

# LABOUR FOCUS ON EASTERN EUROPE

A Socialist Defence Bulletin on Eastern Europe and the USSR



*Poland-*

***'The winter is theirs,  
but the spring...?'***

Solidarity's Complete Programme ● 40 Pages on Poland ● CND in GDR ● The Kosovo Crisis

## Statement of Aims

A growing number of socialists and communists are taking a stand against the suppression of democratic rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The labour movement has international responsibilities in this field as well as in the field of solidarity action with those struggling against oppression in Chile or Southern Africa or Northern Ireland.

But up to now socialists have lacked a source of frequent and reliable information about events in Eastern Europe. Coverage in the papers of the Left remains scanty, while reports in the bourgeois press are selective and slanted. The first aim of **Labour Focus on Eastern Europe** is to help fill this gap by providing a more comprehensive and regular source of information about events in that part of the world.

The mass media give ample space to Tory politicians and to some from the Labour Party who seek to use protests against repression in Eastern Europe as a cover for their own support for social inequality in Britain and for witch-hunts against those who oppose it. At the same time campaigns run by socialists in the labour and trade union movement for many years concerning victims of repression in Eastern Europe are largely ignored by the media. The second aim of this bulletin therefore is to provide comprehensive information about the activities of socialists and labour movement organisations that are taking up this issue.

**Labour Focus** is a completely independent bulletin whose editorial collective includes various trends of socialist and Marxist opinion. It is not a bulletin for debate on the nature of the East European states, nor is its purpose to recommend a strategy for socialists in Eastern Europe: there are other journals on the Left that take up these questions. Our purpose is to provide a comprehensive coverage of these societies with a special emphasis on significant currents campaigning for working class, democratic and national rights.

Whenever possible we will quote the sources of our information. Unless otherwise stated, all the material in **Labour Focus** may be reproduced, with acknowledgement. Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editorial collective.

In these ways we hope to strengthen campaigns to mobilise the considerable influence that the British labour movement can have in the struggles to end repression in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

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# EDITORIAL

## Socialists and Solidarity

All significant currents of opinion on the Left in this country have denounced the 13 December coup in Poland. But the Left still contains many who are sceptical about *Solidarity* itself.

It is, of course, normal for socialists and trade unionists to differ over the demands, tactics and strategy of any labour movement, and to have different views on this or that group of leaders. Thus, some British socialists may consider that *Solidarity's* leaders were too radical in their tactics, others may think they were too cautious or too moderate. Some socialists prefer that their leaders were not Christians — like Lech Walesa, Tony Benn and Eric Heffer — while others would not consider religious beliefs to be particularly relevant one way or the other.

But none of these debates should obscure the fundamental issue of the need for unconditional solidarity with *Solidarity* on the part of the British labour movement. It is worth reminding ourselves of some basic facts about the independent Polish labour movement so brutally deprived of its rights last December:

\* *Solidarity* was an enormous mass movement of working people, embracing 80% of all wage earners in the country — by far the biggest labour movement organization of any kind in Europe in proportion to population.

\* *Solidarity's* leadership and activities were under the democratic control of its membership — indeed its brand of radical, decentralized democracy has gone much further than most labour movements in Western Europe. So any idea that this huge movement could have been the plaything of some outside force is ridiculous.

\* *Solidarity's* links with Poland's working people were not only a matter of its composition and internal democracy: they were also shown in the movement's demands, programme and methods of action. (See the movement's complete programme reproduced in this issue of *Labour Focus*.) We challenge anyone to produce a single demand raised by *Solidarity* that contradicted the movement's democratic, egalitarian origins in the great strike movement of August 1980.

\* *Solidarity* was never simply a trade union. In a society in which the government claimed the right to decide every conceivable issue in public life, no independent labour movement could avoid 'politics'. And since the workers had no independent political parties to take up their political problems they turned to *Solidarity* to do so. More than that, the strike movement of August 1980 was fundamentally concerned with the political rights of the Polish people. They wanted control over their own affairs. All these things meant that *Solidarity* was a very special type of labour movement, combining trade-union and political demands and taking up a vast range of social problems. This should not surprise any socialist with any knowledge of the political system in Eastern Europe.

\* The Polish United Workers' Party (the Communist Party) leadership failed to honour the Gdansk Agreements and forced *Solidarity* to battle every inch of the way to gain the rights agreed at the end of the August 1980 strikes. No law legalizing independent trade unions was passed, no law guaranteeing the right to strike was passed, no law allowing access to the mass media was passed, and so on. Purely political trials continued throughout the time of *Solidarity's* open existence.

\* Despite all the levers of power in its hands, the PUWP leadership was unable to prevent the melting away of the Party membership during those 16 months. Hundreds of thousands of Communists left the Party and joined *Solidarity*. The most democratic congress in the PUWP's history in July 1981 was followed by the most catastrophic exodus of members — half a million in the following six months according to official figures. All this illustrates a central feature of the entire Polish crisis: the limited freedoms granted in the Gdansk Agreements were enough to ensure that the PUWP was incapable of retaining its hold over its own membership.

\* The entire course of *Solidarity's* open existence, its membership and the entire Polish people were continually threatened with crushing military attack from the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

\* At bottom, the fundamental issue in the Polish crisis was whether the Polish and Soviet leaderships were prepared to make basic political reforms entailing some real loss of their absolute political power. Without such reforms, which for *Solidarity's* leaders meant a good deal less than thoroughgoing democracy in this phase of Poland's history, confrontation was inevitable. Such a programme of reforms was not forthcoming. Instead, the country's rulers prepared and carried out a military coup against the Polish people.

\* It is known for certain that General Jaruzelski was heading a secret Committee of 'National Salvation' to carry out a coup from September of 1981. This tiny section of the population, bereft of popular support or legitimacy, later accused *Solidarity* of preparing a coup. What they referred to was the demand raised by *Solidarity* in December for elections and a referendum on whether the PUWP should continue to rule the country. By calling this the equivalent of a putsch, the Party leadership gave the clearest possible indication of what the Polish people thought of them. They knew that they would be swept from power.

This debate over the fundamental issue of working-class internationalism, a question of *principle* for socialists, must not be obscured by arguments about the international context of growing US militarism in which the Polish events have taken place, or about the relative importance of work on Poland as against activity in defence of the people of El Salvador and Guatemala at present being butchered by the client regimes of the United States.

But when it comes to the practical tasks of solidarity with *Solidarity*, *Labour Focus* stands for *labour movement* support in the form of material and political aid to the working people of Poland. Action by anti-socialist or anti-labour movement organizations not committed to the interests of working people here can be of little use to the people of Poland and, by being linked to propaganda drives against the left or in favour of re-armament, can easily be turned against working-class interests altogether.

*Labour Focus* therefore supports the Eastern Europe Solidarity Campaign and other purely labour movement initiatives and bodies taking up the defence of workers' rights in Poland. We also urge our readers to contact and channel support through the Solidarity Trade Union Working Group in the UK, the group of *Solidarity* members in this country seeking to co-ordinate help to their brothers and sisters in Poland. The addresses of these and other bodies can be found in the 'Labour Movement' section of this issue.

# POLAND & THE LEFT — By Eric Heffer

## 'An Attempt to Crush an Entire Labour Movement'

(Eric Heffer has been in the forefront of the campaign to gain support for Solidarity from the British labour movement. We publish here his speech in the House of Commons, summing up for the Labour Party in the emergency debate on Poland on 22 December.)

The Gdansk agreement of 31 August 1980 began by stating:

*'The performance of trade unions in the Polish People's Republic does not fulfil the hopes and expectations of employees. It is considered expedient to establish new self-governing trade unions that would genuinely represent the working class.'*

In a country with a Communist Party in control, supposedly representing the working class, it is admitted that neither the party nor the trade unions represent working people.

The agreement is a tremendous and historic document. As a result of it, freedom in Poland edged its way forward, with the bureaucratic society in Poland and in every other Communist-controlled country in Eastern Europe beginning to be undermined. The rulers of those countries have power and privileges and were not prepared enthusiastically to accept a new free trade union movement, so it was clear that sooner or later they would take action against the free trade unions in Poland because of the threat that they represented to their privileges and power.

Most of us feared that the action against *Solidarity* would come through direct military intervention from the Soviet Union, as happened in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It did not happen like that, but it would be foolish for any of us not to recognize the hand of Moscow here. It is clear that the Polish generals could not have acted as they did had they not had the approval of the Soviet Government and the Soviet military.

What we are witnessing in Poland is something unique, in the sense that we are seeing the demise of civilian party control and the development of military control. The old men of the Kremlin must be wondering what next. Not only the old men of the Kremlin must be wondering that. All bureaucratic Communist leaders in all parts of the world must be wondering what next, because of the military takeover.

As the Opposition and as the Labour Party, we believe that on issues such as human rights, trade union rights, freedom to publish and express one's opinion, the right of people to organize politically and to create political parties in a pluralist society and government by consent and democratic elections, there cannot be any double standards. That is why we are opposed to military or non-democratic Governments.

Whether it is Poland, Chile, Turkey, Greece,

Spain, Italy in the past, South Africa or any country in the world where there is a non-democratic Government and no real freedom of expression, we as democratic socialists take our stand against such regimes. We do not believe in double standards. Therefore, we call upon the Polish authorities, first to lift the ban on meetings and trade union activity and to rescind the state of emergency; secondly, to release all those who have been detained under the emergency powers; and thirdly, swiftly to return to civilian rule.

I shall not argue about unilateral or multilateral disarmament this evening. What is at stake is peace and detente in Europe — and that means in the world. If the Soviet Union intervenes, there is no question but that world peace is put in the balance.

The Polish Communist Party has had the option of fully implementing the Gdansk agreement and giving the Polish people a

real stake in power. By rejecting that course, the leaders of the Communist Party created the radical mood inside *Solidarity*, and it forced *Solidarity* to become political. I do not agree with my friend Arthur Scargill, who says 'It got beyond a union; they became political'. If people have no freedom, what is it expected that they will become but political? For me, politics means that anyone who wants to form a political organization or trade union organization to advance freedom has the right to do so.

An editorial in *The Times* on 16 December stated: 'The radicals in Solidarity overplayed their hand.' Such arguments ignore the reality of what is happening in Poland. That there is an attempt to crush an entire labour movement, involving millions of working people. There must be an alternative to that. The actions or words of a few radicals within the labour movement in Poland can never be used to justify attempts to crush the entire movement.

### Who was Preparing a Putsch?

There has been a lot of speculation on exactly when a decision was taken to opt for a military crackdown. In fact, there is irrefutable proof that a coup, and not simply contingency plans, was being prepared at least as early as September 1981.

A note in the bulletin of the Solidarity press agency (AS) No. 44, dated 26 September—12 October 1981, p. 205, reports a speech by A. Siwak, a Politburo member and ultra-Stalinist being steered by Party leader Stefan Olszowski. The item in AS reads as follows (English translation by the Information Centre for Polish Affairs):

'On 30 September 1981, at a meeting with members of branch unions in Krosno, A. Siwak informed those present that a six-man Committee of National Salvation had been formed, with Generals Jaruzelski and Kiszczak (Minister of Internal Affairs - trans.) at the head. Also that special units of the army and militia have been assigned the task of suppressing popular resistance. The leadership of the party and government would wait another two months before using these forces, until popular support for *Solidarity* had weakened. A decision to rescind the registration of *NSZZ Solidarity* is to be expected.'

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# SOLIDARNOŚĆ

## THE PROGRAMME OF SOLIDARNOSC

*(Many socialists feel they have no clear idea what Solidarity stood for and are reluctant to trust the opinion of others on the subject. For this reason, as well as because of the document's exceptional importance, we are publishing the complete programme drawn up at the Solidarity congress in October. The translation is by Labour Focus from the French version in L'Alternative.)*

### I. Who we are and what we want

The independent, self-governed union *Solidarity*, which was born out of the 1980 strike, is the most powerful mass movement in the history of Poland. The movement began among workers in large industrial enterprises in various regions of the country, reaching its peak in August 1980 on the Baltic coast. In the space of a year, it has won over all layers of the working population: workers, peasants, intellectuals and artisans.

Our union sprang from the people's needs: from its suffering and disappointment, its hopes and desires. It is the product of a revolt by Polish society after three decades of political discrimination, economic exploitation and violation of human and civil rights. It is a protest against the existing form of power.

For none of us was it just a question of material conditions — although we did live badly, working hard, often for no purpose. History has taught us that there can be no bread without freedom. We also wanted justice, democracy, truth, freedom of opinion, a reconstructed republic; not just bread, butter and sausage. Since all the basic values had been trampled on, we could not hope to improve the situation unless they were restored. Economic protest was also social protest, and social protest was also moral protest. These movements did not appear out of the blue, but inherited the blood of the workers killed in Poznan in 1956 and the coastal towns in December 1970. They also inherited the student revolt of 1968 and the suffering of the Radom and Ursus workers in 1976, as well as independent actions by workers, intellectuals and young workers, the Church's efforts to preserve values, and all Poland's struggles for human dignity. The union is the fruit of these struggles, and will remain faithful to them.

Our organization combines the features of a trade union and a broad social movement; it is this which gives us our strength and determines the importance of our role. Thanks to the existence of a powerful union organization, Polish society is no longer fragmented, disorganized and lost, but has recovered strength and hope. There is now the possibility of a real national renewal. Our union, representing the majority of workers in Poland, seeks to be and will become the driving force of this renewal.

*NSZZ Solidarity* embraces many social currents, bringing together people of different political and religious views and different nationalities. What unites us is a revolt against injustice, abuses of power and monopolization of the right to speak and act in the name of the nation. What unites us is our protest against a state which treats the citizen as its own property. We reject the fact that, in conflicts with the state, the workers have no genuine means of defence against the 'good will' of leaders who alone decide the degree of freedom that should be accorded to their subjects. We are against the principle which consists in rewarding absolute political obedience instead of encouraging initiative and action. We are united in rejecting duplicity in public life and the squandering of the nation's hard work.

But we are not just a force of rejection. Our aim is to rebuild a just Poland.

Respect for the person must be the basis of action: the state must serve people instead of dominating them. The state organization must be at the service of society and not be monopolized by a single political party. The state must really belong to the whole nation. Labour is made for people and finds its meaning when it corresponds to human needs.

Our national renewal must be based upon a proper re-ordering of these objectives. In determining its activity, *Solidarity* turns to the values of Chris-

tian ethics, our national working-class tradition, and the democratic tradition of the world of labour. John-Paul II's encyclical on human labour is a fresh source of encouragement. As a mass organization of the working people, *Solidarity* is also a movement for the moral rebirth of the people.

We believe that people's power is a principle that we do not have the right to abandon. But it does not mean the power of a group which places itself above society, arrogating to itself the right to define and represent the interests of society. Society must have the right to speak aloud, to express the range of social and political views. Society must be able to organize itself in such a way as to ensure a just distribution of the nation's material and spiritual wealth and a blossoming of all creative forces. We seek a true socialization of our government and state administration. For this reason our objective is a self-governing Poland.

We hold dear the idea of freedom and total independence. We shall support everything which strengthens the sovereignty of our nation and state, everything which furthers the development of national culture and knowledge of our historical legacy. We believe that our national identity must be fully respected.

The union formed itself and acts under difficult conditions, following a path that has never been taken before. Those who join us are concerned to solve the great problems facing Poland. Our strength and authority is such that people expect us to help in every field of life. We are compelled to fight for the existence of our union, to organize at every level, and to learn, often through our own mistakes, how we should act and struggle in pursuit of our aims.

Our programme reflects the desires and aspirations of Polish society. It seeks to fulfil distant objectives through the solution of present-day problems.


### II. The union in the country's present situation

The emergence of *Solidarity* as a mass movement has definitively changed the country's situation. It has become possible to set up new, independent social institutions, or to make independent those which have been subordinated to the state. The existence of independent organizations of power should be regarded as the most important factor in changing Poland's social and political relations.

There has been a change in the way power is exercised. The authorities should have come to terms with the will of society and accepted its control, in conformity with the Gdansk, Szczecin and Jastrzebie agreements. There should have been a reform of the economy, the state and its various institutions. We had the right to hope that the state would carry out these changes.

The present system of government, based on all-powerful central Party and state institutions, has brought the country to ruin. The brakes have been applied to change for more than just one year, although it is no longer possible to go on ruling in the old way. The situation is growing worse, and we are moving towards catastrophe with seven-league boots. Nowhere in Europe has the economic collapse reached such proportions since the Second World War. Tired and disappointed though it may be, society has shown a great deal of patience and determination during the last year. In the end, however, it is to be feared that exhaustion and impatience will become a blind, destructive force or plunge us into despair. We do not have the right, as a society, to lose hope in a solution to the crisis.

Faced with this national tragedy, *Solidarity* can no longer confine itself to pressurizing the government to keep its promises. Society looks on us as the only guarantors of the agreements that have been signed. This is why the union considers that its main task is to take every possible short-term and long-term action to save the country from bankruptcy, and society from poverty, dependency and self-destruction. The only way forward is to renew both state and economy through democratic social initiatives in every field.



Confrontation on Warsaw's main thoroughfare, Marszalkowska in August between the bus and tram drivers and the militia.

We are fully aware that Polish society expects from us actions that will allow people to live in peace. The nation will not forgive a betrayal of the ideals for which *Solidarity* was created. Nor will it forgive actions, even the best-intentioned, which lead to the spilling of blood and the material and spiritual destruction of the country. This awareness compels us to carry out our objectives in a gradual manner, so that each consecutive action obtains the support of society.

Our sense of responsibility compels us to look with clear eyes at the relationship of forces in Europe which resulted from the Second World War. Our aim is to perform our great labour of renewal without damaging international alliances; indeed, we seek to provide more solid guarantees for those alliances. The Polish nation, animated by a sense of its dignity, patriotism and traditions, will become a valuable partner from the moment when it consciously assumes its own commitments.

The country's present situation necessitates a two-sided programme: immediate actions to see us through the difficult winter period; and, at the same time, a programme of economic reform, which can no longer be postponed, of social policies and reconstruction of public life — a programme which points towards a self-governed Republic.

### III. The union, the crisis and economic reform

The roots of the present crisis lie deep in the economic and political system, and the way in which the authorities, ignoring the needs of society, have blocked all reform projects and squandered huge foreign loans. The crisis began to worsen in the mid-seventies, reaching a climax last year as a result of the government's incapacity to promote major changes.

Faced with economic catastrophe, the government has announced a programme to combat the crisis and restore economic stability. The union does not support this programme, which only partially makes use of our economic resources and does not inspire the confidence of society. In our view, government decisions have to be made credible if there is to be a rapid solution to the crisis. This is why we demand social control over the

government's anti-crisis measures. If they are to be credible, then people with some professional and social authority must be appointed to leadership positions in the national economy.

**Point one: We demand that, at every level of leadership, a democratic, self-management reform should enable the new economic and social system to combine planning, autonomy and the market.**

The union demands a reform that will abolish the privileges of the bureaucracy and make it impossible for them to reappear. The reform must encourage people to work and to show initiative, and not just remain a surface phenomenon. Since the reform will involve some social costs, the union must ensure that certain groups of the population are well protected.

1. The authoritarian direction of the economy, which makes rational development impossible, must be brought to an end. In this system, enormous economic power is concentrated in the Party apparatus and the state bureaucracy. The structure of economic organization serving this command system must be broken up. It is necessary to separate the apparatus of economic administration from political power. Enterprise managers should no longer be dependent upon the ministry, and nor should important appointments fall under the Party *nomenklatura*. The reform will only be successful if it results from the extensive activity of working groups, for which *Solidarity's* 'Network of Enterprise Commissions' may serve as an example. The activity of this network signalled the start of a large-scale self-management movement.

2. A new economic structure must be built. In the organization of the economy, the basic unit will be a collectively managed social enterprise, represented by a workers' council and led by a director who shall be appointed with the council's help and subject to recall by the council. The social enterprise shall dispose of the national property entrusted to it, working in the interests of society and the enterprise itself. It shall apply

economic calculation in the affairs of management. The state may influence enterprise activity through various regulations and economic instruments — prices, taxes, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and so on.

3. It is necessary to sweep away the bureaucratic barriers which make it impossible for the market to operate. The central organs of economic administration should not limit enterprise activity or prescribe suppliers and buyers for its output. Enterprises shall be able to operate freely on the internal market, except in fields where a licence is compulsory. International trade must be accessible to all enterprises. The union appreciates the importance of exports, which are of value to the country and the workers. Consumers' associations and anti-monopoly legislation should ensure that enterprises do not carve out a privileged place on the market. A special law must be introduced to protect consumers' rights. The relationship between supply and demand must determine price-levels.

4. The reform must socialize planning, so that the central plan reflects the aspirations of society and is freely accepted by it. Public debates are therefore indispensable. It should be possible to bring forward plans of every kind, including those drafted by social or civil organizations. Access to comprehensive economic information is therefore absolutely essential, requiring social control over the Central Statistics Board.

**Point two: The approach of winter necessitates immediate and energetic action; the union declares that people of good will are available.**

In the present state of the economy, this winter may be a dangerous time for the population. It is to be feared that the authorities are not able to face up to this danger. Social aid must be organized. Our union declares that men of good will are available.

1. Immediate action on the economy:

a) the union leadership will ask the government to communicate its programme for the winter;  
b) the union will call for an assurance that adequate heating and lighting will be available in both town and country, and that the market will be supplied with essential consumer items (warm clothing, food);  
c) workers' organizations and their enterprise commissions should watch over the extra production of industrial and, above all, food products on free Saturdays; they should agree a position on the distribution of such goods, directing them to the places most in need; and they should adjust production to the existing energy restrictions, reaching agreement with regional union leaderships.

2. Social mutual aid

The union should organize winter relief services, at both a local and enterprise level. Their aim should be: to assure, together with the scouts and the NSZ, supplies of food and coal to particularly vulnerable sections of the population; to organize housing-repair teams for such people and to protect them from the effects of winter; to use enterprise vehicles for school busing, doctors' calls, etc.; to help supply the town population with potatoes, vegetables and fruit; and to organize the distribution of aid from abroad. Enterprise relief services should help to solve supply problems, concerting their activity at a district and regional level.

**Point three: The defence of workers' living standards requires collective action against falling output.**

The primary task facing us today is to halt the fall in output. It is necessary to improve supplies by using internal reserves, and to increase the possibilities for importing raw materials and spare parts. This will depend on the effectiveness of our anti-crisis reform programme, on an increase in exports, and on the securing of credits from both East and West.

In our view, the government should investigate the conditions under which Poland might join the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and present them to the public. At the same time, we should do everything possible to maximize output by using the country's existing resources.

1. New investment must be limited, and materials saved in this way should be used in existing enterprises.

2. It is necessary to use surplus stocks of materials, machinery and plant, making it easier for them to be sold abroad and selling them to private enterprises within Poland. Present restrictions on the activity of such enterprises must be lifted.

3. Given the particular importance of coal and other raw materials, it is essential to prioritize rapid growth in mining employment and technical equipment. The conditions must also be created for a future rise in output. Although the situation is very difficult in many regions of the country, priority must be given to food supplies for the mining areas. People should be encouraged to save coal, above all in the enterprises, but also at home.

4. In principle, the peasant economy must receive a larger share of means of production, especially agricultural tools and machinery, fertiliser and fodder (above all of the high-protein variety). This will permit higher food

production, since the peasant economy is more efficient than the socialized sector.

5. Given the disastrous shortage of energy and raw materials, a number of factories will have to be closed in the coming months. Any decision must be based on the criteria of economic efficiency. Closures must be kept to the minimum necessary, and implemented only when there is no possibility of rationally altering production.

6. In several fields, the length of the working week does not at present crucially affect the volume of production. However, being aware of the requirements of this crisis situation, we may forego demanding the introduction of more free Saturdays in 1982. If it is possible for overtime work to be performed on free Saturdays, any decision must depend on the wishes of the workforce.

7. During this crisis period, arms expenditure must be reduced to a strict minimum, and the resources made available should be used to increase output.

**Point four: The union recognizes the need for a restored market equilibrium, in the framework of an effective anti-crisis programme that will involve a rational reform and protect the weakest sections of the population.**

The main way in which market equilibrium will be restored is through an increase in the production and supply of goods. However, this will not be enough to restore market equilibrium in the short term. It will also be necessary to reduce the demand for goods. This may be achieved by the following methods: a) a gradual rise in prices, together with the transitional retention of ration cards for major consumption items; b) a single round of price increases, together with the abolition of ration cards; c) a currency reform together with a reform of prices. A number of solutions and combinations are possible within this general framework. Some individual proposals are submitted to the union leadership in an appendix to this document; but other proposals are not ruled out.

Only if there is a simultaneous rise in production will these methods prove effective. If none of them is implemented, there will have to be a rationing system for all goods. But this would destroy the market equilibrium, inevitably leading to waste and artificial shortages, further swelling the bureaucracy and the black market, and removing the motivation for greater work-efficiency. Nor would it in any way protect the real purchasing-power of the population.

After public discussion, society must itself choose one of these methods through a referendum. The union will demand that this happens. The sooner it takes place, the less will be the social costs of market equilibrium.

**Point five: The anti-crisis struggle and the economic reform must be subject to the control of society.**

The effectiveness of the anti-crisis struggle hinges on the development of a programme decided by the population, and above all on social control over the way in which it is carried out. The union hopes that such control will eventually be exercised by a new Diet, national councils and workers' committees.

However, the institutions of social control must be created forthwith. The ordeals of the sixties and last year have taught us that the absence of social control leads to wrong decisions and favours inaction and private interests. The union therefore proposes the creation of a Social Council of the National Economy, whose tasks would be to assess government economic policy, to examine the economic situation and relevant legislation, and to take initiatives in this field. The Council must have the right to present draft legislation. Its deliberations should be made known to the public, and its members should be able to communicate with society through the mass media.

**Point six: Although the union will protect everyone, it will take special care of the poorest sections.**

We shall prioritize action to protect those whose lives are most seriously affected by the crisis. In conformity with the Gdansk agreements, we shall demand measures in 1982 to introduce a cost-of-living supplement, to generalize the system of educational grants, to raise family allowances, and to introduce a minimum subsistence threshold as the basis for an incomes policy.

The union considers that subsidies should guarantee the purchasing-power of the least well-off. It is essential:

- that subsidies should be given to workers (and pensioners), as well as to their dependants;
- that the level of prices should proportionately determine all social benefits;
- that there should be an income-ceiling for social benefits, and an increase in the budget of child-care institutions, asylums and hospitals;
- that the union should adopt the principle of relating benefits to income.

Compensation must be paid for any rise in the price of an established list of goods and services. Price increases, as well as the availability and amount



Peasant woman from a village in South Eastern Poland.

of benefits, must be agreed by the union.

We demand a major rise in social welfare. The union will seek to moderate the effects of inevitable price rises on the cost of everyday life: a) by checking on the price index of basic items; b) by encouraging social initiatives to control the quality and price of goods; and c) by calling for a special fund to restrain retail price rises on certain goods and services (milk, school-books, children's clothing, etc.).

**Point seven: Food supply is now the most important problem; ration coupons must be honoured in practice, and food should be distributed under social control.**

Given the shortage of the most essential food items, the union is compelled to demand a system of regulation which ensures that every citizen has the minimum necessary. At present various rationed items, especially meat, are not available in sufficient quantity, particularly since there is also a lack of substitutes (fish, dairy produce).

The union demands energetic government action to ensure that rationed items are available in sufficient quantity on the market, and above all that the peasants are motivated to deliver livestock and increase animal-rearing.

As output and supply reach a higher level, the quality of regulated products must be improved. We demand better organisation of the trade and regulation system, so that queueing is no longer necessary to satisfy the need for rationed items.

**The nation's food-supply is a question of paramount importance.**

The union will not remain inactive in the face of the present supply situation. It is essential to create a country-wide network of union commissions, together with a central co-ordinating body, which will concern themselves with the market and food-supply situation. These commissions will co-operate with Rural Solidarity, opposing the bartering practices of large enterprises, which undermine our solidarity.

**Point eight: The union will oppose social inequalities between enterprises and regions.**

The economic reform will carry a danger of great social and income inequality between enterprises and regions. We must create the conditions in which such inequalities can be attenuated.

Our efforts will be aimed at: a) bringing social action and enterprise welfare activity under the responsibility of the regional committee; and b) creating a socially controlled national fund to transfer capital from one region to another and thereby to reduce inequalities.

The union is currently seeking to change the method of financing enterprise welfare activity, so that the allocation of social funds to the enterprise will depend on the size of its workforce rather than its total wage-bill; to ensure that the local population has access to the enterprise's social provisions (creches, cultural activity, transport); and to form local joint commissions with the district or neighbourhood population, whose task will be to decide on the operation and development of the social infrastructure.

#### IV. Labour protection as the union's basic task

The protection of workers' rights, the way in which the employer actually treats the work-force, the character of working conditions, health, work safety, the payment of a fair wage — all this is the main focus of union activity.

**Point nine: The right to work must be guaranteed, and the wage system overhauled.**

We demand the right to work for all; there should be no unemployment. Although employment policy must be set right, this can be done without loss of jobs. Thus, if an enterprise envisages a decline in activity, working conditions should be changed in such a way that jobs are retained or working hours reduced without loss of pay.

The Union considers it necessary to provide legal and other conditions for leaving jobs in the socialized economy and for engaging in the non-socialized economy. The issue of labour emigration must be legally regulated. In connection with that, the *Solidarity* KK will get in touch with trade unions abroad to encompass under union protection Polish citizens seasonally working abroad.

The Union will resolutely resist all staff reductions unless there are social guarantees for people who are temporarily unemployed: the regulation of their statuses, appropriate allowances, the regulated principles of retraining opportunities. In the sphere of providing jobs, *Solidarity* will accord special solicitude to sole providers of the family, single mothers, employees short of retirement and the partially disabled.

Regional Boards will form special employment commissions.

It is necessary to reform the wage-system in such a way as to guarantee fair wages and equal payment for equal work. Under the conditions of the economic reform, this should signify that the state, in consultation with trade unions, must fix the level of guaranteed wages. It should be uniform for the entire country. We propose a number of objectives for the reform of the wage-system: a) a uniform bonus system; b) a minimum wage set above subsistence level at 50 per cent of the average wage; c) taxation of high incomes (we shall have various proposals on this); d) significant increments to the basic wage for workers in arduous or unhealthy jobs, although this should not halt the struggle to improve working conditions; e) the abolition of piece-rates; and f) the conclusion of branch agreements within the framework of collective wage settlements, although priority should be given to sectors where there is a labour shortage.

The union advises against fresh collective settlements before the National Commission rules on the matter.

We shall seek to obtain uniform wage grids, while preserving enterprise autonomy. If any occupational group negotiates on wages, it should take the occupational average as its reference-point in drafting an agreement. A special wages commission should supervise plans to reform the system of wages and collective agreements.

**Point ten: Workers should have their health and safety ensured.**

1. The Union will advocate steps to produce machines, equipment and tools in line with the requirements of guaranteeing appropriate working conditions.
2. The union will seek to eliminate dangerous, harmful to health and particularly onerous jobs. The Union will regard as a priority task the formation on new principles of a trade union institution for labour inspection. In the sphere of labour safety and hygiene, the union's activity will be coordinated by a special unit set up under the National Commission.

The unit will in particular:

- compile and publish a collection of labour safety and hygiene regulations for factory commissions;
- legally regulate problems involving working conditions and safety, and in particular: a) legally regulate issues connected with post-accident indemnizations and the insurance system; b) ratify the ILO convention guaranteeing the union's participation in defining admissible labour norms.

3. In the event of labour safety and hygiene conditions being substantially neglected, the Union will make use of its statutory rights, including ordering its members to abstain from work. Factory commissions have the duty currently to supervise the observation of the maximum permissible standards of concentration and intensity.

4. The National Commission will take immediate steps to extend the rights due to first-category workers on all jobs (but not trades) with particularly onerous, harmful and dangerous working conditions.

5. The National Commission will take similar steps to change regulations concerning the protection of workers who, as a result of a labour accident or a professional illness, have lost their ability to continue with their previous jobs. New regulations should oblige the enterprise to pay such workers constant allowances to compensate for the difference in their wages.

6. At self-governing and self-financing enterprises, the Union will demand economic and financial planning which takes the need to improve working conditions into account. The Union will control the implementation of those plans and outlays for labour safety and hygiene (trade unions, health services, labour safety and hygiene, social and other services) must be coordinated.

**Point eleven: The right to work must be based on defence of the workers' common interests.**

The union considers essential a sweeping reform of the present situation with regard to the right to work and job-safety. Such a reform must take up, in particular:

- a ban on any limitation of the choice of work;
- equal rights and duties in the job contract;
- legal initiatives by the union on work-relations and safety;
- legal powers for the union to secure decent working conditions and job-safety;
- the possibility of concluding collective agreements with regard to specific occupations, branches of activity and workplaces;
- the settlement of labour disputes by independent parity tribunals;
- the suppression of disciplinary sanctions affecting pay, holidays or safety;
- the creation of jobs for pregnant women, and legislation protecting prison labour.

In co-operation with the union's commission for the reform of the labour law and social insurances, the union will work out its own appropriate draft regulations.

## V. A society of solidarity, a common policy

**Point twelve: The union adopts all the initiatives contained in the Constitution to satisfy the most pressing needs.**

The centralized system has proved its ineffectiveness and failure to adjust. The population rejects it, yet passively expects to receive benefits from the state. Social policy, in conformity with the above principles, must be subjected to genuine socialization.

The union seeks to act within a clearly defined framework of branches and regions.

1. It is up to the union to decide the broad outlines of its activity, and to establish a series of priorities. We therefore reject the existing schemas, particularly the fact that the union cannot issue specific instructions to workplace committees.
2. Within the enterprise, the workplace committee mainly attends to working conditions, wages and employment; the union will carry out other tasks in the neighbourhoods. Workplace committees should co-operate with local community associations, encouraging local self-government when their influence makes this possible.
3. A key supportive role in national self-government will be played by self-governing groups of the town population, local community associations, and all other committees taking initiatives that concern the collective interest. National self-government will involve larger-scale decisions, and should reconcile the sometimes divergent particular interests.
4. Every decision concerning the community, as well as the resolution of divergences of interest between branches and regions, should be conducted under everyone's control. It is therefore necessary to revise the role of the supervisory council, to re-examine enterprise safety, and so on.
5. The union will revive the idea of mutual aid by establishing special services to improve the training of society's workers.

**Point thirteen: The union defends the family's right to satisfy its needs and develop social awareness.**

Family policy should allow the blossoming of the younger generation and the improvement of the family's living conditions, both at the material level and in the fields of health and education.

Enterprise committees and other union bodies will work to achieve:

1. The abolition of night-work for women (in accordance with convention 89 of the ILO).
2. The introduction of 'flexitime', and possibilities of part-time work for pregnant women.
3. The exemption of women from all arduous tasks (carrying heavy loads, etc.); job-security and rest leave after the seventh month of pregnancy, in addition to the existing 98 days of maternity leave.
4. A special sector protected from the market which will sell items produced by disabled and maladjusted people. This sector should be obligatory and under control.

The union is in favour of:

- local initiatives for mutual aid and family protection (e.g., 'Family Solidarity');
- pre-marital clinics and home visits;
- measures which create decent living conditions for unmarried mothers, thereby discouraging abortion;
- the creation of family protection units.

The union should also seek:

1. As envisaged in the 21 points, a uniform basis for calculating family benefit for all socio-occupational groups, including working peasants. (In the years ahead, family benefits should become one of the factors limiting inequality; they should be calculated according to family income, gradually rising to cover the costs of children's education.)
2. Maternity benefit during two or three years for all mothers (and not just those who work).
3. Expansion of pre-school child-care, and better conditions for children in the creches and nurseries. Korczak-type kindergartens should be opened, and religious personnel should again be allowed to run creches and nurseries.
4. Changes in the hire-purchase system.
5. Ratification of the ILO Convention on women's night-work in industry.

**Point fourteen: The Union will defend the rights of the elderly, disabled and severely ill.**

The Union expects the state to:

1. Introduce a uniform general system of normal and disability pensions with uniform criteria for granting benefits, depending on remuneration, length of service and working conditions.
2. Introduce special disability payments ensuring an existence minimum to persons who, because of their age or ill health, are unable to work and are not entitled to pensions or disability payments.
3. Liquidate the old system of normal and disability pensions.
4. Introduce special privileges for old-age pensioners and recipients of

disability pensions (reduced rail fares and so on).

5. Subordinate the commission for the disabled and for employment to the social security agency.

The Union will sponsor the development of household services for elderly and disabled persons and the organization and establishment of homes for temporary sojourn. The Union will support social initiatives aimed at ensuring assistance for the severely ill.

Through the factory commissions, the Union will take care of employees who retire, help them adapt to new conditions and make it possible for them to keep in touch with their enterprises.

The Union will fight discrimination against disabled people by:

- a) sponsoring and organizing social and vocational rehabilitation of such people.
- b) calling for means of communication and buildings as will allow their use by disabled people.
- c) supporting the establishment of new rehabilitation centres and the development of the production of rehabilitation equipment and other installations for disabled people; the *Solidarity* inter-regional disability fund will enable the implementation of these aims.
- d) supporting employees of co-operatives for the disabled in implementing the rehabilitation tasks of co-operatives.
- e) promoting the factory commissions' activities aimed at increasing the number of protected jobs; this will allow disabled people to lead a normal life.

**Point fifteen: In view of the biological dangers to the nation, the protection of health is an area in which the union takes a special interest.**

Social expectations concerning health protection are now greater than what the health service is able to do in this regard. There is a shortage of medicines, medical equipment, posts, premises, means of transport and so on. The defective organization of the health services makes this state of affairs even worse.

Saving the nation's health and liquidating the biological dangers threatening it requires mobilizing the now limited resources and mapping out the most important action lines. The Union regards as such lines:

1. The protection of maternity and of children's and young people's health.
2. Activities to ensure the complete supplies of medicines and other medical resources that are necessary urgently to save life and limb and to ensure the proper medical conditions in health service centres; the activity of the *Solidarity* pool of medicines will continue.
3. Activities to protect mental health and, especially, to create humane conditions in psychiatric hospitals and to complete work on the mental health protection law in such a form as to make it impossible to use it in order to violate civic rights.
4. Activities to rehabilitate socially people afflicted by alcoholism and drug addiction, especially those among young people, and to assist the families of such addicts.
5. Activities to improve the health care of elderly people and to supplement such care by social assistance.

The Union takes the view that if the health service is to perform properly it is necessary to:

1. Entrust the decisions and control concerning the protection of health and the National Health Protection Fund (NFOZ) to territorial self-government groups.
2. Change the structure of the health service and the principles of financing the service by changing the system of social insurance within the framework of economic reform.
3. Ensure that all health services (including industrial and departmental health services) are available and are properly utilized; the industrial health service should focus its efforts primarily on preventive measures, and medical treatment (with allowance for the specific conditions of work enterprises) should be taken over by suitably organized health centres at the place of residence.
4. Entrust the task of allotting all vacancies in sanatoriums exclusively to the health service.
5. Make efforts to raise the professional ethics of the health service; this is related to the need to restore the profession to its proper status by, inter alia, changing the system of remuneration and reintroducing self-managing medical chambers. (IZBY)

We ask the authorities to present promptly a report on the state of health protection, to draw up a register of the basic unsatisfied needs and to work out an action programme for the immediate and more distant future.

**Point sixteen: The union in the struggle for the environment.**

Protection of the environment requires:

1. Explicit prioritization of social objectives over production.
2. Approval and publication of the necessary measures.

3. Awareness of the pillage and devastation of the natural environment in the field of the economy, and the introduction of non-polluting risk-free techniques.

4. Real defence of nature through environmental restoration and better use of natural beauty spots and parks.

We therefore demand:

1. An assurance that protection of the environment will really be a factor in the elaboration and realization of the economic reform.
2. The creation of a sizeable fund for defence of the environment, to be placed at the disposal of the self-governed communes.
3. New regulations on environmental protection that will allow the union to play an active role.
4. Representation on relevant bodies for all nature-protection societies.
5. The listing of enterprises whose activity threatens the environment; access to information about the crucial areas of water-purification and new industrial construction.
6. Information about the dangers to nature and public health, and reports on the content of research into the matter.


In order to solve these problems, we have to:

1. Encourage union members to join environmental defence committees; check on the legality of industrial practices; foster new techniques that are not harmful to nature; and bring the factories up to date.
2. Ensure that regional experiences in the protection of nature inspire the activity of enterprises working to improve the environment.
3. Adopt a union position on state projects and draft legislation concerning this matter.

**Point seventeen: The union demands that the people's basic rights to housing are respected, and that an effort is made to improve the habitat.**

The Union participates in developing housing and communal construction in order to:

1. Create opportunities for implementing initiatives in housing construction, especially in co-operative housing; accelerate the development of building sites; use the potential of industrial construction enterprises for the benefit of housing construction; comprehensively assist the producers of building materials and enterprises and plants working for housing construction; and ensure the necessary construction quality by — inter alia — abolishing piecework and improving working conditions.
2. Facilitate the establishment and development of communal, co-operative and private construction enterprises and small plants producing building materials.
3. Restore the autonomy of housing co-operatives and, at the same time, abandon patronage and factory-sponsored construction, the Union should see that the new independent housing co-operatives have the right to be registered.



**A miners' cottage near Katowice**

4. Create conditions for rationally developing individual housing construction (in towns and villages) and ensure it has fiscal, material and technical assistance.
5. Prevent the construction of housing settlements in polluted areas and the use of health-endangering materials.
6. Modernize and expand communal and service installations in towns, small towns and villages.
7. Abolish all regulations that make it impossible to exchange apartments, regardless of their character and type.
8. Normalize apartment rents to safeguard apartment resources and ensure funds to repair apartments and funds to provide apartment grants for the poorest sections of the population; the factory commissions should change the tenets for using the apartment fund and introduce new forms for using this fund and grants to supplement the apartment rents paid by poorer people, increased assistance for old-age pensioners and recipients of disability pensions, increased payments to meet the cost of capital overhauls, and so on.

The regional boards will assume social supervision over implementing

housing policy and over the correctness of town and country planning and will ensure social control over the design and construction of new housing settlements.

**Point eighteen: The union should ensure that all workers have free time to raise their cultural level.**

1. Union members will seek a better organization of working time, so that they are able to rest and raise their cultural level during leisure hours.
2. To this end, the union will strive to introduce, by steps, a five-day week for all, as the functioning of the economy improves. While naturally taking into account various social constraints, the union will attend to the problem of Saturday and Sunday work for public employees and workers in the commercial and cultural sectors. It will make it possible for them to engage in sporting activity at various times of the week, month and year.
3. In order to ensure that holidays really are a period of relaxation, the union will campaign for: financial provisions in the enterprise social budget to provide leisure for all; and the extension of holiday periods.

The conditions will thereby be created for educational and cultural activity during the holidays.

Acting at the level of occupational branches, the union will have to make it possible for members to take time off work to involve themselves in management problems within the enterprise or the local community. Such time will be devoted to the creation of local or broader services. The union must also ensure that such time off is allowed to workers in attached enterprises.

The union will encourage the formation of inter-enterprise and community-based physical training clubs, whose aim should be to enable real relaxation through recreational and sporting activity.

## VI. The self-governed Republic

**Point nineteen: Pluralism of social, political and cultural ideas must form the basis of democracy in the self-governed Republic.**

1. Public life in Poland requires deep reforms which should lead to the definitive establishment of self-government, democracy and pluralism. For this reason, we shall struggle both for a change in state structures and for the development of independent, self-governing institutions in every field of social life. Only such a course can guarantee that the institutions of public life are in harmony with human needs and the social and national aspirations of Poles. Such changes are also essential if the country is to find a way out of the economic crisis. We consider that pluralism, democracy and full enjoyment of constitutional rights provide the guarantee that the workers' efforts and sacrifices will not be wasted once again.
2. Our union is prepared to collaborate with the various social movements, particularly with other unions created since August 1980 which belong to the broad Solidarity movement (the Union of Individual Farmers, the Artisans' Union, the Private Transport Drivers' Union), as well as other independent, self-governed unions which present legislation prohibits from joining our movement. In fact, such legislation must also be changed. In Poland today, the freedom of trade-union organization and the right to choose the union to which one belongs are of crucial importance to the workers. We therefore believe that the trade-union law is our most precious asset: it must guarantee the freedoms mentioned above.
3. Our union maintains special links with the Independent Students' Association and with independent youth movements like the Scouts. These organizations and associations are encountering many obstacles to their activity and registration. We believe it is necessary to pass a new law which will guarantee the complete freedom of association to citizens.
4. We hold that the principles of pluralism should apply to political life. Our union will assist and protect civil initiatives which seek to propose different socio-political and economic programmes to society. But we will oppose any initiative by leaders of our union to set up political parties.
5. Faithful to the principles of pluralism, our union accepts the possibility of coexistence with other unions.
6. Unless there is a complete reform of penal law, and particularly of that part which can be used to repress civil rights, the principles of pluralism will always be threatened.

**Point twenty: True self-government is the guarantee of a self-governed Republic.**

The system which ties political to economic power, based on continual Party interference in the functioning of enterprises, is the main reason for the present crisis of the Polish economy. The so-called 'nomenklatura' principle rules out any rational cadre-promotion policy, rendering the millions of workers who do not belong to any party second-class citizens.

The only solution is to create workers' self-management committees which will give the real decision-making power to enterprise personnel. Our union demands that the self-management principle should be rein-

troduced into the co-operatives. It is essential to pass a new law protecting the co-operatives against interference by the state administration.

**Point twenty-one: Regional self-government structures, legally and financially autonomous, should genuinely represent the interests of the local population.**

The self-government of a regional structure is based on the principle of free elections. Everyone should be free to stand, with equal rights for all candidates. A wide election campaign should be organized, so that the various candidates can put forward their point of view. The forthcoming national council elections should be held in the same conditions.

*Solidarity* will insist on this point, drawing up by the end of December 1981 a project for a new electoral system which will be presented to the Diet after consultation with our membership.

Regional self-government bodies should have the right to decide on all regional matters. They may be subject to control by the state administration, in conformity with the law. But such control should be confined to examination of the activity of such bodies in order to establish whether it is in conformity with the law. In the case of a dispute between a self-government body and the state administration, the competent tribunal should issue a ruling. The regional self-government bodies should have the right to act on economic matters, and be able to collaborate with other self-government bodies. In order that these aims may be fulfilled, the self-government bodies should have the status of a moral entity, with the right to acquire financial means through local taxation, and so on.

The First Congress of Solidarity recommends the National Commission to draft a law on regional self-government along the above lines. This should be opened up for consultation and then presented to the Diet. *Solidarity* will encourage any initiative by self-government bodies which serves to resolve the problems bound up with the economic crisis.

**Point twenty-two: The self-government bodies and structures must be represented at the highest level of the state power.**

1. It is essential to grant the unions the right of legislative initiative.
2. We shall fight to restore supreme power to the Diet. The new election system must give it a genuinely representative character.
3. We consider it useful to examine the case for a self-governing body at the highest level of state power. Its task would be to supervise the implementation of the economic reform programme, as well as the activity of regional self-government bodies.

**Point twenty-three: The system should guarantee the main civil liberties and respect the principles of equality for all citizens and public institutions.**

This necessitates:

1. Respect for the principles and commitments emanating from the international conventions ratified by Poland, and from the Universal Charter of Human Rights. In particular, ratification of the optional protocol to the Universal Charter of Human Rights — which provides for international supervision of the Charter's practical application — will furnish in our eyes the necessary guarantee.
2. Explicit mention in the Constitution of the principle of equality of all citizens, regardless of their convictions, ideas and political affiliation.
3. Application of the law to all factors of public life, including political and social organizations. It is necessary to amend those articles of the Constitution which deal with the role of such organizations, and to define explicitly the relationship to the Diet of all such organizations, as well as the other organs of the state administration.
4. The creation of an independent Constitutional Court (or of an equivalent chamber within the Supreme Court), which will rule on the constitutionality of legislation and on the legality of other rights and decrees. The Constitutional Court should also check that Polish legislation is in conformity with the international rights of man.
5. A change in the law on public gatherings, associations and passports. (The passport law should express the right of everyone freely to choose their abode, even if it is abroad, and the right freely to return to Poland.) Any limitation of civil liberties must be subject to judicial control.
6. Abolition of secrecy in public life, and a guarantee that all citizens have access to state documents. Any decision which tends to introduce secrecy must be precisely defined by the law.

**Point twenty-four: The administration of justice must be independent, and the repressive apparatus must be subject to social control.**

In order that this may be achieved, it is essential:

1. To conduct a thorough reform of the judicial system, and to ensure scrupulous respect for its independence.

This can be guaranteed by:



Men in uniform at a Central Committee meeting of the Communist Party.

a) Setting up completely self-governing bodies in the judiciary, which would have, inter alia, a decisive say in all judicial appointments and the appointment of the president of the court.

b) Observing the principle that the function of judge must not be combined with any other public service, especially service in political organizations, and that judges cannot be transferred or removed, except through disciplinary action or in case of illness.

These guarantees should be recorded in an amended Law on the System of General Courts and in the Law on the Supreme Court. These laws should also make it possible to recall a judge on the motion of the general assembly of judges within a transition period of one year of the law coming into force. Moreover, it is necessary for the Supreme Court to abolish the practice of appointing judges for a term.

c) Appointing lay assessors and members of the college for offences by direct election in order to increase society's role in the administration of justice.

2. To do away with the state's arbitrary powers in the economy. Economic disputes should fall under the normal judicial competence.

3. To ensure correct functioning of the judicial apparatus through:

a) the independence of the examining magistrate attached to a particular court, and the allocation to him of exclusive responsibility for pre-trial investigations and decisions on custody;

b) a reform of the public prosecutor's office, limiting his role to penal-law cases; bringing him under the Ministry of Justice, and ensuring his independence in carrying out his functions;

c) the complete independence of lawyers, and measures to ensure that defence counsel has the right to attend preliminary hearings regardless of whether the body in charge of the case so approves; and  
d) the removal from police tribunals to proper courts of all cases potentially involving a custodial sentence, and Ministry of Justice control over the functioning of such tribunals.

4. To pass a law on the militia, limiting its role to the defence of public order and citizens' safety, with no interference in the field of politics. By failing to distinguish political activities which threaten public order from other such activities, the militia has committed a number of abuses. There must be a new law on the secret services, precisely defining their area of competence and providing for social control over their activity.

5. Within the prison system, it is necessary to define the situation of political prisoners, to establish a charter of rights and obligations for all detainees, and to bring the prison system under social control. The social readjustment centres should be disbanded.

6. No one may be forced to act against their convictions. Another, non-military form of public service should be allowed for conscientious objectors. The Union will defend anyone persecuted for their trade-union, political or social convictions.

**Point twenty-five: In a Poland based on law, no one should be persecuted for their convictions, nor compelled to act against their conscience.**

In conformity with paragraph 4 of the Gdansk agreement, our union is prepared to defend anyone persecuted for their political convictions. We shall insist on implementation of the Warsaw agreement concerning the release of political prisoners and the cessation of judicial procedures against people who have expressed opposition to the existing regime. If repression is used against union militants, we shall use every means in our power to defend them.

It is absolutely essential to amend the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure — especially those paragraphs which allow for action against people who express different views from those propagated by the Party and government.


No one should be held for more than twenty-four hours without charge. Decisions on this matter should be taken by the examining magistrate, so that it no longer has a repressive character.

**Point twenty-six: The people responsible for the ruination of the country should be prosecuted.**

We demand explanations and the identification of those responsible for the massacre and persecution of the workers of Poznan in 1956 and the Baltic coast in 1970, students in 1968 and the Radom and Ursus population in 1976, as well as for the Bydgoszcz provocation in 1981. Such persons ought to be punished with all the severity of the law.

The same procedure should be instituted against those who, by their actions between 1970 and 1980, have brought the country to economic ruin. It should spare no one, including those who occupy the highest functions in the Party and government.

The principle of equality before the law, an elementary sense of justice, and the need to give concrete reality to the changes that have begun oblige the union to insist categorically on this point. If legal proceedings



**'We demand ... the identification of those responsible for the massacre and persecution of the workers of Poznan in 1956 .**

have not begun by 1 December, the National Commission will convoke a People's Tribunal to hold a public trial and render a verdict.

**Point twenty-seven: The younger generation ought to have favourable conditions for its physical, mental and moral development.**

The education of our children should be under our control alone. The union will oppose any attempt to subordinate the education system to the ideological, physical and economic interests of the ruling power. We will fight for all young people to have free access to national and world culture, and for every child to have an equal opportunity of development.

The union will support:

- actions to satisfy the needs of economically deprived families and to facilitate the advancement of retarded young people;
- actions to improve the system of protection for homeless children and for children in need of special help;
- actions to improve the system of preventive medicine and the fight against pathological phenomena in our society such as alcoholism, drug-taking and cigarette addiction among the young;
- the self-management movements among youth which attempt to create their own unions and independent associations;
- initiatives to create new organizations for the promotion of culture and education.

The union will fight for parents to have a real influence on the goals, methods and direction of their children's education in public schools and through the media. It is necessary to create committees attached to the National Commission which will concern themselves with the affairs of the youth.

**Point twenty-eight: Culture and education should be accessible to all.**

1. Culture and education cannot be used to impose uniform beliefs and to create attitudes of submission and passivity.
2. The history of our nation has shown that, condemned many times to death, it has nonetheless survived and been able to preserve its national identity, not by physical force, but exclusively through reliance on its own culture (John-Paul II). For this reason, the government policy which has brought about a decline in culture and education must be changed.

The economic and social reform we envisage is designed not only to improve living conditions but also to develop culture and education.

3. Taking into consideration the enormous losses suffered by our culture and education, and the continual aggravation of the economic crisis, the union should elaborate a plan of action which aims at:

- a) the creation of a new law concerning national education, higher education, the press and publishing;
- b) the ending of current programmes which have proved to be harmful (the 10-year plan, the centralisation of culture and education, the allocation of public buildings, schools and other services);
- c) the encouragement of efforts to create active participation in culture and to popularise culture in hitherto neglected regions;
- d) an increase in the budget for national education, culture and scientific research, and the creation of other sources of finance in addition to state grants (self-financing of cultural institutions);
- e) the creation of a social fund for national culture.

4. This plan of action will form part of a general plan for the revival of national culture and education, elaborated in collaboration with the regional self-government bodies, social institutions, artistic and scientific associations.

The union will support regional self-management bodies that wish to play the role of patron of the arts.

5. Union activity in the domain of culture and education will be coordinated by the Union Council for Culture and the Union Council for National Education. (Both Councils created by the National Commission.)

**Point twenty-nine: The union will assist and protect every independent initiative for self-management in culture and education.**

One of the principal reasons for the crisis in culture and education is the state monopoly in these areas. Society should be in control of its own culture and its own education. The state should guarantee all the necessary means for the realisation of the goals and values created and recognised by society.

1. The union will support every initiative in the field of culture.
2. It is indispensable that all cultural institutions should become autonomous, and that social control should be exercised over their activities.
3. It is necessary to raise the level of technical culture by stimulating research and invention by engineers and technicians. The union supports the creation of independent associations of technicians, as well as their activities.
4. The elaboration of cultural and educational policy, and the distribution of funds for those ends, should be within the competence of socially autonomous organs accepted by society. The administration must be in the service of those organs.
5. The union will create its own cultural and scientific institutions. It will create its own publishing house by using the printing facilities of the old union (CRZZ), and it will undertake steps to set up its own university.

**Point thirty: The union will support the freedom of scientific research and the self-management of scientific institutions.**

The subordination of science to political interests has rendered it ineffectual in the struggle against the social and economic crisis. The union expects from the scientific milieu firm and competent assistance in the realisation of its programme.

It will support every initiative from this milieu which aims to:

1. assure the self-management of science and its independence from every political and administrative authority;
2. create favourable conditions for the carrying out of research in the cultural, social and economic life of the country;
3. undertake research concerning work-safety and public health.

We must also attempt to safeguard our scientific potential (personnel, laboratories, literature) presently threatened by the consequences of the crisis.

**Point thirty one: The union will fight against lies in every field of life, for our society wishes and has the right to live in truth.**

To say and to write the truth is essential for the development of social awareness and the safeguarding of our national identity. To construct a better future, it is necessary to know the truth of the present.

1. We consider media censorship to be an evil which the present situation alone obliges us to accept temporarily. We do not accept censorship in science and art. Censorship cannot limit the people's right to know its own past, its history and its literature. We will combat every abuse of censorship.
2. The most dangerous tool of falsehood is the language of propaganda, which debases the way we express our thoughts and feelings. The union will struggle for the purity of our language as a means of greater understanding among citizens.
3. The union will support the development of free publications as one of the means of struggling against censorship.



**'Television Lies!' declares the street slogan outside Solidarity's First National Delegate Congress in Gdansk last October.**

4. The effects of censorship on our culture and history are catastrophic. The union commits itself to struggle for the restoration of truth in these areas.

5. One means of propagating the truth is our own union literature. We will publish there news that is eliminated or falsified in state publications.

6. The union will support war veterans in their attempt to shed light on our history and to recognise the merits of those who consecrated their lives to the freedom and independence of Poland.

**Point thirty-two: The media are the property of society. They ought therefore to serve it and be controlled by it.**

Our union's struggle for access to the media is carried on in the interests of the whole population. The union demands respect for the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech expressed in the Constitution. Hence:

1. The union considers as inadmissible the jamming of foreign broadcasts, the prohibition of literature which expresses a viewpoint other than the official one, the destruction of our posters, etc.

2. The union will collaborate in examining the draft law on information.

3. The union demands respect for the right of citizens and their organizations to set up publishing houses and to have free access to radio and television. The allocation of paper, printing facilities and broadcasting time must be subject to social control.

4. The union is opposed to any form of information monopoly. The union demands an end to the state administration's unconstitutional monopoly over radio and television, as well as a change in the law of 1960 which established the Radio and Television Committee. The union calls for an organ of social control over radio and television, comprising representatives of government, political parties, unions, religious and social organisations, intellectuals and radio and T.V. staff. This organ should have the final say on programmes.

5. So far, our efforts to obtain the right to broadcasting time have been inadequate. We therefore demand the fastest possible application of the agreement ratified by the National Commission of *Solidarity*, and the creation of autonomous *Solidarity* editorial committees in the central and regional structures of radio and television.

6. The union will protect its members employed in the radio, television and press, supporting journalists who respect the principle of truthful informa-

tion. The union recognizes the right of editorial staff to appoint their chief editor. The union will support the Association of Polish Journalists in its efforts to protect the ethics of their profession.

7. The union will create agencies for news, photos, cinema and press.
8. It will establish an information committee attached to the National Commission.
9. In conformity with Article 33, Section 2 of the Constitution, the union demands that it be able to open its own radio station.
10. In the struggle for access to the mass media, the union will use all the means provided for by its statutes.

## VII. Our Union.

The union's life is based on the principle of democracy, which involves submission to the will of the majority, while maintaining respect for the ideas of the minority. Acceptance of decisions taken by union leaders in a democratic manner is a guarantee of unity in action.

The statutes are the basic document which determines the democratic functioning of the union. In practice, we recognize that an action not proscribed by the statutes is admissible — this allows union life to be enriched by new forms of action. In adopting a tolerant attitude towards different points of view, however, union leaders and all members should resolutely combat any breach of the statutes. Democracy in internal life, discipline in action, and the honesty of union members are the guarantee of the union's strength.

**Point thirty-three: Members of our union have the right to express their views and wishes without constraint, and to organise freely for the achievement of common goals.**

The effectiveness of union action depends on the various links between its members which augment the means and forms of struggle, ensuring the authenticity of our movement and its participation in the functioning of society. The creation of such links requires a free exchange of ideas and agreement on positions.

### 1. The Regions.

Links between rank-and-file members are created at the level of enterprise branches; these branches then come together at regional level, in accordance with the principles laid down in the statutes. The demarcation of regions should take place democratically under the control of the National Commission, so that they coincide as far as possible with territorial administrative divisions. We must attempt to create regions that are strong enough to give structural and technical support to all the enterprise branches. We must avoid fragmentation of administrative units, because this restricts the union's effectiveness and influence vis-a-vis the authorities.

### 2. Intermediate links.

The practical life of the union has given rise to various intermediate links between enterprise branches and regional leaderships; the union leadership should assist such links by organisational, financial and technical means. The principal task of intermediate bodies is to assist enterprise commissions in the area of information and advice, and in the creation and development of centres of union life; they should also defend the interests of the population at local level, and exert pressure on the administrative organs of power.

### 3. Occupational branches, occupational sectors and others:

Union branches should assist one another and complement the actions of the union leadership in defending the interests of the different groups of workers and union members, without harming the interests of other groups.

The main tasks of the branch are:

- to initiate and co-ordinate activity dealing with the specific problems of their occupational sector, and especially to conclude common agreements;
- to represent the interests of a particular group in the union;
- to undertake actions at the level of the administration and the state, in agreement with the union.

The experience we have acquired demonstrates that broader representation of union members assists the leadership to resolve problems.

### 4. Agreements.

Agreements between enterprise commissions, and between different groups of union members, take place outside the organizational forms prescribed in the statutes, thereby enlarging the scope for initiative and giving the opportunity to bring principles to life. In helping these different agreements to be concluded, union leaders should not assume the role of organisers.

### 5. The means of expression and the formation of opinion.

The principal method is to use the union's information system in such a way as to popularize, without falsification, its goals and methods of action, as well as its position on social, economic and political problems.

The union leadership must therefore pay particular attention to technical and material organisation, the content of information, and working conditions in the information services. It is essential to improve our information network so that we can compete with the "party-state" broadcasting monopoly.

The most important tasks in this area are:

- a) to increase the print-run of the weekly *Solidarnosc* to about a million;
- b) to create a journal for country-wide distribution;
- c) to produce regional periodicals wherever possible;
- d) to produce a journal and a weekly in every region;
- e) to create the necessary conditions for the development of a country-wide news and publicity system (daily information service, collection of journalistic material), by relying on the existing centres (BIPS, AS) and on the extension of regional information offices;
- f) to improve the information service in the regions, relying, for example, on the ABS and other communication systems;
- g) to build libraries attached to the regional and enterprise commissions.

At the moment the news agencies of the press and of *Solidarnosc* tend to be self-financing. The union fights for the freedom of expression, and it ought to apply the same principle in its own information media. Thus the leading bodies of the union, to whom the editors of the dailies and periodicals are responsible, should not interfere in this work. They should give them the greatest liberty, except during periods of definite danger for the union (protest actions, strike mobilizations).

The teaching work carried out by the popular universities is indispensable for the union. The purpose of these universities is to spread knowledge without falsification, to develop the understanding of militants, to raise their civic consciousness, to promote social activity and self-education. The popular universities should diversify their methods to include courses, apprenticeships, seminars, initiation clubs, lectures and publications.

This should make it possible for them to reach all layers, especially in the enterprises. While maintaining a diversity of programmes and methods, the popular universities will maintain contact with one other for the exchange of experience and information. Their activities will be financed by the regional committees and enterprise commissions. Alongside the education of public opinion, the principal task of the education and information services is to link union members both with one another and with the leadership and union agencies. Such links will create a diversity of ideas in our organization, while maintaining unity in action.

**Point thirty-four: The decisions and actions of union bodies should be based on a real knowledge of membership views and wishes.**

The union's members should have a determining influence on leadership actions. This is achieved by means of elections and by the expression of opinion on all questions affecting the union. The free circulation of information and the transparency of union life are necessary in order to educate public opinion.

### 1. The decisions and actions of the union leadership.

When the union leadership takes a decision, it should follow the position of the majority. To ensure the transparency of union life the leaders and the commissions should, at every level, inform the members of their work by publishing all the documents and texts concerning all official discussions and negotiations.

National and regional leaders have a duty to work in common with the socio-occupational working groups and with the sectoral and occupational branches. Leading members of the union have a duty to meet regularly with those who elected them.

### 2. The organization of work around the programme.

Union leaders should respect the regular functioning of democratic representation, which can be ensured by knowing the opinion of the greatest possible number of union members.

The circulation and synthesization of views can best be achieved by work around the programme. Special groups, composed of union militants and experts, should be attached to national, regional and enterprise commissions for the study of a particular theme (e.g. wages, working conditions).

At the same time, it is essential to create and develop socio-occupational working groups with the task of preparing reports and programmes for the union.

These centres should function in an independent manner, under the control of the Programme Council, and should be composed of militants with authority, scientists and other members designated by the leadership. Basing themselves on the demands and ideas communicated by each enterprise organisation, and on the materials provided by the socio-occupational working groups, the programme commissions should then formulate the questions to be addressed to the members of the union.

Having synthesized the results, these commissions should then:

- keep the union leadership informed about the strength of different opinions and the importance which union members give to different problems;
- formulate proposals concerning union information and propaganda;
- draw up a programme to be discussed by the representative organs.

If it is organized in this way, work around the programme should qualitatively improve the drafts and encourage enterprise branches to think about the programme.

### 3. The study of membership views in the enterprises.

It is also very important to conduct polls in order to find out what union members are thinking in the enterprises, the regions and the union as a whole. To carry out such surveys we must appeal to the socio-occupational working groups. This type of enquiry is indispensable for finding out correctly and in detail what union members think on the essential questions; this will determine the correctness and speed of decisions and strengthen the union's position in negotiations.

### 4. Direct democracy.

The union should adopt certain forms of direct democracy in addition to the forms of representative democracy prescribed in the statutes. The referendum merits special attention, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but above all because of the weight of the decisions or guidelines which come out of a referendum. The referendum can be used at different levels, but there must always be a great deal of thought before it is used at national level. The National Commission decides whether to organize a national referendum.

A referendum should be preceded by an information campaign presenting the different positions and allowing collective discussion around the questions posed. Union leaders who would like to ascertain members' views before taking a decision should always specify whose opinion they wish to know and how it should be discovered. One must proceed honestly in seeking the support of members' views.

#### Point thirty-five:

**1: Negotiations and agreements are the principal means for defending the interests of the workers and citizens belonging to the union. But if this method fails we must have recourse to forms of protest.**

In seeking to achieve union demands, the leadership should first use means which do not have a negative effect on social peace. The first step is to present suggestions and projects to the administrative, economic and state bodies. If there is disagreement, we must use discussion to try to find ground for agreement. But in the present situation, if no account is taken of the union's opinion in matters which concern it, then the leadership will be obliged to modify its tactics.

### 2. The union leaders should negotiate with the competent economic, administrative and state bodies in serious situations of conflict.

In carrying out discussions, the union leadership should convoke negotiating groups and clearly define their mission and competence. Negotiating teams have the power to sign agreements to be later ratified by leading union bodies. The preparations for negotiation should include, among other things: consultation with the union members concerned, presentation of the subject, goal and tactics, and an analysis of what is at stake. The union must insist that the negotiations be conducted openly. Experts, whose role is defined by the negotiating team, may also take part in the discussions.

It is imperative that every agreement should specify the duration, method and conditions of implementation accepted by both parties.

### 3. When attempts to negotiate fail, the union leadership may organize demonstrations and protest actions.

The character of such actions (economic/political) depends on the causes that have provoked them, not on their object. Every action must have a clear and precise goal and be carefully organized; it is likewise essential to allow for circumstances under which the action may be called off.

Mass actions may take the form of demonstrations to reaffirm certain positions (pressure to begin or continue negotiations, or a demand that signed agreements should be carried out); they may also have a protest character (against decisions that are harmful, or against the failure to carry out commitments). Such actions should set a limit for acceptance of their demands, and fix a date for precise action in the future.

If the warning is not heeded, then our actions must prove the determination and mobilization of the population behind the demands which have been put forward. Strikes and boycotts form part of this type of action. Strikes are above all actions of protest. Because of the economic losses which they entail, they ought to be the ultimate form of protest.

The leading bodies of the union should carefully prepare the protocols and the conduct of negotiations, as well as the actions of protest. At every level, the leadership must also prepare short-term and long-term action for confronting certain dangers, such as a state of emergency or aggression.

### 4. Decisions concerning the outcome of negotiations or protest actions, compromises and the terms of the final agreement should be taken only after an analysis of membership views.

During the course of the negotiations and protest actions, the union members involved should be regularly consulted. Leaders should inform the membership about the positions taken by the union negotiators and about partial results achieved. Information and propaganda actions should be addressed, especially during periods of tension, not only to union members but also to the entire population. Guided by the general interest, the union must strive to ensure that the goals which it seeks to attain are understood and accepted.

### 5. All members of the union are united by fundamental common goals; internal conflicts should be resolved by discussion leading to unity and not by administrative or disciplinary decisions.

#### Point thirty-six: Control and criticism of union bodies is the right and duty of every *Solidarity* member.

The activity of all union authorities is placed under permanent control. The reports of control commissions should be rapidly published and distributed in the union. All union members are free to criticize the leadership, either in the course of meetings or in the press. Those who are criticized have the right of reply.

Membership of representative bodies control the leadership by making use of the right of questioning and the vote of confidence. If there is a question, the answer must be given within a definite period. If it does not satisfy the questioner, then he or she may call for a vote of confidence. If the vote results in a decision of non-confidence then the leader or leading body must offer to resign. This may be refused — in which case a final solution may be found by appealing, if necessary, to a special commission. In conformity with the statutes, control over leadership activity is also exercised by the Review Commissions. These bodies collect information, point out irregularities in procedure, indicate the means for remedying this type of situation, and prepare reports for the representative bodies.

## VIII. THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

*Solidarity* is the guarantor of the social accords of 1980, and demands that they be consistently put into practice. The only way to save the country is to realize the constitutional principle of the sovereignty of the nation. Our union establishes its programme at a moment when the nation is threatened with catastrophe. We cannot remain in crisis. A way out must be found.

### The anti-crisis agreement.

The anti-crisis agreement should ensure the survival of society in the difficult winter months ahead. It must point out the direction to follow in order to emerge from the crisis. It should be the first text of collaboration between the state power and society.

### Agreement on economic reform.

Agreement on economic reform requires collaboration between the state power and society for a radical change in the existing economic order. The reform should give the leadership of enterprises to personnel within the economic system who will harmonize the laws of the market with planning. The hundreds of agreements signed by the government still remain only on paper. Promises made by the state to the working people should be honoured.

### Agreement for a Self-governed Republic.

The agreement for a Self-governed Republic should provide the direction and means for a democratization of public life, of the Sejm (Parliament), the political, territorial and economic authorities, the courts, national education, etc. Realization of this agreement will establish a just relationship between citizens of the state. The road to a Self-governed Republic is the only one which will make Poland internally strong, an equal partner with other nations.

The union considers the new social contract to be an indissoluble unity. The action programme of *Solidarity* is above all a commitment by the union to the nation. We are confident that it will meet with the approval of the entire nation. No partisan, individual or group interest can consider itself to be above the nation.

We do not pretend to have a monopoly of truth. We are ready for an honest and loyal dialogue, an exchange of ideas with the state power, a quest for just decisions which will better serve the country and the interests of working people and citizens. May this accord unite us around what is national, democratic and human in Poland; around those things which do not divide us.

# POLAND: ON THE EVE OF THE COUP

## One year after August — What shall we do next?

*(The following discussion between prominent figures in Solidarity is of exceptional interest because it provides an insight into the thinking of very influential people within the movement as the political struggle intensified in the autumn of 1981. Since the official media has repeatedly dubbed most of those taking part in the discussion as 'radicals' intent on seizing power, the extraordinarily frank and open exchange of views has an added interest. Jacek Kuron and Jan Litynski were both members of KOR and Kuron was an adviser to the Solidarity national leadership. Bronislaw Geremek was widely acknowledged as the most influential adviser to Lech Walesa. Jerzy Milewski was the moving spirit behind the 'Network', a committee founded in the spring of 1981 linking together some of the largest industrial plants in the country and promoting the idea of workers' self-management. Ryszard Bugaj was a leading economic adviser to the movement who presented an economic reform programme to the Solidarity national congress proposing a combination of national planning, workers' self-management and the market. Zbigniew Bujak was the leader of Solidarity's Mazowsze organization which embraced the Warsaw region and is now one of the principal leaders of the Solidarity underground resistance movement.)*

*The discussion was originally published in Robotnik No. 79 under the title, 'One Year After August — What shall we do next?' and appeared in September 1981.)*



Jan Litynski, editor of *Robotnik*

**Jan Litynski:** We are now in what seems to be a dead-end. The economy and the state are disintegrating. One could, of course, argue about the extent to which the rot has been brought about by sabotage, whether deliberate or semi-intentional, by the state apparatus, and the extent to which it is a result of its powerlessness in the face of the events of August 1980, which even the most cautious observers call a revolution. *Solidarity* hastened this collapse by paralysing, so to speak, the state apparatus.

### **Solidarity is losing points**

It seems that waiting to see what the authorities do and negotiating compromises has proved ineffective. *Solidarity* is slowly losing points. It is disappointing members. Those who expected the economic situation to improve, are as disappointed as those who hoped that the radicalism of the union movement would bring about new political structures and the fall of the current power structure. Their hopes have been dashed.

Various dangers arise in such a situation. It fosters a 'radicalism' of the KPN type (1) in which the slogan of independence, which is unrealistic in the current situation, is advanced. This problem has been made worse by the irresponsible arrest of the KPN leaders, which has boosted the popularity and plausibility of their programme, which is anyway much more

realistic than it seemed ten months ago. Another danger to which the union has already succumbed is the spread of the 'hunger movement', protesting at food shortages. There is a real threat that this may lead to wildcat strikes and riots.

After the incident in Bydgoszcz last March, the only initiative promoted by the union has been the movement for self-management. It is, however, uncertain how this could integrate with the present system, and the movement is too weak to take power and to control the economy. And besides, such a transfer of power carries with it the danger of degeneration into economic anarchy.

Efforts to create political parties have also been unsuccessful, mainly because they have not offered any firm programme and have not adopted the characteristics of genuine political parties. The attempts to found clubs of different kinds, clubs for social initiatives, for instance, are still in their infancy. They have neither an overall strategy nor even pragmatic tactics. They are attempts to patch up today's problems rather than to put forward a long-term initiative.

**Jacek Kuron:** One senses increasing impatience, a feeling that we cannot stand this any longer. For many people this means it is time to overthrow the authorities. The argument goes as follows: we have created the union to control the authorities. But this appears to be impossible, because they are too devious. Everyone accuses them of hiding something from us, not being straight with us.

And what can these authorities do? Even if they devised a better anti-crisis programme than the one they already have — which is, by the way, quite acceptable — it would rot on the newspaper stands. The authorities have no credibility in society. That is why only a mass social movement can find the way out of the crisis, a movement which would, at the same time, build a new system. But this needs time.

### **Is there a threat of a civil war?**

And here there is a serious danger. I can imagine that the worsening situation will lead to desperate acts. And then part of society may see hope in a strong government. Already now somewhere around Jaruzelski such a conception is being born. After all, the prime minister doesn't appoint generals to the cabinet just because he trusts them. I believe he thinks that a strong government equipped with military means could save us. But the introduction of military rule would end in disaster. Even if it wins the support of a part of society, it would be violently opposed by others. Then, for the first time, I think civil war could threaten us.

**Bronislaw Geremek:** The country is profoundly threatened, to an extent seldom equalled in its history. We risk not only an external intervention, but also a collapse caused by internal factors. I may be wrong, but it seems to me that nobody among us, sitting at this table, knows the way out of the crisis.

The catastrophe is evident. It overwhelms us. So far, there are no mechanisms to contain it, neither from the authorities nor from *Solidarity*. At first, it seemed right for *Solidarity*, which had left the authorities with their monopoly over state power, not to take responsibility for the running of the state. And this attitude would still be correct were it not for the catastrophe.

### **The union understands the situation in the country**

To my mind, the Union has understood the situation in the country. See, for example, the self-management movement which has suddenly taken off. It proves that everyone feels a sense of responsibility without aspiring to a seizure of power, even if self-management wins out. There is still a state which has all the key

decisions in its hands — foreign trade, investments, banks, the bulk of food distribution and, finally, the legal system.

There is a common opinion that the union should become a positive movement which takes responsibility for the fate of the country. The possibilities of fulfilling such a duty are greater than we thought when we acknowledged the leading role of the PUWP (Polish United Workers' Party). Thanks to *Solidarity*, to the Church and to the self-management movement, some changes in the legal system and in the civil service are possible. The make-up of these institutions will not depend on us, but the way they function will do.

**Jerzy Milewski:** It's just been said that the country is profoundly threatened. It seems to me, however, that there is also an enormous opportunity for it. There was one such a chance in 1918, and it was seized, while the general geopolitical circumstances were probably worse than today. All I hear now is talk of crisis and total catastrophe. And yet we have got a chance to retrieve our national spirit, lost in the seventeenth, maybe the eighteenth century. And let's stop frightening Poles with tanks. If we haven't yet had an invasion, it's because there won't be one, since they know that it would be a tragedy not only for us, but for them as well.



Zbigniew Bujak, Warsaw *Solidarity* leader now in underground.

**Zbigniew Bujak:** Our movement grows weaker. At the outset it was based upon a great hate towards the authorities, towards the party. But this is not enough anymore. Motives must change. The members of our union do not understand the policy of their leaders. From the beginning, this policy was never explained to them. Protests, strikes, local struggles do not form a coherent whole. I became convinced of this during a meeting at the URSUS factory. It was only when I told them that all these self-management initiatives were leading to taking control of the economy that people understood and approved. Moves to found political parties are different — people do not want them. Power over the economy — yes, but parties — no.

### We should change our policy

At the moment, people are waiting for a clear programme. Whether they understand it or not, they want to hear that it is the way out of the crisis. There is a perceptible inclination toward the idea of strong government, even if it were to impose some restrictions.

I think therefore that there is a need to channel our activities in two distinct directions. Besides a policy leading to great structural changes, a policy not always understood by our members, there must be a stream of specific activities clear and comprehensible for all. This is why I attach such importance to the self-management movement.

**Jerzy Milewski:** There is no doubt that the members want *Solidarity's* leaders to deal with everything, absolutely everything we do not know whether it should do this by controlling the

state, or by taking its place. Thus, in my opinion, *Solidarity* should work on a positive programme, without waiting for the government's proposals. These always come too late anyway and we cannot apologize to our members for not taking a line because we didn't have a government project to criticize.

However, *Solidarity*, with its weak trade union structure cannot satisfy the demands and expectations of its members. It must therefore initiate and support all rank-and-file initiatives, all organizations, semi-organizations and groups which orient towards control and working out a programme. This was how the network of leading factories was set up.

### Towards self-management

Why did we take up the idea of self-management, although it was usually associated with the old 'self-managements' controlled by the party, and unpopular among our members? It was while people were saying that the Union should stick to defending workers. And yet somebody had to go ahead with reform. It wasn't going to be the authorities and their 500-person Commission. It was up to the organizations of self-management. And it is up to them to decide what kind of reform should be introduced. I wouldn't want to interfere.

I can envisage possible self-management structures: vertical, territorial, and a national executive or coordinating commission. A union of employers, parallel to that of workers. There would then be somebody with whom one could negotiate the wages, social conditions, there would be a responsible counterpart and not, as today, the Politbureau in disguise. I am thus sceptical about the idea of a lower house at the Sejm, a house for self-management representatives. I can see no reason why the parliament, which is a state authority, should give one house to the organisation of employers, that is to workplace self-management organizations. It would, however, be different with a genuine local self-government, that is to say, with new-style local councils in small (*powiaty*) and big (*województwa*) districts.

### Towards political parties

In my opinion, our next step after self-management would be to go on to local self-government, and finally, a self-governing state, that is, the Sejm. After all, there are supposed to be elections to local councils in February 1982 and if we leave them to the FJN (National Unity Front), people would say: 'You should have done something, there was a voting mechanism to create, a new electoral law to work out — and you have neglected the whole thing.'

It is thus clear that one should start to work out proposals for changing the existing electoral system, best if several such proposals arise, one should devise proposals for voting for councillors. And this is what one labels a political party. There is no use calling it otherwise. *Solidarity* cannot play the role of political party, since any party which organizes a vast majority of society can only be totalitarian.

Parties should be built in the same way as self-management. One talks about them, and then one attempts to form their structure. Self-managements are already forming their structures; parties have yet to do so. I would like to say here a few words about the Polish Party of the Working People. This initiative was undertaken in the same spirit as the Network. I envisage the mechanism of its emergence as follows: cores would form in various districts or factories, and people would set up contacts and make agreements. This would give rise to a nation-wide structure, as happened with the Network.

It goes without saying that parties will claim participation in government. The election of councillors is already such a form of participation. In the Sejm which we shall elect in three years there will have to be a few independent deputy's clubs, they will present some independent programmes, and it will be up to the Sejm to choose one of them.

And let us deceive neither ourselves nor our Big Brother. Let us tell him openly: 'Look, Big Brother, do you think that this totalitarian regime, in which the people clearly have no confidence, can be a strong link in the Warsaw Pact?' I, for one, rather doubt it.

**Jacek Kuron:** I've heard much discussion recently about attempts to found political parties. This is evidence of considerable wisdom and experience. You can tell that this is a wish to prevent the Union from taking power, for the Union is, after all, indispensable to defend society against the authorities.

### Too early for parties

But what parties is one talking about? A party which overthrows the existing order and takes full power would become quickly a state-party. We know this from the past 36 years. This is not what we want. Let us take another idea: a party that fights for free elections and then, for seats in the Sejm. This is the option I favour, but I do not think the time is right to launch an initiative. We cannot afford, at the time being, to overthrow the authorities, start an electoral campaign which would have to be sustained enough to achieve the elections with full-fledged programmes. This will bring us neither bread nor meat, but very likely a foreign army instead.

I therefore repeat: a new system must be the work of the movement which will, at the same time, extricate us from the crisis. And this can be done, I believe, only by the self-management movement. This movement should, first and foremost, organize itself in each district, and nationally too. Credit where credit is due to the Network, but what I have in mind goes much further. We are still at the stage of the coordinating committee. To my mind, a national leadership should be elected on the basis of regional and national federations. On the nationwide scale, it would be an organisation fighting over the shape of the economic reform and for social control over its implementation. Local self-management units, on the other hand, could take up the struggle against unemployment, and for improvements in supplies in the shops which might be encouraged by boosting local industry. There are so many things to be done, in, for instance, health care, education. What is more important, however, is that the foundations of future local councils are being laid down in this way — people who work in these local units on programmes dealing with trying problems are anticipating, to some extent, the work of a future council. This is therefore a struggle for a new electoral system and for new elections as well: a new structure of local government is being created.


And this idea is also significant in another way: it involves many people. The greater number of people involved in overcoming the crisis, building self-management systems, local councils and so on, the greater the chance for patient survival of this difficult period. I agree that those who are taking part in hunger marches and those who are active in self-managements are different sorts of people, but they are not entirely mutually exclusive.

### I believe in a club movement

I mean here a conception which is purely political. I believe in a club movement, a movement of all those for whom a self-management programme means building a new social system. Is such a club movement a party? Of course it is, if we label any political agreement among people a 'party'. But this formula seems too broad. I have in mind a movement of clubs, mutually independent, especially as regards the formulation of their policies. They would differ from one another and they would communicate via the self-management movement, to which they would affiliate and within which they would build their programmes. They would thus become a kind of league at the province level, with a loose nation-wide agreement, and it's from these that parties entering into parliamentary elections might spring up.

Such a movement might thus give birth to political parties. For the time being, these initiatives remain within the Union, promoting self-management, and through it, profound reform of the entire system. The system thus created would be a fusion of both local councils and parliamentary system.

**Ryszard Bugaj:** During the next 2-3 years we may hope, at best, for a stabilization of real wages. There is, however, a danger that things will go from bad to worse, that the next 3-4 years will be a period of further decreases in real incomes. It is a result of the crisis



Jacek Kuron

Let us not deceive ourselves — even if our economic situation develops favourably, many people will be discontented, and *Solidarity* will be criticized too. This means a long period of social unrest. Recovery from the crisis is a matter of life and death for us.

### It is the state which is of crucial importance

I see the need for two different kinds of activity: action in the present, and for the future. In both the activity of the state has a crucial significance. It cannot be replaced by any rank-and-file action.

As regards the present, loans of some \$2bn to \$3bn are essential to save our economy - otherwise we shall surely go to the wall. Only a state, and what's more, a relatively strong one, can guarantee such loans. Next, a regulation of the market, or to put it bluntly, an increase in prices, is necessary. If this does not come about, we will be threatened with total 'cubanization', with rations put on all the goods, with the rejection of money as an invention which did not catch in our country. Perhaps we shall have to rediscover it. The increase in prices can be ordained only by the government — in consultation with the trade unions, of course — but only by a sufficiently strong government, which has the confidence of society.


Economic reform is another course of action. Mr Milewski claims that reform cannot be imposed on any specific works, that each self-management knows best what should be done. But the essence of the reform is a system of economic cooperation, certain rules of coordination by which everyone abides. The rules must be drawn up centrally.

Thus, in my opinion, the key to the crisis lies neither in rank-and-file initiatives, nor in self-management, local self-government. This is not to say that I do not appreciate the importance of all these activities. They are indispensable and necessary not only

because they relieve tensions in society, and not only because they may contribute to an improvement of the economic situation, but first of all because they lay the foundations for the future welfare of the country. But they cannot replace state activities.

And here we have a key question. Is this state able to take on such activities? I must admit that I feel rather uneasy about its capabilities considering the recent party congress. The congress did bring about far-reaching changes within the party, a 'personnel' revolution. But it was, at the same time, a meeting of the 'frustrated people from the queues', of honest lower level party activists, with impeccable records. The crooks were higher in the hierarchy, but the middle ranks bore the blame. Look at their postulates submitted to the commission of the congress — 'Calling on the government to do this, guarantee that, give whatever.' But do they have any ideas about the way out?

Now returning to our discussion. I think it's too late to talk about whether there will be parties. There will be. We shall inevitably face problems about elections, and this will be an enormous catalyst.



'No, you can't see the papers in my brief-case!' Jaruzelski (left) seems to be telling Kania at the emergency Party Congress in July. When he ousted Kania as Party leader in October he already had detailed blue-prints for the military coup.

Some people say that we have three years till the elections to the Sejm. To my mind, it is a matter of a year to eighteen months. At the moment a third of those in the Sejm have been expelled from their constituency and do not represent anybody. There is practically no one from the party's Central Committee in this Sejm. The pressure for elections will therefore not be confined to society / as opposed to the party - trans./.

So, I'm in favour of political initiatives of a party kind — associations, leagues. And there is, I feel, a chance that society will take geopolitical factors into consideration, that it will acknowledge the leading role of the party and accept a realistic model. One could imagine this as follows: at the elections to the Sejm the party may have its own list, for separate mandatory seats, and alongside, we could have a list for those social forces which are really independent, and yet respect a minimum of political principles specific to our system. Even this model is not risk-free; nevertheless, I think it's our best option. I see it as our best chance for rebuilding the political system. Otherwise the state, or administration will be neither effective, nor credible.

## The union and the parties

I would warn, however, quite seriously against involving the Union in any political initiatives to do with parties. Anyone involved in such activity should, I think, declare that it is their private business. For we are obliged to respect those who joined a trade union or, say, a social movement whose demands were clear. As long as we are fighting against censorship, or for economic reform in general, there is no problem. But it is quite different when we take a specific position on the content of reform.

Until a relatively coherent political structure emerges, the Union will be compelled to take up various initiatives, to play an instrumental role and to take a position. But groups which want to turn the Union into an instrument of their political struggle should be opposed.

**Bronislaw Geremek:** I do not think we have to opt for a specific anti-crisis programme. We should instead create an atmosphere in which different proposals emerge, and are tested out. And here I agree with Kuron that various social movements, a kind of social agitation should constitute *Solidarity's* background.

## Power and strength are on the side of *Solidarity*

But the Union remains central, not other structures. It seems to me that it is within the framework of *Solidarity* that various programme groups and forms of pressure should be worked out. I do not anticipate the formation of political parties. So, I am considering programmes and methods within *Solidarity*.

Let's start with the Union's strategy. There is a real danger that we may become afraid of losing contact with the masses, and put up radical demands, accomplishing tactical ends at the expense of strategic ones, whereas the Union should take a long-term view. Yet, paradoxically, its strategy should be that which I have just opposed, speaking of immediate tasks and tactics. The biggest danger the Union faces is loss of its impetus: a situation in which the Union might become a conservative force, established in the post-August system, restraining an increasingly radical society.

What does keeping up the impetus mean? First and foremost, it cannot neglect material problems, such as food and provisions. It must also raise the question of self-management and say that it is a change of social atmosphere and a different attitude towards work that is at stake. In a decaying economy there is also a decay of human activity, yet the way out of the crisis needs increasing efforts, despite deteriorating material conditions. Self-management is, it seems to me, the only means of generating an active attitude. And this argument, I believe, refutes all the objections raised against self-management.

I do not, however, envisage the creation of political parties yet. At the moment, power and strength are on the side of *Solidarity*. And I believe that if the social activities we were talking about were to lead the Union to take up the key questions determining the future of this country, it will all have been worthwhile. Is setting up political parties useful in such a situation? To my mind given acknowledgement of the leading role of the PUWP, it is of no use at all. The Union has acknowledged this leading role and let us not deceive ourselves — this party, however weak and rotten, keeps a tenacious hold on its power. You only need to look at its reaction to self-management to see how stubbornly it defends the interests of party and state machinery and possessions. It will not give up anything willingly.

If we assume the state of affairs described here as a starting point in our reasoning, then we should draw out the consequences. I think that it would be unreasonable after August '80, not to say absurd, to reproduce a structure of the Znak kind, that is to say, a structure of the only one honest group in the Sejm which represented the voice of society. That voice will be of some importance to future historians, but power and strength was then on the side of the Church. Now it is on the side of *Solidarity*.

## What instead of the National Unity Front?

The problem we are facing now is that the mode of rule carried on before August '80 is impossible. A new system of co-existence

between the authorities and society is being settled, it is not yet known what form it will take, but as long as it is without some institutional form, it will be defective.

These forms will emerge slowly and in various ways. We have reached the first stage — local councils. I do not think that one should enter the local council elections with political parties. But the National Unity Front (FJN) is also inadmissible — these councils are not, and never were an element of rule, of a representative system. And I do not believe that they could become an element. They could, rather, become a local self-government network with real influence on people's lives. What kind of electoral system can we obtain? I do not know. But since I am against setting up new political parties, I think that in the elections — based on one seat per constituency — candidates should stand on their personal reputation, and put forward concrete programmes.

The elections to the Sejm are, of course, the ones that pose the biggest problem. I don't think the three years will run their course. Two solutions are possible. It is conceivable that a genuine pluralistic system will be created or that 3/4 of the seats would be reserved for the FJN. In the latter case, I would incline towards a lower house in the Sejm. It is a realistic solution and, at the same time, it guarantees a kind of social representation; and, as a voter, I would not feel the system had been rigged.

#### Vote for blocs, not for individuals

**Jerzy Milewski:** I am against elections based on spontaneity, one cannot vote for individuals instead of programmes. For if the voters do not decide programmes, and if in a group of councillors or deputies everybody represents different views, the whole system will be of no avail. The result will be a rally.

**Jan Litynski:** I agree with you. Voting for individuals is the worst possible solution. One elects then completely unknown people whom one may have heard of, but does not know anything about. The elections in *Solidarity* have already demonstrated the weakness of such an electoral system. But if the case of a trade union voting for trustworthy persons may make some sense, because one elects a specific kind of leader, it is not so with self-government. In this case one should vote for certain kinds of programme blocs.

**Bronislaw Geremek:** Let us register in the minutes that you did not understand my proposal.

**Jacek Kuron:** I would like to make two remarks here. Last year I wrote about the idea of two chambers in the Sejm. One chamber would represent society (it was not called a self-governing chamber at the time), the other — the party. I have argued in favour of this solution, because it would allow society to have some influence on the key decisions and, at the same time, it would give the Soviet Union assurances on the preservation of its interests in Poland. This conception was based on the assumption that the PUWP is a guarantor of Soviet interests. It appears, however, that in the face of social conflicts, there are splits in the party. It is thus a formula for 'yesterday', but it is hard to find a bet-

ter one.

#### Towards a civil state

A second remark: I understand, of course, that self-management cannot overcome the crisis as long as it is confined to discrete concerns. In general, the main function of the self-management movement is for me not management itself, but that is, in present circumstances, impossible. I am speaking about a self-management movement which would build, through its central structure, a new mechanism of taking decisions. And here I agree with Bugaj — to overcome the crisis is a matter of decisions concerning the entire economy. I think that the economy should be based on autonomous concerns, but with central planning that would stimulate the market, influencing thereby the decisions of concern.

However, in order to guarantee the social character of planning, a self-governing chamber in the Sejm is necessary, a house that would also include trade unions. A state which is taking central economic decisions must be a civil state, governed by society. And to achieve this end we must have the self-governing mechanism.

**Ryszard Bugaj:** The policies outlined in our discussion are not so entirely inconsistent. It would be proper, however, to point out the differences.

#### Against a self-governing chamber

I am uneasy about the idea of a self-governing chamber. Its supporters usually claim that it is more realistic than the demand to rebuild the entire electoral system. If we assume that such a demand must be formulated as a call for free elections, then I agree. If not, the effective character of the idea of a self-governing chamber depends on the powers we would like to give it. If they were to be broad, then the party will surely strongly resist. This is why I do not accept the argument that it is a realistic proposal.

What is important from my point of view is that the self-governing house cannot be entirely democratic, since it would be formed in multi-staged, indirect elections. These elections would have to be preceded by a long series of disputes about the division of seats (how many for us and how many for the other unions, how many for self-management and how many for local governments, and so on, and so forth). But what is even more important there will be no group in this chamber representing an overall conception of social and economic policy, no group representing the interests of the whole society.

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*The following report appeared in 'News of the Day', an underground Solidarity publication in Warsaw on 3 January 1982.*

**The editor-in-chief of Trybuna Ludu (the main Party paper), meeting with the editorial staff before Christmas, asked: 'How long will the state of war last?' and answered as well: 'Until the Poles forget the word "Solidarity".'**

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## Poland on the Road to the Coup — by Jadwiga Staniszkis

*(A propaganda battle is being waged across Europe over the conditions that produced the military coup. At the same time, the sheer scope and complexity of the political struggle in Poland throughout the sixteen months of Solidarity's existence makes it extremely difficult for socialists in the West to grasp its overall dynamic. We are therefore extremely fortunate to have the work of the Warsaw sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis to help us make sense of the main underlying trends, in a series of brilliant analyses (some of which have been published in Britain in Soviet Studies and the Bulletin of Scottish Politics). We publish below an article she wrote at the beginning of November 1981 under the title 'Institutional Revolution'. In the light of events we have given the article a new title. We have also made some stylistic alterations in Ms Staniszkis' original English without altering in any way the substance of the text. Political circumstances unfortunately prevented us checking the edited text with the author.)*

One year after the August 1980 events, it seems almost impossible to stabilize Poland's quasi-liberal form of authoritarian-bureaucratic regime resting on the legitimacy of a 'social contract' and a conciliatory pattern of problem-solving. Totalitarian temptations to turn back to organized coercion are being openly formulated. (1) Some of these voices represent the *ultima ratio* of state power; some are rooted in a rigidity stemming from the interpretation of *Solidarity's* demands in terms of ideological clichés (2); others are bound up with institutional-sectoral interests (3). Such temptations are further reinforced by the longing of Party members for a more active policy and for an end to their serious status problems associated with the tactic of permanent 'retreat' (4). Often, such attitudes are justified by formulas from the Communist youth of ex-'true-believers' among the current PUWP leadership, when coercive measures were legitimated by arguing that if the ruling group's policy were popular, this would indicate that it was not a genuinely revolutionary power ... (5) For some

PUWP leaders, a 'hard-line' policy seems to be the only available way out of chaos and economic crisis: the example of Kádár in 1956 is sometimes invoked in this connection.

Paradoxically, the above shift and the rapidly deepening polarization that has followed it (6) are in a way independent of the inner dynamics and function of *Solidarity*. On the contrary, *Solidarity* seems more open to co-optation (7), more demobilised and fragmented than before, despite the highly politicized rhetoric of its first Congress, the momentary eruptions of the frustrated masses (8), the status politics of its functionaries (which irritated the power apparatus so much), and the fundamentalist mentality of its rank and file that makes communication so difficult. (9)

The evident trend towards a hard-line policy is above all the product of tensions within the power apparatus itself, reinforced by the dynamics of the international situation. (10) It is reminiscent, in a surreal way, of the situation in Czechoslovakia 13 years ago. The only difference is that the 'other side' is inside the country and if we can speak of an 'intervention' it is an economic and invisible one (11). As we remember, the Soviet intervention of August 1968 took place when Dubcek's regime had already seriously curtailed its radical plans, had excluded some of the most controversial figures, (12) and seemed to be fragmented and divided. (13) However the aggression of the other side resulted from a tangle of minor frustrations and group interests, often so petty in character that they were unaffected by the moderation of Dubcek's policy. (14) There is a very close analogy with the present Polish situation: for Walesa's moderate policies cannot influence or diminish the elementary status problems of the Party apparatus which are rooted in the very existence of *Solidarity*. In 1968 all these frustrations, many of them stemming from a formal-organizational or localist rationality, built up to a critical mass and finally exploded. The intensification of a 'paper war' of propaganda also played a role. After a time, all verbal arguments had been worn thin and driven to the point where 'something had to be done'. Moreover, the final intervention — or, in our case, the 'confrontation' — has very important roots in factional disputes within the Soviet power elite.

The present crisis of the Polish power apparatus has a number of dimensions. First, at the level of government, it involves a growing disintegration of the state administration, (15) combined with the inability of a paralysed state machine to control real developments. This leads to mounting chaos, itself politicized by factional in-fighting. (16) What is more, the tactic of devolving responsibility for local problems to the district level, in order to avoid an accumulation of tension, has virtually destroyed the capacity of the Jaruzelski team to steer the country. Secondly, at the level of the Party, there is a deep identity crisis in which all the traditional single-party functions, though seriously reduced, have not given way to new roles. Conflicts within the PUWP are more and more coming into the open (17) and Kania's political base has been swept away. (18) The propaganda and coercive apparatuses are becoming increasingly unreliable. (19) Even the 'branch-union' relics of the old transmission-belt structure recently split over the question of internal democracy. The main problem, however, is a power vacuum: not the form of rule but its very existence. The economy, as well as managerial layers, seem to be completely out of control.

Probably one immediate factor in the shift to a 'hard line' policy is the increasingly open talk of ways in which the vacuum can be filled. (20) Thus the peculiarly 'institutional' focus of the Polish revolution gained additional strength as the power vacuum became deeper. The 'institutional revolution' may be seen as an 'open conspiracy' in which such goals as the peaceful evolution to a pluralist system are expressed in public. Nevertheless, the ruling group's ability to act is greatly reduced by the methods of this revolution — which the government side recently described as 'a paper putsch'. (21) The most effective of these methods are: 1) utilization of loopholes in the Polish legal system which, characteristically for an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime, provides the necessary flexibility without requiring formal changes in institutional structure; 2) appeals to legality based on the popular sense of justice and outrage at breaches of the law, combined with the drafting of new legislation and, in carefully selected cases, a

call on the authorities to abide by the law; 3) references to the legal facade of the existing political system (the Constitution, international conventions signed by Poland, etc.); 4) the creation of institutional bodies that may eventually serve as vehicles of change (e.g., self-management at factory level); and, last but not least, 5) independent activity to fill all areas of the power vacuum.

## 1. CHANGES IN SOLIDARITY

The 'open conspiracy' stage in *Solidarity's* development was preceded by a period of institutionalization (September 1980 to March 1981) which might be termed a 'self-limiting revolution', and by a period in which the movement faced a growing identity crisis (April to July 1981).




Before the identity crisis: male and female shipyard workers in Gdansk in August 1980

'Self-limiting revolution'. Most characteristic of the movement's first period was the painful process of cramming a radical wave of protest and class war (in Dahrendorf's sense of the term (22)) into a trade-union formula that was clearly too tight for it. Nearly all the other features were by-products of this self-limitation of the Polish revolution. Thus its symbolic politics, mainly consisting in attacks on local PUWP bosses with no attempt to undermine political institutions as such, served as a peculiar alibi for regional *Solidarity* leaders who had to pay with their own authority for the deradicalization of the movement being urged by its top leadership and intellectual experts. The other features included a predominance of status-oriented over interest-oriented policies, (23) and a full-scale mobilization of the rank and file. This mobilization had in it elements of a cultural revolution (24): not only was *Solidarity* perceived as a vehicle of upward mobility for the whole working class, but it seemed to respond to anti-hierarchical aspirations. Workers soon decided to talk. For some, this was merely an unreflective imitation of the vocabulary of the *Solidarity* leadership, which had for the first time demonstrated its ability to operate on the same level of generalization as the ruling group and the intelligentsia. But many workers made a conscious effort to change their habits of speech, using their semantic potential to overcome the limitations rooted in a restricted semantic code. (25) The powerful hierarchy based on differential semantic competence seemed to have vanished. Gone too was the old 'double-talk', so that many words were restored to their former meaning.

Another characteristic of this period was the lack of ideology due to the tactical, but at times shameful, silence of the self-limiting revolution. However, this was masked by the distinctive mentality of the membership, which itself played the role of an ideology. There were several reasons for this peculiarly non-ideological climate of the Polish revolution. First, the ritualization of ideology had bred a deep suspicion of all ideologies in the post-totalitarian regime. Secondly, the Polish opposition of the 1970s, being a loose coalition of people of different origins who were opposed to the system, had developed a typically non-ideological style. This ideological under-determination — if we think of ideology in traditional terms — is also apparent in *Solidarity*. More than 55 per cent of workers cannot give a name to their political attitudes, and most of the 36 per cent who support the opposition (KOR and the KPN) can give no ideological reason except that 'the opposition tells the truth'. (26) On closer examination, however, the situation is not

quite so simple. If we accept that the mentality typical of most *Solidarity* members (with its monism, fundamentalism, moralism and unidimensionality on the one hand, and its strong status orientation on the other) actually plays the role of an ideology, then the superficial ideological underdetermination may as well be interpreted as ideological overdetermination. (27)

The initial stage of *Solidarity's* development came to an end with the so-called Warsaw agreement of 30 March 1981 which followed the Bydgoszcz crisis. The agreement was formulated in a peculiar style, so that nothing was either unambiguously promised or unambiguously rejected. The semantic form was typical of the intellectual experts on both sides — full of allusions, meaningful winks and non-binding signals. Nor, or course, was that the end of the bargaining: the semantic style left both sides considerable room for manoeuvre. The agreement came as a shock to working-class *Solidarity* members. For we must remember that the 30 March compromise, in which it was nearly impossible to deduce what had been won and what had been lost, actually forestalled



Crowds of *Solidarity* members march past the union's headquarters in Bydgoszcz last March protesting at the police action to beat up *Solidarity* leaders there.

the preparations for a general strike. The hierarchy of semantic competence now reappeared and proved as stable as before. In a sense, the workers felt expropriated of their own creation, since all expressive functions in the movement were now fulfilled by its middle-class members. (28) *Solidarity* was no longer perceived as a vehicle of upward mobility; and the cultural revolution — or, rather, people's faith in it — was gone. This first stage in *Solidarity's* development therefore ended with the visible demobilization of its rank and file.

**The identity crisis.** The next stage (April to July 1981) was marked by a worsening identity crisis which simultaneously took several forms. This crisis mainly stemmed from the fact that although *Solidarity* had considerable political (chiefly blocking) power, it did not participate in economic decision-making and therefore lacked economic power. Poland's limited political revolution was not followed by a social revolution that changed the deep structure of domination based on state ownership of the means of production. In a paradoxical way, since the class war took the form of a movement against the political power hierarchy, *Solidarity* actually strengthened the central disposition of the means of production which was one of the main causes of the present economic and political crisis. The institutionalization of the class war, together with *Solidarity's* specific role as shock-absorber, made it possible for the government to survive without far-reaching changes in its structure and mode of functioning. Moreover, while the paralyzed government was unable to make any decisions, *Solidarity* looked on passively at the deteriorating economic situation in the country. In these conditions its great, but in a sense merely negative, power was useless.

The second dimension of the identity crisis consisted in the impasse of a 'self-limiting revolution' that seemed to be wearing out all its instruments. The ruling group had already been unmasked, and was therefore much less sensitive to the status issues fuelling popular protest. Furthermore, it was the people and not the ruling group which had to pay the costs of the strikes: the ruling group

was, in a sense, the owner of the means of production without having all the responsibilities of an owner; it participated only in the economic gains and not in the losses. Since it was also quite prepared to issue dud cheques, nearly all the victories won by *Solidarity* during this stage of the conflict had a superficial character. The impasse of the self-limiting revolution also arose from a narrowly trade-union definition of the movement's activity. This tactical silence dangerously widened the gap between *Solidarity's* day-to-day activities, with their short-term goals often mirroring the tactics of the other side, and the Sorel-type myth of the destruction of the ruling group's power-monopoly through a universal refusal to obey (as in the August 1980 strikes). There were no intermediate goals between the two.

The third source of the identity crisis was the conception of how the movement should function: in particular, a certain notion of the union's inner cohesion, and the strangely passive tactic of observing, and if necessary protesting against, government actions, but without assuming responsibility for the system's functioning. The view of inner cohesion not only prevented open discussion and negotiated resolution of differences within the movement; it was also responsible for a kind of sham radicalism in the election of regional union officials. Since it was not possible to discuss clashes of interest and opinion, the only basis for election was an exaggerated emphasis on the few differences that could not be concealed (for example, whether or not the candidate belonged to the PUWP). As a result, nearly all PUWP members were barred from holding union posts, even though more were elected to factory-level *Solidarity* commissions than had joined the *Solidarity* founding-groups during the August 1980 strikes. The doctrine of passivity, combined with avoidance of responsibility, also proved to be a trap. For it came to infect *Solidarity* with the paralysis then typical of the government, and even opened the door to co-optation. As a leading *Solidarity* official said in an interview: 'Since we do not have our own ideas about how to solve economic and social problems, we protest against bad government programmes but end up collaborating in their realization.' (29)

**The 'open conspiracy' stage: a mass movement or a political party of activists?** Tensions due to this multidimensional identity crisis forced *Solidarity* to enter the third stage of its evolution, provoking a corresponding change in the strategy of its leadership which became apparent not only at National Commission meetings but also at *Solidarity's* First Congress in September/October 1981.

First, the new characterization of *Solidarity* as a social movement, rather than just a trade union, made it possible for the movement to speak out publicly on political questions. This in turn led to an eruption of radical rhetoric, and to the open expression of two different mentalities that substituted for ideologies. These were: a) **the pragmatic orientation**, rooted in the tactics of institutional revolution, which required an avoidance of matters of principle as the price for its efficiency; and b) **the fundamentalist orientation**, involving a moralistic approach which, above all, took statements at face value and tolerated no discrepancy between statements and actual conduct. The difference between these two orientations is well illustrated by the decision to leave the formula about 'the leading role of the Party' in the *Solidarity* statutes, as well as the demand for free elections to the Diet/Sejm formulated during the first part of the *Solidarity* Congress. The pragmatists treated this as a signal to the government indicating the areas of possible bargaining, while the fundamentalists, especially at factory level, saw it as a serious status problem for *Solidarity*, a tension-producing contradiction that had to be thoroughly elucidated and resolved. They did not think in terms of political tactics. In general, the fundamentalists are not seriously concerned with politics: if a phenomenon is considered negative, then this very judgment is enough for it to be eliminated. The assumption that only one part can be right, combined with their sense of moral rectitude, leads them to believe that if evil is stigmatized, it will inevitably be destroyed or will even destroy itself. This is why they underestimate the need for a political strategy and why, in spite of being sharp critics of the system, they are in practice less radical than the pragmatists. (31) Furthermore, their maximalist attitudes make them somehow defenceless in the face of a reality in which the state dwarfs society (every third person is a manager of

something). It is virtually impossible for their programme to be put into operation.

There is also an abyss between the pragmatic and the fundamentalist political imagination. For the pragmatists the state means political institutions and political games; while the fundamentalists perceive it in terms of personal values (sovereignty, dignity) (32), remaining insensitive to political games and to the idea of 'institutional revolution'. One of the few things in the programme adopted at Congress which actually have some resonance at the base is the idea of 'settling accounts' with the policy of the seventies, but not the idea of institutional reforms which is nevertheless an important part of the programme. The former approach is thus more common among the working-class rank and file, who never had the chance to participate in the political games (or illusions of political games) with the ruling elite that were so characteristic of the seventies pattern of 'repressive tolerance'. In fact, it was mostly the intellectual layers who were involved in this pattern.

Verbal declarations, promises and definitions are more 'real' for the fundamentalists than they are for the pragmatists. This is why the rhetoric of the fundamentalists is a greater source of irritation for the ruling elite than the efficient tactics of the pragmatists. It may be the case, however, that the existence of a fundamentalist orientation enables the ruling elite to channel its sense of helpless frustration in the face of the pragmatists' 'open conspiracy'.



One verbal declaration made a reality: the sign in the Lenin Shipyard carries the name of the official unions, which were to be well and truly blotted out.

Another new element in *Solidarity* which increases the possibility of confrontation with the power apparatus is its much more active approach to such questions as self-government, union control over food-rationing, and the campaign for *Solidarity* control over the distribution of goods produced through voluntary work on official free Saturdays. Moreover, the combination of status politics and symbolic gestures has lost much of its strength in a shift towards institutional reform which includes, for example, the demand for a Labour Chamber in the Diet. However, this mainly involves a reorientation of *Solidarity* activists and the army of nearly 40,000 full-timers, while the rank-and-file membership is displaying signs of demobilization. Ordinary members are not involved in many of the conflicts and games within the movement, and are poorly informed about *Solidarity* contacts with the government. Even when they do receive information, their fundamentalist mentality does not allow them to understand what is going on. Many of them, in fact, feel alienated as if they were a mass levy to be raised and later disbanded. (33) Tired of the hardships of everyday life, they are less and less inclined to involve themselves in union activity. Even the fight for genuine 'self-government' seems more important to union activists than it does to the masses.

It should be emphasised that the shift in *Solidarity* tactics has not only increased tensions in union relations with the ruling group, but also set up conflicts and tensions within the movement itself. A good illustration is the history of the self-management idea. *Solidarity* full-timers at factory level were the first to recognize the pitfalls of passive tactics, and the first to sense the dead-end of the 'self-limiting revolution'. One group, from more than fifty large enterprises, organized a horizontal 'network' (34) which elaborated the concept of a 'social enterprise' combining radical workers' councils with a far-reaching programme of economic reforms. The network's radical tactics included the organization of factory-level workers' councils with a very wide area of competence, and the use of *faits accomplis* to influence future legal regulations. However, this initiative was not well received by either the state administration or the *Solidarity* officials. Regional union leaders saw such horizontal structures as undercutting the hierarchical order; and the National Commission, though more neutral, did not give any support until late July 1981. Interest in the idea of self-government only began to rise sharply when the meeting with Deputy Minister Rakowski broke down on 6 August 1981, and when the ensuing media campaign charged that *Solidarity* was not concerned to lift the country out of crisis. However, the National Commission and some of its advisers did not share the 'network's' approach to self-government. The latter regarded workers' councils as a means of activating the rank and file and socializing the means of production (thereby bridging the gap between the union's political and economic power), and above all as the only way in which the economic reform could be speeded up. But the former mainly supported the idea of self-government in order to signal their general interest in a solution to the economic crisis, so building a more positive image for the union. National Commission leaders, and some advisers with a background in the opposition, also had in mind a political aspect of the self-government idea: namely, the fact that the election of managers, rather than their appointment from above, would seriously curtail the *nomenklatura* mechanism. Overpoliticization of the self-government idea distracted the National Commission from the issue of the factory's legal status vis-a-vis the central administration. This was particularly apparent in the Diet negotiations, and in the KKP Presidium decision which caused so much heat during the second part of the *Solidarity* Congress. (35)

It should be added that some *Solidarity* leaders and experts treated the question of self-government as an arena for displaying their conciliatory attitudes, linked to rumours about the possibility of a Government of National Salvation. This heightened conflicts within the union, since the rank and file and the factory activists, most of them with a fundamentalist orientation, were unable to understand or accept such games with the ruling group. These divisions also increased the possibility of confrontation with the power apparatus, especially now that the KKP, in seeking to avoid an accumulation of tension, had relegated to factory level the negotiations on areas of self-government which generated the most conflict. We should remember that the ruling group used the same tactic in setting up district crisis-management groups with a broad field of competence. The danger of local conflict is further increased by the fact that since the Ninth Congress of the PUWP did not elect Kania's main rivals to the new Central Committee, nearly all the factional in-fighting has been conducted at the level of the district Party committees.

Nevertheless, the present climate of confrontation seems to be due not only or even primarily to these trends in *Solidarity's* development, but to processes taking place within the Polish United Workers Party.

## 2. DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL REGIME IN POLAND

The evolution of the Polish political system after the summer 1980 strike wave was determined by spontaneous processes and uncontrolled events in the play of political forces, rather than conscious action to bring about reforms. This may be seen in the most characteristic development: namely, the transformation of the PUWP's polymorphic status, involving attempts (observable from late January 1981) until they were halted by the Bydgoszcz crisis of

March 1981) (36) to divest the Party of its sole responsibility for the functioning of the economy and state administration. In reality, these were ad hoc efforts to divide such responsibility between Party and government, and thereby to avoid a confrontation with *Solidarity*. In keeping with this tactic, the PUWP was supposed to take 'hard-line' measures in response to Soviet expectations, while the Jaruzelski government would maintain the 'social contract' legacy. After careful analysis, one has to agree with Juan Linz's view that 'authoritarian regimes are likely to be complex systems characterized by the heterogeneity of models influencing their institutionalization, often involving contradictory models in an uneasy coexistence'. (3) Changes within Poland's totalitarian, and then bureaucratic-authoritarian regime may be seen in dialectical terms as pointing to the contradictions and inner dynamics of the system.

The main contradiction of the system is bound up with state ownership of the means of production. The social relations based on such ownership develop in two ways. **First**, the forms of social protest (class war) mature and exhaust themselves, just as the ruling group's techniques for absorbing this protest exhaust themselves in a parallel process. (38) In Poland, social protest began with a stage of 'artificial negativity' (39) in which the political system could not operate or introduce the necessary changes without the reconstitution of an opposition from above. During the successive political crises of 1956 and 1968, a public was summoned from above to participate in a ritual political drama. But once its role was fulfilled, this public was more or less smoothly demobilized.

This stage of 'artificial negativity' gave way in December 1970 to a *populist* phase, and then in the late seventies to a *corporatist* form of interest articulation which passed into the *class* form of August 1980 (in Dahrendorf's sense of the term), when the exploited and powerful masses came out against those who held positions of power and disposed of the means of production.

All these forms of protest gradually produced their own tensions which caused them to pass into the subsequent, more mature form. To be more specific, the 'artificial negativity' tactic, based on a pattern of regulation through crisis, (40) had not only exploited almost all the instruments of symbolic manipulation by the end of the sixties, but had more and more evidently gone out of control. The subsequent populist form of protest absorption not only required a very costly and indiscriminating economic policy, but generated serious status problems for the managerial layers of the power apparatus. The corporatist form which followed was very suitable for the ruling group, since its structures prevented the development of a more general, political space. But although it had the capacity to buy off, from the point of view of society, it carried a high price in moral ambivalence, rapid social differentiation, and fragmentation of both economy and society. Tensions within the managerial layers, now crucially linked to greater uncertainty in day-to-day operations, grew even faster than under previous forms of class war. The next and latest form of social protest appeared with the birth of the social movement *Solidarity*, with a membership of nearly ten million. The inner tensions of this form, as well as its inner dynamics and contradictions, were described in the first part of this article.

**Secondly**, the contradiction bound up with state ownership has taken the form of economic-political cycles, with a peculiar pattern of regulation through crisis. During such periods of regulation, a downward revision of investment and output targets would temporarily decrease tensions and help to prolong state ownership of the means of production. In the late seventies, however, the destabilizing impact of corporatist protest absorption combined with easy access to hard-currency credits led to an abandonment of this essential regulatory activity. As a result, we now have in Poland a full-scale economic crisis that is completely out of control.

The second contradiction of 'actually existing socialism' is based on the structure and mode of functioning of the political subsystem. The dialectical development of this contradiction may be described in the following series:

1. Creation of an artificial reality, involving a totalitarian utopia based upon a mythical unity of social and state interests, and upon

the idea that super-centralization is required for the mobilization of all resources.

2. Exhaustion of all the system's reserves, and the gradual emergence of every pitfall bound up with this artificial construction.

3. A trial-and-error process whereby the ruling group develops instruments for dealing with at least some of the system's pitfalls. The most important of these instruments are: the pattern of artificial negativity, the politics of detotalization from above/ritualization of ideology, the reconstruction of certain social interests through a lame pluralism without responsibility and a corporatist structure of interest articulation. The former was characteristic of the 1960s, the latter of Gierek's regime in the 1970s. Another method of dealing with the pitfalls of totalitarian utopia was the pattern of crisis-management or even regulation-through-crisis. This was based on the two characteristic features of Polish society: a culture of symbolic gesture, differentiated according to social status; and a strong Catholic Church which may both play the role of shock-absorber and be accepted by the ruling group as a party to negotiations. These processes set up many specific tensions, of which the explosion of discontent in August 1980 was in a sense a by-product. (41)



The Party daily announces Jaruzelski's election as Party leader in October.

### 3. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE AUGUST 1980

The present crisis of Party and government may be seen as the next stage in the evolution described above. Poland in the late 1970s was a typical case of an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime — that is to say, 'a political system involving limited political pluralism without responsibility, and a series of particular mentalities rather than a clearly elaborated guiding ideology; a system in which a leader, or occasionally a small group, exercises power within formally ill-defined yet actually quite predictable limits'. (42) Already in the 1950s these features were joined by the pattern of a polymorphic Communist Party, in which a PUWP with low institutional specificity merged with the state administration and various organizations designed to transmit political ideology and instructions to the masses. Also typical of this phase was a peculiar process of feudalization, such that vaguely differentiated political functions came to depend upon personal constellations. This neo-feudal characteristic was further strengthened by a process of fragmentation typical of the corporatist forms of interest articulation.

The events of August 1980 and after changed nearly all these features of the political system in Poland. Not only did lame pluralism turn into almost-responsible pluralism, with full-time

union officials wielding considerable blocking power, but the ruling group nearly overcame its lack of a distinctive legitimacy formula which constitutes the principal handicap of authoritarian regimes. The idea of a 'social contract' thus replaced the corroded 'vanguard' myth. As we see, however, the inner dynamics of the liberalization process, setting up counteractive tensions within the power apparatus, makes it impossible for the 'social contract' to become a stable form of legitimation. Moreover, the feudalization of the system has reached a new stage since August 1980. As the enterprises became much less sensitive to both financial and commandist instruments, the profound economic crisis led to a rapid growth of what is virtually a natural barter-economy, based on an exchange of commodities and services beyond the control of the ruling group. It should be borne in mind that this group itself has nothing to exchange or offer: its special privileges have been concealed, the investment funds are no longer available, and the security of managerial jobs depends more on good relations with *Solidarity* than on obedience to orders from above.

The worsening economic crisis has thus greatly weakened the **totalitarian** character of the system (in the sense of a concentration of power).

The most interesting phenomenon which arose after August 1980, however, was the inner transformation of the Polish United Workers Party as it unsuccessfully tried to divest itself of its polymorphic status. Later, at the Ninth Party Congress, populism was mistaken for democracy and a superficial victory over the Party apparatus actually concluded in its evident consolidation. More important still, any chance was lost to develop a new model of Party functioning. Politbureau pragmatists rejected the more ideological orientation proposed by the Katowice Forum of 'true communists', on the grounds that it would provoke open polarization and confrontation. Also rejected was the line stemming from Party secretaries in the big enterprises, according to which the Party should be a movement against the state bureaucracy. Indeed, the Ninth Congress embraced the government's stabilization plan, which did not envisage any tasks for Party organizations, especially at factory level. This is why strong tensions are now apparent within a PUWP unable either to abandon its polymorphic status or to go on functioning as in the past. A

#### Footnotes

- 1) See the report of the Fourth Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee, *Trybuna Ludu* 16-18 October 1981.
- 2) Rakowski, for example, overinterprets *Solidarity's* demand to control food distribution as a struggle for economic power.
- 3) See the speech at the Fourth Plenum by Politburo member and former Minister of Internal Security, Milewski.
- 4) See Siwak's speech at the Fourth Plenum.
- 5) See Barcikowski's speech at a meeting of the Party apparatus, 20 February 1981.
- 6) During the Fourth Plenum, thirteen members of the PUWP Central Committee surrendered their *Solidarity* cards.
- 7) Thus Walesa has carefully avoided the figures in the National Commission Presidium who are controversial from the government's point of view. Kuron openly expressed a desire for a Government of National Salvation in *Niezalezność*, 18 September 1981, and in an interview with *Sztandar Młodych*, 15 October.
- 8) The August 1981 hunger marches in Lodz and Warsaw, the racial clashes with gypsies in Konin, and the September strikes in Katowice and Zyrardow over the food crisis.
- 9) Very typical was the Szczeglowice miners' strike in September 1981. The miners rejected higher pay for work on free Saturdays, so that they would not be treated as an overprivileged stratum. This incident, which involved a threat of violence against Branch Union activists who had called for more money in a TV interview, may be seen as a kind of crusade against temptations of evil.
- 10) See Zamyatin's interview in *Stern* following the Haig-Gromyko meeting in September 1981; and Suslov's article in *Novy Mir*, 14 October, which expressed the rapid change in tone after the assassination of Sadat.
- 11) Thus there were a number of versions of the so-called stabilization plan. Between March and June we could observe: a growing rigidity in the treatment of individual farmers, stemming from protection of the collective farms; a halt to the plans for radical investment cuts, owing to Poland's defence obligations; and a Soviet threat to enforce 'balanced trade' with Poland if the political situation did not change (Poland's current deficit is 1.5 billion rubles). Baibakov visited Warsaw in September, and various Comecon partners took up Polish investment projects for their own use on the basis of Poland's energy supplies. As it happens,

member of the Lodz PUWP Committee pointedly expressed this dilemma in an interview given to the Party daily *Gazeta Robotnicza*: 'If it is to rebuild its authority, the Polish United Workers Party should now play the role of an opposition party.' But this is an extremely difficult formula for a ruling party with the strong status orientation of the PUWP!

The PUWP crisis is aggravated by the severe limitation of the five characteristic roles of a communist party: politicization of the masses, utilization of the trade unions as a tightly-controlled transmission-belt, recruitment and training of a new political elite, guidance and leadership in the sense of a permanent Party presence at the top of many institutions, and direct control over the economy. At the same time, no new roles have so far been elaborated. The Party's identity crisis is, in my view, the main reason for the authoritarian, or even totalitarian, temptation apparent among some of its activists. These problems, insoluble with the formula according to which the PUWP functions, are further deepened by the evolution of *Solidarity*. But in any case, the inner dynamics of the Party would have brought it to the present point.

#### Concluding Remarks

It is very difficult to understand Polish political life. Most labels are quite misleading: for example, the fundamentalists are generally less radical than the pragmatists, while the ideologically-oriented groups within the PUWP — the so-called hard-liners — indirectly support *Solidarity* in its fight against the *nomenklatura*, because they wish to appear fully competitive on the political arena. On the other hand, *Solidarity's* Church advisers do not seem interested in the idea of self-government, preferring a more hierarchical order and having no wish for a social revolution.

This brief analysis of the Polish drama, aggravated by the near-total collapse of the economy, is not intended to provide answers about the future of the Polish revolution. Rather it has attempted, without contamination from moralistic or emotional elements, to analyse the revolution's multidimensionality and the internal dynamics of the situation. At least this should help us to understand what has recently happened in Poland.

these projects were for high energy-consuming steel-mills, so that the reallocation of three million tonnes of coal from Western to Eastern markets further aggravated Poland's credit problems.

- 12) General Prchlik, for example.
- 13) In connection with the '2,000 words manifesto'.
- 14) See Jiri Valenta, *Anatomy of Intervention*, New York 1978.
- 15) In response to *Solidarity's* call for a Social Council on the Economy, the chairman of the Council of Ministers Economic Committee, Krzak, promised to discuss the idea, while on the very same day (16 October 1981) Jaruzelski's press attache, Urban, who is linked to Rakowski, vigorously rejected the idea.
- 16) At least some of the strikes after the Ninth Congress were actually provoked by, for example, a one-week delay in the issuing of food coupons and a consequent disorganization of food supplies in Katowice and Lodz.
- 17) Kociolek, the Warsaw first Party secretary, collected nearly 800 signatures demanding a tenth congress. When Siwak proposed that the Politbureau should co-opt Kociolek, who had not even been elected to the Central Committee, a few Politbureau members (Kubiak, Grzyb, Labecki) turned him down flat. It is as a result of these conflicts that Kania resigned as first secretary on 18 October. Similarly, liberal district secretaries such as Fiszbach have come under fire from 'old communist' groups in their region.
- 18) Party secretaries from big enterprises who supported Kania in his conflict with Olszowski in March 1981 openly criticized him for preventing any change in the Party formula. See, for example, the meeting of 20 August 1981 at Cegielski factory, reported by Polish TV.
- 19) The general secretary of the Branch Union openly criticized the overcentralization of his organization and was expelled on 17 October 1981. Independent unions were organized within the police, and a deep conflict between the Association of Journalists and the government led to the expulsion of its chairman, Bratkowski, from the PUWP. Jaruzelski decided to extend the existing army draft for another two months, because the new draft would be composed of people already under *Solidarity* influence. This was in line with a discussion at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee on the possibility of declaring a state of emergency (17 October 1981).

20. The Catholic Church, some PAX people such as Reiff, the Peasant Party and the independent, Jacek Kuron, proposed the formation of a 'Government of National Salvation'.
21. See Urban's comment on the *Solidarity* proposal of a 'Social Council on the Economy', 16 October 1981.
22. When those without power opposed those in positions of power. See *Class and Class Conflict*.
23. See the conflict over free Saturdays in January 1981, which was interpreted above all as a sign that the government was prepared to treat *Solidarity* seriously.
24. See the investigation conducted by Marody from Warsaw University at the Warsaw steel-mill in December 1980. His conclusions was that *Solidarity* was principally seen as a vehicle of upward mobility.
25. See Basil Bernstein, *Language and Social Classes*.
26. See Odrobinka's survey in Gdansk shipyard, June 1981.
27. These problems will be discussed in my forthcoming book on Poland's 'self-limiting revolution'.
28. See Jankowski's survey in Szczecin, June 1981.
29. See the interview with Grzegorz Palka from Lodz Region of *Solidarity* in *La Repubblica*, September 1981.

30. An amendment was added to the effect that *Solidarity* will defend its members 'as citizens as well as in workplace situations'.
31. See the Mazowsze daily, *Wiadomosci Dnia*, 24 September 1981, which published the programme of the fundamentalists.
32. See the survey conducted on 1 June by Radzko from the *Mazowsze* Social Research Centre.
33. According to data from Odrobinska, more than 70 per cent of workers feel that they have no influence on the life of society.
34. The network was created in March 1981 on the initiative of Gdansk shipyard and Mielec WSK factory.
35. This decision renounced all Siec's demands for reform.
36. This provocation is described in my article in *Bulletin of Scottish Politics*, Spring 1981.
37. See Polsby and Greenspan (eds.), *Handbook of Political Sciences*, Vol.3, Boston 1978.
38. See my article in *Soviet Studies*, April 1981.
39. See Paul Piccone, 'One-dimensionality', *Telos*, Spring 1978.
40. See my article 'On some contradictions of socialist society', *Soviet Studies*, April 1978.
41. *Soviet Studies*, April 1981.
42. Linz, op. cit.

## Solidarnosc on the Eve — by Zbigniew Kowalewski

(Friends of Solidarity return repeatedly to the question why the movement was caught so much off guard by the military coup and whether it could have responded more effectively if it had been better prepared. In the article we publish below, Zbigniew Kowalewski, a leader of Solidarity in the large industrial city of Lodz and one of the most prominent Solidarity leaders now in exile, describes the movement's last days before the coup and reveals that the notion widespread in the West that no preparations were made is wide of the mark.

His article was written for the Swedish magazine ETC. The English translation is taken from the February issue of the French magazine Inprecor.)

After a long struggle, the radical current which supported workers' self-management won an important victory at the second session of *Solidarity's* first national congress. This session rejected the compromise which the Presidium of the National Commission (KK) of the union had agreed with the Sejm (Parliament) concerning the laws on workers' self-management and state enterprises. The Congress did not consider the battle on the legislative front over, despite the partial defeat for *Solidarity* resulting largely from this compromise.

It was decided, as proposed by the Lodz delegates, that both laws (which were in contradiction with the positions of both the union and the self-management movement) should be the subject of a referendum in the enterprises. On such a basis the union would fight for the modification of the laws adopted by the Sejm. In addition, the Congress clearly expressed its intention to carry on the struggle for genuine workers' self-management, supporting the struggle of workers even when they go outside those laws.(1)

After the adoption of this resolution and before the end of Congress, a group of militants supporting self-management organized concrete measures for the organization and activity of the self-management movement. The regional co-



Fire-brigade cadets occupying their training school in Warsaw just before the riot police stormed the building in December 1981 — a test of strength before the coup.

ordination of the self-management bodies of Upper Silesia, under the presidency of Jan Huzarewicz and with the help of Henryk Szlajfer as expert, decided to put into effect what the 'Lublin Group' had been fighting for for many months.

On their initiative, only twelve days after the end of Congress, the delegates of 17 regional co-ordinating bodies met on 17 October and created the Founding Committee of the National Federation of Self-Management Bodies (KZ-KFS). This was meant to be a provisional body until the holding of a 'National Congress of Workers' Councils' to ensure the necessary preconditions for 'a self-management model of the economy and the state'.(2)

### THE DEBATE ON SELF-MANAGEMENT

Unlike the Lublin Group, the Network organized in 17 big enterprises had not so far supported vertical development of the self-management movement. They were in fact quite hostile to it. Nevertheless, from that time they ceased to oppose it. One of the better-known militants of the Network, Hans Szyk, was even elected President of KZ-KFS. One must point out, however, that the Gdansk regional leadership joined the

Federation only after a great deal of hesitation, and that the Lower Silesian (Wroclaw) region never joined. Both were under the influence of Network militants.

At the time of the Congress a number of Network militants opposed the resolution on self-management, even though the majority of enterprises belonging to the Network participated in the struggle for workers' self-management. But the majority of the experts in the Network, and certain *Solidarity* militants under their influence, were partisans of a market economy and competition between enterprises. They were often hostile to the radical initiatives taken by the self-management movement. They were believers in parliamentary democracy rather than the democracy of workers' councils, placing themselves in a technical framework rather than the framework of the workers' movement itself. Nevertheless the working-class base of the union clearly aspired to more radical actions.

As the sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis has already pointed out, the gap which existed between the working class base and many of these leaders tended to become deeper to the extent that it was an expression of a difference in political imagination. 'I fear that the language of the leaders is not very convincing for the rank and file,' she wrote. 'Even the slogans of socialization and self-management say little to the imagination of the masses. It is no accident that it is easier to promote self-management by talking about seizing economic power, as I do, or by talking about an active strike, as Kowalewski does in Lodz.'(3)

The National Commission of *Solidarity*, to start with, did not formally recognize the Federation as a partner. Without being equivocal, its position was in any case not clear. Although the Lodz delegation had asked that the referendum be organized within a maximum delay of six weeks after the end of Congress, the National Commission was slow to take the necessary decisions about organizing it. The experts

recommended two possible tactics: put off the referendum to some indefinite time in the future, or try to the maximum to limit its scope.

In view of this situation the Lublin Group decided, on 13 November, to draft 19 questions for the referendum (4) which it submitted to the Committee of the National Federation for Self-Management. These were accepted by the Committee. The National Commission experts then presented a project which limited itself to four questions, thus giving clear witness to their intention not to go beyond a certain point in questioning the law. They claimed that certain controversial judgments could be interpreted in a sense favourable to *Solidarity*, simply forgetting that it is those in power — i.e. the bureaucracy and not *Solidarity* — who make the interpretation.

Under the pressure of its radical wing the National Commission finally adopted a resolution which set the referendum for the first week of December. But it did not settle the question of its content nor the manner of organizing it. This date would have been a fiction and could not be respected. In the same resolution the National Commission recognized nonetheless the necessity of co-ordinating self-management bodies at the regional and national level and committed union bodies to help set this up. (5) But this still did not signify a recognition of the Founding Commission of the Federation.

At the same time the position of the workers' self-management organizations in the workplace was, if not always difficult, then at least often very complicated.

It became clear that the authorities intended to ignore the union congress resolution demanding that workers' councils should elect the directors in almost all enterprises. The government wanted the state administrative bodies to keep the right to appoint the directors of the 1500 largest enterprises, which are decisive for the economic life of the country. Clearly the struggle to break up the *nomenklatura* system was only just beginning.

The most militant and politically conscious sections of the self-management movement, however, refused to give way on this point. In spite of the difficulties, the struggle for the election of directors continued. An ever increasing number of workers' councils adopted the idea of multi-candidate elections proposed by independent experts of the Lodz section of the Scientific Association for Organization and Management. This method had been popularized by the 'Lublin Group' (6) from August onwards; and, without paying any attention to the views of the authorities, workers' councils would invite these experts to help them organize multi-candidate elections for the post of director.

The policy of producing *faits accomplis* did not stop there. The official Law on State Enterprises specified that it was the director's job to run the enterprise. The *Solidarity* Congress, however, took the view that self-management organs should control the

enterprise, that the director was only there to implement their decisions. Wherever *Solidarity* and the workers' council felt strong enough, it was their position rather than the official one which prevailed.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in most cases the workers' councils were not yet self-management bodies but organs of struggle for self-management and control over production. 'Such control is the main axis of a programme of transition to genuine workers' self-management and, at the same time, one of the principal forms of the struggle for self-management ... In the conditions now facing us, such workers' control above all involves thorough knowledge of the workings of the enterprise and the right to veto decisions of the administration.' (7)

Anyway, in a growing number of factories, the self-management organs and *Solidarity* commissions declared in the name of the workers that they wished to break their links with the 'Industrial Associations' — that is, the intermediate layer of the bureaucratic management system, coming between the ministries and the units of production, whose parasitic character is particularly glaring. Enterprise workers' commissions drew up their own plans for a democratic and freely-chosen link-up between enterprises, also drafting outline statutes for their enterprises. At the same time, the regional and national organs of the Movement for Self-Management worked out and popularized model plans on these questions, thus taking the initiative out of the hands of the bureaucrats.

#### CO-ORDINATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The regional bodies of the self-management movement restricted their activities on the whole to helping the enterprise self-management organs to develop and become stronger. They did not reach the point of exercising social control over the economy. However, there were some first steps in this direction, particularly in Upper Silesia, where the authorities tried to raise coal-output by bribing the miners and lengthening the working week.


Given the worsening energy crisis, the regional co-ordinating bodies of self-management worked out a plan for increasing coal-extraction based on completely different criteria. In this plan, a rise in total coal output and improved use of it depended upon 'changes in the system of work organization so as to: i) increase the proportion of the working-day actually used for productive work; and ii) limiting the consumption of electric power in the production cycle'. (8) It was shown that real working time in the mines averaged 66 to 73 per cent of nominal time, and that poor work organization resulted in an unjustified wastage of energy equivalent to millions of tons of coal.

Nonetheless, the most important task was still to create self-management bodies in as many enterprises as possible. The law passed by Parliament had set 31 December as the final date for the creation of self-

management organs in all state enterprises. Where the workers had not yet been won to the idea of self-management, the bureaucrats could use the time-limit to set up councils without reference to the level of consciousness and activity of the masses. From a political point of view, these councils would thus become objectively dependent on the bureaucracy.

In order to counter this danger, the *Solidarity* leaderships and the self-management regional co-ordinating bodies would have to make a considerable effort at the ideological and organization levels. Co-ordinating bodies existed in 25 regions by the end of November, but outside the big industrial centres the *Solidarity* regional leaderships were not very active on the question of self-management.

The big factories played a key role in this struggle, often drawing the greatest support for self-management among the workers. But it was also here that it proved most difficult to institutionalize, since the implementation of direct democracy was a most complicated matter. The Law insisted that the workers' council be elected by a direct vote. Although the Lublin Group had previously come out in favour of indirect elections by delegates, (9) this idea did not get enough support from *Solidarity* and was not taken up by Parliament. It would have both complicated and prolonged the process of election. Moreover, although the idea of developing self-management from below — through workshops and other workplace groups — had been popularized it had met with little response among the workers. In the large enterprises it would not help to overcome the division between manual and intellectual labour, and would make more difficult the transformation of inner-factory relations and the abolition of authoritarianism.



Marian Jurczyk, *Solidarity* leader in Szczecin.

For the radical currents in the union, however, a referendum and a struggle to change the law were not the only ways in which workers' self-management could be realized.

#### THE TACTIC OF THE ACTIVE STRIKE

Starting in August, Lodz Region made widespread propaganda on the tactic of the active strike, utilizing a plan which I had worked out. (11) The vice-president of the

region, Grzegorz Palka, elaborated a plan on the tactics and strategy of the struggle for economic reform based on self-management, in which the active strike played an important role. At the same time, Andrzej Slowik, *Solidarity* chairperson of the region, drew up a plan for a second Chamber of Parliament and regional councils to serve as the organs of workers' economic power. (12) We should also add the plan for union control over rationing and the distribution of consumer goods, which was put into practice from October onwards. (13) In this way, a strategy of struggle for workers' power was outlined.

On 23 October, the active strike was recognized by *Solidarity* as one of the means of union struggle. In the resolution adopted on that day, the National Commission warned the government that it would be obliged 'to prepare and carry out an active strike in particular sectors of the economy' (14), if, by the end of October, the authorities proved incapable of taking energetic measures to improve the supply of goods to the population, if they continued to oppose social control over the economy, and if they did not halt repression against the union.

A few days previously, the President of the Association of Journalists, Stefan Bratkowski, wrote in a letter to the 5th Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee that an active strike was society's best response to a show of force by the ruling powers. 'Do not forget,' he said, 'that the Poles have an amazing talent for self-organization. In a few days the general strike will create a network of spontaneous conducting wires, a network of committees for mutual aid and co-ordination. The factories will work during the strike; trade will go on. Only the authorities will have nothing to do.' (15)

The authorities were seized with panic. A week later, at a session of the Sejm, General Jaruzelski warned anyone contemplating an active strike of the risks they would be running. Other PUWP leaders, including CC Secretary Stefan Olszowski, made statements of a similar kind. The central Party organ, *Trybuna Ludu*, published a long commentary on the pamphlet *The Active Strike Tactic*, explaining that it contained a scenario for a seizure of power by *Solidarity* which had to be resisted at all costs. (16)

Despite its earlier decision, the *Solidarity* National Commission did not set to work on preparing the active strike. In fact, the expert circles launched a stand-up fight against the whole tactic. At a discussion in *Solidarity's* Warsaw Centre for Socio-occupational Research, some of them stated: 'It is very difficult to realize the active strike, but very easy to strangle it.' (17) Among the technicians who favoured a market economy, some expressed their hostility to the idea of centralized council power. 'Seizure of economic power during the active strike, and hence the establishment of rule by workers' councils, may lead to the replacement of the central bureaucracy by another bureaucracy, and


of one authoritarian system of allocation and decision-making by another.' (18)

At a union meeting in Lublin on 4 December, one of the most influential experts on the National Commission declared that the active strike 'was an idea launched by leftists and Trotskyists, a fine-sounding word whose exact meaning no one knows'. This irritated a number of the workers present, who not only knew what an active strike was, but were working on plans to practise it in their enterprises.

This was not an isolated reaction among the workers. In the course of November and early December, the idea of an active strike made rapid headway within the union, particularly, but not exclusively, among the industrial workers.

A survey conducted in Lodz region in early November showed that 65 per cent of *Solidarity* members were in favour of an active strike, while only 12 per cent favoured a classical passive strike. (19) At Wifama, a big modern factory in Lodz, as many as 85 per cent said they supported an active strike. The workers saw it as an effective way of struggling against the crisis and the economic policy of the bureaucracy. The *Solidarity* chairperson at the Manifest Lipcowy mines explained: 'The only prospect is to impose social control over production. And the only effective way of doing this is the active strike. It is a form of action which allows us to exercise control over the whole process, from production in the enterprise to the final delivery of the product.' (20)

Some *Solidarity* regional leaderships did begin preparations for the active strike, appointing special teams to be in charge. This happened not only in Lodz, but also in Stalowa Wola and Warsaw. During the patriotic demonstration on 11 November, the vice-chairperson of Warsaw *Solidarity*, Seweryn Jaworski, called on the strikers to prepare to take control of the factories through an active strike.



Seweryn Jaworski, deputy chairperson of Warsaw *Solidarity*.

On 6 December the chairperson of Lublin *Solidarity*, Jan Bartczak, made a similar appeal. At the same time, the Upper Silesia leadership published a plan for a union office to distribute goods produced during an active strike. Grzegorz Palka, the National Commission Presidium member responsible for the economic reform, had appointed an informal co-ordinator to prepare the active strike at national level. In fact, there was already some co-ordination on the ground between Lodz, Warsaw and Stalowa Wola. In Warsaw Jerzy Dwyer, a Presidium member and supporter of the 'Lublin Group', had drawn up some practical instructions for the active strike.

## THE QUESTION OF WORKERS' GUARDS

At the same time, the slogan of workers' guards (i.e., a *Solidarity* self-defence militia) was beginning to have a certain resonance. On 2 December the Lodz Presidium had put forward a 'proposal for union action: an active strike combined with the creation of workers' guards', whose function would be to 'defend industrial enterprises and distribution networks during the active strike'. The next day, at the Radom meeting of the National Commission Presidium, Grzegorz Palka demanded that the union should call for the formation of a workers' guard. On 4 December one of the Lublin union leaders explained: 'If *Solidarity* does not prepare for this, we will be caught by surprise and unable to offer resistance. We must not only prepare for the active strike, but put everything in place to defend ourselves against attack and provocation by the authorities.'

The establishment of a workers' guard was becoming all the more urgent in that 'territorial units' of the army were beginning to appear in the enterprises. People became convinced that their purpose was to collect information for an eventual assault on the factories.

At that point, the crisis already had an overtly revolutionary character. In November, the authorities had publicly stated that their own very limited project for an economic reform, due to be introduced in January, would be postponed until 1983 at the earliest. On 3 December, the National Commission wrote as follows: 'The so-called provisional economic system for 1982 (the *Provizorium*) maintains the old system of economic management, while making the enterprises and the workers responsible for decisions that remain in the hands of the central institutions. This is tantamount to cancelling the economic reform and the laws on self-management and the enterprise already adopted by the Sejm, while at the same time threatening numerous closures and redundancies. Alongside the *Provizorium*, the government plans to introduce sweeping price rises. Society is being asked to pay for a reform that will not take place. The union will not tolerate price rises without an economic reform. Faced with the consequences of such price rises (factory closures, redundancies and low wages), we will defend the workers by every means prescribed in our statutes, in accordance with the constitutional aims of the union.' (21)

The government decision increased the level of discontent among the working class. The workers expected a lot from the economic reform, conscious that the crisis could not otherwise be fought against. Also gaining ground was the determination to take things in hand and implement the reform by the forces of the workers themselves. The new round of talks between the National Commission and the government had borne no fruit. It became clear to everyone that the authorities were merely trying to gain time and refusing to give way on any issue at all — from *Solidarity* access to the media, through social control over supplies and economic policy, to the reform of the prices system. Society was beginning to feel threatened by a bureaucracy which, behind closed doors, was drafting a special powers act and preparing to attack *Solidarity*.

The mass radicalization impelling the struggle against bureaucratic power was now developing at a rapid pace. Together with the slogan of an active strike, the demand for free elections to the Sejm and regional councils was finding an ever greater echo. Under the workers' pressure, the union leadership began to realize that a confrontation was becoming inevitable, and that it could no longer evade the question of power which the working class had itself placed on the agenda. There was no way in which to oppose it.

Zbigniew Bujak, chairperson of the Warsaw region of *Solidarity*, was among the union leaders who realized that the government tactics had to be resolutely opposed: with regard both to economic reform and to the question of elections. 'This involves almost a final showdown with the authorities,' he declared, 'a conflict of Bydgoszcz proportions. But this time there will be no concessions. We are convinced that this is the only road we can choose. If we lose, the situation will hardly be any worse than it is today, and our own position will be better than if we had made any concessions. For to make concessions would be to give up resolute defence of our interests: it would be to fall back upon purely unionist positions.'

Andrzej Slowik made a similar analysis of the situation. On 9 December, after a series of mass meetings in the twelve largest Lodz factories at which the workers clearly came out in favour of an active strike and the formation of workers' guards, he said to me: 'After the Bydgoszcz provocation in March we entered a revolutionary situation, but we did not know how to make use of it. We reached a compromise and gave up the idea of a general strike. The situation is now once again revolutionary. If we do not act accordingly, we shall betray the working class. It can wait no longer, because it realizes that the authorities are prepared to keep society in a state of crisis if only to save their privileges and defend their own interests. This is what the factory-workers told me today. I regard this as a mandate, and it is on this basis that I shall go to Gdansk. There are only two possibilities: either the bureaucratic dictatorship which is crushing society, or working-class, self-management socialism.'

In Lodz, then, they decided on action to deprive the bureaucracy of its economic power and to instal a system of workers' self-management by revolutionary means. It was planned that the first active strike would begin in our region on 21 December — that is, that the working class would take control of production and distribution. At the same time, workers' guards were to be established in the enterprises.

A study was also begun of the social priorities and rational principles according to which energy should be distributed to industry. The union made ready to take control of the regional energy system as one important element in the preparation of a regional active strike. A communiqué issued by the Lodz Centre for Socio-occupational Research on 8 December testifies to the workers' state of mind: '88.3 per cent of those interviewed stated that they will actively support the union leadership, whatever the dangers involved, if it decides on action to confront the authorities for the purpose of achieving the demands of August 1980. The active strike is the form of confrontation most frequently mentioned.' (22)

Within the regional *Solidarity* leadership, it was believed that a call for an active general strike would not be approved by a majority of the national union leadership. It was therefore decided that, if Andrzej Slowik met with opposition, he should demand the go-ahead from the National Commission for an active strike in his own region. It seemed likely that Lodz would then draw other regions into an active strike, and that this would sooner or later change the balance of forces on the National Commission.

The strategy and struggle tactics proposed by *Solidarity* to solve the question of power might have been adopted by the whole union. The active strike would have allowed the masses, then searching for radical forms of action, to pass on to the offensive. The establishment of workers' economic power would have allowed the accumulation of sufficient forces to solve the question of political power. The development of workers' self-management by revolutionary means would have led to the emergence of local and regional self-government, releasing the energy of millions of citizens. This, in turn, would have provided a solid foundation on which to demand free elections: If the relationship of forces did not prove sufficiently favourable to solve the question of political power, leading instead to a continuation of dual power, then Lodz Region considered that a victorious active strike should result in the formation of a Self-Government Chamber or Socio-economic Chamber within the Sejm and the regional councils. Such a body would have to be elected by all the producers — wage-earners, peasants and individual artisans — and concentrate all the economic powers of the state in its own hands.

The last meeting of the National Commission, held on 12 December, revealed a convergence of views between Lodz and other regions. (23) The representative of Krakow Region put forward the following action

programme for *Solidarity*:

'a) The National Commission, in co-operation with the National Self-Management Federation, shall draft a set of bills and other legislative measures relating to the economic reform. The proposed economic model should be put to a referendum in the enterprises, so that the support of society may be obtained as quickly as possible.

b) During the general strike, the union will begin to apply the economic reform — the central co-ordination to be provided by a Social Council for the National Economy which the union shall establish as a *fait accompli*.

c) The union shall call off the strike when the economy is functioning at every level according to the new principles.

d) These goals can only be achieved if the union has access to the mass media. The National Commission shall declare an active strike in the radio and television, the press, the printing-houses and the press-distribution sector, so that these means of communication are placed at the service of society.

e) The general strike announced in the National Commission Presidium statement of 3 December will not be necessary if the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland give up their intention of imposing special powers. Whatever happens, the National Commission will step up its activity to achieve the reform and abandon its past, ineffective policy of concessions and compromise.

f) From that moment, all talks between the union and the state must be relayed live by Polish television.'

S. Jaworski from Warsaw favoured an active strike as the continuation of the general strike which the union should not fail to declare in the case of a state of emergency. 'We all know perfectly well,' he said, 'that we cannot permit ourselves a long general strike. An active strike must be directly prepared during the occupation-strike.' Jaworski was convinced that extremist groups within the state apparatus would seek to employ armed violence. 'I believe it is necessary,' he continued, 'to set up workers' guards in all the regions, especially in the big enterprises. Even if they have no special equipment, we will surely find them necessary. They will be a force with which extremist groups bent on confrontation will have to reckon.'

The delegation from Upper Silesia also adopted a radical though somewhat different position, arguing that the union should concentrate on the struggle for elections to the Sejm and the regional and municipal councils, as well as on the socialization of the mass media. 'We hope that the Sejm will make a positive gesture. And the only positive gesture it could make to fulfil its historical mission would be to call elections ahead of schedule. But we can hardly count on that, and so we should organize the elections ourselves, without the Sejm and without the state. Our union, like all other organizations and all Polish

citizens, wants only one thing: that the power should genuinely pass into the hands of the Polish people.'

The moderate current advocated a different kind of tactic. Its main spokesperson, the president of Bydgoszcz region, Jan Rulewski, argued that society and the state had entered a period of confrontation which had intensified since August 1981. 'This points to a general confrontation,' he said, 'which should culminate in a general strike, an active strike.' The crisis of the state had to find 'a political solution' by looking to the experience of parliamentary democracies. 'Western societies and democratic civilizations have long since rationalized these modes of political confrontation by creating institutions such as Parliament, or in our case the Sejm.'



Solidarity leader, Jan Rulewski

Invoking those workers who ever more insistently called for free elections to the Sejm, Rulewski declared: 'The union's strategy must allow millions of people to express themselves, and this is why I would like to propose, as the expression of this confrontation, a referendum through which not only the union leadership but all 10 million members and allied social forces — the whole of society — can express themselves. As a small tactical point, however, the referendum should not only contain questions relating to self-management. It should allow us to ascertain whether society gives a vote of confidence

to this representative system: to the Sejm, the government, and the system of power in force in Poland.'

The idea was that a referendum vote of no-confidence in the system would prompt *Solidarity* to declare a general strike. If the government did not then accept a political solution, it would be necessary to form a provisional government of independent experts whose task would be to organize free elections to the Sejm and other representative bodies, thereby assuring popular supremacy.

The tactic proposed by Bydgoszcz Region had a number of weaknesses. Above all, it did not start from an analysis of the political conjuncture. By contrast, the representatives of Lodz Region believed that the union's activity should start from the existence of a directly revolutionary situation. Although the situation was such that a confrontation between the state and society could break out at any moment, Jan Rulewski's proposal did not involve an immediate mobilization of the masses.

It was not clear how power could be seized from the bureaucracy without a direct confrontation, without a qualitative leap in the counter-power of civil society represented by *Solidarity*. A passive strike, even on a general scale, would not allow the problem to be solved. Jan Rulewski's tactic was based on illusions which had, for several months, been rejected by the masses and a growing number of union leaders. Nor was it without significance that parliamentary democracy appeared to Jan Rulewski as the form by which the working people should come to power. The more radical currents, while not dismissing parliamentary democracy, favoured its combination with genuine council democracy.

The tactic proposed by Lodz, Krakow and Warsaw Regions had an obvious advantage over that put forward by Bydgoszcz. Still, it displayed a weakness which can be found in all the tactics advanced during the Polish revolution in 1980 and 1981. In its struggle to solve the question of power, even the most revolutionary current within *Solidarity* had nothing to propose on 'the struggle to win over the army'. Such was the feeling of power emanating from the mass movement that the most aware members fell victim to the illusion that this strength would be enough to neutralize the army, and that the problem of confrontation was not yet pos-

ed. *Solidarity* and the whole of the mass movement would pay for this illusion in the hours that followed.

The National Commission did not come down in favour of any of the proposed tactics. It was content to call for a referendum on the system and the form of rule — which was not in contradiction with any of the tactics put forward. The debate remained open on the way in which the problem of power should be resolved. However, a defensive attitude prevailed in face of the risk of attack by the state against *Solidarity* and society, although it was evident that whoever took the initiative and struck first would have the advantage in the event of a confrontation.

Zbigniew Kowalewski  
Paris, February 1982

#### Footnotes.

1. *Dokumenty Zjazdu*, BIPS, Gdansk 1981, pp. 124-6.
2. *AS* (*Solidarity* press agency, Warsaw-based) No. 45, 13-18 October 1981.
3. *Niezaleznosc* No. 129, 16 September 1981.
4. *AS* No. 52, 12-15 November 1981, p.207.
5. *AS* No. 49, 2-4 November 1981, p. 302.
6. *Samorząd* (bulletin of the 'Lublin Group') No. 2, pp. 22-26.
7. Z. Kowalewski, *Solidarnosc i walka o samorząd zalogi*, Lodz 1981, p.23.
8. H. Szlajfer, S. Jablonski, W. Latoch, H. Nojman, *Wrzost produkcji wegla kamiennego*, duplicated, Katowice 1981.
9. See the *Draft Plan on workers' self-management in social enterprises belonging to the whole people* drawn up by the Lublin conference of 14 July 1981.
10. Kowalewski, op. cit., pp. 25-44; J. Strzelecki, 'Rady robotnicze 1956-1958', *Robotnik* No. 73, 1981, p.4; and S. Bratkowski, *Nowy Marsyliusz*, Warsaw 1981.
11. Z. Kowalewski, *O taktyce strajku czynnego*, Lodz 1981.
12. See the programmatic proposals submitted by the Lodz regional leadership to the first delegate congress of *Solidarity*.
13. Z. Kowalewski, 'Solidarité à la veille du coup de force ou la bataille du pouvoir', *Le Monde*, 7 January 1982.
14. *AS* No. 46, 19-25 October 1981, p.301.
15. Loc. cit.
16. A. Pawłowska, 'Czynniowiec po władze', *Trybuna Ludu*, 2 November 1981.
17. *AS* No. 48, 29 October - 1 November 1981, p.205.
18. A. Krajewski, 'Ogłosimy strajk, bedziemy pracować', *Przegląd Techniczny* No. 47, 1981, p.8.
19. *AS* No. 50, 5-8 November 1981, p.401.
20. Statement by the *Solidarity* chairperson from a Jastrzebie mine.
21. *Kommunikat* (bulletin of Lodz Region) No. 294, 4-5 December 1981.

## Walesa's Last Speech

(We publish below the last speech of Lech Walesa, given to the National Commission meeting on 12 December, hours before his arrest. Translation from the French publication *Liberation* entitled *Pologne by Labour Focus*.)

(...) I did, of course, say that I was playing the game, and I've often been ticked off for it. But what does it mean to say that I was playing the game? At the start, we all set off for victory. I beg pardon from everyone who thinks that Bydgoszcz was a defeat, a step back. I argued against everybody that if we'd organized a strike at the time of Bydgoszcz, we'd have been not only

murderers but self-murderers. Now you must admit: it was a truly brilliant stroke to take a step back.

But that's not all. After Bydgoszcz, we had on our side part of the militia, some deputies, local councillors, and so on. That was quite an achievement. We couldn't choose to fight at that time. We can't do that even now, because there are still people who say: what can be done, how will we end up, what will be done afterwards, how can we seize power? Such voices are only beginning to emerge. There wasn't all that at the time. Others say that the union is on the retreat. But I'd argue against anyone that the union is not on the retreat. It's just that, as I said at the last meeting (1), we've only had to deal with minor problems up to now: wage

rises, redundancies, things like that.

Now we've got to devilishly serious, political matters. We must all discuss side by side, not divided into groups, what we should do and how we should do it if there is a confrontation, if we avoid the confrontation; how we can ensure that people are with us; what we can do so that the authorities understand us, and so that we attain our goals. If we already grasp these essential ideas, then we can begin the struggle. But let us not forget that people want to eat, that really ... (*Walesa breaks off, ed. note*) My light's always going out at home. I had some guests yesterday, but I couldn't make anything for them because there was no electricity. Someone's got something against my flat. (...)

We know that .. there are different views. Jasio Rulewski has spoken, and so have others. I've also got my own view. It's the same as Jasio's, except that he forgot to mention one thing. .. He talked about the 'provisional government'. But the provisional government isn't going to fall from heaven; someone's got to make a start. This threefold conception (2), which I supported, which I used to support, is what should pave the way for what Jasio was talking about. The referendum, elections, the ballot, candidates, an election list, etc., etc. (...)

Let's be quite clear, though. We've reached a point which I thought would arrive only in the spring, and which I still hoped to avoid. Even if you criticized me and didn't leave me in peace, I hoped to hold on until the spring. I didn't want political solutions now. I stuck to this until Radom (3), and now I realize that I won't go any longer. Because there's too much internal resistance and misunderstanding among us. So I've become convinced that there are no other solutions, that the political solutions must be grasped sooner than I thought.

That's why Radom was what it was; that's why I stopped being good old Walesa — because someone did think once that I was good old Walesa. You all thought I was a traitor, that I'd been bought off, and so on. But it wasn't true: as many people as possible must understand this.


And there's another thing, dear members: there would in any case have been an economic crisis. You should explain in all your publications that the crisis would have been even worse, and the beatings even more frequent, if *Solidarity* had not come into existence. We argue with the government to prevent any sackings or shootings. The crisis would have been much worse without us. People would have broken into shops; there'd have been trouble, and so on. So, you should explain as quickly as possible that the economic crisis was inevitable, that the authorities knew it, and that they even allowed *Solidarity* to be created (...) so that it would serve as a shock-absorber, reasonable and serious, not intent on liquidating the Party.

If people understand that, they won't tell us that *Solidarity* is to blame for the cigarette-shortage, the lengthening queues, etc., etc. Then we'll have a bit of peace. (...)

The main thing for people today is the queues, the food-parcels, the aid ..; and even more, that they can profit from the 20 per cent self-management now being built. How shameful! Twenty per cent of enterprises have a self-management body. In Lodz, they pulled off a fine stroke. One day it was discovered that one person was producing ball-bearings and another was then melting them down. What an absurdity! When they could have been making pitch-forks instead! Things will work a little better when we're in power. If ball-bearings aren't being sold, then we'll produce pitch-forks; and if they aren't sold, then we'll produce rakes. Instead of stupidities.

Don't tell me that my team or region have given me their full back-

ing. Because, of course, Jasio will make a speech and be applauded. I, too, will be applauded after saying the opposite. That's what the human mind is like: people can let themselves be manipulated. And you leading members, you know it very well. We are responsible for the main currents. We know there are political solutions: we're preparing for them, we're discussing them. But something must be done for people in the enterprises. (...)



Lech Walesa

As for the trade-union law and the dangers involved, I think they've again driven us up a blind alley. Someone mentioned the grave danger in the powers given by the Diet to the government, which will then give us a terrible harmful trade-union law. .. The new law will have the same result as the old, except that you'll be able to make a return trip to Lodz. Everything else hits just as hard as before. They can suspend the right to strike for three months, during which time they can raise prices, dissolve the union and close everything down. Because that's the law.

Of course we proposed a different law. I don't know if you know, but I protested. We proposed another law which said that, although we'd accept a suspension of the right to strike in certain conditions, it would not be possible to raise prices, dissolve the union, and close everything down. When the government's draft legislation is put into effect, things will be the same for us as before. Thank you very much.

#### Footnotes

1. The Radom meeting in early December, the one before the Gdansk meeting.
2. Walesa is referring to the Church, the Party and *Solidarity*.
3. At the Radom meeting, Walesa abstained on a resolution to call a general strike if emergency powers were decreed. The resolution was carried by a very large majority.

## POLAND: THE COUP AND AFTER

### Blitzkrieg — By Peter Green

The events that took place during the bitter night of 12-13 December were not so much unexpected as unthinkable for most of *Solidarity's* leaders. There had been so many crises and so many threats to *Solidarity*. The Party's authority had sunk so low,

its officials were so much at odds with each other, they so much needed the co-operation of *Solidarity* to get a thousand everyday tasks accomplished, it was just not conceivable that they would risk crushing the labour movement for good. Harsh new repressive laws perhaps, a drive to split *Solidarity* certainly. But not a fight to the finish, that would be madness, the end of everything.

Then in a few hours in the middle of the night, the black hood of the political police was pulled down over the heads of thousands of *Solidarity* activists, the doors of *Solidarity* headquarters were beaten down, telephones, telex, the mass media were shut down, cars were banned, a curfew was imposed.

The following morning and throughout the day General Jaruzelski's voice rams home the news of the blitzkrieg against the labour movement. Decree after decree follows demanding complete capitulation, unconditional surrender to the Military Council, and death for those who resist. Then as the day draws on, the voice of Archbishop Glemp urging calm, pleading that there be no resistance.

Almost all of *Solidarity's* leaders were rounded up, mainly at their hotel in Gdansk on the Saturday night. Some escape: Zbigniew Bujak, the Warsaw leader, along with Ursus chairperson Janas; Bogdan Lis, *Solidarity's* former Vice-President and Bogdan Boruszewicz, both from Gdansk. At the Lenin Shipyard Mirosław Krupinski, *Solidarity's* Vice-chairperson, still free, organizes a national strike committee, which raises the call for a general strike: 'No union, no organization, can allow their leaders to be repressed and the union to be deprived of its rights.'

On Monday the industrial workers of Poland tried desperately to hold the line. In Gdansk alone between 47 and 60 plants are gripped in occupation strikes. The shipyards are occupied. All major factories in Poznan and Wrocław are reported on strike. Warsaw's biggest plants — FSO Zerán, Ursus, Huta Warszawa, the Swierczewski works — are occupied. Intellectuals and students also occupy buildings in the capital. Travellers along the coast report pairs of Polish flags flying from dozens of coastal town factories right along the Baltic Seaboard. A united strike committee of the workers in the Szczecin area co-ordinates the factory occupations in the region from the Warski shipyard. On Wednesday this committee's

appeal to the peoples of the world reaches the West: 'Risking our lives and personal freedom and disregarding the draconian measures of martial law, disregarding attempts to shackle us with fear, hundreds of thousands of Polish workers and patriots have begun a strike demanding the calling off of martial law, the release of all those arrested, the restoration of all union and democratic rights achieved by the nation through struggle since August 1980. We appeal to you: help us in our struggle by mass protests and moral support. Do not watch passively the attempts to strangle the beginnings of democracy in the heart of Europe. Be with us in these difficult moments ...'

In Upper Silesia a desperate and bloody struggle is being fought out between miners and steel workers and the security police. Now in 1981 and 1982 the Silesian workers come forward ready to die in defence of their brothers and sisters throughout the country. On Wednesday the deaths came at the Wujek colliery.

In Nowa Huta on Monday and Tuesday a fierce battle is fought by the security forces trying and failing to take control of the steel complex. Radom is sealed off from the outside world as stories spread of an army mutiny there. Factories are occupied in Lublin and at the helicopter plant in nearby Swidnik.

During the first days the pattern of violence is always the same. The military surround the big factories, the workers are told to surrender with a time limit of a few minutes. Then tanks break down the gates and the militarized police units — ZOMO and others — storm the factory, driving the workers out and rounding up many. In most places the workers do not put up armed resistance. In the largest plants the workers then re-occupy, often on the next shift. In Gdansk at the Lenin Shipyard the military had to attack the yard three times and still the yard was occupied on the Wednesday. There was fierce resistance reported from Szczecin where the shipyard was soon closed altogether and where threats were made to fire the entire workforce for good. Eventually all the Baltic shipyards were closed until the end of the first week in January: the riot police could not keep them open and unoccupied.

From what we know, the mass resistance from the workers continued longest in Upper Silesia. But we should remember that events in most of the country during the first weeks of military rule remain obscure. The



Zbigniew Janas, *Solidarity* leader in Ursus factory, now in underground.

only reason why we learn quickly of the deaths at the Wujek mine was because the miners there forced the military authorities to broadcast the news as a condition for giving up their struggle.

Mystery also surrounds the scale of the round-up of internees. The military regime has fairly consistently maintained that the number was about 5,000, while both the Vatican and the French government put the initial number at 40,000 or more. A *Washington Post* journalist in Upper Silesia, who was in Upper Silesia when the coup occurred, gave the total interned in the Katowice province alone at 2,000 (there are 49 provinces in Poland). The net of the political police stretched far beyond *Solidarity* officials and included, for example, a number of delegates to the Communist Party's Emergency Congress of July 1981.

By the end of the first week in January, the military and internal security troops had consolidated their grip on Poland. But almost immediately signs of underground resistance and civil and industrial disobedience multiplied. The first occasion when the Military Council felt strong enough to take Western correspondents on a package tour outside Warsaw proved instructive. They chose Poznan. Correspondents went to the Cegielski plant (famous as the workforce that started the Poznan uprising of 1956). There, as we saw on our TV screens that night, workers were wearing *Solidarity* badges — a grave criminal offence under martial law — and declared their support for the union. The struggle was far from over, and Jaruzelski's battle to turn military victory into a political consolidation will be long and arduous.

## The Life-and-death Struggle in Silesia — By Joe Singleton

### Wujek

An undated leaflet from Katowice entitled 'The Fourth Silesian Uprising' described the situation in Wujek and in the other Silesian mines as martial law was introduced:

*'In the majority of Silesian mines strikes started already on 13 December — the first longer time all mines stopped work. At first miners did not go underground — the*

*possibility of an attack was not considered seriously. Miners blocked the gates only, where their families started to gather. This was the case at the Wujek mine, where on shift did not leave the mines and on Monday other miners joined in. For a shorter or the afternoon of 13 December news came that the strikers in the Thorez mine had been dispersed by force. At night, at the forge of*

*the Wujek mine the strikers were getting hatchets ready for hand to hand fighting. On 15 December the ZOMO attacked ... When the ZOMO forced through the entrance close fighting broke out.'*

Seven miners were killed in the ZOMO attack on Wujek, and after this experience miners in other regions went underground to better defend themselves.

It took two assaults on the Wujek mine before it was evacuated by the ZOMO on 16 December. Apart from the 7 dead miners there were 79 injured and 4 militia had been killed. According to a report by *Solidarity* in Katowice the miners in Wujek armed themselves with molotov cocktails, steel cables and sticks of dynamite. They threatened to blow up the mine. The first attack by the ZOMO and police, using 40 tanks, 6 armoured cars and 6 transport vehicles, was repulsed by the miners. In the second attack helicopters dropped tear gas grenades.

#### Resistance in the Ziemowit and Piast collieries

In the Ziemowit mine the miners went underground and dynamited some of the entrances to keep out the army and police. According to Radio Warsaw the miners refused all visits and threatened to blow up the mine if the police or army tried to force entrance. The 1300 miners at Ziemowit continued their resistance for 10 days before coming to the surface again on Christmas Eve.

In Piast the miners likewise dynamited the entrances and barricaded themselves underground. One of the miners later told his story to a Dutch lorry-driver and it was published in the Dutch weekly *De Nieuwe Revue*.

*'On the evening of 14 December, the day after martial law was declared, we decided to stay in the mine. 2000 miners took part in the occupation. They divided themselves into different groups for each level. Nobody had planned such an occupation so the main problem from the start was the lack of food and drink. However during the first five days the people outside sent us down food which the police did not prevent.'*

*'Afterwards, the strike committee rationed food: a sandwich, a little sausage and a piece of chocolate per day. Contact*

*with the outside was by telephone and radio. We heard of the strikes in the other mines and this boosted our morale.*

*'Nights were very cold and we stayed close together. After five days the food supply was stopped and the rations caused more and more hardship. After Christmas we had only a third of a sandwich, a tiny piece of sausage and two cups of water a day. The miners used to look for crusts of bread that had fallen on the floor the previous day.'*

*'On Christmas Eve two priests came down the mine. They tried to persuade us to give up the occupation, telling us it was a lost cause. We had the impression they were sent by the government. Having been told by the strike committee that we had no intention of giving up our strike they promised to come back the next day and say mass. But they never came back, which was very disillusioning for the many of us who were believers.'*

*'After Christmas the food situation became unbearable. The Strike Committee, having learned that the occupations had ended in the other mines proposed to end our strike in return for the guarantee from the authorities that nobody would be victimized and that work would resume as normal.'*

*'Under those conditions, we left the mine on 27 December. The majority of miners were able to get away from the yard, which was filled with police and military, but the strike committee was arrested and taken away.'*

The Piast occupation had lasted 13 days, and was the longest occupation-strike against the Jaruzelski regime. The demands of the miners was broadcast by Radio Warsaw on December 25, an important victory won by the occupation. Their demands were 'the lifting of the state of war, the freedom of all detainees and immunity for strikers'. One of the arrested strike leaders in Piast was Zbigniew Bogacz, a member of the National Commission of *Solidarity*. Ac-

ording to press reports there were strikes and occupations in 20 collieries in Silesia in the aftermath of the military coup.

#### Huta Katowice

A high level of resistance was also organized in the big Silesian steel plant Huta Katowice, one of the plants placed directly under military control by the martial law decree. There are 19,600 workers in Huta Katowice, 16,000 of whom are members of *Solidarity*. On the first day of martial law the police occupied the Katowice headquarters of *Solidarity* and arrested 60 leading members of the union. On Monday the workers occupied the modern steel plant and raised banners which said: 'Strike until victory' and 'Jaruzelski, traitor to the working class'. The strike had been decided on by a vast majority of the workforce. The workers barricaded the factory gates and threatened to blow up the steel works. On 15 December the families of the strikers, who had gathered outside the gates, were attacked violently by the police. Tanks filled the streets around the plant. But the occupation continued. Eight days after the strike began, the new governor of the province, General Paszowski, admitted on Radio Warsaw that the resistance had not been defeated. It wasn't until 23 December that the tanks succeeded in breaking down the gates of Huta Katowice and ejecting the workers.

During the strike, the workers had produced a strike bulletin, the *Free Trade Unionist*. One week later PAP confirmed that 6 editors of the strike bulletin and 9 other strike leaders had been sentenced to from 3 to 7 years' imprisonment.

An underground leaflet, produced by Katowice *Solidarity* in January, quotes a young Silesian miner — a third generation miner and son of a 1921 insurgent — as saying: *'We'll wait until spring. And then what? We'll have an uprising. We, Silesians, do not forget, we forget nothing.'*

## The New Regime — By Joe Singleton

On 13 December 1981 General Jaruzelski declared a 'state of war' in Poland (itself an illegal act since, according to Art. 33 of the Constitution, only the Sejm has the power to declare a 'state of war'), and announced the formation of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON).

#### Powers of the martial law regime

Under the new regulations the Military Council has the power to:

- arrest any citizens and detain them indefinitely by simple administrative decision.
- order the services of any citizen at any time.
- requisition crops and radio sets.
- execute any citizen opposing its decisions, or disturbing public order; such decisions to be made by military tribunals.

The new regulations also made it illegal:

- to go out without identity papers.

— to meet in groups (except, for a religious occasion, in a church).

— to be in the street between 10pm and 6am.

— to strike or participate in any protest action (striking is punishable by 3 to 5 years in prison and, in the case where the enterprise has been militarized, by death).

— to participate in the activities of an organization which has been banned or suspended (i.e. *Solidarity* as well as most other cultural and social organizations).

— to possess a weapon.

— to travel abroad, to travel in the frontier areas, or to travel away from home for a period exceeding 48 hours.

— to take photographs or film.

The new regime also placed under direct military control:

— all Poles working in areas considered vital to national security.

— all sectors vital to the economy (transport, post, communications, energy supply, etc.)

— all the media and communications networks (telephones are monitored).

The military regime closed down or suspended all universities and academic establishments, airlines, ferry and passenger boats, the post (except for medicine and clothes) and a large number of organizations.

A series of new social measures were introduced, the chief of which were:

- the suspension of free Saturdays, the introduction of the 6-day week with the possibility of Sunday work.
- the 8-hour day may be increased to 12.
- paid holidays are reduced from 26 days to one day per month worked.

Jaruzelski also announced that the military council had taken steps 'to detain a group of people who endanger the security of the state'. On 7 January 1982 the government announced that 5,906 persons had been detained following the military coup. On 9

January it was announced that a further 1,433 persons had been arrested. The number of people imprisoned in mid-March was 3,600 (*Guardian*, 13 March 1982).

### Structure of the new regime

The leading authority in the state is the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON). This body has no legal status in the Constitution. According to Jaruzelski's announcement the Military Council had 'constituted itself' and the first statement of the Council claimed a mandate derived from the support of 'the Polish armed forces'. This Council consists of 21 military men and has effectively ruled the country since the imposition of martial law.

The Military Council sometimes acts in the name of the Committee for National Defence (KOK) which, according to the 1967 law, is the main agency of government during a 'state of war' and is set up by the Council of Ministers. The KOK is, however, merely an agency of the Military Council.

Although claiming not to replace existing government institutions, the normal task of the Council of Ministers of the government has been taken over by a new body appointed by and under the control of the Military Council. This is the Council of Ministers Socio-Political Committee, chaired by Mieczyslaw Rakowski. Through this Committee the military exercises control in the areas of education and culture, information, propaganda, health and social issues. A similar appointed committee is responsible to the Military Council on economic affairs.

Alongside the Military Council, but not playing a prominent role publicly, is the Directorate, consisting of four military men and four civilians from the Party leadership. Most important for maintaining effective control is the institution of Commissars Plenipotentiaries. These are appointed by the Military Council through the Committee for National Defence. According to Jaruzelski, 'the military commissars /are/ at all levels of state administration as well as in certain economic institutions ... The commissars have the authority to supervise the activity of all units of state administration.' At the local level the commissars are an extension of the Military Operational Task Groups, which were sent into the towns and villages in October and December. Most Commissars at local level are recruited from the officers commanding these Task Groups, which exist now in over 2,000 towns and villages.

At the provincial level power is exercised by the provincial defence committee, responsible through the KOK to the Military Council. Normally these should be presided over by the civilian voivod, but in all important areas the voivods have been replaced by military officers (Gdansk, Radom, Katowice, Elblag, etc). In any case the military commissars are empowered 'to supervise directly the work of the committees'. (*Trybuna Ludu*, 2 January 1982)

In the factories the traditional trade union and party organizations have been replaced by the newly-created Factory Social Com-

missions. Involving selected party activists, members of the suspended unions, and overseen by a military commissar these ZKS's may also have a role to play as nuclei of future unions.

Finally, local Citizens Committees for National Salvation (OKON) have sprung up everywhere. Including party activists and members of the old front parties (United Peasant Party, Democratic Party, etc.) these committees work under the supervision of the local commissar or head of the military task force and their task is to disseminate and organize political support for the decisions of the military council.

### The Party

The leading bodies of the PUWP were very little in evidence in the weeks and few months after the military coup. The Central Committee which met in March, almost three months after the military takeover, gave its approval, as expected to the action of General Jaruzelski. Writing in the army paper *Zolnierz Wolnosci* on 21 December, Politburo member Marian Orzechowski admitted that 'there are divisions in the Party. The present period of trial should be used for purposes of consolidation and purification.' It is difficult to find reliable figures for the extent of the purges that have been carried out since 13 December. One of the more interesting new appointments made since the coup has been that of General Tadeusz Dziekan to the newly-created post of Head of Cadre Department of the Party's Central Committee. A Hungarian news agency report (MIT) on 2 February claimed that 760 personnel had been purged from their posts in the state administration since the coup. This included 6 chairpersons and 17 vice-chairpersons of provincial councils, 160 mayors and 4 village administration officials. In his speech to the Central Committee in March Jaruzelski gave some indication of the extent of the purges carried out within the Party. He claimed that, following the declaration of martial law, 311 secretaries of the first stage and provincial Party organizations had been purged, 249 secretaries of factory organizations as well as 1,856 secretaries of basic and branch Party organizations.

### The repressive apparatus — the security forces, detention centres.

The chief power in the state is in the hands of the leaders of Poland's regular military forces, which number around 300,000. Only a section of regular troops, however, was involved in the operations of the military takeover. Most of the work of repression was carried out by the security forces and police. The security forces involved were the Internal Military Security (WSW) units, the Border Protection Forces (WOP) and the territorial defence units. These number about 80,000 soldiers. The physical suppression of strikes and occupations during the first weeks after the coup was carried out mainly by the special riot police troops (ZOMO) with an estimated strength of about 20,000. They were supported by the paramilitary Volunteer Police Reserve (ORMO) which number some 350,000. All these security and police units were directly

responsible either to Jaruzelski or to the Minister of the Interior who is a member of the Military Council.



Graffiti across a Military Council proclamation at a Warsaw bus-stop

The ZOMO played a crucial role in breaking the workers' resistance. A typical operation was that at Swidnik:

'On 16 December between 1.00 and 1.30 the whole plant was surrounded by army units. The strikers were given 10 minutes to leave. Tanks smashed the fences and several hundred ZOMO personnel entered the grounds. A great number of tear gas grenades were thrown. Then the gassed and beaten-up workforce were gradually shoved out through the main gate. Passes were scrutinised. This went on until 7am.' (*Infobulletin of NSZZ Solidarity*, Warsaw, 28 December 1981)

It was also the ZOMO that entered the yards of the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk, arresting hundreds and injuring 300, and the Huta Katowice steel plant (where the resistance lasted 10 days). Strike leaders were arrested and sentenced to between 3 and 7 years' imprisonment.

Internment also falls under the jurisdiction of the militia and not the courts. According to the ordinance of 12 December a person can be interned ... 'if on the grounds of the prevailing conduct of a person there is a good reason to fear that if that person remained at liberty, he/she would not observe legal order.' There is no fixed term for internment, which may be for the duration of martial law. According to the text of the decree of 13 December, there are 49 such internment centres. But a clandestine *Solidarity* bulletin has claimed that there are at least 78 centres. Initial reports stated that internees were being held in harsh, overcrowded and cold conditions in centres which were located in evacuated prisons, investigation centres, barracks, reformatories and army holiday camps. Most reports agree that intellectuals generally have much better conditions than workers.

A declaration by internees in Bialoleka, printed in an underground publication of *Solidarity* in early January, said that conditions 'do not differ significantly from those in the majority of Polish prisons ... The prison rules read to us are more severe than those in the Nazi POW camps'. There were reports of hunger strikes in Bialoleka in January.

## Conflicting Responses in the Catholic Church — By Oliver MacDonald



A priest travels in style.

The military coup has placed severe strains on the unity of the Catholic Church and brought to the surface tensions both inside the Church in Poland and between the Primate and the Pope.

From the night of the coup until early February, policy was largely dictated by Archbishop Glemp and the officials around him in Warsaw, notably Bishop Dabrowski and Abbot Orszulik. All three are long-serving Church civil servants trained by the former Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, who died in May 1981. Their line has been basically conciliatory towards the Military Council, opposing popular resistance, urging acceptance of General Jaruzelski's authority as a fact of life, however regrettable, and seeking to persuade the general to grant specific concessions to the population on the path towards a compromise between the authorities and a revived, more 'moderate' *Solidarity*. They have at the same time sought to restore relations between the regime and Western governments, and to exert pressure on *Solidarity* for a compromise.

During December and January, Pope John-Paul II did not publicly criticize Glemp's strategy, but as a result of the conference between the Pope and the Primate in Rome in early February, the Church's stand has noticeably hardened, as has the military government's attitude towards the Church.

### Glemp's Bid

Following the coup of 13 December, Archbishop Glemp moved swiftly to hit hard at resistance to the crackdown. On the very first day of martial law the Primate rushed out a statement arguing that 'opposition to the decisions of the authorities during the state of war could provoke violent attempts to enforce compliance. This could provoke bloodshed...' And he added: 'While some could accuse the Church of cowardice ... it has regarded and always will regard human life as the supreme value ... Each head and each pair of hands will be priceless in rebuilding Poland after the completion of the state of war.'

This statement was repeatedly broadcast by the official mass media during the first crucial hours and days of the crackdown, as industrial workers all over the country did precisely what the Primate had urged them not to do and bitterly resisted the military regime.

In the face of this mass resistance from below, a meeting of bishops on 15 December issued a strong statement saying that Poland was 'a nation terrorized by military force' and that 'society's moral feelings are deeply wounded by the drastic reduction of civil rights'. While calling for the preservation of peace and the attenuation of passion and anger, this statement finally demanded the restoration of *Solidarity's* rights. The Primate did not immediately respond, he

simply banned local churches reading the statement to congregations on Sunday 20 December.

During Christmas week Glemp held a meeting with a group of priests and called on them to 'avoid any public pronouncements on the state of emergency' and to 'stay out of any public political activity'.

Primate Glemp, supported in his strategy by the Vatican's diplomat, Monsignor Poggi (who was sent by Cardinal Casaroli), met Jaruzelski on 24 December in what was announced to have been 'a spirit of mutual understanding'. The Primate did indicate that the Church wanted an end to martial law, the release of detainees and a return of *Solidarity's* right to engage in trade-union activity. But then so did the military authorities.

### The Mantle of Wyszynski

The presumed advantage of this approach was that it would enable the Church to play an active role within the new framework, seeking to modify it for the better and enabling Jaruzelski to link up with the Primate and weaken more hard-line elements within the regime. The disadvantage was that it publicly set the Primate against those seeking to actively resist Jaruzelski's framework; and that the Military Council might in any case fail to offer the Primate any tangible benefits for the population in return for the Church's general support.

The Primate sought to respond to criticism of his stand by invoking the memory of his predecessor and mentor, Cardinal Wyszynski, and repeatedly quoting the experience of collaborators with Gomulka and Gierak. His speeches were notably lacking in quotes from the present Pope. At a wafer-breaking meeting with doctors on 28 December he said: 'The late Primate always repeated that Rome was not built in a day. It was necessary for us to build our future gradually, realistically and calmly, having assessed realities and conditions.' He then moved to an implicit attack on *Solidarity*, or people within it, for having gone 'too far': 'People of ideals permitted themselves to be drawn into haste to a great extent. It would today be difficult to analyse the causes of reverses or errors that have accumulated, those false notes which joined in this great voice of the whole nation.'

Glemp urged his listeners to view events in a long-term historical and even biological perspective, referring to the phoenix-like quality of the Poles — 'this nation's extraordinary genetics, some kind of genius embedded in this earth' — which always in the end delivers it from adversity.

Despite criticism, Glemp pressed ahead with his strategy during early January. Behind the scenes he was urging a number of demands on the government, particularly the demand for an end to the practice of making *Solidarity* members swear loyalty oaths or face dismissal from work. He wrote privately to General Jaruzelski on this issue on 28 December. He was also seeking moves towards three-sided negotiations between the government, *Solidarity*, and the Church, as well as a series of signs of good-will from the government.

On 6 January, after failing to persuade Jaruzelski to end the loyalty oaths and sackings, Glemp publicly attacked the practice, bluntly saying that: 'The extraction of such statements is unethical.' At the same time he continued to defend his general acceptance of the government, implying that any other strategy could lead to severe restrictions on the Church. 'A Catholic,' he declared, 'is not permitted to react to force with force, or with preparations for revenge.' He pointed out that: 'For Warsaw a state of martial law is nothing new. Martial law was proclaimed for the first time on 14 October 1861. All Churches in Warsaw were closed. It was the new archbishop, God's servant, who restored the churches to their use as places of worship, but even

that did not calm the surging crowds and led to the tragedy of the January Uprising and to the expulsion by the authorities of the blessed archbishop who, after 16 months' work in Warsaw never returned to it alive ... We have experiences which should teach us patience.'

On 9 January the Primate met General Jaruzelski for the first time, a public mark of Church acceptance of the Military Council. But the private discussions with the government were 'getting nowhere. Only when the workers' resistance was still going on in the December strikes was the Military Council interested in serious negotiations with the Church (even being prepared to discuss the form of local elections). But once the strikes ended, the regime showed no interest in meaningful talks on a future settlement.

The Primate evidently felt that one reason for this was Walesa's 'intransigence'. He told US Senator Larry Pressler that Walesa was an 'inexperienced politician' who expected 'the Communist Party to go down on bended knees and apologize for what happened'. He also allowed a member of his own crisis team, Professor Mitzewicki to go on a secret mission to France at the start of January to explain that the authorities were committed to a search for a national consensus.

Church officials in Warsaw indicated to Western journalists that one obstacle to serious negotiations was NATO's demand for *Solidarity* to be allowed to function — resistance to this had therefore become a point of honour for the Warsaw Pact.

Another remarkable initiative by the hierarchy was the suggestion that it would take responsibility for Walesa's confinement, by supervising his stay in a monastery and by working out an agreed policy with the government on the people Walesa would be allowed to see. (This suggestion was apparently opposed by the Vatican. But it is certainly the case that Walesa is in close contact with the Church through Abbot Orszulik, one of the Primate's key political advisers.)

On 22 January the Bishops' Conference met in Warsaw for the first time since martial law. Its statement was noticeably tougher than Glemp's previous remarks, firmly pinning the blame for bloodshed on the military authorities: 'Let us state emphatically that infringement of the right to freedom leads to protests and rebellion, and even to civil war.' The Primate modified the impact of the statement the following Sunday by broadcasting a sermon calling on the people to comply conditionally with the military council.

### The Pope Intervenes

By the end of January, however, Glemp's strategy seemed to be crumbling. The Military Council signalled unmistakably that it was unwilling to play ball and hold serious negotiations with the Church and *Solidarity*. On 26 January it formally ordered Walesa's internment, keeping up a barrage of propaganda against some of the Pope's personal friends and suggesting that its real strategy was to divide the Polish hierarchy from the Pope himself.

It would appear that the crucial turning-point in the Church's policy came after the week of discussions in Rome in early February between the Pope, the Primate, Cardinal Macharski of Warsaw and Archbishop Gulbinowicz of Wrocław. Gulbinowicz reputedly had been pressing for thoroughgoing denunciation of the regime, while Macharski reflected the views of the Pope himself. Before the meeting the Pope had strongly backed the Polish bishops' statement of late January and Macharski had delivered a sermon in Krakow, extensively quoting the Pope.

We do not, of course, know what was decided in the Vatican discussion, but one notable

feature of the Primate's visit to Rome was the widely differing versions of a sermon he delivered there given by Warsaw Radio and by the Vatican. Warsaw radio reported that: 'The Primate recalled the bloodshed some two years ago at the altar, the blood of Archbishop Romero of San Salvador. The Primate also spoke of conflicts in Poland ... For more than 18 months anger has continued, and yet we have succeeded in maintaining self-control. The painful events at the Wujek colliery, where seven miners lost their lives, have remained an isolated case. Poland must not become an arena of bloody strife ... The Church will seek to attenuate anger and to calm down internal vexations.' Vatican radio's account left out any mention of Archbishop Romero, but quoted him as saying that in Poland 'room will be found for *Solidarity*, room will be found for self-governing trade unions ...'

On 9 February, the Pope struck a theme never before mentioned by Glomp by praising those who, despite enormous difficulties, maintain

their families and remain faithful to justice, human rights, peace and truth for Poland. Such sentiments could at least imply support for the resistance movement. And just before returning to Poland, Glomp himself said that the task of the Church was to speak out in defence of human dignity and fundamental human rights.

The Rome meeting was followed on 26 February by a statement from the Polish episcopate. In addition to calling for an end to martial law, the release of the internees and the re-legalization of *Solidarity*, it demanded an amnesty for those sentenced for martial-law infringements and safe conduct for those in hiding. It also called for the restoration of the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs' right to operate and for pluralism in cultural life. There was also a twist in the way the question of popular resistance was tackled. While rejecting the 'principle of all or nothing' it called on the population to 'strive systematically, persistently and gradually towards the implementation of our aims'. And

the bishops also seemed to reverse the Primate's previous approach to international relations. Instead of urging Western governments to create conditions for making national conciliation easier, the Bishops declared that 'the achievement of national accord will be an important factor in guaranteeing the development of economic co-operation with other countries.'

All in all, the Church and the Jaruzelski government have moved very much farther apart since the end of February than they were at the end of December. It appears that Glomp's efforts at a swift compromise with Jaruzelski have been rejected both by the government and by the Pope. A series of administrative actions have been taken by the regime against outspoken priests — a priest in Koszalin has been sentenced to 3½ years' imprisonment for supporting mass resistance to martial law. And the Church itself has adjusted itself to a strategy of the long haul, abandoning its earlier step by step approach to gaining concessions.

## Documents of the Resistance

### Communiqué

Gdansk, 13 December 1981  
1320 hrs.

Today a state of war has been declared in the country, and mass arrests of *Solidarity* leaders and activists have taken place. Basing itself on the attitude of the authorities in preceding days, the union had foreseen this development and adopted certain resolutions which take effect as from today. In accordance with the resolution adopted in Radom on 4 December, and with the National Commission resolution of 12 December, our response to this act of violence is: A GENERAL STRIKE.

In launching the strike, we declare that it has been forced upon us. We have been provoked. No union, indeed no organization of any kind, can accept wanton reprisals against its leaders, the suspension of established rights, and the curtailment of civil liberties. The strike has been called in support of two demands: 1) the release of all detainees; and 2) an end to the state of war.

When these two conditions are met, we shall be ready to start talks in search of a common platform. We draw the authorities' attention to the fact that our incipient action is in accordance with the statutes of *NSZZ Solidarity*, and with the will of enterprise branches conveyed to us by telex. In the course of the strike we must maintain discipline and calm, respect public property, and avoid unnecessary clashes with the security forces. Calm, dignity and good organization in the factories are our weapons. The solidarity of all working people in Poland is our strength.

For the National Strike Committee:

M. Krupinski — vice-chairperson of the National Commission  
A. Konarski — member of the National Commission Presidium  
A. Przygodzinski — member of the National Commission  
J. Waszkiewicz — member of the NC Presidium.



The militia confronts a crowd in a side-street just off Warsaw's Victory Square (left) on the fourth day of martial law.

### The Basic Principles of Resistance

(This leaflet was issued by *Solidarity* in the Katowice area at the end of December 1981. English text from The Information Centre for Polish Affairs.)

The coup d'état has forced *Solidarity* members to make a dramatic choice between resistance and capitulation. Here is some practical advice for those who choose the courageous road of resistance and wish to be apart of the *Resistance Union Solidarity*. The present reign of terror is a variant of the totalitarian Stalinist terror with which our generation has not previously come into contact. The new situation requires new rules, which should be learnt as soon as possible. The following are some basic principles of opposition:

1. In the event of a strike or other form of protest — YOU ARE PART OF THE WORKFORCE.
2. Do not form open strike committees. Protect your leaders and organizers. The most basic principle when taking action is — THE WHOLE WORKFORCE IS ON STRIKE; THERE ARE NO LEADERS.
3. When confronted with the police or army — YOU ARE AWARE OF NOTHING; YOU KNOW NOTHING; YOU'VE HEARD NOTHING.
4. In every place of work *Solidarity* members must exist physically (don't

let yourself be stupidly caught out because of ill-considered bravura) and morally (the attitude of every *Solidarity* member should make it clear to the rest of the workforce that WE ARE NOT RUNNING AWAY, WE ARE WITH YOU).

5. Don't let off steam with your work-mates: your enemy is THE POLICE, THE ZEALOUS WORKER, THE INFORMER.

6. Work slowly, complain about the mess around you and the inefficiency of your supervisors, leave all decision-making to the commissars and informer, overwhelm them with questions, voice your uncertainties, don't think for them, always pretend to be ignorant.

7. Don't pre-empt the decisions of commissars and informers by being subservient. All the dirty work must be done by them alone. In this way you will create a void around them; and by inundating them with the most trivial matters you will make the army/police machine split at the seams.

8. Stick religiously to the most idiotic instructions, don't solve problems — leave that to the commissars and informers. A senseless rule is your ally. But remember to help your fellow-workers at all times, without paying any heed to the rule book.

9. If you are told to break some contradictory regulations, demand that the order be put in writing, complain about it, prolong the whole process.

Sooner or later the commissar will want to be left in peace — THAT WILL BE THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE DICTATORSHIP.

10. Take as much compassionate leave as you can.

11. Avoid social gatherings, have nothing to do with the zealous workers, the informers, the commissar and all others like them.

12. Give all the help you can to the families of those who have been arrested, wounded or murdered.

13. Collect money for social aid, set up funds.

14. Take part in whispered propaganda, pass on information about what is happening in the country as a whole, quote examples of resistance.

15. Paint slogans, paste up posters and handbills, circulate uncensored publications — BUT ALWAYS WITH DUE CARE.

16. When organizing, use the old principle of conspiratorial work: I KNOW ONLY WHAT I NEED TO KNOW. REMEMBER THAT TODAY THERE IS NOTHING MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE FIGHT FOR THE RELEASE OF INTERNEES, THE FIGHT TO END THE STATE OF WAR, THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES AND UNION RIGHTS.

WE SHALL WIN!

The Resistance Union Solidarity

## The Aims of the Underground Interview with Bujak

(This interview with Warsaw Solidarity leader, Zbigniew Bujak, probably the most authoritative leader of the movement still at liberty, was given to New York Times correspondent John Darnton and is taken from the International Herald Tribune of 19 January 1982.)

The highest-ranking *Solidarity* leader who is still at large has declared in an interview that the union is continuing its activities underground and is prepared for a long struggle to fight for democracy and to overcome what he called military dictatorship. The union official, Zbigniew Bujak, insisted that the struggle must be conducted through peaceful resistance. 'I see that the current situation lends itself very much toward the organization of terrorism, and I fear that very much,' he said. 'Our country has never known terrorism, and it would be better if it didn't come to that.'

Mr. Bujak, 27, the head of the Warsaw chapter of *Solidarity* and a man whose popular appeal has made many unionists think of him as successor to Lech Walesa as the union's leader, is in hiding somewhere in Poland. The interview, the first he has given since the military crackdown began, was conducted by submitting questions through a complicated chain of intermediaries so his whereabouts was not revealed.


Mr. Bujak, whose handwriting is known to this correspondent, told of his escape in the early hours of 13 December, when most of his colleagues were rounded up by the police, and he provided details about the union's current activities. He also answered what he called a 'brutal question': Should *Solidarity* have done anything differently to avoid a confrontation?

'My answer, too, will be brutal,' he said. 'I know that many Western politicians believe that if we had been wiser we could have avoided this tragedy. But I also know that what they call wisdom for us meant collaboration with the state and party authorities — a collaboration that would have been directed against the workers, the intellectuals, the people of culture and the arts. We would have become another annex of the totalitarian system radiating only an impression of democracy. This must not be demanded of us or of our *Solidarity* union.'

'But let me expand on the subject,' he continued. 'Many people compared the construction of *Solidarity* to a revolution. But this revolution precluded the use of force and kept the arrangement determining the Polish *raison d'etat* — alliances, economic cooperation, the leading role of the Polish United Workers Party.'

'It was supposed to allow the party and government authorities to reform the system of rule in the country and find a new formula for the leading role of the party taking into account the social changes that were occurring. It is known; now, that nobody was thinking about such changes and reforms and that our hopes — that we would find even a token of good will on the other side — were illusory. It's clear the current situation could not have been avoided.'

Mr. Bujak, a former paratrooper, said that he was now in contact with union activists from Gdansk,



Wroclaw, Lodz, and other regions and that the union was reorganizing. He said the leaders in hiding were considering calling a national warning strike to demand the lifting of martial law and the release of Mr. Walesa, who is under house arrest, and of other union leaders. Attempts to bring union leaders to trial or to expel them from Poland would bring a strike, he added.

The first shock of martial law has passed, he said, and now spontaneous opposition is growing.

As examples, he said that there was passive resistance against political dismissals in factories, that intellectuals were turning in their party cards, that people were banding together to refuse to sign loyalty oaths and that artists and performers were refusing to cooperate with state-controlled radio and television.

'If this decisive resistance continues — and there is a chance that it will escalate — I see a real possibility of stifling the dictatorship or at least bringing about its liberalization and returning rights to the dissolved and suspended organizations,' he said.

Mr Bujak returned several times to the theme that the confrontation that culminated in the imposition of martial law on 13 December was inevitable, given the hard-line stance of the authorities, unless the union had relinquished its mission and its identity. There were two roads, he said. *Solidarity* could have thought only of its own survival, which would have meant abandoning efforts for reform and co-operation and selling out the interests of workers, intellectuals and others. Or it could have tried, as it did, to realize the programme adopted at its national congress in September to democratize the country and to institute reforms to lead it out of crisis.

The authorities, too, had a choice, he said — to adopt reforms or to destroy the union. 'From the moment when they decided to defend their privileges, the confrontation could not be avoided,' he said. 'Truly independent unions can

exist only in conditions of democracy. Thus to continue and to remain independent, the union must fight for democracy and become its guardian.' He said that the substance of the programme adopted in September, amounted to a 'reconstruction of all the spheres of social and economic life.'

'No one has the right to say that this was unwise,' he declared.

Taking a long view, he said that martial law had killed hopes for economic reform and that one result would be a deteriorating food supply. He predicted that the 'tragic food situation' would be exploited by the authorities to pit workers and intellectuals against farmers and would lead to the requisitioning of food by force and attempts to collectivize agriculture. Such moves would fail, he said.

Mr. Bujak said that martial law 'caught us all by surprise. I personally was most surprised of all.'

As far back as last spring, he said, many union activists suspected that the authorities were planning some kind of action against *Solidarity*.

Hours before the military crackdown began, he said, the entire union leadership, assembled at a meeting in Gdansk, began receiving information about movements of troops, policemen and special riot policemen and about a cutoff in communications. But the scope and the intent behind those actions apparently were not clear to the unionists. A last-minute change in the plans allowed Mr. Bujak and a few others to escape the police.

He said that if liberalization over the next few months did not return to the level that existed before the crackdown, the underground would grow quickly. Its activities, he said, would include distributing leaflets and conducting rallies and demonstrations and other protest actions.

'I do not exclude also that an armed underground might develop involved in terrorist activities,' he said. 'That would be a real disaster for our country. That is why I believe there should be no arming action in the current situation.' Instead, he called upon *Solidarity* members to organize cells of 10 people and to help those who have been dismissed from their jobs. (...)

Asked for his reaction to sanctions imposed by President Reagan against Poland and the Soviet Union because of the crackdown, Mr Bujak indicated that it was a complicated subject requiring more information and reflection on his part. The sanctions mean increased suffering for the people, he said. But later added, 'One can notice already that these sanctions constitute a great pressure, and we attach growing hopes to them for a reactivation of *Solidarity* and return to the road of reform.'

As for his own plans, Mr. Bujak said he would remain in hiding until the struggle for 'the reactivation of our union' was won. 'I will not leave the country, and I will not let myself be thrown out,' he said. 'One problem I have is my family life. I have a wife, and I want very much to have children.'

## the All-Poland Resistance Committee of Solidarity



People run to the aid of a police victim after clashes in Gdansk

(These two documents come from the one only body claiming national leadership of the entire Solidarity resistance. It is not clear, however, how comprehensive its authority is — we do not know, for example, whether Bujak is involved with the Committee, which is reportedly based mainly in the Gdansk region. The English texts of these documents and the subsequent one from Krakow was furnished to us by the Information Centre for Polish Affairs in the UK.)

On 13 January 1982 a meeting was held of those members of the *Solidarity* National Commission and those linked with the functions of the National Commission who are still at liberty and who continue their trade union activities. After familiarizing themselves with the situation in various regions of *Solidarity* and after deciding upon the best means and methods of con-

ducting the Union's activity in these necessarily conspiratorial conditions, the members of the meeting have established the All-Poland Resistance Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union *Solidarity*. 'Mieszko' became the Chairperson of this Committee.

The All-Poland Resistance Committee of *Solidarity* will perform the function of the supreme body of the Union until:

1. The State of War is rescinded and consequently the *NSZZ Solidarity* has restored to it the right to conduct its legal statutory activity.
2. The arrested and detained Union activists, members of the opposition, students and intellectuals are released.
3. The authorities begin a proper dialogue with the Presidium of *Solidarity's* National Commission, headed by Lech Walesa, the Presidium being there in its entirety.

The All-Poland Resistance Committee continues the activities of the National Strike Committee, established on 13 December 1981 in the Gdansk shipyard. The All-Poland Resistance Committee assumes the responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of the Union throughout the country.

Those members of *Solidarity's* National Commission who did not participate in the meeting which founded the Resistance Committee have the obligation to establish contact with the All-Poland Resistance Committee. At the same time we wish to warn all members of *Solidarity* against any attempt to purport to represent the Union in talks with the authorities. In the current dramatic situation in Poland unity and solidarity is of particular importance for us all.

'Mieszko'

The All-Poland Resistance Committee, *NSZZ Solidarity*

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**Wroclaw was the site of a meeting between the directors of nursery schools and representatives of the junta. The representatives of the junta suggested that it was possible to obtain information on resistance from the children in the nursery schools, for example, about whether their parents use typewriters at home. (From *Solidarity's* Information Bulletin No. 15, 12 January 1982.)**

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## An Appeal to the Public

Fellow Citizens!

We have been brutally halted in our struggle for dignity and for respect due to every human being and to the nation, for the recognition of our place in the scheme of things and our rights and these include our right to unite our thoughts and our actions.

Bound together by our hope to create the longed-for vision of life and of human co-operation we have become a new quality in history. We dare not forfeit such a historical opportunity. The architects of the state of war are still counting on shock tactics, on brutality, on psychological terror, on paralysing propaganda. We, however, all Poles of good will, are morally united. Conscious of our strength, with dignity we can overcome the lonely hatred of our enemies — enemies of our freedom and sovereignty.

At a time of this national and human trial we must forget about issues of secondary importance and about differences of opinion among ourselves. Let us set ourselves tasks in such a way which would not lead to the abandonment of our Polish hope so that we would not experience the bitterness of time lost.

Always at the most difficult moments of our history the Polish nation demonstrated abilities of self-defence and active self-preservation, worthy of admiration. Today, too, it is our duty to organize ourselves into a mass, underground resistance movement which would transcend social divisions. Each group of conspirators should adhere to humanitarian aims and distance themselves from terrorism and illegality. Each group should always act in accordance with the principles of Christian ethics, deeply ingrained in the nation. The most important task should be centred on the human being and the fate of our country.

In fulfilling the programme of action each resistance group should adhere to the following principles:

1. Let us remember that it is not too late to achieve an agreement between all the Poles and that the architects of the state of war will, sooner or later, opt for talks with representatives elected by society. Every authority must co-operate with the nation as it is the nation which, through its labour, creates the power and the welfare of the country. The authority, left to itself, without the labourers and culture, is deprived of its 'raison d'être'.
2. Through our behaviour and actions we must demonstrate that we refuse to bury our ideals and our faith, as occurred in August 1980 in our vision of the future. We have inherited this faith from our fathers who perished under the flags with 'For your freedom and ours' on them. The

suffering of our nation is a treasury from which we should draw our strength for the fight for our dignity and freedom.

3. Decisively and with determination, as employees, we demand the release of the imprisoned and interned co-workers and union leaders. We do not give our acceptance to the martial law regulations in force in our country. To this end we should despatch petitions signed by work-forces to Parliament and to the authorities. Tell your managers that it is their duty to concern themselves with the fate of those working for them who are victimized by the authorities.

4. Prepare registers of those interned, arrested, dismissed from employment or otherwise victimized. Take care of their families.

5. The state of war, sooner or later, will come to an end. An introduction of a social order, based on justice, in Poland is a question of time. Prepare registers of people collaborating with the martial law authorities and make their names public. Let each of them know full well that his/her performance is being monitored and that public opinion will eventually pronounce judgment on them. Make public the names of those managers who, by forcing people to sign declarations of loyalty, attempt to destroy human dignity and honour.

6. Boycott all new bodies such as the so-called Social Welfare Commissions and self-government bodies created by decree. These structures are being set up on the pretext of defending employees' interests; but their real purpose is to draw workforces into acceptance of the authorities and to demonstrate that the existence of *Solidarity* and other democratic structures in workplaces is not necessary.

7. Let us help each other to survive psychologically during this time of trial. Let us develop independent sources of information through all available means in order to protect those among us who are less strong from the authorities' one-sided propaganda.

8. Use passive resistance wherever it is possible and sensible to do so. Every nation has a right not to accept the authority if the aims of such authority are wrong and are a tool of interests foreign to the nation.

9. Our common posture is further underlined through our common activities all over the country. The first such activity should take place on 30 January. On this day let us visit the families of those who were killed, wounded, interned, arrested and deprived of employment. Let us turn this day into a symbol of our remembrance and of solidarity with those who were forcibly taken from our midst.

'Mieszko'

All-Poland Resistance Committee of Solidarity

## An Appeal by the Krakow (Malopolska) Branch of *Solidarity* to its members.

Anti-union repression is continuing and has become increasingly more widespread. In Krakow around 150 people have been interned, several thousand arrested; the number of people detained and subsequently released cannot be precisely established. A massive purge is underway in workplaces. Trade union activists who refuse to sign pledges of loyalty are being dismissed, eg. in government administration offices and in judicial institutions.

*Solidarity* declares that it shall defend its members by all available means. Legal aid, material and food assistance and medical care have been already organized for those imprisoned and interned and for their families. An individual patron has been or will be shortly assigned to each family. The biggest problem is to determine who has been detained and to track down their families. This can be done only through unofficial channels since to the present day the authorities have not made available the lists of people detained, neither have they officially informed their families.

In these circumstances assistance to those imprisoned should be organized along the following lines:

- a) all information regarding people who have been detained, along with addresses of their families, should be passed on, preferably to the Charity Office of the Krakow Curia;
- b) help for your imprisoned colleagues and their families should be organized in your own work-places and, if possible, the Curia should be informed about the extent of such action;
- c) funds should be collected on a regular basis to help those imprisoned and dismissed from employment. If it turns out that the money collected is not needed at your place, it will come in handy elsewhere. A monthly payment equal to the union membership fee will resolve all problems with regard to financial help. The money should be either held by yourselves or handed over to the Charity Office of the Curia.

Help should be organized along the same lines for those who, as a result of anti-union repressions, have lost their jobs or will be dismissed in the future. All such cases should be registered and apart from providing help, regular contact with these people should be maintained. When circumstances allow for it, *Solidarity* will seek redress of their wrong, demand their reinstatement and insist that compensation be paid to them.

The Krakow *Solidarity* leadership advises that wherever the workforce is insufficiently organized to refuse collectively to sign documents confirming resignation from the union, such documents should be signed by everybody in order to protect the most dedicated activists from being dismissed and thus losing contact with their working environment. It is not important to which documents we put our signatures, what matters is how we continue to act. From the legal point of view all declarations made under duress are invalid. The action conducted by the authorities has a purely psychological purpose. It is meant to create an atmosphere of fear, to isolate those most dedicated and to break up workers' unity. At the same time it must be remembered that nothing can be gained by submission. These authorities respect only strength. The stronger our resistance the better results can be achieved for the workers and for the union. Let us not deceive ourselves: on 13 December a final attempt was made to return to the times before 1 October. Passive attitudes can only be of service to those who had devised a plot against the nation. It is of utmost importance that the workers' unity and dignity are upheld and strengthened. We should rather attract than reject all those who had previously displayed a negative attitude towards *Solidarity* but as a result of the martial law now see the authorities in their true colours.

It is also important to protect all decent management: all managers who attempt to defend their factories and offices against the rage of the security forces, Party apparatus and military commissars; all managers who have been dismissed because of showing reluctance to carry out orders. The union will also seek to redress their wrong when the time comes. And it will come for sure because the solidarity of the people cannot be crushed. As during the Nazi occupation we should fight against all informers and collaborators by naming them and publicizing their activities. We shall not harm them but there can be no place for them in our union. In workplaces records should be kept of all important occurrences and of how people behave for future reference.

**Parcels from the German Democratic Republic arrived at the prison in Zarnowiec, with a note saying that the gifts were for the internees there from a Roman Catholic parish in Rostock.**

## British Labour Movement Response to the Military Coup in Poland — By Joe Singleton

The leadership of the British labour movement responded immediately on 13 December with a condemnation of the military coup in Poland. Eric Heffer, Labour Party spokesperson on European affairs, speaking at a protest rally outside the Polish Embassy on 13 December, called for an end to military rule and for British labour movement support for *Solidarity*. A similar statement was made by TUC General Secretary, Len Murray.

The NEC of the Labour Party passed a resolution giving 'full support to *Solidarity*' and called on the British labour movement to break all links with the PUWP and official Polish trade unions 'while the military regime continues'.

The International Committee of the TUC, meeting on 21 December, called for the release of all detainees in Poland, an end to martial law, and full freedom for *Solidarity*. The TUC sent a delegation to the Foreign Secretary of the British Government, Lord Carrington, on 21 December which asked that all aid to Poland, excluding humanitarian aid, be linked to the satisfaction of the TUC demands.

On 24 December the TUC sent an official delegation to the Polish Ambassador in London. The delegation protested against the imposition of martial law and the repression of *Solidarity* and requested that the General Secretary, Len Murray, be allowed to visit Poland as part of an official delegation from

the European trade unions. The General Council of the TUC, which met on 23 December, stated its full support for *Solidarity*. A letter was sent to trade unions in the other East European countries calling on them to support the Polish trade union. The International Committee, meeting on 11 January, reported that the response from the East German official trade union, the FDGB, was insulting and that the TUC was breaking all official links with the East German union.

The TUC set up a special fund for aid to the Polish workers and itself contributed £5,000 for medical aid. It also sent a letter to all affiliated unions and to all trades union councils asking for aid. It has protested against the Polish Government's refusal of a visa for Len Murray and in a statement on 30 January expressed its continued concern over the situation in Poland which was 'getting worse'.

Britain's major unions have come out in defence of *Solidarity* and condemned the military coup. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) sent an official delegation to the Polish Embassy on 26 February.

The NUM condemned the military takeover and the repression of *Solidarity*. It expressed special concern over the killing of seven miners in Silesia and demanded that a delegation from the NUM be given permission to enter the mining areas of Poland to

see what was happening. It demanded the release from detention of Josef Patyna, a representative of *Solidarity* who had paid an official visit to the NUM at the beginning of December. Already on 5 January the South Wales Area Executive of the NUM had sent a protest to the Polish Ambassador, asking for a personal meeting and the right to send a delegation to the Polish miners.

The General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) was part of the delegation to Lord Carrington and the Polish Ambassador in Poland. The quarter meeting of the T&GWU Executive, at the beginning of March, passed a resolution of support for *Solidarity* and condemned the repression. The T&GWU also contributed money to the TUC aid fund and stated that its union's drivers would be available to drive medical and food supplies to Poland.

The Executive of the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU) issued a statement which condemned the repression of *Solidarity*. The statement pointed out that the military coup was a 'blow against trade unions and socialism' which plays into the hands of reactionary forces in the West. The real friends of the Polish workers, said the GMWU statement, are 'trade unionists and democratic socialists in the West'. The statement also called on the TUC to maximise its support for *Solidarity*. As a demonstration of its concern for the plight

of Polish workers the GMWU asked its members in the food and drug industries to contribute one hour's wages to *Solidarity* so that the food and drugs which they produce could be sent to Poland. GMWU members work in such drug industries as ICI, Organon, Sterling Health, and Travenol Laboratories and in the food chains Associated Dairies, Fray Bentos and Brooke Bond. The union also opened a special bank account for Polish aid. The GMWU has expressed special concern over the fate of *Solidarity* leader Bogdan Lis who was a guest at the GMWU Congress last year.

The Executive of the National Union of Teachers (NUT) also condemned the military coup and has written to the Polish authorities expressing concern over teacher members of *Solidarity* who have been interned. The NUT has drawn up a list of teachers detained in Poland. The National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) has written a letter to the Polish Ambassador as well as to other East European trade unions condemning the repression and calling for the freedom of *Solidarity*. The union has written to the Ambassador about the fate of *Solidarity* member M. Kukula who visited the NALGO

conference in June 1981.

Two regional associations of Trades Councils (Lancashire and Cleveland) have called for a labour movement conference to organize solidarity with *Solidarity* and throughout Britain an increasing number of Trades Councils have set up defence committees or organized local activities (Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester, Oxford, Stirling, Edinburgh). *Solidarity* activists at the base of the trade unions was particularly strong in Scotland. The Glasgow Trades Council, an important body in the Scottish labour movement, sponsored a march in January which was also supported by the Scottish teachers' union (EIS) as well as NALGO and NUPE. The Scottish central region of the T&GWU organized meetings for members of *Solidarity* with the Grangemouth dockers, BP tanker drivers and the workers at Plessey who were occupying their factory. The joint shop stewards committee at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital (COHSE, NUPE, AUEW and NALGO) sent a letter to General Jaruzelski condemning the military coup. Similar actions have been repeated many times at other factories and workplaces throughout Britain.

In January the Massey Ferguson workers in Coventry voted to black all supplies of parts shipped from Poland. This involved a 700,000 contract with the Ursus Tractor Factory near Warsaw. The deputy-convenor of *Solidarity* in Ursus, Piotr Kozlowski, spoke in the Coventry plant. A similar decision was later adopted by the Massey Ferguson workers in Manchester.

The adoption of internees and the twinning of workplaces has also begun to be organized as a form of solidarity. The British Leyland workers in the Albion plant in Scotland have decided to adopt internees.

On 16 March the Labour Party National Executive Committee organized in London a rally in defence of *Solidarity*. This was addressed by Zbigniew Kowalewski, a member of the Presidium of *Solidarity* in Lodz, as well as by Labour Party and TUC leaders. Three days previously a demonstration was organized in the capital by the Socialist Organiser group and the London Labour Briefing, which was supported by the London Regional Committee of the Labour Party.

## Defence Committees in Britain

### SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION WORKING GROUP (UK)

This is the group of *Solidarity* members from Poland who are presently in Britain. The STUWG is very active in the British labour movement, providing speakers for labour movement organization and workplace meetings. It organizes a relief fund for *Solidarity* in Poland and produces a regular information bulletin which can be subscribed to. It will also provide names of detainees and prisoners for adoption by labour movement bodies and give assistance in the twinning of workplaces. It is in touch with *Solidarity* in Poland and also with the TUC here in Britain. Contact at: 64 Philbeach Gardens, Earls Court, London SW5. Tel: 01-373 3492.

### EASTERN EUROPE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

A campaign on an explicitly socialist basis which has been active in the unions and especially the Labour Party since 1978. Trade union organizations, Labour Party branches and socialist organizations, as well as individuals, can join the EESC. It organized a meeting in defence of *Solidarity* at the last Labour Party conference and produces a regular Newsletter. Its Hon. President is Philip Whitehead MP and Hon. Chairperson is Eric Heffer MP. Contact: EESC, c/o Vladimir Derer, 10 Park Drive, London NW11.

### POLISH SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

The PSC has been the principal national organizer of defence activities in Britain. It organized the first major national demonstration on 20 December and produces a news bulletin every two months. It aims to build links between the Polish people and democratic organizations in Britain. It is open to non-labour movement parties and organizations and its leadership is quite hostile to the Marxist left. It also supports an economic boycott of Poland. The PSC can be contacted at 12 Marlborough Crescent, London W4.

### AID COMMITTEES

Fundraising is an important part of defence activity. Money raised for the victims of repression and their families, to be channelled through *Solidarity*, may be sent to the Solidarity Trade Union Working Group (UK) whose address is above. Money may also be sent through a fund set up by London Labour Briefing, sponsored by Eric Heffer, Tony Benn and others, the address for which is *Labour Poland Solidarity Fund*, c/o Co-operative Bank, 110 Leman St., London E1. The Friends of Poland (11 Ellerton Rd., London SW20) have also set up a trust to channel funds through the Catholic Church. The address for this fund is c/o the Sisters of Mercy, St. Vincents Convent, Carlisle Place, London SW1.

### SOLIDARITY WITH SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

This group, likewise open to forces outside the labour movement, has as its main activity the promotion of a total trade and cultural boycott of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. It can be reached at 7 Quin tin Ave., London SW20.

### LOCAL COMMITTEES

The following is a list of local labour movement committees that we know of at the time of going to press:

**Birmingham Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Roger Murray, 28 Blackford Road, Birmingham 11. Ring 021-773 5396.

**Glasgow Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Ian McCalman, 18 Mossgiel Rd, Glasgow G43. Ring 041-632 1839.

**Greater Manchester Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Jon Silberman, 51 Montrose House, Crete St, Oldham, Lancs. Ring 061-620 2885.

**Oxford Labour Committee on Poland**, 468 Banbury Rd, Oxford. Ring 0865 58238.

**Edinburgh Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Edinburgh & District Trades Council, 12 Picardy Place, Edinburgh.

**Leeds Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Dave Feickert, 28 Roundhay Mount, Leeds 8, Yorkshire. Ring 0532 490927.

**Coventry Solidarity Committee**, John Fisher, c/o ASTMS, 26 Queens Rd, Coventry.

**Cardiff Polish Solidarity Committee**, c/o Mark Jenkins, 87 Beatty Ave, Cardiff. Ring 0222-764195.

### Adoption of Detainees and Prisoners

The adoption, by trade union and other labour movement bodies, of detainees and political prisoners in Poland is an important way of giving real support to *Solidarity*. We present below a list of detainees and prisoners organized according to their particular trade group or profession. This is a very incomplete list. Union branches

wishing to adopt a *Solidarity* detainee in Poland are advised to contact the Solidarity Trade Union Working Group in London.

#### BUILDING WORKERS

**Garnicki, Marek**; Senior steward Wschod prefabricated concrete plant, CP member; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Bydgoszcz  
**Kuligowski, Janusz**; Deputy convenor prefabricated housing factory; Town: Sosnowiec

**Masior, Michal**; Construction engineer, deputy works convenor, member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Rybnik; Camp: Strzebielinek  
**Mikus, Boguslaw**; Chargehand Chelm building works; Town: Lodz  
**Milewski, Stanislaw**; Civil engineering worker water industry; Town: Tczew; Camp: Strzebielinek  
**Strzalko, Andrzej**; Senior steward timber yard; Town: Bialogard

**Wyszkowski, Krzysztof;** Carpenter; Camp: Strzebielinek

#### SHIPYARD WORKERS

**Debowski, Stanislaw;** Stecunia Polnocna (northern shipyard); Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Drag, Adam;** White collar engineer, member, regional praesidium; Town: Gdansk

**Grzelawski, Edmund;** Repair worker;

Town: Gdynia; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Gwiazda, Andrzej;** Electrical engineer, member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Gdansk

Camp: Strzebielinek

**Gwiazda-Duda, Joanna;** Engineer, Institute of Shipbuilding Technology, Member Solidarnosc regional committee; Town: Gdansk

**Jagielski, Krzysztof;** Warski yard, arrested for organising strike; Town: Szczecin

**Jedrzejewski;** Repair worker Pilsudski yard; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Jurczyk, Marian;** Warehouse worker Warski yard, member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Szczecin

**Klawikowski, Brunon;** Lenin yard;

Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Kolodziej, Andrzej;** Convenor, Paris Commune yard, Town: Gdansk

**Koziacki, Andrzej;** Worker, Paris Commune yard; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Koziatek, Jan;** Worker Lenin yard,

Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Kuczata, Zygmunt;** Worker Lenin yard;

Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

#### ENGINEERING WORKERS

**Garal, Eugeniusz;** Nowotki diesel plant, member Solidarnosc Mazowsze regional committee; Town: Warsaw; Camp: Bialoleka

**Hassa, Marian;** Swierczewski small arms factory; Town: Warsaw

**Kalas, Makary;** Unitra radio factory;

Town: Bialogard

**Kaniewski, Jerzy;** Ursus, Town: Warsaw

**Karpezo, Stanislaw;** Ursus, Town: Warsaw

**Kasinski, Stanislaw;** Ursus shop steward;

Town: Warsaw

**Knapp, Jacek;** Worker in either Ursus or Nowotki diesel plant, member Warsaw Solidarnosc regional executive

Town: Warsaw; Camp: Bialoleka

**Koniewski, Jerzy;** Ursus; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Warsaw

**Kopaczewski, Antoni;** Skilled metal worker convenor; Town: Rzeszow

**Kosmowski, Patrycjusz;** White collar engineer, leader strike committee

Camp: Strzebielinek

**Krol, Witold;** Metal mechanic Walter ammunition works

Town: Radom; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Lasocki, Wojciech;** Ursus shop steward, member regional committee; Town: Warsaw

**Lazarz, Mieczyslaw;** Convenor FLT Bearings;

Town: Krasnik

**Lis, Norbert;** Ursus; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Gorzow

**Miastowski, Slawomir;** Convenor PZTV-OLTEL TV factory; member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Gdansk

**Mroz, Anna;** Precision engineer, Swierczewski small arms factory; Town: Warsaw

**Nowak, Andrzej;** Teletra telecom factory;

Town: Poznan

**Nowicka, Ewa;** Convenor Belmo electrical equipment plant; Town: Bydgoszcz

**Parniewski, Anton;** ZNMR agricultural machine repair; Town: Slupsk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Piesak, Andrzej;** Telecom engineer, member Solidarnosc National Commission, Town: Jelenia Gora

**Podsiadlo, Henryk;** Steward Unitra electronics factory; Sentenced to three years' prison for organising strike; Town: Bialogard

**Puczek, Zbigniew;** WSK engine plant; Town: Swidnik

**Rulewski, Jan;** engineer/mechanic; chairperson Solidarnosc regional committee, member Solidarnosc National Commission

Town: Bydgoszcz; Camp: Strzebielinek cell 10

**Sawicki, Ryszard;** Ursus; Town: Gorzow

**Sokolowski, Andrzej;** Engine plant, Town: Swidnik

**Strepikowski, Marian;** Machine factory, Town: Slupsk, Camp: Strzebielinek cell 34

**Strzelczyk, Zygmunt;** Ursus; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Gorzow

**Szumski, Pawel;** Unitra-Unitech radio factory; Works committee member; Sentenced to three years' prison for organising strike;

Town: Bialogard

**Trembinski, Bogdan;** Zwar radio factory

**Wielgosz, Bronislaw;** worker, mining machinery factory, convenor; Town: Glinnik

#### CHEMICAL AND OIL WORKERS

**Kocian, Stanislaw;** Chargehand Police chemical works, member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Szczecin

**Powrozny, Michal;** Chemical engineer Stomil rubber works, member Solidarnosc National Commission; Town: Olsztyn

**Przewlocki, Zbigniew;** Chemical engineer Ozos chemical works; Town: Olsztyn

**Ungier, Gregorz;** Oil refinery worker;

Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

#### DOCKERS/PORTWORKERS

**Cegielski, Jacek;** Portworker; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Cegielski, Leszek;** Convenor Polish Oceanic Shipping Line, member regional Solidarnosc praesidium; Town: Gdansk

**Laskowski, Mariusz;** Polish Oceanic Line; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Olkiewicz, Ryszard;** Administrative worker Port of Gdynia; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Pietrucki, Tadeusz;** Polish Oceanic Line, Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Poziomski, Antoni;** Polish Oceanic Line; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Pozniak, Zbigniew;** Trans Ocean Shipping; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Popalinski;** Trans Ocean Shipping; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Rowinski, Hieronon;** Polish Oceanic Line; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek cell 36

**Urbaniak, T;** Docker; Town: Gdynia; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Wandas;** Polish Oceanic Line, Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

#### BUS/TRANSPORT WORKERS

**Bunikowski, Andrzej;** Driver, PKS Coach Co; Town: Tczew; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Frankiewicz, Henryk;** Transport worker; Town: Gdansk-Oliwa; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Juskiewicz, Ludwik;** Transport worker; chief shop steward urban transport; Town: Lodz

**Kedzierski, Zygmunt;** Busworker; Town: Gdynia; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Koblynski;** Busworker; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Knap, Zbigniew;** Busworker; Camp: Bialoleka

**Pawlicki, Andrzej;** Transport distribution worker; sentenced to 8 years prison;

Town: Dabrowa-Slaska (Silesia)

**Rudecki, Raymond;** Driver long distance buses; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek cell 12

**Rzepka, Tadeusz;** Busworker WPK;

Town: Poznan

**Suda, Roman;** Driver long distance buses

Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek cell 6

#### ELECTRICIANS

**Bulc, Andrzej;** Town: Warsaw; Camp: Bialoleka

**Debski, Boguslaw;** Electrical engineer, Bialystok Unitra Biazet factory committee;

Town: Bialystok

**Kolaska, Makary;** Electrical engineer Bialogard Unitra-Unitech radio factory; sentenced to 3 years in prison

**Pietkiewicz, Antoni;** Electrical engineer building combine, deputy chair of regional committee; Town: Kalisz; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Walesa, Lech;** Electrician, national secretary Solidarnosc

Town: Gdansk; House arrest

#### PRINTERS

**Blazyk, Zygmunt;** Town: Gdansk;

Camp: Strzebielinek

**Budkiewicz, Andrzej;** Head of printshop, shipyard; Town: Gdansk

**Grzesiak, Bohdan;** Nowa Publishing House, Member Solidarnosc regional committee

Mazowsze, Camp: Bialoleka

**Kusiniski, Stanislaw;** Member Solidarnosc regional committee Mazowsze; Town: Warsaw

**Sosnowska, Anna;** Town: Gdansk

**Sosnowski, Leszek;** Town: Gdansk

#### STEEL WORKERS

**Jaworski, Seweryn;** Huta Warszawa works, Deputy chairman Solidarnosc Warsaw region;

Town: Warsaw; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Luzny, Jan;** CYNK steelworks Deputy Convenor, member Silesian regional review committee; Town: Miasteczko Slaskie;

Camp: Strzebielinek

**Marusinski, Wojciech;** arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Paumor, Zbigniew;** Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Przygodzinski, Aleksander;** Turner, Bierut steelworks convenor, member Solidarnosc National Commission, three-year sentence for organising strike; Town: Czestochowa

**Renet, Herbert;** Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Sadurski, Karol;** Member regional committee; Town: Warsaw

#### TEXTILE WORKERS

**Jurasowska, Janina;** Teofilow Mill, Town: Lodz

**Karga, Jerzy;** Teofilow Mill, Town: Lodz

**Kostrzewa, Ryszard;** Member Lodz Solidarnosc council; Arrested for organising strike;

Town: Lodz

**Mienkarska, Jadwiga;** Teofilow Mill, Town: Lodz

Lodz

**Mordzinska (MS);** Railway workshops shop steward

#### RAILWAY WORKERS

**Czapniewski, Leon;** Town: Zajaczkowo; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Hamadyk, Josef;** Workshops maintenance ZNTK works; Town: Gdansk; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Kwiecinski, Marin;** Train driver, member of Solidarnosc regional control commission Jelenia Gora; Town: Luban; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Lenartowicz, Marek;** Engineer, shop steward, Cegielski works; Town: Poznan

**Makenson, Robert;** Town: Lublin

**Mordzinska (MS);** Railway workshops shop steward

**Mrozinski;** Railway workshops shop steward

**Niezgoda, Czelaw;** Former chair Lublin region

**Rozplochowski, Andrzej;** Train driver (steelworks) executive member Solidarnosc Silesian region; Town: Katowice

**Urbanski, Roman;** Town: Zajaczkowo; Camp: Strzebielinek cell 30

**Waliszewski, Pawel;** Railway workshops

**Wardarwy;** Town: Lublin

**Zitala, Mieczyslaw;** Railway worker, chair branch committee; Camp: Strzebielinek

#### MINERS

**Bomba, Wladyslaw;** Thorez mine, arrested for organising strike; Town: Walbrzych

**Czarnynoga, Czeslaw;** Ziemowit mine; Arrested for organising strike

**Gasierek, Piotr;** Halemba mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Silesia

**Jaworski, Jan;** Staszic mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice; Camp: Strzebielinek

**Jedrek, Artur;** Julian mine, Solidarnosc welfare secretary; Town: Katowice

**Kota, Ludwik;** Halemba mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Silesia

**Krystian, Tadeusz;** Ziemowit mine; Arrested for organising strike

**Kulinski, Leszek;** Staszic mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Patyna, Jozef;** Technician Siersza mine, shop steward. Member Silesian regional executive and Solidarnosc National Commission

**Postrozny, Jan;** Staszic mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Semkowski, Zbigniew;** Thorez mine, secretary stewards committee; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Walbrzych

**Skwira, Adam;** Wujek mine, secretary works committee; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Katowice

**Sobol, Jacek;** Halemba mine; Arrested for organising strike; Town: Silesia

(This list was compiled by Socialist Worker and published in its 20 February 1982 issue.)

# EASTERN EUROPE'S CND

## Unofficial Peace Movement in GDR —

By Joe Singleton

13 February of this year was the 35th anniversary of the British saturation bombing of the city of Dresden in which more than 35,000 German people lost their lives. This event is officially commemorated every year in East Germany. This year 3,000 mostly young people gathered in the city of Dresden for what was probably the first and certainly the biggest unofficial demonstration for peace since the establishment of the GDR. Before the demonstration over 5,000 people had attended a peace forum in the Church of the Cross in Dresden, an event sponsored by the Evangelical Church of Saxony. The peace forum had received the approval of the authorities, but at the end of the forum over 3,000 went on an unofficial march to the ruins of another Dresden church, the Church of Our Lady, which serves as a memorial to those killed in the bombing in the Second World War.

The event was significant not only for its size, or for the fact that it was unofficial, but because it signified the emergence in the GDR of a power new independent movement which is critical of the official policies of the SED (Socialist Unity Party, the East German CP).

The unofficial demonstration was not a spontaneous follow-up to the peace forum. Already last November a group of young East Germans had circulated an appeal for a peace march in Dresden on the anniversary of the destruction of the city. In the month before the forum leaflets were circulating in Dresden calling for the peace march. It seems that the decision of the Church leadership in Saxony to offer the peace forum was a way of avoiding confrontation between the young people and the police.

### The Berlin Appeal

This demonstration follows the publication in January of the 'Berlin Appeal'. Entitled 'What Leads to Peace' the document was first published with a list of 35 signatures but within weeks the number had grown to around 300. The Appeal was signed by the prominent oppositionist Robert Havemann and appears to have been initiated by the Evangelical pastor Rainer Eppelmann. Eppelmann was arrested on 9 February but was released after two days when the Evangelical Church intervened on his behalf.

The Appeal calls for the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Germany, East and West, as a first step towards a nuclear-free zone in all of Europe. It calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German soil, East and West. (There are 400,000 such troops in the GDR.) It also proposes a series of social and political steps which the East German regime should take to 'demilitarise' daily life in the GDR, thus

reducing the threat as well as the psychology of war. The most significant of these latter proposals concerns the social peace service (Friedensdienst) as an alternative to military conscription for East German youth.

### Make Peace Without Arms

The main slogan of the demonstration, as of the Appeal, was 'Make Peace Without Arms' (Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen). This is in contrast to the slogan of the regime, 'Peace Must Be Armed'. A group of East German youth had attempted to demonstrate with this slogan on their placards last September as part of an official march sponsored by the youth organisation, the Free German Youth (FDJ), to celebrate World Peace Day. On this occasion the police intervened and prevented them from doing so. The police did not intervene in the February demonstration. The FDJ Congress, which began just 10 days after the Dresden demonstration, was organized under the officially sponsored motto 'Peace Must Be Armed'.

The regime appears to be taking seriously the growth of anti-militarist sentiment among large sections of youth. In the official press and at Central Committee meetings the developing peace movement has come under strong attack. Through the pages of *Neue Zeit*, publication of the East German CDU (Christian Democratic Union), the regime has carried out an active campaign against the idea of peace without weapons.

*'We cannot unilaterally disarm nor can we allow ourselves to be defenceless against imperialism. We must be just as concerned about the defence of our fatherland as about the cause of peace. The new socialist world can only be created under military protection.'*

(*Neue Zeit*, 30 May 1981)


### The Social Peace Service

The demand for some form of social peace service as an alternative to the 18-month mandatory military conscription came to the attention of the authorities in May 1981 when groups of young people in the Dresden area, on their own initiative, began to present petitions to the church and the regime. What these young people had in mind was civilian service in hospitals or other public health facilities, an option which already exists in West Germany. In August 1981 these petitions received a great deal of publicity because they were presented to the regional Synod in Dresden while the World Council of Churches was meeting in that city. The petitions called on church leaders to intercede on their behalf with the state authorities. In the past 6 months it is known that over 6,000 East German youth have signed similar petitions. The

petitions have also had their effect on the church hierarchy. At a meeting of the Synod of the Evangelical Church in September 1981, in the city of Gustrow, province of Mecklenburg, a resolution was passed which called on the Standing Conference of Church Directorates (the church's executive body) to initiate talks with the state authorities on this issue.

### Writers' Conference

The regime's official policy on conscription as well as on the general military question was also challenged by some speakers at the Berlin Meeting for the Promotion of Peace which met in East Berlin 13-15 December. This meeting, previously approved by SED, was attended by about 100 writers and scientists from both parts of Germany. It was initiated by the East German writer Stephan Hermlin, who some years earlier was one of the initiators of the writers' protest over the revocation of Wolf Biermann's citizenship. Western participants included Gunter Grass as well as Bernt Engelmann (Chairperson of the West German Writers' Union) and Professor Ulrich Albert (Vice-President of the Free University of Berlin). A number of well-known dissident writers from East Germany also attended; Stefan Heym, Rolf Schneider and Gunter de Bruyn.



Stefan Heym

Although most of the speakers backed the official line of their respective governments, Stefan Heym condemned equally the Cruise and Pershing missiles planned for the West and the Soviet SS-20s already in place. De Bruyn spoke in favour of the demand of youth for an alternative to military conscription:

*'The peace-oriented policy of the GDR ... damages itself when it rejects the offer of*

*alliance of independent peace movements in its own country, young Christians, for example, who are demanding a social peace service.'*

The concept of the 'balance of terror' between East and West was also strongly attacked by Gunter Grass and Rolf Schneider attacked the FDJ official slogan 'Peace Must Be Armed' as 'the armaments race in spirit'. Heym also called for a joint demonstration of East and West Germans against nuclear weapons to take place on Alexanderplatz, East Berlin.

### Dilemma of the Party

The SED regime has always encouraged and praised the peace movement in West Germany, has campaigned actively against the stationing of new missiles in Western Europe and has developed in its own population a heightened sense of the danger of nuclear war. The regime has reacted strongly, however, against the rise of the independent peace movement which has questioned key elements of SED policy and opposed the extremely high level of militarization in the education, cultural and social spheres of East German life. At the Central Committee meeting in November Politburo candidate member Werner Walde attacked the need for an independent peace movement because 'our whole republic is one giant social peace service'. The demand for a social peace service was described by Walde as 'anti-peace, anti-socialist and anti-constitutional' and he promised the danger of confrontation with the state authorities to those who pursued this course.

The regime is clearly nervous of the rapid rise of the new movement which is outside its control. In Dresden 'Rock Groups for Peace' have been formed by young people and many more youth are wearing officially condemned peace badges. The badges are based on a symbol of swords turning into ploughshares. (This is Soviet in origin and is taken from the Soviet Memorial outside the UNO building in New York.)

### The Church

The Evangelical Church in East Germany (6,850,000 members) is attempting to mediate between the youth and the regime. The church as an institution has not supported the Berlin Appeal nor did it support the demonstration on 13 February. Youth, especially Christian youth, have turned to the church as an independent institution, to win its support for their demands.

The '70s have been a period of detente and co-operation between the SED regime and the Evangelical Church, symbolized by the meeting in March 1978 between Honecker and the then East German Bishop Albert Schönherr. Both sides are clearly satisfied with the 'Schönherr line' although there is continuing conflict over the question of military education in schools and the rights of Christian conscientious objectors.

The proposal for a social peace service and the new proposals for a nuclear-free Germany have originated outside the church hierarchy, at the local parish level and among groups of youth. The church hierar-

chy, while feeling constrained to respond to the issues raised by youth, especially by young Christian pacifists, has at the same time sought to keep it under control and avoid conflict with the regime. The official position of the church was stated at its recent Synod, held 29-31 January in Herrnhut. The Chairperson of the church federation, Bishop Werner Krusche, said in his report (published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 February 1982) that the church would continue to seek a compromise with the regime on these questions, but that 'demonstrations will not help us in our situation'.

### A new democratic movement

The 3,000 demonstration in Dresden in February (perhaps even more significant than the 300,000 demonstration in Bonn in October) represents an important development in the form of opposition and social protest in the GDR. The new peace movement clearly has a large degree of support in East German society. Although it takes up the regime's own demands for peace, disarmament and 'a nuclear-free Europe from Portugal to Poland', the government will move against the new movement because it is independent. The reintroduction of 'the German question' into European politics, and the mutual reinforcing of mass democratic peace movements in both parts of Germany, open up possibilities which at the present moment are difficult to predict. But Dresden has opened up a new phase for the democratic opposition in the GDR.

## 'Make Peace Without Weapons'

(Frieden Shaffen Ohne Waffen)

*(The following document from the GDR, dated 25 January 1982, and known as the 'Berlin Appeal', has since been signed by more than 300 East German citizens. This translation, from Frankfurter Rundschau of 9 February, is by Labour Focus.)*

1.

There can only be one war in Europe, a nuclear war. The weapons piled up in the East and in the West will not protect us but destroy us. We will all be long dead when the soldiers in their tanks and missile bases, and politicians in their defence bunkers — those whom we trust for our defence — continue to live and go forth to destroy whatever remains.

2.

If we want to live then away with weapons. And to start with, away with nuclear weapons. The whole of Europe must become a nuclear-free zone. We propose negotiations between both German states for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Germany.

3.

Divided Germany has become a launch base for the two big nuclear powers. We propose that this dangerous confrontation should be ended. The victorious powers in the Second World War must finally conclude peace treaties with both German states, as was decided in the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Thereafter the former allies should withdraw their occupation troops from Germany and agree to guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of the two German states.

4.

We propose that the great debate over the question of peace be continued in an atmosphere of tolerance and the recognition of the right of freedom of expression and that every spontaneous expression of the desire for peace be publicly approved and promoted. We call on the public and on our Government to discuss and decide on the following questions:

- a) Should we not renounce the production, selling and importing of war-oriented toys?
- b) Should we not replace military instruction in the schools with instruction about the question of peace?
- c) Should we not allow a social peace service for conscientious objectors instead of the current military conscription?
- d) Should we not renounce all public military demonstrations and instead use our state celebrations to demonstrate the desire of our people for peace?
- e) Should we not renounce all so-called defence exercises? Since there is no reasonable civil defence possible in a nuclear war, such exercises only serve to make nuclear war appear less dangerous. Is it not, perhaps, a form of psychological preparation for war?

5.

Make peace without weapons — that doesn't just mean creating security for our own survival. It also means making an end to the senseless waste of the labour and wealth of our people which goes into the production of weapons and the equipping of massive armies of young people who are thereby taken out of productive labour. Shouldn't we prefer to help the starving people in our world rather than continue to prepare our death? Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. (Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount.) The balance of terror has so far prevented a nuclear war only by postponing it to tomorrow. People live in fear of this approaching day of horror. They are looking for new ways to give peace a more secure foundation. The 'Berlin Appeal' is also an expression of this searching. Think about it, make proposals to our politicians and everywhere discuss the question: which way leads to peace, and which to war?

Demonstrate your agreement with the 'Berlin Appeal' by adding your signature.

Berlin

25 January 1982

Reiner Eppelmann, Pastor of the Samaritan community, Friedrichshain; Manfred Altmann, artisan; Axel Bayer, worker; Evelyn Bayer, worker; Eva-Maria Eppelmann, housewife; Volker Elste, student; Stefan Preyer, mechanic; Lorenz Göring, student; Katja Havemann, housewife; Robert Havemann, scientist; Eberhard Henke, manager; Ralf Hirsch, locksmith; Michael Heinisch, student; Christfried Heinke, student; Gerd Jäger, deacon; Daniela Karschewsky, clerk; Rosemarie Kessler, worker; Günter Kessler, worker; Olaf Kraensel, clerk; Detlef Kucharzewski, worker;

Regine Maywald, clerk; Johannes Maywald, clerk; Lothar Niederohe, worker; Rudi Pahnke, pastor; Jürgen Pagel, student; Lutz Rathenow, writer; Thomas Schulz, worker; Ralph Syrowatka, deacon; Friedhart Steinert, worker; Bernd Schulz, worker; Winfried Weu, mechanic; Andreea Weu, nurse; Günter Weu, religious instructor; Bernd Weu, engineer; Hans-Jochen Tschiche, pastor and director of the Evangelical Academy, Magdeburg.

## Charter 77 and Peace

We have recently been meeting with expressions of interest from various quarters about our attitude to the current peace movement in Western Europe, a movement which in its extent and in the determination of its opposition to nuclear weapons surpasses anything yet known in Europe. Our attitude follows from the very basis of our commitment to the cause of civil and human rights in our country.

It is our endeavour that the pacts which, as Law 120/76 SB., have become a part of our legal order, should be adhered to: namely, the International Pact on Political and Civil Rights and the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which in the opening paragraph declare, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recognition of the inalienability of human rights and of human dignity as the foundation for freedom, justice and peace in the world.

We demand that our ruling bodies should honour the undertaking which our Republic took upon itself by ratifying these Pacts and by signing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Final Act places respect for the basic human freedoms as formulated in the Universal Declaration and in both Pacts among the fundamental principles of policy for reducing tension, for peace and international cooperation. In agreement with these documents, which are important products of the policy of detente in Europe and the basis for its further development, we regard respect for human rights and freedoms as an integral part of detente policy, just as important as its military, economic and diplomatic components and interacting with them.

We have said repeatedly in letters and suggestions to our state authorities that we take seriously the words about the indivisibility of peace which have been so solemnly proclaimed now for decades on various occasions. The Helsinki document is quite unequivocal in including explicitly as an equal component within the framework of indivisibility respect for human rights, without which a policy for peace worthy of the name is unthinkable. The connection is mutual and works both ways. One can hardly believe in the sincerity of peace efforts where people are persecuted for demanding that the undertakings of detente policy

in the area of human rights and basic freedoms should be carried out. On the other hand, one cannot regard as defenders of these rights and freedoms those who are stepping up the arms race and bringing closer the danger of war, particularly in Europe, robbing it thereby of the hopeful prospect opened up by the Helsinki Final Act and threatening the continent with becoming a nuclear battlefield, the graveyard of the nations and of the civilisations from which sprang the concept of human rights in which the right to life is given pride of place.

One can hardly regard as true defenders of these rights, including the right to life and to freedom from the fear of war, those who accuse only their adversaries and political opponents of infringing them while tolerating such behaviour in themselves and their allies. We therefore welcome the fact that among those now lifting their voices in warning, and firmly demanding of their own governments in the first place that they follow policies in line with the Helsinki undertakings, are many of our friends who have not hesitated to show their solidarity with those of us whose attitude to the breaking of these commitments and willingness to contribute to their fulfilment have earned us persecution, harassment and even greater curtailment of our rights at the hands of our rulers. Our wish is that they continue to fight for peace in its indivisibility, which embraces not only various geographical areas but also various dimensions of human life. We do not have the same opportunity as they have to voice our joint belief in the indivisibility of peace and freedom as loudly as they can. We would like to tell them at least in this way that we are at one with all who are working to save our continent from destruction and to enable the nations, their governments and all people of good will to tread the road marked out by Helsinki 1975.

**Václav Malý, Charter 77 spokesperson**  
**Dr. Bedřich Placák, Charter 77 spokesperson**  
**Dr. Jirí Hájek, member of the Group of Charter 77 spokespersons**  
 Copies sent to: Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia, Presidium of the Government of Czechoslovakia, The Office of the President of Czechoslovakia, Czech Peace Council, Christian Peace Conference, Pacem in Terris.

# CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## Charter 77 Solidarity with Poland

*(Below we publish three responses from Czechoslovakia to the events in Poland. The documents were provided by the Palach Press Agency.)*

### 1.

Charter 77, the Czechoslovak human rights movement, joins the world progressive forces in expressing its support for the day of solidarity with the Polish people on 30 January 1982. We believe that the solution of the Polish crisis cannot be achieved through continuing repression but only through the full participation of all the representative sections of the Polish society including workers' *Solidarity* and the Catholic Church.

Signed by spokespersons: Ladislav Lis, Anna Marvanova and Radim Palous.  
 30 January 1982.

(These three spokespersons were elected on 7 Jan 1982 on the 5th anniversary of the foundation of movement.)

### 2.

Certain mass media have put out a report that Charter 77 supports the Polish authorities who are using force to try to bring about a solution of the Polish crisis. The Charter has never made any such statement. It has always insisted on the validity of international agreements on human rights and on the dialogue which is in the spirit of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. Any solution of social conflicts by means of military or political force is alien to all previous standpoints adopted by Charter 77. The annulment of personal liberties, internment of thousands of people without due process of law, the shedding of blood of fellow citizens, the invalidation of trade union rights of workers and other working people, the suspension of activities by trade union organizations recognized by Polish legal institutions — all these are steps which will solve nothing but to the contrary will exacerbate social and international tensions and represent a terrifying menace for the future. We would like to believe that it will be possible to arrive at a solution which will leave neither victors nor vanquished and which will make it possible to heal the deep wounds and continue the work of renewal.

### 3. Workers, students and citizens of Czechoslovakia

*(The distribution of the document which follows has led to charges of incitement against: Jan Wunsch, 25, worker, married with one child; Josef Wunsch, 20; Vaclav Soukup, 23, worker; Jitka Tumova, 23, office worker. All of these were still in custody as of 5 February. Another worker, Jiri Wolf, 30, who has already spent four years in jail, faces charges of subversion.)*

Raise your voices in defence of the Polish workers. Express your disagreement with the persecution of the progressive workers and intellectuals in the PPR. Understand that Poland is our business. If the attempt to revive democracy and workers' rights in Poland is crushed, all hope for the renewal of socialism throughout the Eastern block will be wiped out for many years.

Understand that what is happening in Poland is not a counter-revolution but a revolutionary attack by the proletariat on the bureaucratic system and exploitation. The Polish workers are fighting for a free life in a free state, as we did in 1968.

Do not allow our regime to get away with expressing support for the Polish junta in your name. Displays of support for the military dictator Jaruzelski which are made in your name must be shown up as lies. Let us distance ourselves from the proclamations of our self-proclaimed leaders. Express by every means at your disposal your support for the revolutionary endeavours of the Polish proletariat. Demand the lifting of martial law in Poland, and the release of workers' leaders democratically elected by the over-

whelming majority of Polish workers. Let it be understood that the attack on the Polish proletariat is a blow for the whole of the working class, above all for workers in the countries of 'actually existing socialism'. Every step in the crushing of the proletariat — a proletariat deprived of all civil rights and freedoms and denied any possibility of intervening in the running of the state — is a step towards the strengthening of the state capitalist system in the communist countries.

The communist grandees see every attempt at real revolutionary action by the proletariat as an attack on their own monopoly of power, which is inevitably threatened by the prospect of real working-class rule. The Polish revolution must not be suppressed with your silent agreement in order to protect privileges, profit and luxuries. If the Polish renewal process is crushed at its inception, you will also feel the consequences in, for example, the end of detente and the worsening of the international situation.

Solidarity with Solidarity!

Freedom for the trade union leaders and the others imprisoned in Poland!

Down with the Jaruzelski military dictatorship!

**Group for Revolutionary Action  
Prague**

15 December 1981


## Charter Defies Threat of Trial — By Mark Jackson

While the attention of the West has been focussed on the huge upheavals in Poland, the Czechoslovak Party leadership has moved on to a new stage in its attempts to silence the small groups of critics of its policies associated with the Charter 77 human rights initiative.

In May 1981 a number of arrests were made of various signatories of the Charter 77 human rights appeal in connection with the affair of a French van which was allegedly taking 'anti-state' materials to Prague.

According to the *Palach Press* news agency: 'In December this group was, to our surprise, designated as the "group of Jiri Ruml and co.". Those involuntarily included in this group are the former journalist Karel Kyncl, the writer dr. Milan Simecka, the historian dr. Jan Mlynarik, then Jan Ruml, who was a member of VONS along with his father Jiri, as well as dr. Jiri Siklova and the authoress Eva Kanturkova. At the end of January these seven defenders of human rights were charged under Art. 98 of the criminal code, and were held in custody for a further two months until 25 March. As has happened so often in the past, they have been accused of subverting the Republic because as journalists and authors they wrote books, essays and sketches in which they accurately presented the situation in present-day Czechoslovakia and self-sacrificingly gave help to fellow citizens who were persecuted and imprisoned for their beliefs.'

The length of time that the seven have been held without being brought to trial may reflect a desire by the regime to hold them hostage in order to inhibit the activities of its



Charter 77 spokesperson, Ladislav Lis

critics at a time when the economic problems of Czechoslovakia are mounting, and living standards are under attack. While there is not likely to be any direct repetition of the 'Polish example' in Czechoslovakia — especially now that *Solidarity* has been driven underground — the ever more evident need to seek new economic policies may well lead to tensions inside the Party leadership, a leadership that does not feel able to allow any open discussion of problems. The result can only be a high level of official paranoia, with Poles and 'dissidents' being used as scapegoats for the failures of the system.

It is this contradiction which gives the Charter movement an unquenchable vitality. New spokespeople have been elected and new discussion material — above all a long document on ecological problems — has been issued.

A Charter statement issued on 7 January 1982 pointed out that 'those who are really serious in calling for struggle against bad management, indifference and irresponsibility on the part of the leaders, as well as against apathy among the led ... must grasp sooner or later that the appeals can only be effective when they are accompanied by firm guarantees that the rights, views and dignity of those appealed to will be respected.' Thus, 'Charter 77 lives on — because our society still needs it because the problems pointed to at its initiation are not yet solved and the attempts to destroy it merely underline the need for its existence.'

The document is signed by the new spokespeople, dr. Radim Palous, 56, a chemist and Catholic philosopher; Anna Marvanova, aged 52, an ex-Communist Party member who resigned in 1969, and Ladislav Lis, 54, who joined the CP during the war, but who came into conflict with the Party leadership and worked as a building worker until 1968 when he became a Party official under Alexander Dubcek. The following year he was removed from his post and expelled from the Party.

## Czechoslovakia and Solidarnosc — by Jaroslav Suk

*(A crucial source of strength for the Polish authorities in the face of Solidarity has been the absence of similar movements in other Soviet bloc states. Here Jaroslav Suk, who was jailed in 1970 for participation in the leftist 'Revolutionary Socialist Party' and who in 1977 signed the Charter 77 appeal, analyses the reasons behind the passivity of the Czechoslovak workers. Suk left Czechoslovakia last year. The document is taken from the journal Informacni materialy No. 39-40, published in West Berlin. Translation is by Mark Jackson.)*

The huge social movement in Poland, the tremendous victory of the workers and the democratic gains accompanying that victory could not fail to strike a chord in neighbouring countries with a similar social system. I have myself been present when workers in Prague factories have listened to foreign broadcasts at the crucial moments of the new Polish experience. And I have witnessed not only discussions among workers, but also a definite awakening of activity in official union assemblies. Whereas it used to be considered the accepted thing not to waste other people's time by initiating discussion, now people have started to refer to collective agreements, even if only to details and with no overall framework. Signs have been put up on walls, anonymous letters concerning Poland have been sent to newspapers and journals, and lively discussions have taken place among trusted friends. Nobody believes the official propaganda, and some 40 per cent of the population listen to the western radios (according to a Charter 77 source of January 1981). Furthermore, Czechoslovakia's longest border is with Poland, and with a little effort Czechs and Slovaks are able to understand the Polish media.

The bureaucracy does what it can, suppressing accurate information and spreading lies. It also cracks down on any expression of solidarity with the democratization movement in Poland, and on any attempt to actively follow the Polish example. The picture presented by the bureaucracy's propaganda is one of lazy Poles with an economy in a state of collapse. Poland, it is suggested, is in a state of chaos and anarchy, and behind everything looms the 'counter-revolution'. The Czechoslovak state, and its inhabitants, may therefore be obliged to give economic aid to Poland, to the detriment of living standards within the country. There is a grain of truth in every lie, and among the most unenlightened sections of the population one may hear such jokes as: 'The Polish coat of arms is a kangaroo; it has an empty pocket and jumps around a lot.'

Nevertheless, behind its wall of verbal aggression and slander, the Czechoslovak bureaucracy shows signs of fear at the Polish events. Thus, it has launched a savage wave of repression, including imprisonment, harassment and forced exile, against the numerically insignificant Charter 77 movement. At the same time, *Rude Pravo* writes of 'the need to pay attention to the voice of the workers'. Unfortunately, the situation does not quite warrant their fear that the Polish events will have a direct and open expression in Czechoslovakia.

There are a number of reasons for the relatively small impact which the Polish events have had in Czechoslovakia. The late seventies and especially the early eighties began to show some results of the policy adopted in the early seventies: that is, the policy of transferring investment resources to satisfy consumer demand, and of abandoning major traditional production goals in order to please the Soviet Party and to win some backing for the consolidation of the Husak regime. This regime reintroduced censorship, formally accepted the occupation of our country by the Soviet army, conducted a huge series of purges, suppressed culture and nearly half the intelligentsia, strengthened the police and held a number of political trials. The only positive thing it had to offer was an improvement in popular living standards.

Soviet loans and a few good harvests prolonged Husak's economic mini-miracle for a while. And at the price of many sacrifices, Czechoslovak citizens to some extent accepted the 'consumer society'. If they looked no further than their most elementary needs — eating well, owning a car, having a well-furnished flat or even a nice house — they could count on being left

in peace by the state. The citizen has pretended to be loyal, and in return the bureaucracy has pretended to be working for socialism and the well-being of the citizen. In true Orwellian double-speak, this very passivity is described as political involvement. Citizens allow someone else to speak in their name, to say the opposite of what they really think, to make their decisions for them, and to trample on all their interests apart from their wage. The citizen pretends that everything is all right, and more than this is not required. Pay goes up, somewhat faster than prices, and people are not so badly off.

Charter 77 document no. 26, issued in 1979, gave details of the situation of the Czechoslovak consumer. As a co-author of that text, I will allow myself to use what in my view are its most important findings. The Czechoslovak consumer pays for his or her wage not only in political passivity but also in the obligation to function in an inefficient economic system which wastes his time both at work and outside. The intensity of work is very low in most places, so that a parallel, more intensive labour market has grown up especially in the service sector. Even at the best of times, there have been significant gaps in the range of consumer goods available, and it has not been possible to meet all one's needs without recourse to special contacts, bribery and hoarding. Since one wage is not enough for a family, both adults usually work, often having more than one job each. The life of the Czechoslovak citizen is full of pressure and insecurity, while in the shadows of private life, where atomized individuals or family units are compressed into the smallest possible social space, one can find lurking a whole range of horrors: emptiness, hate, envy, violence caused by trivialities, and a basic lack of fulfilment.

There is no mystery in the repugnance which people feel for the idea of political involvement. For in 1968, and to a large extent in 1969 as well, the population placed all their hopes in the liberal Communist Party leadership, which then shattered these hopes by their failure to trust the masses and their constant retreats in the face of the bigger Kremlin and Pankow bureaucrats. The bulk of the population is filled with scepticism, fear, passivity and often cynicism.

In Poland, public opinion has been moving away from a naive faith in 'good rulers', and mass activity has been on the increase. In Czechoslovakia, however the curve of social awareness and activity has been turning sharply downward since the early seventies. The Polish economy disintegrated, whereas the Czechoslovak economy found a definite, if temporary, stability. In Poland, the power of the police has been clipped and many opposition groups are able to work in the open, publishing a huge quantity of leaflets and journals; teachers employed in the (state) university have given lectures at the (unofficial) 'flying university'; and certain oppositional writers are actually published by the official press. In Czechoslovakia, by contrast, the slightest independent activity or even any sign of independent thinking is brutally crushed in the egg. Although Charter 77 expresses the aspirations of the vast majority of the population, it cannot find any active support among a passive and intimidated population which fears that it will lose its tenuous and relative prosperity. Whereas the Polish working class has learnt the need for solidarity and become united in the course of struggle, the Czechoslovak workers remain shrouded in the darkness of everyday life and the scramble for necessary and unnecessary goods, venting its dissatisfaction in aimless petty quarrels within groups of workmates and acquaintances.

The upward movement of the Czechoslovak economy, however, is both transitory and relative. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, price rises have been employed as an economic instrument with which to combat the inevitable disproportions and difficulties arising from an inflexible, undemocratic and incompetently administered economy. The bureaucrats in charge of Czechoslovakia have fought tooth and nail to maintain the system of strict centralization by which all economic life (leaving out the black market) is subject to administrative direction and the rule of unwieldy indicators. The attempt to control everything from the centre inhibits the natural development of the economy, as well as militating against normal scientific research and technological in-

novation. It is thus potentially suicidal for the bureaucracy itself. The bureaucracy has no alternative, however, since decentralization and the loosening of control over lower levels of the system would result in increased activity by middle and lower bureaucrats, and perhaps even by those who are today entirely powerless in economic decision-making and hence inevitably also in the field of politics. The groups of desperate bureaucrats left over from the '70s are now beginning to display their backsides. The Czechoslovak economy is not capable of competing on the world market. A country which has always earned most of its income through the export of finished goods is now importing a disproportionate quantity of machines and appliances and exporting raw materials. Each kilo of machinery exported by the USA earns 12.36 dollars, by Japan 5.16 dollars, and by the West European countries 4.42 dollars, while the figure for Czechoslovakia is 1.84 dollars (*Listy* 2/81). The pace of work is low and the quality is poor, owing to lack of motivation felt by the workers. Czechoslovakia is tied firmly into Comecon, above all to the USSR on which it is dependent for many basic goods. Thus, at a time when the cut-back in industrial investment is pushing Czechoslovakia further behind the developed countries, Soviet advisers have forced the construction of a huge power-station to supply the whole of Comecon. This dangerous monstrosity is not the only example of money poured down the drain. The bureaucrats owe money to Western capitalists, and the debt is growing. The devastation of nature and the environment has reached a point where, although official propaganda remains silent, there is now a real trend in public opinion concerned to protect the environment. This is no trifling matter: babies cannot drink tap-water in Prague owing to the quantity of potentially poisonous nitrogen in it (originating from fertilisers); many once-forested hills are now covered by dead wood; many streams and rivers are dangerously polluted, and so on.

The situation has not reached the point, however, when it will stimulate action among a population currently sunk in passivity that is both systematically inculcated and enforced by repression. The fact that it is difficult or impossible to obtain a particular consumer item is not enough to move people to decisive political action or to create a broad political movement. The people of Czechoslovakia are used to an alienated existence and spiritual emptiness. This is compounded by the privatization of working class life, and by divisions which remove the capacity to act effectively, so that its only form of "action" is a total lack of interest in working quickly or well. It is even questionable to talk about the existence of a working class when its supposed members have no socialist perspective and are unable to see any way out of their oppressed condition. (What it knows of so-called "socialism" has discouraged it from all hopes for a better socialist future.) It has been completely disillusioned by the failures and betrayal of those in whom it placed its trust. The workers are atomized and manipulated. The only thing which might stir the masses is a further worsening of the economic situation — a virtual certainty — to the point where an actual economic crisis compounds the more general social crisis evident for many years. After all, the Polish August showed that miracles can happen even in Eastern Europe.

We should mention here that the Polish example has added a new element to the thinking of the Czechoslovak opposition, which will have an impact in the event of a new social movement: namely, the use of strikes as an instrument of struggle against the bureaucracy. When the founding declaration of Charter 77 was being drafted, and when the text was circulating among various political currents, the socialist groups had to wage a fight for the inclusion of the right to strike. Now, however, the key role of the working class in the anti-bureaucratic struggle is much more clearly understood. There has also been a change in views about the forms of struggle employed in 1968, when self-management organs sprung up in hundreds of enterprises as the potential embryo of a new model of socialism.

The whole idea of creating independent trade unions was put down as superficial minimalism. Now, however, we have seen that this road has a number of things in its favour; above all it runs with the grain of the workers' interests, without being inhibited by those of the managers. It offers the possibility of raising demands which could not be expressed in a situation where the workers found themselves involved in "co-management" within the ex-

isting state structure. It has also been shown that this road does not lead to abandonment of the self-management perspective, but rather offers it new perspectives. Although self-management may have been virtually eradicated from the minds of the Czechoslovak working class, the idea of free trade unions has firmly established itself.

With hindsight, it is possible to see Charter 77 as a very positive factor in political development which contributed to the definition and elaboration of various political currents, and to the clarification of the key strategic and tactical axes of all the democratic groups. This association of the defenders of civil and human rights should properly be considered as one of the factors contributing to a future social movement, rather than as something which could actually initiate such a movement. Whatever may come of Charter 77 — and given that the police is currently trying to wipe it out, there is much to fear on this score — its effect on social life in our country cannot be wiped out. Its moral appeal for life to be lived "in truth" perfectly and movingly expressed the outlook of a small group of determined people in the midst of a sea of lies and apathy.

Any Czechoslovak counterpart to the Polish events of 1980 would certainly have many distinctive aspects, in particular a less unified and less politically experienced working class. But we should start today to formulate and discuss out the demands that it will have to fight for. I would suggest the following demands.

1. Establishment and recognition of free trade unions under exclusive control of the workers, their aim being to protect the workers against the bosses.
2. Recognition of the workers' right to set up self-managing institutions in the factories and enterprises, which will have decisive control over the life of the self-managing units and co-ordinate their activities at the level of society as a whole.
3. Abolition of the privileges of all bureaucrats, from the highest to the lowest: their wage should be no more than the average for workers, and all special privileges, such as special health care, should be ended. Abolition of Tuzex (hard-currency) shops, and the release of goods in such shops to the regular market.
4. Abolition of censorship and of the institutions for press and media. Free discussion through the press and other media is one of the most effective medicines for restoring the health of our social life. All political and other institutions must be open to public scrutiny. All economic information, from the highest economic institutions right down to the basic units of production, should be made public.
5. The establishment of a just legal system to protect socially conscious citizens and punish criminals. The Constitution of the CSSR, and the international agreements codified by law 120 of 1976, are not upheld and are often directly transgressed by the existing legal institutions. Many laws are supplemented and modified by secret ministerial instructions, which frequently affect or even directly contradict the law in question. The police, and above all the state security and other secret police and military institutions, abuse the lack of clarity in certain laws in order to criminalize strikes, to persecute politically conscious citizens, and to restrict the rights of believers, the right to free travel, and so on.
6. For full use of the work period, and a shortening of the working week.
7. Abolition of the political criteria for enrolment in middle and higher education. All citizens, irrespective of age or occupation, should have the right to study what they wish. There should be a system of study-grants for workers. Pluralism in education must be introduced, and the politicization and militarization of schools brought to an end.
8. Wages should rise so as to keep pace with inflation. Pensions must be increased and indexed in the same way as wages.
9. A list should be compiled of all state and economic institutions, along with the numbers of those employed in them. The number and staffing of such institutions should be radically reduced, and the extra personnel transferred to more socially useful work.
10. Equal wages of men and women. The socialization of transport — with priority for free or very cheap public transport and of other services. The network of services and retail outlets must be increased, and services should be either free or very cheap.

11. Release of all political prisoners, that is to say, of all people punished for expressing their opinions or for activity connected with their beliefs, excluding acts of terrorism. Abolition of all legal regulations concerning such matters. The state must take account of the activities of groups of socially conscious citizens, who can help to stimulate social discussion and join with the trade unions in defending human, civil, economic, social and cultural rights.
12. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

These demands are designed with the first phase of a social movement in mind, and therefore do not take up a series of basic points which could be productively raised in the kind of situation we are envisaging. The demands formulated here, however, will help towards the solution of deeper problems, and in some cases contain solutions implicitly. Most particularly, we are thinking of the fact that the CPC is the backbone of the whole bureaucracy, and that its leadership is virtually identical with the centre of that bureaucracy. Our programme does not directly attack this centre, but the fulfilment of the demands in the programme would reduce the bureaucracy to a powerless and evidently irrelevant appendage of a new system. Another question is that of military organizations such as the so-called People's Militia, which is the armed wing of the CPCz, operating in many factories and often disposing of its own supplies of arms. However, that question will have to be reached in the actual struggle between the workers and the bureaucracy, so that any attempt to raise demands 'calling for' the abolition of the People's Militia, etc., is meaningless. The People's Militia will either disband itself or use its forces for purposes opposite to those for which it was constructed. The third possibility — the use of Militia members and units against their fellow-workers — is hardly likely to occur, at least in most factories and enterprises. So, any demand for the abolition of the Militia would only refer to a minority within it. The formulation of such a

demand, particularly in present circumstances, can have no great significance. I have also omitted to discuss the question of other armed groups; that is, the army and the military security controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. The Polish experience has shown that every armed power is ineffective against a mass workers' movement, although 1970 should remind us that solidarity, clarity of purpose, determination and tactical sense are things that have to be learnt. But there is no point in spreading the illusion that everything can be solved easily or at once.

The above demands are based on the situation as it exists today in Czechoslovakia, which is totally undeveloped. It is quite possible that the social aspects of the programme will be given greater emphasis than the others, and that it will be necessary to give greater weight to the demand for the right to strike etc. Such problems I leave in the hands of the prophets.

The international situation will be of great significance for the future social movement. It is a source of encouragement that we live next door to liberalizing Hungary and democratizing Poland, even if the only help we get from Hungary is non-interference and even if the Polish workers have yet to express their solidarity with their partners in Czechoslovakia. (We must bear in mind that they have a lot of domestic problems to deal with.) It is sometimes suggested that the very isolation of the Poles is a source of strength. My view is quite the opposite: above all from the long-term perspective of maintaining hegemony in the struggle with the bureaucracy, it is necessary for the Poles to support every potential anti-bureaucratic ally, and for us to keep informed about the experiences of the Polish struggle. We must work towards international co-operation in the struggle against the bureaucracy, which itself operates at an international level.

Uppsala 30 June 1981.

## Chartists Back Irish Hunger Strike

*(Last spring the Guardian reported Lech Walesa's public statement of admiration for the courage of Bobby Sands and of shock at his death on hunger strike at the Maze prison in Northern Ireland. (No other British papers, so far as we know, mentioned the item.) The following similar support for the demands of the IRA prisoners, this time from supporters of Charter 77, was totally ignored by the press here. The saying that news equal facts that someone somewhere would prefer suppressed is only too true.)*

### Czech political prisoners write to Margaret Thatcher about Northern Ireland.


Following reports of the dramatic hunger strikes in Long Kesh and the deaths of several hunger strikers we are seriously disturbed by further developments in the situation in Northern Ireland. Although we reject some of the forms of the IRA struggle and principally disagree with any violent solutions of social, minority or religious problems, we believe that the activities of the IRA are politically motivated and cannot be identified with criminal activities. We therefore believe that members of the IRA who are imprisoned in Long Kesh and other Ulster prisons have a right to the status of political prisoners.

We protest against the uncompromising attitude of the London government which in its consequences means only further violence and we would like to appeal for a considered and non-violent solution by both sides of the crisis in Northern Ireland.

**Tomas Petrivy**  
**Karel Soukup**

Both authors were released on 1st May 1981 after being imprisoned for alleged criminal activities which were not proved. They are signatories of Charter 77 and systematically persecuted for their political views.

The following Charter 77 signatories decided to add their signature to this letter: **Petr Cibulka**, **Milan Hlavsa**, both former political prisoners, **Ladislav Pilva**, **Kveta Princova**.



Karel Soukup

# YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND

## Yugoslav Reaction to Polish Coup — By Michele Lee

The Yugoslav Government has condemned the introduction of martial law but in measured terms, emphasizing the need for the Polish people to sort this problem out by themselves. Yet it has allowed very critical comments to appear in the press and television, so much so that the Polish Embassy found it necessary to protest. (*The Times*, 18 December 1981) Here are a few:

Belgrade *Politika*: 'What the Polish people want is national independence, free choice of their own road and defence of authentic progress.'

*Borba*, the paper of the Socialist Alliance: 'The fundamental struggle is between the democratic forces in the working class and in the workers' vanguard against bureaucratism and a dogmatically imposed model, but not against socialism as such. Of course, the struggle against counter-revolution, which in the general disturbance did raise its head, is self-understood, but it is difficult to believe that it was anything but secondary.'

The Yugoslav trade unions have expressed their deep concern for the working class in Poland after the introduction of the state of war.

*Student*, paper of Belgrade university students: 'The PUWP has admitted its impotence by in-

roducing the martial law. The Party was unprepared for the problems, and perhaps did not really want to tackle them. The Polish working class has raised these problems in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980. The only time the Party appeared willing to change its ideas about the way forward for socialist construction was in August of last year. Those who visited Poland in that year saw for themselves that the Polish people forgot to be frightened, that they were pressing for a qualitative change.' Punning on the word 'real socialism': 'The Polish real utopia is in fact the world real utopia. Can committees dispense with people?'

*Start*, Zagreb bi-weekly:

'It is irrefutable that *Solidarity* had emerged as the authentic representative of the Polish working class, that the working class trusted it and that a vast majority of it identified with it and its struggle. All those who summarily condemn *Solidarity* as anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary, argue at the same time also that the Polish working class itself (that is, its 80%) is anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary ... It is clear that the Polish working class, after so many attempts and disappointments, had become distrustful and demanded firm guarantees but it was also ready for

dialogue and agreement. Those who were not ready for it, who clung with desperation and dishonesty to their monopoly and privileges, were the domestic and foreign conservatives. They are guilty for the fact that the struggle of the Polish working class and the great majority of the Polish people for better, more democratic and more human socialism, has once again been confronted with such difficult problems ...'

*NIN*, the Belgrade weekly: 'Not even the military government of the day disputes the fact that the main resistance to its act of 13 December came precisely from the working class. Therefore an essential question for understanding the Polish drama remains: can workers be counter-revolutionary? Can they struggle against their own essential class interest? The question of the socialist model, which so many times and with such measures of force and violence had to be defended from the workers, has to be posed once again. There is only one answer to this question, in our opinion. If the action of the Polish army had as its aim the maintenance at all costs of this model in its old form then, in the long run, its chances of success are negligible. To think otherwise is to go against the fundamental messages of history and of the Marxist way of looking at the world.'

## Yugoslav Intellectuals Oppose Coup

*(Around 400 Yugoslav intellectuals have signed a number of petitions condemning General Jaruzelski's introduction of martial law. One such petition was read out at a meeting called at the Belgrade Student Centre a few days after Jaruzelski's move and around 150 people put their names to it after the meeting. A demonstration was called for a few days later in front of the Polish Embassy but the Secretariat of the Interior refused to give the necessary permission. When, in spite of this, a couple of dozen people still turned up, fifty policemen were waiting for them; a number of people were subsequently questioned by the police. Below is the text of three such petitions circulating throughout Belgrade last December, showing many similarities but also significant differences in language and emphasis. Among those who signed the third petition were Milovan Djilas, Srdja Popovic, the Belgrade lawyer who often defends political dissidents and Dobrica Cosic, the well-known Serbian novelist. Nebojsa Popov and Ljubomir Tadic, two ex-professors of the Belgrade University, who were fired from their posts after the government moved against Praxis signed the second petition. Translated by Michele Lee.)*

### 1. To General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Warsaw

Expressing full solidarity with the trade union *Solidarity*, which at this moment represents the Polish people, we strongly protest against the introduction of military rule in Poland under your command and demand an immediate end to it in the interest of peace and democratic Polish renewal. All political prisoners should be immediately released.

### 2. To General Wojciech Jaruzelski, President of the Military Council of National Salvation, President of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP.

It has fallen to you to enrich the unglorious arsenal of bureaucratic

counter-revolution by bringing to it the experience of military rule. The efforts you are investing in covering up for your acts before European and world public opinion speaks volumes of its nature. Your attack on the Polish people confirms once again that in its fear and hatred of authentic movement of workers, intellectuals and youth, of freedom and democracy, the usurping bureaucracy does not lag behind the most militant bourgeois reaction. Leonid Brezhnev could have hardly hoped for a better birthday present.

We strongly condemn your brutal attack on the democratic achievements of the Polish people and demand an immediate end to the state of emergency, the freeing of all those arrested and the recognition of all the democratic rights which have been won since August 1980.

### 3. To Poland, the Polish people, independent trade union *Solidarity* and all the political and democratic currents.

On 13 December 1981 a cruel military regime has been imposed by means of an unwarranted declaration of martial law. Such a drastic and fraudulent misuse of an army against its people, its historic and living strivings, is unprecedented. With it the democratic movement and national dialogue in Poland has been ended. This act, in addition, has disturbed international relations and endangered peace in Europe and in the world as a whole.

We greet the suffering and heroic people of Poland and its struggle for democracy and independence and join with others who have been shaken and disturbed by the Polish tragedy with this demand: for an urgent and immediate ending of the state of war, for the freeing of all arrested Polish patriots and democrats, for an end to all foreign interference in Polish affairs, for an urgent resumption of dialogue and negotiations with the patriotic and democratic forces in Poland, for resumption of the work of independent trade union *Solidarity*.

## Two Protests Against Official Harassment of Petitioners

### To the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia

Between 18 December and 7 January eighteen people in Belgrade, mainly students, were taken to the police station — some were even kept in prison for a several days — on the grounds that 'suspicion exists that the person named has in his possession a petition addressed to V. Jaruzelski as well as signatures of a number of citizens on the same /petition/'. The police often issued in addition a written document to this effect. A number of people were warned both informally and officially that 'the state and the government of Yugoslavia has made its position on the events in Poland quite clear and no further action of the citizens in this connection will be tolerated'.

We ask:

— Is it forbidden in the S.R. of Serbia to express one's thoughts and if so, by whom and from when?

— Who, and by what right, selects among hundreds of those who have signed letters and petitions to Jaruzelski and the trade union *Solidarity* those against whom the repression will be applied?

— Is this done to frighten citizens and discourage them from politically stating their positions, or to inform some interested party that the position of the Yugoslav government itself is different from a significant number of its citizens?

We demand that the guilty be found, publicly named and punished for infringing human, self-managing and political rights of the citizens.

We demand that the Assembly takes measures to prevent such occurrences from happening again.

Signed by 35 people

Belgrade, January 1982

**To the Committee for Supervision of Work of Organs of Internal Affairs of S.R. of Serbia. To the Council of Federal Assembly for Supervision of Work of Organs of the Law**

We urge you to critically examine the work of organs of Internal Affairs and the organs of Law because the constitutional rights of citizens who have recently been expressing their attitude to the current events in Poland have been denied. Using the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, these citizens were speaking in public, signing petitions of protest to General Jaruzelski and of support to the Polish people, as well as showing their concern in other ways.

The organs of Internal Affairs, brutally denying the right to the freedom of thought and expression, overstepping their powers, exerted pressure on a number of participants in these protests. Thirteen people were threatened and maltreated in this way. Four flats were searched because of 'founded suspicion that they contained a text of petition to Gen. Jaruzelski with signatures of persons (citizens) from the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia'. Three were arrested and kept in confinement because of 'well founded suspicion that they had committed an act of defamation of dignity of a foreign head of state, that is, of dignity of a foreign state'. Two comrades were released after two days while one,

Zastavnikovic Veselinka, a student at the Faculty of Political Science, had her charge changed to 'offence according to Para. 24 of the Law of Citizens' movement and habitation'. She spent ten days in prison out of the fifteen she was condemned to after her appeal.

We protest against these actions and expect:

1. That those who had overstepped their competence and by this endangered the exercise of elementary rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this country should be made to account for it;
2. That the confiscated texts of petitions and signatures should be returned to their owners;
3. That measures are taken which will prevent the repetition of similar behaviour from the organs of Internal Affairs in the future.

Only the guarantee of freedom to each is a guarantee of freedom all. Any exception only endangers this principle. Since we are convinced that socialism can only exist in a free society, please allow and make possible for us to retain this conviction.

Signed by 51 people.

Belgrade, January 1982

## YUGOSLAVIA'S ALBANIAN CRISIS

### Wrong Turn in Kosovo — by Michele Lee

*(We print below a general assessment of the events which took place last spring in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. As we go to press, news has just reached us of a thousand-strong demonstration in the capital, Pristina, to mark the first anniversary of the initial disorders on 11 March 1981. On the eve of the anniversary, the police had arrested several students in the town of Vitina, closed a number of schools and shops in the capital and severed its telephone links with the rest of Kosovo, thereby testifying to the continued unrest among the ethnically Albanian population.)*

*Already on 3 February 1982, the provincial secretary for internal affairs, Mehmet Maliqi, had referred to various 'complications of the security situation' and to a number of indications that 'hostile activity' was on the increase. He further claimed that the police had uncovered no fewer than 33 'illegal groups', describing as 'massive' the Marxist-Leninist Group of Kosovo and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia. The character of the official propaganda offensive in recent months also seems to suggest that Albanian nationalism, often tinged with the distinctive ideology of the Tirana regime, continues to have considerable resonance in the social and economic conditions of the province.)*


Six months have gone by since a wave of mass demonstrations shook towns and villages throughout the Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) of Kosovo, demanding republican status for the province. Kosovo is one of the eight federal units of Yugoslavia, which is made up of six republics and two provinces.

SAP Kosovo, which occupies some 4% of Yugoslavia's territory and contains around 8% of its population, is overwhelmingly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Though the Army moved with tanks early last April, and

the Province has been *de facto* under a state of emergency ever since, the situation remains in the official language 'complex'. Security is now in the hands of special detachments of the Yugoslav paramilitary police: one wing is organized at the federal level while the other, the all-Yugoslav Security Forces, is organized by the republics and the provinces. The latter, armed with modern riot control equipment, in uniforms clearly differentiating different republics and provinces, has never been used before. The men patrol the towns and the countryside mainly after nightfall. Together with the local police, they also guard roadblocks which have been set up on all roads into the province: nobody is allowed in unless on clearly specified and approved business. The initial intervention of the police and the army claimed officially twelve dead and over one hundred and fifty wounded, but the real total is no doubt larger (although probably not as high as the hundreds and even thousands claimed by the emigre press).

Two months of open confrontation gradually gave way to a passive but nevertheless tangible resistance, which still flares up, in occasional — though by now rare — demonstrations, but most often takes other forms: the painting of slogans on public buildings (some twenty feet long and almost invariably demanding republican status for Kosovo); the distribution of leaflets; and, more serious, industrial sabotage and the destruction of agricultural fixed assets (the burning of forests, the felling of fruit groves, etc.).

Most worrying to the authorities is the industrial sabotage; because of its high degree of concentration, Kosovo's industry is particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. Consequently, the Province's Territorial Army, locally recruited and commanded by an Albanian, Major-General Fadil Quaranolli, guard all factory gates and



Tanks in the street of Pristina, April 1981.

each new shift is accompanied by a small unit — the T.A. members often working their machines in full uniform, arms handy.

The policy of repression for which the authorities have opted has been exceedingly harsh: quite apart from the initial dead and wounded, one hundred and forty people have so far been formally tried and sentenced to prison for a disturbing total of nine hundred and ninety-nine years. Many others have been dealt with summarily by magistrates' court, which can imprison for up to ninety days; these minor sentences go largely unreported. Direct reporting of the trials has not been permitted, with the state press agency Tanjug (accused at one point by the provincial government of being biased) supplying all material to the daily papers. The harshness of the sentences, particularly where young people are concerned — and indeed the whole analysis and interpretation of the Kosovo events — has upset and divided Yugoslav public opinion.



(photo: NIN)

**Demonstration in Pristina in Kosovo, April 1981.**

Sentences of from ten to fifteen years have been quite common for those accused of belonging to some irredentist organization or for committing some act of violence (though it is worth noting that nobody has as yet been accused of killing or wounding a member of the police or the army, or indeed anybody else). Two-thirds of those sentenced have been students, high-school pupils, teachers, less often workers and peasants (again, mainly young, though a few in their forties and fifties) who organized or participated in demonstrations. Few of the slogans heard on these occasions had either an anti-Serb or secessionist character; most merely demanded republican status within Yugoslavia for Kosovo.

All those brought to court were treated with exceptional severity. Thus on 21 May at Skopje, capital of Macedonia, five people were given gaol sentences ranging from seven to thirteen years for forming an illegal organization, the National Party of Labour, whose aim was the unification of Albanian-inhabited areas of Yugoslavia with Albania. Of the five, three were workers, one was a teacher, and one a private builder. All but one were in their mid-thirties.

On 3 August, a group of eleven was tried in Pristina, the provincial capital. They were charged with organizing demonstrations in a number of local villages, erecting a

roadblock and disarming a police-car. After a day of weapon-training in the woods, they gave themselves up. They were gaoled for between one and thirteen years. Of the eleven, five were peasants, two high-school pupils, two workers and two unemployed.

On 8 August, ten students and high-school pupils were sentenced to between four and eight years in prison for organizing demonstrations and shouting 'We want a republic! Long live the Socialist Republic of Kosovo!'. One of them, an eighteen year old from a village in the district of Lipljane (the scene of a considerable ferment among secondary-school — and even primary-school — children), was charged, in addition, with writing these slogans on the blackboard in his classroom and throwing stones at a police car. He received a five-year sentence.

On 31 August, three youths were gaoled for two, four and six years for painting up the slogans: 'Arise, brother Albanians!' 'Down with Yugoslav revisionism!' and 'Long live the Republic of Kosovo!' on eight houses and an electric substation. This is the picture which, with individual variations, has been repeated throughout the summer months in the courthouses across the Province.

Those identified as having been involved in any way with the events of last spring have in most instances been dismissed from their schools, colleges and workplaces. Since in Kosovo (which in any case has a low proportion of its population in employment) wage earners often support large families, the sentences and the dismissals have often caused enormous hardship. What is more, any help to families left unsupported is rigorously discouraged. The authorities, in desperation, have recently announced a measure (of doubtful legality) which will make parents responsible for their children's behaviour, and the first charges of this kind have been placed with the public prosecutor.

All in all, the Yugoslav state has decided on a policy of exemplary punishment, despite the fact that it is clearly understood (and indeed often publicly repeated) that the events demand a political response, including a good deal of self-criticism by the political leadership at all levels. In the words of Mehmed Maliqi, an old partisan, until recently president of the region's War Veterans' Association and now the new police chief: 'We must above all win the battle for our children.' More recently, Mitja Ribicic, president of the Slovenian branch of the Socialist Alliance, declared himself against a 'legalist-administrative approach' which condemns to long-term imprison-

ment eighteen-year-old youths instead of 'influencing them by different methods, above all of an educational kind'.

In the meantime, the wounds which the oppression has opened in the Albanian community will take years to heal; a chasm of suspicion and hostility has opened up between the Slav (mainly Serb) and Albanian population in the area. Since the demonstrations first took place, more than four thousand people of Serb origin have left or applied to leave the Province. The Albanian population, on the other hand, has been exposed to hostility from much of the press printed in Belgrade in a manner which bears all the marks of traditional Serb anti-Albanian chauvinism.

The thinking behind the policy of heavy repression is, no doubt, that the crushing of any actual or potential opposition for a decade or so will buy the time in which to tackle some of the more acute socio-economic problems of the Province. This policy, however, represents an irresponsible flight from reality: far from being a temporary solution aimed at stabilization, it is sowing the seeds for an even greater future threat to the internal cohesion and stability of Yugoslavia.

Alongside the judicial reprisals, around six hundred people have been expelled from the Party and this process of 'political differentiation' is still continuing. Mahmut Bakalli, the head of the provincial party; Dusan Ristic, president of the Assembly; Mustafa Sefendi, secretary of the interior; Imer Jaku, secretary for culture and education; Gazmend Zaymi, rector of the University; Shaban Hyseni, head of Kosovo television; Ali Hadri, director of the Albanian Institute and a noted historian, have all been replaced. It is interesting that most of the above-mentioned have not been expelled from the party, and this lenient treatment contrasts vividly with the long sentences handed out to the youth. Although the number of those so far affected by the purge is far below the figure reached in Croatia and Serbia in 1971-2 (particularly in Croatia following the days of 'national euphoria'), this may be just a matter of time. However, as even a superficial examination of the events would show, the central slogan raised in the demonstrations, a Republic for Kosovo, enjoys widespread support not only in the population at large but also among the cadres of both Party and state, particularly at the base: there has been a general closing of Albanian ranks in the face of the federal government's iron-handed policy.

The demand of the Albanians in Yugoslavia for their own republic has roots in the awakening of a sense of intense national pride which until not long ago was denied to them, though tolerated in other Yugoslav nationalities. The spring explosion is in many ways a product of this delayed summation of national equality and rights. Their size and ethnic compactness (occupying a strip in the southwest which goes from coastal Montenegro halfway down Western Macedonia, and which bulges into Serbia precisely at Kosovo) is, in the eyes of the

Albanian population, sufficient reason for changing Kosovo's status from that of a province to that of a republic.

According to the Yugoslav constitution, however, national minorities cannot have their own republics; despite its size, the Albanian population is a national minority by definition. The constitution also specifies that provinces must be integrated into republics: Kosovo is a province of the Republic of Serbia.

Due to the historic conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs during the era of formation of their respective states, a conflict which the revolution was able only partly to transcend, the Albanians find it difficult to accept the nominal tutelage of Serbia. This tutelage is indeed nominal, because the 1974 constitution grants the two Yugoslav provinces effectively the same rights and responsibilities as it does to the Republics. Kosovo, like the other federal units, has its own party organization, National Assembly, constitution, high court, police, flag and other state symbols, university, academy of arts and sciences, own bank, etc. The change so universally desired would make in a sense little difference; this is an argument used by both sides.

On the one hand, given that provinces and republics are *de facto* equal and that, according to at least one interpretation of the Yugoslav constitution, republics but not provinces have the right of secession, is not the demand for republican status in effect a demand for secession? And would this not just be the first step towards the disintegration of the entire multi-national state, something which, due to the mixed ethnic distribution, would inevitably lead to a civil war? On the other hand, the size of the Albanian minority — both in relation to that of other Yugoslav nationalities and in relation to Albania itself (whose population is around two and a half million) — makes it qualitatively different from any other in Yugoslavia, probably in Europe. In recognition of this fact, Kosovo was given autonomy and made a federal unit on a par with others.

This compromise solution, however, appears not to have worked: there is a widespread conviction in the Albanian population that nothing short of a republic would guarantee them equality with other Yugoslav nationalities. Speculation as to whether such a step might not at some point in the future lead to secession is insufficient as a response to this conviction, particularly as few irrendentist slogans had appeared on the demonstrations.

Albanian nationalism becomes quite understandable when one surveys the economic position of Kosovo, and the size of the gap which separates it from other republics and SAP Vojvodina. It is true that some of the others (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) are poor as well, and that even the richest contain pockets of considerable want. Within Kosovo itself, moreover, differences in the standard of living can be as large as anything seen elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

But the point is that, as a federal unit, Kosovo is lagging far behind the others and that this gap is increasing. In spite of the funds poured into it — and these have been considerable since the mid-sixties — the relative change has been painfully slow. According to the 1975-6 plan, the economy there should have grown at a rate 10% faster than the Yugoslav average; instead it was slower by 10%. In 1975 its per capita income was 33% of the Yugoslav average — by the end of that five-year period it had slipped to 29%. Slovenia, Yugoslavia's most developed republic, is today six times more developed than Kosovo; at the end of the war that ratio was 3:1. Whatever figure one chooses to consider, the Province is a case *sui generis* in Yugoslavia today, and this is not sufficiently recognized by the authorities there.

Its birthrate, at 32/1000, among the highest in Europe, is one cause of its falling behind (it is the figures per capita which are so devastating), but it is not the only or the fundamental one. Deeper reasons are to be found in post-war history (Kosovo was included into the category of the underdeveloped and therefore given additional grants only after a significant delay); some in the nature of the Yugoslav economy (market socialism has increased regional inequalities) and in the international context within which it has to operate (high price of industrialization exacted by imperialism).

A young population (more than half of the Kosovars are under the age of twenty) puts additional strains on social services while fewer people are employed (one in ten) than in Yugoslavia as a whole (one in five) — these fewer also enjoy lower incomes. Pressure on the land is high (it is the most densely populated area of Yugoslavia) and unemployment in the cities is greater than elsewhere. Of the total population of over 1½ million, only 173,000 are employed, while 71,000 are looking for jobs and a further 80,000 are employed outside (mostly abroad). One third of the population is still at school. Unemployment is a special problem: it has recently been calculated that three times as many people chase one job in Kosovo than in the rest of Yugoslavia. Social inequality, particularly that created over the last fifteen years of rapid economic growth, is bitterly resented.

The ideology of the Albanian Party of Labour, with its emphasis on egalitarianism, finds among the poor, the unemployed and the low paid its natural audience. Many of the social and economic problems confronting Kosovo are present also in other parts of Yugoslavia, only here they are thrown into a sharper relief by the greater poverty and backwardness. The federal government has so far failed to take appropriate measures to tackle the very special case of underdevelopment presented by Kosovo. Making Kosovo a republic might be a necessary condition.

Paradoxically, Kosovo's industrial infrastructure is more modern than is the case anywhere else in the country — it is far more

automated than Slovenia's. This is due partly to its more recent origin but also to its high concentration. Much of the Yugoslav reserves of lead, zinc, nickel and half of its coal lies in Kosovo and this mineral wealth is exploited by real industrial giants: one of the biggest, the Trepca complex, employs over 19,000 workers. The next five-year plan envisages a diversification of its industrial base in order to create more labour-intensive branches (though even if all the plans are put into operation there will still be 100,000 people looking for a job in 1985). To raise greater income within the province, more processing plants are to be built and more money spent on agriculture, which in turn will demand more extensive irrigation of this generally fertile but dry land. Between now and 1985, the Province is due to receive 140,000 million dinars (over £2,000 million), a sum comparable to the total received over the last fifteen years.

However, what has also been learnt from the failure of the past five-year plan is that money alone is insufficient to break the vicious circle of economic underdevelopment. Consequently, the current plan envisages a more extensive integration of Kosovo's industry with enterprises in other republics and Vojvodina, through joint economic ventures and sharing of risks.

Economic investment apart, the political response which the state can make to its troubled province will necessarily be conditioned by the quality of its relations with the People's Republic of Albania. After diplomatic relations were restored in 1971, trade rapidly expanded to reach \$116 million in 1980, four times the figure for 1978. A lively cultural exchange was initiated, particularly after 1978, the year of Albania's final break with China. Theatre and folk-music ensembles travelled back and forth, professors from Tirana lectured at the University of Pristina, and the Yugoslavs published modern Albanian (from Albania) literature not only in Albanian but also in other Yugoslav languages; some of this literature was included in Kosovo textbooks.

In 1978 there was a joint celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the League of Prizren, the historic watershed of Albanian national revival of the 19th century. The occasion was of immense significance for the growing warmth bet-

ween the two neighbours. The initiative came largely from the Yugoslav side; though welcoming visitors from Kosovo, the Albanian government never allowed their nationals to travel unofficially to Yugoslavia, nor did they permit non-Albanian Yugoslavs to travel in Albania. Yet for a whole period Belgrade turned a deaf ear to the unremitting anti-revisionist propaganda beamed from Tirana, which possesses one of the strongest transmitters in Europe and whose television is received on 60% of the territory of Kosovo.

The Albanian Party of Labour clearly felt that this increased co-operation should not stand in the way of its duty to 'wage ideological struggle in the defence of Marxism-Leninism and against revisionism' because among other things 'the Yugoslavs wage their ideological struggle against the Albanian positions even if they do not say so'. The Yugoslavs, including in particular the Albanians in Kosovo, clearly hoped that better relations would ultimately give them some say in Albania after Hoxha's departure while the Albanians feared that closer ties could also prove subversive to the APL conception of the Albanian road to socialism. And although there is no evidence that Tirana has masterminded recent events in Kosovo, it has for the first time openly backed the demand for republican status raised in the demonstrations of the past spring.

This demand the Yugoslavs for their part



Security forces at work in Kosovo, April 1981.

have termed 'anti-constitutional', 'irredentist' and 'counter-revolutionary'. People caught writing it in public are liable to two years of imprisonment. In this new climate there is a danger that the very real progress of the past decade is being rolled back: textbooks are being re-written, literature originating from Albania expunged from them, the history taught in Kosovo's schools re-styled — all in the name of combatting 'romantic nationalism'. One of the consequences has been that many schools, even faculties of the University, had to start the new academic year without adequate books or the necessary number of teachers.

It is notoriously difficult to draw the line between national affirmation and nationalism and for a country like Yugoslavia it is extremely dangerous to confuse the two. But one of the paradoxical results of current repression in Kosovo has been to put Kosovo on the Yugoslav map. The average Yugoslav citizen is for the first time learning something about Kosovo's past and present and the country as a whole has been firmly reminded that Yugoslavia is not a country of South Slavs but quite simply the homeland of a number of different Balkan nationalities.

**Michele Lee**  
November 1981

## Yugoslavs Demand Amnesty for Albanians

(Last October, more than a hundred students from three different Yugoslav republics signed a petition demanding political amnesty for those jailed in the aftermath of the spring events. This is a development of major importance, being the first such concerted action by Yugoslav students in support of their fellow-students and citizens in Kosovo. We print below the full text of the petition.)

Belgrade-Zagreb-Ljubljana  
October 1981

To the:  
Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia  
Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo

We propose the opening of an initiative to re-examine juridical policy in SAP Kosovo, with respect to the current trials of participants in the demonstrations and persons who in some other way expressed their political positions in Kosovo in the course of March, April and May 1981. The reasons for this initiative are as follows:

1. The greatest number of cases involve exclusively political charges over which, in principle, courts have no jurisdiction.
2. The massive number of people sentenced in the first stage (222 up to now) and the unusually high level of sentences (from 1 to 15 years) point to clear legal arbitrariness in the service of a momentary political interest, which directly brings into question the principle of independence of the judiciary.
3. The protection of the legal rights of the accused, and therefore the very impartiality of the legal process, have in the majority of cases been brought into question by staging collective rather than individual trials; by the unusually short duration of the trials; by the fact that charges were always

proved *in toto* and in all cases; and by the complete absence of information offered to the wider public in the course of the court proceedings.

4. The clearly discriminatory approach in the criminal proceedings, directed in the main against young people of Albanian nationality, principally school children and students, creates a situation in which greatest political responsibility and punishment is being reserved precisely for those who have least political power or institutional protection.

In a situation in which the national-economic instance is used as the key to social power and income, a situation of increasing republican and social etatism, nationalist deviations were bound to occur, above all among those in positions of responsibility in the League of Communists. One is therefore surprised by the difference in the kinds of punishment which have been meted out, on the one hand, to the leaders in the LC of Kosovo and, on the other, to young people who have grown up in such a climate and who for years have been indoctrinated in the idea of national

emancipation which, though an essential precondition of human emancipation, cannot be seen as the highest or only form of emancipation. It is doubtful whether the legally established aim of punishment can be served by such trial proceedings at all.

In saying this we do not, of course, advocate that the previous political leadership of SAP Kosovo should be put on trial, but rather that the problem should be tackled at its socio-economic roots and solved by democratic means. We expect that the proposal for this initiative will be accepted also in the interest of safeguarding human rights and developing democratic relations within Yugoslav society.

The undersigned students of the:  
University of Belgrade  
University of Zagreb  
University of Ljubljana

## ALBANIA

### Albania's Party Congress — by Michele Lee

Delegates representing 120,000 members gathered on November 1, 1981 in Tirana for the Eighth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour. The proceedings were inaugurated by Enver Hoxha who, as the First Secretary of the Party throughout its existence, holds something of a record for political longevity in post-war Europe. The Congress closed six days later by confirming him in his post: after four decades of uninterrupted — though not challenged — leadership Hoxha, at 73, is apparently in good health, despite recent rumours to the contrary. The Congress also marked the fortieth anniversary of the Party's foundation: formed in 1941 as the Communist Party of Albania, within three years it had organized an effective resistance and taken power in this small country, one of the poorest in Europe, strategically placed at the mouth of the Adriatic.

The last congress, held in 1976, took place in the shadow of worsening relations with China, which had been Albania's closest ally for fifteen years. (Two weeks before it opened, Peking had officially announced the downfall of the Gang of Four.) The period which led up to it had witnessed a series of purges: of dissident intellectuals (1973), of top military cadres (1974) and of the economic heads (1975-6). The 1976 congress adopted a new constitution emphasizing national self-reliance, atheism, a defence policy based on 'armed and militarily trained nation' (a concept close to that adopted two years previously by the Yugoslavs), and nationalization of all means of production, however small, including the complete collectivization of agriculture.

The Five-Year-Plan drawn up for 1975-80 spoke of industry growing by 41-44% and agriculture by 38-41%. However, according to the economic report presented to the Eighth Congress by Premier Mehmet Shehu, the final break with China in 1978 had severely affected the fulfillment of that plan — apart from cancelled credits, Albania had to find quickly a new outlet for 50% of its exports. The social product therefore grew at a modest 4.5% a year, while living standards stagnated.

The new Five-Year-Plan for 1980-85, which has already started, strives for a 6% average annual growth rate of the social product,


with agriculture due to have grown by 32% and industry by 34% by the end of the period. Real earnings per capital will, however, continue to crawl up at less than 2% per annum. Modest living standards, on the other hand, continue to be offset by tangible economic and social achievements, so that the leadership has little to fear from popular discontent, despite the monolithic nature of its rule, the still-pervasive images of Stalin, and of the summary treatment handed out to any manifestation of opposition within the party or outside it.

Albania would like to increase its trade with its neighbours and also Western Europe. At present it trades with over fifty countries, exporting mainly chrome, nickel, copper and iron ore in semi-processed form, but also oil, electrical energy and increasingly machinery and finished products, while importing basically advanced technology. The 1980 value of Albania's trade with the world was estimated at \$750-800 million, of which 41% with Comecon countries, 40% with countries of Western Europe and 19% with Yugoslavia. In fact Yugoslavia has become Albania's foremost trading partner, with trade in both directions agreed to rise at an annual rate of 18% in the current five-year period. The completion of the railway line to Vlorë in the south and the Yugoslav border in the north will help Albania's export plans.

Albania has earned the reputation of a maverick country in Eastern Europe. After collaborating with the Yugoslav Communist Party during and immediately after the war, the Albanian Party leaders broke relations with Belgrade in 1948, the year Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern bloc, and soon became one of the most vociferous critics of Yugoslav 'revisionism'. Though it was a founding member of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, Albania's relations with Moscow started to deteriorate as early as 1956, soon after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, and by 1961 the break was complete. In 1968, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania left the Warsaw Pact; by this time it had acquired the friendship and protection of China.

For a decade and a half China provided economic and military assistance to Albania, which was in turn China's most

loyal supporter in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Certain aspects of the Cultural Revolution were espoused with some enthusiasm by the Albanian leadership, whose conception of socialist construction laid much stress on egalitarianism (even today, army officers wear no insignia of rank). Soon after Nixon visited China in 1972, however, relation began to turn sour and by the summer of 1977 the party daily, *Zëri i Popullit*, was openly attacking China's foreign policy. Favourable to China's earlier denunciation of the two superpowers, Tirana would not follow the Chinese on the path of identifying the Soviet Union as the more dangerous of the two.



Party Secretary in the Albanian village of Borshi. The painting on the local inn depicts the fortress, Albania, besieged by Titoism, Monarchism, Imperialism and Revisionism.

Today it classifies both China and the Soviet Union as revisionist. Soviet revisionism, according to Hoxha's report, inspired by 'the ancient spirit of Czarism' has been placed in the service of expansionsim; he also denounced national oppression, Slav racism, Orthodox mysticism and the cult of the military and the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union. Mao's thought, in turn, is presented as an ideology aimed at world domination, and the 'so-called dictatorship of the pro-

letariat in China' as nothing but the dictatorship of rival groups who have brought the party and the country to chaos. China, according to Hoxha, has become one of the main centres of 'world counter-revolution, allied with sinister and fascist forces'. In fact, throughout his speech, he insisted on referring to the ruling communist parties as 'ex-communist parties' and to their countries as 'ex-socialist'.

It is interesting that in Poland, the APL distances itself as much from the Polish Communist Party (for being 'anti-Marxist' and 'counter-revolutionary') as from Solidarnosc ('a reactionary ally of the Church and world imperialism'), although it had enthusiastically welcomed the Polish August 1980. According to the Albanian Party leader, true socialism is to be found in the 'rich heritage of Stalin's rule' and in contemporary Albania.

As a result of this doggedly independent foreign policy, which now entails the claim that the Party of Labour is the only true communist party in power, Albania has become rather isolated on the international scene. No official delegations from other ruling communist parties was present, with the significant exception of the Vietnamese (led by Son Hao, a member of the Central Committee). However, representatives of some twenty small 'Marxist-Leninist parties' (including, according to the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug, two formed by Yugoslav Albanians working abroad), were there, testifying to a certain international appeal of the Albanian ideological stance.

While the Chinese press has passed over the occasion in silence, *Pravda* took once again the opportunity to call for normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Albania on the basis of 'mutual equality and common interest'. Referring to Brezhnev's speeches of 1966 and 1971 (delivered at the 23rd and 24th congresses of the CPSU) and of 1976 (to a Central Committee plenum) calling for an end to hostilities, *Pravda* refrained from raking over the past or apportioning blame for the break for the third successive year.

In his three-hour long speech of 1 November, Hoxha reserved particularly sharp words for the Yugoslav leadership who have 'liquidated' the dictatorship of the proletariat and engaged in the restoration of capitalism. Condemning the repression of the Kosovo demonstrations of last spring, he re-affirmed Tirana's support for the creation of an Albanian republic within Yugoslavia, which would unite Albanians of Kosovo with those living in Macedonia and Montenegro — something which Belgrade had quickly denounced as interference in Yugoslav internal affairs.

The Eighth Congress of the APL ended on 7 November without any great surprises and represents very much the continuation of the policies adopted in 1976. The only significant change was an increase in the size of the Politbureau from 11 to 13 members, and the replacement of two of its members, Spiro Koleka and Haki Toska, by Hajredin Celiku, the woman director of the

Metallurgical complex at Elbasan, and Muhu Aslani, the party secretary in Shkodër. No reason for these changes were given, though there were hints that Koleka, at 65, was getting too old. Apart from insisting on 'further consolidation of the internal front', Hoxha appeared to be dissatisfied with the results of the 'revolutionization' of culture over the past fifteen years.

Although Albania maintains diplomatic relations with some eighty countries, neither Britain nor the United States recognize the government in Tirana. After supporting the defeated royalist faction during the War, they attempted for years thereafter to foment opposition, by landing some 300 agents in Albania between 1946 and 1952: thanks to information passed by Kim Philby, these operations were unsuccessful. But they set a pattern for relations which still have not been repudiated. In addition, the two countries hold four tons of Albanian gold, which they have refused to return unless compensation is paid for two British naval vessels sunk by mines in the Corfu Channel in 1946 (although Albania had no mine-laying capability, they accuse it of 'complicity'), and for foreign capital nationalized after 1944. There are signs, however, that this matter may be on the way to being settled; Hoxha's hint in this direction is supported by the recently announced visit to Britain of a party of Albanian professors, due to take place in the course of the current academic year.

Michele Lee  
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## The Death of Shehu — by Michele Lee

According to official sources, Memhet Shehu committed suicide during the night of 18 December 1981, a month after the National Day Celebration at which he apparently did not appear and two months after the Eighth Congress of the APL at which he gave one of the two main reports. But no signs of official mourning accompanied his departure and only the briefest of announcements appeared in the Albanian press. Lurid accounts of his last moments soon began to float around diplomatic circles which spoke of a Politbureau shoot-out — at one time it was reported that Hoxha himself was shot dead. But while it is highly unlikely that Shehu shot himself, the significance of his sudden death is difficult to assess. It shows there is a power struggle taking place at the very top of the Albanian leadership, which has by no means been won by Hoxha and his supporters, because there are signs that Albania has started on the road to de-Enverisation.

Albanian Balkan neighbours, as well as Balkan specialists sitting in Moscow, are now carefully analysing the meagre news filtering out of Tirana. Since 1978, after its break with China, Albania has tried to go it alone, and the economic and political costs of this orientation have been increasingly hard to sustain. Some sort of return to the Soviet bloc (without necessarily rejoining the Warsaw Pact) or a more general opening to the world are two possible options for

the Albanian party to follow; clearly both have protagonists in the leadership today.



M. Shehu

However, in one of his first speeches since replacing Shehu, the new chairperson of the Council of Ministers, Adil Carcani, vigorously attacked both the United States

and the USSR as 'aggressive, warmongering, colonialist and oppressive imperialist superpowers', reaffirming that Albania would not establish 'diplomatic or any other relations' with either of them. For the moment, at least, the rumours which abounded in the period before Shehu's death seem to have been firmly quashed.

Shehu's departure leaves Enver Hoxha the only surviving member of the original Central Committee of 1941, the Party leadership which took the country through the revolution of 1941-4. Most of the others have since then been purged and executed — Shehu's death fits well the bloody pattern followed by the Albanian inner-Party struggles for the past thirty-six years; its heavily repressive methods of rule have isolated it from its people and its fear of the outside from much of the world. For sure, Albania has been a victim, one of many, of splits and divisions within and between the communist parties in the course of which most of the leaders of its revolution have perished. For all the vicissitudes of his political career, Shehu was one of the principal actors of the Balkan revolutions which took place during the Second World War in open opposition to both the Axis and the Allied plans. The funeral pomp surrounding Suslov, whose rise to prominence has been in directly inverse proportion to his service to the cause of communism, contrasts tellingly to the lack of any for Shehu.