption of an uncompromising attitude: **no agreement whatever, ruthless struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie**, because this is now the only way to educate and weld together our still feeble Indian Communist Party.

The other thing which, in my opinion, is extremely important for India, the VI. Congress of the Communist International laid down in its resolution, namely, that it is against the establishment of Workers and Peasants Parties. This formulation was based then on the assumption that the Workers-Peasants Party is, by its nature, so to speak an embryo of our S.-R. Party which has in its ranks a Communist wing. In agrarian countries such as India, China, etc., the development of Narodniki ideas is inevitable. The existence of Workers-Peasants Parties can obliterate the bounds of the Communist organisation, can drown the Communist Party in this Workers-Peasants Party. Therefore, the decision of the VI. Congress was perfectly correct, but it has not been carried out. In the last year, an enormous stride has been made in the sense of giving a definite form to the ideology and organisation of the Communist movement in India, but an enormous stride only in comparison with what was a year ago. But in comparison with what is required now in the face of important events, in comparison with the rapid change in the attitude of the bourgeoisie to the working class and with the new tasks which are confronting now the working class of India, not enough has been done. We, the Comintern, the R. I. L. U. and all the Parties taken together, have done very little to help the development of the Indian Communist Party (hear, hear!).

Of course, one of the obstacles in the development of the Indian Communist movement was the fact that the only thread which connected the Indian Communists with the Comintern was the same Roy who is now developing an entirely Menshevik

ideology. What did the Mensheviks say in 1905? They said: As the revolution is a bourgeois-democratic one, leadership of the revolution must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie. And what did the Bolsheviks say? The Bolsheviks said: although the revolution is bourgeois-democratic, it can be carried to a conclusion only under the leadership, the hegemony of the proletariat. In Roy's speeches we have Menshevism pure and simple in regard to the tasks confronting the Indian revolution. It seems to me that we, the Plenum of the E. C. C. I., must pay a hundred times more attention than hitherto to helping the labour movement in India, to assisting the Communist Party of India, purging it from every variety of overt and covert Mensheviks and to converting the as yet small Party — in the process of mass struggles — into a mass Party which will take the lead in the labour movement of India.

II.

The other question to which I would like to draw your attention is that of social-fascism. Comrade Bela Kun told us in his speech very interesting facts and made a series of prognostications, but it seems to me that in our discussion of social-fascism we cannot take as our point of departure only what Comrade Bela Kun said, because he spoke of Social Democracy as something integral. Fascism is going on. Quite so, but there are workers in the Social-Democratic Parties and millions of workers are still following these parties. Therefore, the prospect of social-fascism cannot be so simply accepted. We must account to ourselves what will be the degree of social-fascism, what part it must affect, what it will call forth in social democratic ranks and in the ranks of workers sympathising with Social Democracy, what position they must take up as Social Democracy becomes fascised. First of all, it is clear that fascism cannot affect only the leading cadres. There is, I think, a very strong pre-conceived notion in Communist circles that only the upper stratum is reactionary, whereas the lower Social Democratic cadres are less reactionary. I think that if we turn our attention to what is going on in the Social-Democratic Parties, we will find that reaction is rising not only in the upper and middle strata, but also among the lower functionaries who are dragging with them a certain section of demoralised corrupt workers. The development of Social Democracy into social-fascism will take, on the one hand, the form of fasciation of all strata with the exception of a few insignificant groups, and secessions in social-democratic ranks will take place simultaneously to the Right and to the Left. What happened in Saxony about two years ago when the Right of the Social-Democratic Party seceded? We have there a decidedly Fascist organisation. This was a Right secession of fascist lines. It accelerated the progress of Social Democracy towards fascism. To the extent as the upper and lower Social Democratic cadres and a certain section of corrupt workers fell under the sway of social-fascism, sections of workers will secede from Social Democracy, with the result that it will rather pass over to a new social petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois basis. Comrade Bela Kun did not touch on this contingency, and I must therefore say that his very interesting study of the question of social-fascism is rather abstract, it lacks the concrete character of class struggle which is actually going on in factories and works, and which, on the one hand, dissociates a section of workers from the social-democrats and brings them into our camp, and on the other hand, dissociates certain sections of workers corrupted by fascism and social-democracy and brings them into the social-fascist camp.

One more question concerning social-fascism and fascism. We all know that Fascism is reaction, but we also know that not every reaction is fascism. We know that fascism is centralisation, but not every centralisation is fascism. Therefore, a general formula which accepts only these two terms: on the one hand, reaction, and on the other hand, centralisation does not give a full characteristic of fascism, it falls short of what is most characteristic of fascism. And what is most characteristic of fascism? It is this: **with the help of social-demagogy, fascism endeavours to make use of a section of workers and elements who come from working class circles, of certain corrupt sections of the working class and social-democracy who have been entirely demoralised by the imperialist regime.**

Mussolini did not begin with pure fascism, but with social-fascism. He came forward with a programme in comparison with which the whole German Social-Democratic programme is nothing. He demanded almost the confiscation of banks, etc., etc. How did Mussolini recruit his cadres? From the Socialist Party, from anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist ranks, etc. He recruited cadres schooled to a certain extent in the labour movement, and this is the characteristic peculiarity of fascism. Therefore, if we speak of fascism, we must always bear in mind his specific peculiarity of the fascist regime which shows both the features of centralisation and reaction, and which works by means of social-demagogy utilising certain sections of working class functionaries, former party workers, in order to suppress, destroy, corrupt and demoralise the labour movement. This peculiar feature of fascism is noticeable in a number of countries. Did not the Horthy regime in Hungary approximate somewhat to social-democracy and fascist trade unionism? Don't we also witness in Italy a peculiar combination of social-demagogy, brutal repression, centralisation, etc.? This is why I think that this side of the question must be taken into account in the definition of fascism. On the other hand, in view of the likely fascisation of social-democratic parties, we must take into consideration that social-fascisation will proceed on the basis of a series of crises in the social-democratic parties themselves and among the workers who follow these parties.

III.

I will deal now with the Labour Government in Great Britain and the prospects of the development of the British Communist Party. I think that we all agree that the present situation offers splendid opportunities to the British Communist Party of developing into a mass party. The MacDonald Government is manoeuvring. The French newspaper "Temps", in its estimate of the king's speech and MacDonald's declaration, says the speech was very moderate in regard to internal policy and very cautious in regard to foreign policy. The "Temps" also declares that no British Government could say anything but what MacDonald has said. We therefore see that any illusions of the masses that they are in power must soon evaporate. We witness already an attempt to reduce the wages of 500,000 cotton operatives. We will see presently an enormous pressure on the workers in the form of rationalisation of industry, and as a result of all this we must expect a rapid disillusionment of the British proletariat insofar as the Labour Government is concerned.

Comrades, the British proletariat cannot get over its illusions automatically. The objective situation is certainly favourable, but to accelerate the process, intervention of a subjective factor is necessary — the Communist Party. In this connection, I am sure that every member of the Plenum is justifiably anxious in regard to the ability of our British Party to make a proper use of the favourable situation. This anxiety is very justified. The development of our British Party in the last two years bears witness of enormous internal organisational weakness, as well as of great ideological weakness. In the last two years our Party has lost two thirds of its members, and this, in Britain where the Party is legal. Comrades, just imagine what would happen if this Party were assailed by a Mussolini regime, or if blows were showered on it, such as are showered on the Chinese, Bulgarian and other Parties? It is difficult to say if even one tenth of the Party would survive.

The British Communist Party has splendid prospects of development. The objective situation is favourable as never before. MacDonald is in office the second time. This is a new experiment. The MacDonald Government is better equipped now than the first time, it is also more infamously treacherous than in its first term of office. Therefore, the masses will shed their illusions quicker. Who will profit by this? Where is the strenuous will of the Party apparatus? Where are the mass organisations capable of rallying and co-ordinating that which is already agitating the minds of hundreds of thousands of British workers? It is incumbent on the Communist International and this Plenum to tell the British comrades in a comradely but firm manner that it is time to put an end to wobbling if they do not want to ruin the Party. For ten years the British Party has been free from internal political strife. Some people thought that this was an ideal state of affairs, that the Party is growing

normally, without internal strife, without political differentiation, without internal dissensions, etc., some people thought this ideal. (Bell: This is not so.)

But comrades, what does this outward prosperity show? It shows that the Party did not concern itself sufficiently with political problems. The meaning of the Right tendency was not realised in the British Party by everyone of its members. The British Party discussed the Right tendency in Germany, in the U. S. S. R., in all countries. But, comrades, there is a Right tendency not only in Germany, the U. S. S. R. and other countries, but also in Great Britain itself. It was and is possible to educate the Party, to consolidate it, to rally it ideologically, to make it stronger, provided there be ruthless struggle against the Right in the Party's own midst. The Right enemy is also to be found in Britain and in the British Party! The British comrades forgot this. Struggle against Right tendencies in the British Party is of particular importance now in connection with the colossal objective possibilities of the British labour movement and the Communist Party of Great Britain which will enable this Party to become a mass Party, an organisation embracing tens and hundreds of thousands of members and capable of carrying with it millions of British workers.

IV.

I am coming to the last question. Comrades, if the analysis that social-democracy has been converted into a social-fascist organisation, that social-democracy is rapidly developing into social fascism is true — and it is absolutely true — all our legal Parties are confronted by the question of their conversion into illegal Parties.

In Czechoslovakia, France and Germany, the situation is such that our Parties and the revolutionary trade unions must expect to be driven underground at any moment. I think that I will voice the wish of all present here if I ask: Comrades, are our Parties ready? The best prepared Party is that of Germany, but even this Party is not prepared 100%.

Is the French Party prepared? Not even by 50%. Is the Czechoslovakian Party prepared? Not by 25%. Comrades, I think that this is a very serious question.

Of course, we must struggle hard and do our utmost so as not to allow ourselves to be driven underground, but the correlation of forces might be such that we will be driven underground for a time. We must be prepared for this, and I assert that our Parties are not yet prepared. Therefore, the inference I make from my own speech is: with feverish haste we must prepare ourselves for being driven underground. If we do not make timely preparations for this, we run the risk of being taken unawares. (Applause.)

DECLARATION OF COMRADE LUHANI.

Comrades,

Permit me to submit the following statement:

1. I recognise that the position which I held in relation to the question of Indian industrialisation was wrong. I fully agree with the Theses of the VI. Congress on the colonial question that imperialism's main tendency is to retard the free development of the productive forces of the colonies, especially India. There was no permanent policy of industrialisation in India. At best there existed an alternate policy of industrialisation and de-industrialisation. The present policy of British imperialism is, as stated in the Theses on the colonial question, to "suppress and retard the economic development" of India.

2. British imperialism, whether it is represented by the Tories or by the Labour Party, is in no position to grant any concessions to India. The tasks which the new "Labour" Government of London now undertakes in relation to India consist of the following:

I. To continue and intensify the suppression of India;

II. To retain India as a colony in the interests of capitalist rationalisation in Great Britain;

III. To concentrate forces in India in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.

The de-colonisation of India can be only the result of a "strong anti-imperialist policy" (Colonial Theses), a policy expressed in revolutionary action of the mass of exploited under the leadership of the proletariat.

3. Roy's views recently published in Brandler's organ in Germany constitute an open betrayal of the interests of the growing revolution in India and the interests of the militant proletariat of Germany. Roy systematically deceived the Communist International through his double political book-keeping. The exposition of his opportunist views has revealed him as an agent of the reformist national bourgeoisie of India wearing the fine mask of a Marxian and a revolutionary. He is simply another Nehru with more European experience and therefore with greater skill in concealing the programme of the bourgeois counter-revolution of India under pseudo-radical phraseology.

Eleventh Session.

9th July, 1929 (morning).

Comrade BELL (Great Britain):

Comrades, in the period that has elapsed since the VI. Congress, we have seen a striking confirmation of the general lines laid down in the main political resolution, particularly the characterisation of the present period as that of the **Third Period**.

The VI. Congress clearly characterised also the third period in its particular relation to the features of rationalisation and anticipated some of the forms and features of social fascism, which have figured so much in the discussion at this Plenum. The VI. Congress resolution spoke about the period of the rapid development of technique, the accelerated growth of cartels and trusts, in which tendencies in the direction of State capitalism are to be observed.

On rationalisation and social fascism the VI. Congress resolution is well worth further study and consideration.

We have to go back to the VII. Plenum to recall our first discussion on the question of rationalisation. At that particular Plenum there were many comrades who had considerable doubts as to the actual lines to be adopted towards rationalisation, which had just begun to raise its head in Germany. For myself, I had the rather limited view of looking upon rationalisation as scientific management. Of course, scientific management and rationalisation are bound up together. But rationalisation is very much wider. It not only aims at the elimination of the rule of thumb methods in the labour process, of the reduction of a number of unnecessary movements of the workers, it also aims at the re-arrangement of factories so that raw materials come in at one end, and the finished products go out at the other, by direct mechanical means.

Rationalisation is a product of the law of the development of capitalist industry, from free competition to concentration and monopoly. At the same time, it involves the establishment of gigantic selling agencies between the capitalists for the distribution of their products.

It was no accident that scientific management found its origin in the United States of America. America was a young capitalist country with none of those historic traditions behind it as we have in England. In the period when scientific management first found its expression in America, we can say America represented an expanding imperialist country, with a highly paid aristocracy of labour, with enormous resources of raw materials and food, and with large masses of cheap labour from Central European countries. But the coming of war brought about a new series of conditions. We have seen, following the war, the devastation of the areas of Northern France and other parts of Central Europe that came under the destructive forces of the war; we have seen a considerable impoverishment of these countries. We have seen these areas being rebuilt, and

It is to be expected that Brandler & Co., the collaborators of Social Democracy, will become the lackeys of the social imperialists — MacDonald & Co.

4. The Indian proletariat is now coming forward as the leader of the national revolutionary struggle against imperialism. That is exactly what I have said in my statement at the VI. Congress. I also said then that the Indian national bourgeoisie is quickly becoming counter-revolutionary. I emphasise that although I was wrong in the estimate of the economic situation I was right in my political deductions.

5. The categorical demand of the present moment is to give organised expression to the independent role of the Indian proletariat as the leader in the struggle against imperialism. The Indian proletariat, carried by objective historical factors to the crest of the revolutionary wave, must have its Communist Party which will prepare it in the process of the imminent conflict for the capture of political power directly from the hands of imperialism, and for the setting up of a Soviet Republic in India.

in their reconstruction they have been built upon the basis of a higher technique. In this period we might say that they have jumped whole decades of normal capitalist development.

In Great Britain the strides towards rationalisation taken during the war were important, but quite insufficient to ensure Great Britain retaining the position it formerly held before the war. Moreover, Great Britain, thanks to her insular position, was immune from the wastages of war such as characterised many of the countries of Central Europe. Following the war, economy in Great Britain relapsed in a degree to its traditional methods, and even now, in many of the important sections of the basic industries, scientific management and rationalisation is only breaking through. On account of the backwardness of rationalisation in Great Britain, the hesitance of the bourgeoisie and the pressure of world rationalisation which has been going on since the war, the effects upon the British workers are terrible and deep in many of the basic industries, and disastrous in their effects on social life.

We see the elimination of hundreds of thousands of workers from those industries, particularly the mining industry, where whole villages are being de-populated. This elimination of hundreds of thousands of workers in the coal industry, in the metal industry, and in the textile industry, is bound up and related to the problem of unemployment. We have had since 1920 a permanent army of unemployed of 1½ million. Side by side with this we see going on an intense exploitation, a terrific speeding up, and what is equally important, the abolition of time-worn customs which were fought for by the workers on account of their bearing on the living standards of the workers. In addition to this, the cutting of wages and the lengthening of hours are the characteristic features of the present period of rationalisation in Great Britain.

As regards the question under discussion of the standard of living and the question of the general situation amongst the working class, I think it is necessary to draw a distinction between the standards of living and the cost of living. I think that Comrade Kuusinen was correct in taking us back to some of the fundamentals of Marxism, particularly on this question of the standard of living. Because until we have a clear conception of the standards of living in its relations to the cost of living and in its relation to the extraction of surplus value, both in its relative and in its absolute sense, we will in all probability fall into the mistake of being deceived by abstract statistics which are divorced from the realities in life. Marx himself has put before us this problem very clearly in his differentiation of the different forms of wage, nominal wages, real wages and relative wages, and I believe that if you keep all these three forms in mind, we shall be able to elucidate the problems in connection with wage struggles in their relation to the further intensification and exploitation of the workers.

It is not necessary to argue from this platform that the working class does not live by bread alone, by which I mean

the working class movement is not purely and simply a matter of wage struggles. There are in addition all kinds of social problems associated with the lives of the workers, such as housing, of education and various forms of social needs on the part of the workers which are bound up in the class struggle of the workers. We must try to see the relation of all these particular factors when we are discussing the question of the standard of living of the workers in its relation to rationalisation and its influence upon the intensification and exploitation of labour. Capitalist rationalisation of labour we see going on does not only mean a terrific speeding up in the labour processes, the elimination of millions from the labour processes, but a tremendous wear and tear of labour in itself, a tremendous increase in industrial diseases, fatal accidents, and so forth. In addition to this the exhaustion of workers as a result of the speeding up process, the tension upon them by the new labour processes, brings in its wake a lessening of the leisure time of the workers and there is an integral part of the working class struggle.

Comrade Kuusinen is right in assuming that we are not against rationalisation. Comrade Kuusinen is correct in saying that in the U. S. S. R. rationalisation is a means of speedily developing the construction and building up of socialism. In the U. S. S. R. all the advantages of rationalisation accrue to the proletariat throughout the dominant class in the State. Under capitalism, however, we must fight against the effects of rationalisation, mobilise the workers along the whole line in the struggle to prevent the capitalists from intensifying the exploitation of the masses. In England the process of rationalisation began more intensively after the defeat of the General Strike and the miners. Under the Baldwin administration rationalisation was undoubtedly considerably accelerated with the aid of the entire labour bureaucracy, not only the so-called Right, but also the so-called Left wing elements. All of them have been won over to the question of "industrial peace" and the defence of parliamentary democracy. What is the peculiar situation in England with regard to the Labour Government? Where in the camp of the bourgeoisie is the Labour Government now being treated as an enemy, even in the moderate degree as in 1924. But the bourgeoisie, while not fearing the Labour Government itself, does fear the working masses in the country. That is why we systematically read in speeches of the leading politicians of the Liberal and Tory parties, a declaration of policy for the Labour Government to carry through, a condition for remaining in office. At the same time they are always lecturing MacDonald and the Labour Government on the advisability of keeping their eyes on the extremists in the movement.

With regard to the social fascist features; what are these? In the IV. section of the thesis of the VI. Congress, we have a series of characteristic features of fascism in different countries, and these, fit exactly the Labour Party. When we turn back to the Labour Government of 1924, we recall that one of the first acts of MacDonald was to put an ultimatum to the Indian nationalists not to expect anything from the Labour Government. Similarly we recall the treatment of Zaglul Pasha in Egypt, the building of the new cruisers, and, during the transport strike, the threat to use the Emergency Powers Act against the workers. We can also recall the secret military memorandum by Stephan Welsh for the railwaymen, in preparation for General Strike action in the country, and in preparation for war.

It is not necessary to mention the gross betrayal by the labour bureaucracy of the General Strike and the sabotage of the miners' struggle. In this period, moreover, we have also witnessed a terrific campaign against the militant workers in the trade union movement, and in the Labour Party, particularly directed against the Communists. We see in the Labour Party the beginning of the process of elimination of the Communists in order to have the entire hierarchy of the functionaries in the labour and in the trade union movement, working in concord to retain the Labour Government in office. This process of the elimination of the militant elements brings about at the same time the elimination of inner democracy in the Labour Party and paves the way for the complete fascism of the Labour Party. In this period also we can recall the opposition to the Chinese Revolution on the part of the labour bureaucracy, and

the sham fight against the Trade Union Act and other anti-working class legislation of the period.

It is a coincidence that in 1929 when MacDonald comes into the Government for the second time, the first thing he has to tackle is the question of the tremendous movement in India. Once again MacDonald has turned a deaf ear to the appeals of the workers of India and Britain to release those comrades now under arrest, for trying to organise the trade union and working class movement in India.

It is quite the biggest thing before us in Great Britain at the present moment — the situation in India. The characteristic feature of the movement in India at the present moment, is the complete solidarity of the Indian workers, their immunity from attempts of provocation in their struggle to build up the trade union movement and a working class party. The workers are no longer being intimidated by the old methods of the British imperialists. Consequently the British imperialists are resorting to methods of putting aside all pretence of democratic methods, and exposing the mailed fist. In this process MacDonald, in accordance with the process of continuity, carries forward the policy of Baldwin.

In Great Britain the industrial peace campaign which has gone on since the defeat of the general strike, is now passing over to a new phase, a phase of complete alliance between the employers, the labour bureaucracy and the State. The whole burden of the speeches of the labour bureaucrats and of the functionaries in the lower ranks is: "Do not embarrass the government", "do not do anything to interfere with the government" — what is now still more characteristic is: "Do not expect too much from the government". They are already anticipating their difficulties and are beginning to prepare the workers for the disillusionment that is coming very soon. Presumably we may be sure that those workers who put up any semblance of resistance to the government, who try to embarrass the government, will receive short shrift from the bureaucracy from the top to the bottom. The entire labour bureaucracy in the trade union movement and in the Labour Party are being turned on to this defence of the Labour Government.

Comrade Bela Kun spoke of the transformation of the Social Democracy into bourgeoisie. There is a special feature of this in England that I would like to draw attention to. Henderson, who used to be an iron moulder, Clynes and many of the other Cabinet Ministers and responsible officials in the Labour Government today who were formerly workers or intelligentsia of a lower degree, have become transformed into petty bourgeois not only in ideology, but in the whole of their social life. This process has gone on in the labour movement ever since the Party became fully developed, but the coming of the Labour Government has intensified this process to an unexampled degree. We see with the coming of the Labour Government all the petty functionaries in the Labour Party with their eyes definitely glued upon the Labour Government in the hope of obtaining State official positions, positions in the colonies and in the government apparatus. It is a process of corruption of the Labour Party and the trade union bureaucracy, and an indication of the transformation that is going on towards making the Labour Party into a social fascist organisation. While in the old days the Labour Party was a party of social reformism, today it has abandoned all pretence to fight and struggle against capitalism. The Labour Party has not only abandoned all pretence of fighting against capitalism, it has become its most valiant defender. But already we see in the many partial strike movements a considerable restlessness among the workers. What MacDonald has to reckon with is that the working class in England will not wait for the Social Democracy to hand out those concessions or demands which the workers are pressing for. In this situation we can look to the possibility of the Labour Government using all the forces of the State against the workers. The struggle of the Communist Party therefore becomes a struggle for winning the masses of the workers over to the Communist Party leadership and away from the leadership of the Labour Party which is defending capitalism through a policy of social fascism.

Now I come to the question of the Communist Party. Comrades have spoken here from the platform as if the C. P. in Great Britain has never been anything else but a Left wing of

the Labour Party. To say that means not to understand the history of the British Communist Party.

Comrade Pollitt in polemising with Comrade Rust correctly said that the line of the Party was quite correct until 1927 and the line of the Party was the C. I. line, the line endorsed by Lenin.

Of course, it is true that during the middle and latter part of 1927 we ought to have been quicker to see the changes than we did. This has never been disputed since it was first raised. It is also true that we had the assistance of the E. C. C. I. at the IX. Plenum when we were struggling to make a complete break with the policy of the Party in the past. It is true that the change from the old policy to the new was not effected without hesitation. But no Party, quite apart from the British Party, ever made such radical changes without considerable hesitation, without considerable vacillations, and without making a considerable number of mistakes. Our French comrades, up against the same problem, had to go into considerable discussions and had much hesitation before they overcome the traditional obstacles in their taking over the new line of the C. I. And it is not to be expected that a Party like the British Party, with a tradition of 8 years, a tradition which had the sanction of Lenin and the whole of the C. I., — it is not to be expected that this Party could make a volte face, directly in opposition to the previous line towards the Labour Party, in a month or two's time. We have remnants of the old line in the trade union work and in our attitude to the Labour Party. Lozovsky says that the feature of the British Party is that there have been no crises and the Party has always lived an ideal life. I had to interject and remind him of the crisis in the British Party in 1923. In 1923, the Party in conjunction with the Political Secretariat faced a crisis. The whole of our Political Bureau came here to Moscow to discuss the Party position, and took organisational methods to reorganise the Party and make complete changes in its work. I am not polemising on the shortcomings of the Party or trying to defend them. Shortcomings are one thing, but to allege, as it has been suggested, that there is an opposition inside the Party which the present leadership is trying to suppress — this is a complete perversion of the facts. There is no opposition in the Party which the present leadership is trying to suppress, or prevent from expressing its viewpoints.

Some comrades have said a great deal about the loss of membership in the Party. Of course, it is a bad thing if the Party attracts masses and then they go away again. But I would like to say that this is not peculiar to Britain. The Russian Party has had workers who have come into the Party, and have gone out of it again. All other Parties have this problem before them. It all amounts to a question of the degree of loss. You may say, why did the Party do nothing to absorb these new members and maintain them in the Party? That is a weakness of the Party which we must eliminate. But where the political level of the membership is not the highest, this was a difficult task. This question has engaged the attention of the Political Bureau of the Party as much as it has here in the Plenum. From this particular period when we understood that the membership was going away (we understood that the losses were due, besides our own organisational weaknesses, to the fact that the workers were being victimised and so on), we began to discuss the question of retaining them. We saw then that the weakness was in the district organisation. And the C. C. adopted a policy of unloading from the centre and sending the Political Bureau members into the districts to stimulate the membership and raise the organisational level in the districts, and put a stop to the membership going away from the Party.

A great song has been made about the fact that two members of the Political Bureau were not included in the recent reorganisation proposals. There are two different arguments, one from Comrade Rust and one from Comrade Ulbricht. The one from Comrade Rust was the complaint that he and Comrade Arnot, after the last Party Congress, were not recommended for inclusion in the Central Committee. I think it is necessary again to recount the exact facts regarding the situation. The Central Committee have been for a long time concerned with the overloading apparatus of the Centre, and have been also concerned with drawing fresh elements into the Central Committee. We did not need to wait for the open letter of the C. I. to the Party

Congress to tell us it was necessary to draw fresh elements into the Central Committee.

The Central Committee prior to the last Party Congress had this question in mind when they brought forward proposals that Comrades Rust and Arnot should not be included in the Central Committee. The C. C. made those proposals (which I did not agree with) for the purpose of allowing new elements to be brought into the Central Committee, comrades who in direct contact with the working class movement in the factories and in the trade unions. It was furthest from the mind of the Central Committee to exclude those members because of their critical attitude. That was a hopeless perversion of the situation, because any critical attitude expressed by those comrades had always been met by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and there has never been a line adopted by those comrades endorsed by the C. I. in opposition to the line of the Central Committee. If that was so, why did we not exclude Murphy who was even more critical of the Central Committee than either Rust or Arnot.

The more recent situation arises out of the proposals of the Central Committee to try and strengthen the work in the localities and the districts and unloading the Political Bureau by reducing its number from 9 to 5, having a small working Political Bureau with the other members of the Political Bureau to work in the districts, and helping to strengthen the organisational and political apparatus in the country. This policy of a smaller Bureau explains the situation which has arisen. When we find that two members hitherto associated with the Political Bureau find themselves outside. There is no reason to suggest that there is an organised Left opposition in the Party which is being suppressed. Of course, as I have already said with regard to the change of policy, there have been elements of hesitation there have been remnants of the old line and so forth, and this expresses itself in a certain differentiation in outlook among a number of comrades. I think it is possible for the Party to sort out this differentiation that is going on without anything in the shape of panicky methods, or provoking a crisis simply because we have not had one for a number of years. That is not the way to bring about the unity of the Party. It is the best way to disrupt the leadership of the Party by sowing distrust and destroying collective leadership in the Party. We must pay attention to Comrade Piatnitsky's views, because his speech was the most helpful speech for the British Party and other Sections, concerning the further line of the Parties. Comrade Piatnitsky says quite correctly that it is necessary for the Parties to eradicate all traces of Social Democracy in the ranks, especially the remnants of constitutionalism which is a feature not only of the British Party, but of the other Parties as well.

We must also understand (and I think it is one of our weaknesses, although the British Party percentage is, I think perhaps the strongest proletarian percentage in the C. I.) that our work, which has in the past been concentrated in the trade unions, should be concentrated on the building of factory groups and work directed in the factories, although at the same time we must not neglect all the possibilities offered to us in the trade unions and in developing the struggle against the labour bureaucracy in the trade unions. I think we can also acknowledge with Comrade Piatnitsky that we, too, have placed too much reliance on bureaucratic methods.

I myself believe it is more important to work through personal contact than by letters of instruction and directions to be carried out by others. We must make the Party leadership from top to bottom a living thing, and not a mechanical institution.

In Great Britain the potentialities at present for mass work are great and we are alive to the fact that this is an extremely critical situation for the Party. The Political Secretariat and the Plenum will help the Party to eliminate all remnants of the old line of the Right policy, of conciliation, inside the Party. The Political Secretariat and the Plenum will do this in accordance with the general practice, by helping to guide and build the Party, to encourage the Party, to consolidate its ranks in order to be able to carry through a correct C. I. policy and overcome the difficult period we are going through.