
YOUNG SOCIALIST FORM

February 1960

Toward the
Second National Conference
of Young Socialist Supporters,
April 15-17, 1960,
in Philadelphia:



Vol. 3 - No. 2 (whole no.8)

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Grateful acknowledgement is made to Whitey K., Roger P., and Jim L. for their assistance in publishing this bulletin. -JR

Young Socialist Forum box 471, Cooper Station New York 3, N.Y.

Call for National Conference

of Young Socialist Supporters

To all Young Socialist Supporters and supporting groups:

The second annual National Conference of Young Socialist Supporters is hereby called for the Easter 1960 weekend, Friday, April 15 through Sunday, April 17, in Philadelphia.

The major questions of policy up for decision at this conference are four in number:

- 1. founding of the Young Socialist Alliance on a nationwide basis (declaration and constitution);
- 2. the international political turn and its impact on the struggle against American militarism by youth - (war resolution);
- 3. (memorandum on) the 1960 elections our orientation and role;
- 4. Tasks and Perspectives Resolution; (resolution on) transitional program for the American campus.

A draft agenda will be forthcoming to organize the above points and include provisions for a first-hand international report and local area reports. Some material already published and relevant to the coming conference is in the last two issues of Young Socialist Forum. YSF Vol. II, No. 2 contains the minutes of the First YS National Conference together with all adopted documents, in particular the Interim Motion on Organization which sets foreward the rules for organizing the coming conference. YSF Vol. III, No. 1 contains the Resolution on YS Tasks & Perspectives adopted by the June 59 Plenum of the National Committee and introduced to the Philadelphia conference by the Editorial Board.

The conference now called is our first delegated one. Since the YS Supporters lack previous experience in such conferences, it is desirable to state more fully than usual in a Call some aspects of procedure to insure a full, uniform, democratic preparation.

Pre-conference discussion

Pre-conference discussion will be officially opened on Feb. 15, 1960, two months preceding the conference. By that time several more Editorial Board draft documents will be published in <u>YSF</u>. Every local unit should allow adequate time for the discussion from all points of view on material submitted for conference decision. Reporters should be assigned to present at least main resolutions to meetings of the locals. Every YS supporter is encouraged to write for <u>YSF</u> on questions of interest or dispute.

Technical Requirements

Membership eligibility

Only those members who have become YS supporters by Feb. 15 and only those members who are in good standing with respect to national YS supporters dues will be eligible to wote for or run as conference delegates. Since "good standing" is defined as not more than three months in arrears in dues, by April all those voting must have paid through Dec. 1959. A special conference assessment of fifty cents is to be paid prior to voting on delegates by each member to the local for transmittal to the national organization. This money is to defray conference expenses including aid to delegates from more distant areas. Only that number of local unit members who meet all of the qualifications listed in this paragraph (ie. qualified members) can be counted as the basis for the number of delegates to which that unit is entitled.

These supporters dues and conference assessments paid by the individual members to the locals by the time of voting for delegates must be turned over to the national organization by the convening of the conference so that the locals delegates may be seated.

Election of delegates

Each local unit shall be entitled to one delegate for every five qualified members or major fraction thereof. Where there is a division on national policy within a local unit, that division must be established for the purpose of electing separate delegations by a resolution or statement made in writing and submitted to the local unit for a vote. Such a written document may either be a nationally circulated resolution or a locally written statement. Members must be present and voting in person at the meeting where the election of delegates takes place. The only exception is for members whose absence is for a substantial reason such as being sick or working and who send in an unambiguous written statement of their positions or candidate choices.

The extensive presentation of proper democratic procedure for the selection of delegates under factional conditions is not for the encouragement of heedless, trivial or personally motivated factionalism. Such unjustified divisions are debilitating to the morale of the organization and highly expensive in time and energy. Factional division is a very serious recourse and the present set of rules is set down to insure that such an experience if it occurs may be gone through as painlessly and fairly as possible.

The determination of the number of majority and minority delegates, in the event of division, shall be based on the number of qualified members who <u>wote</u> for the respective written positions. The following table shows the modified proportional system to be followed if division occurs:

number of qualified members in unit:	total number of delegates the unit is entitled to:	minimum of those for a mito get:	voting nority	2 dels.,	3 dels.
3-7	ı	•	-*	-	-
8-12	2		1/3**	-	•

13-17	3	1/4	~ *	• •
18-22	4	1/5	2/5	••
23-27	5	1/6	1/3	<u>.</u> .*
28-32	6	1/7	2/7	3/7
in general:				·
5n <u></u> 2 2	n a	1/n/1	2/n / 1	3/n/1

(* in the special case of a unit entitled to an odd number of delegates and where the division in unit woting is exactly equal, two delegates with 1/2 wate each will be elected)

(** for example, in a unit of 8 qualified members, 8 times 1/3 equals 2 2/3 members; therefore, a minimum of 3 (not 2) would get a delegate. If the unit had 11 qualified members then 11 times 1/3 equals 3 2/3 members so 4 voting minority members would be the minimum to get a delegate. The same consideration holds true for figuring all other fractions in the above table.)

In the event a unit undergoes a <u>more than</u> two way division, that unit will elect delegates on a directly proportional basis (ie. in a unit entitled to <u>n</u> delegates, <u>at least</u> 1/n fraction of qualified members must have woted for a position for that position to get a delegate).

After a division has been established, those woting each way will select in caucus their own delegations and report them to the unit as a whole for acknowledgement. Where ne division has taken place the election of delegates will proceed normally by the unit as a whole. In either case the unit shall issue credentials to the elected comrades certifying that the named individuals are bona-fide delegates and giving the date and locality of election, number of members qualified to vote, number voting and the division of votes if a division is present.

In the event a local unit is unable to send as many as it is entitled to of its own members as delegates, it may elect YS supporters from other areas. Such proxy delegates must be elected in the regular fashion outlined above with their names introduced into the elections, voted on and certified. Since each delegate can cast no more than one vote at the conference, if a unit or grouping in a unit intends to send proxy delegates, it is advisable to check in advance with the proposed candidates that they will not otherwise be regular delegates.

For the coming National Conference it is in general recommended that National Committee members and alternates <u>not</u> avoid delegateships since the ratio of NC members to YS supporters as a whole is large.

Editorial Board Dec. 28, 1959

draft WHERE WE STAND

proposed Founding Declaration of the Young Socialist Alliance

- 1. The Young Socialist Alliance is founded in response to the need for a nation-wide youth organization capable of bringing revolutionary socialist ideas to a new generation. This is necessary for building a revolutionary movement which can lead the working class to socialism. The YSA bases itself on the traditions of marxian socialism pioneered by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and Liebknecht. We believe that socialism can be initiated only as the result of struggle, international in scope, of the working class against the capitalist class the struggle culminating in the creation of a new type of state, a workers' state. Socialism means that for the first time in history man will control his own creation society rather than be controlled by it. The dynamic of socialism is of a continual expansion of human freedom in all spheres: in politics, economics, culture and in every aspect of personal life.
- 2. In December 1958 the National Conference of Young Socialist Supporters, which is now superceded by the Young Socialist Alliance, issued an eight point political statement:
 - (1) For a labor party by the union movement. As an immediate goal, for independent political action through united and independent socialist electoral opposition to the two capitalist parties.
 - (2) Unconditional backing of the fight for full equality by the Negro people and other minorities.
 - (3) Militant opposition to the entire witchhunt with special focus on the witchhunt on the campus and the political screening of youth in connection with military service.
 - (4) Support to the colonial peoples' struggles for freedom and independence. For the withdrawal of all imperialist troops from foreign soil.
 - (5) Advocacy of workers power as the only progressive alternative to the capitalist drive toward military dictatorship and fascism, a drive recently illustrated by General deGaulle's placement in power in France.
 - (6) Support to struggles for workers democracy in the Soviet Union and Peoples Republics such as the Polish and Hungarian workers revolutions. Opposition to attempts of imperialism to reestablish domination over this section of the world.
 - (7) Against further nuclear tests and the build-up of the U.S. war machine, the success of the struggle against the capitalist war danger and for world peace depends upon the success of the struggle for international socialism.
 - (8) For the regroupment of revolutionary socialist youth into an independent, broad and militant national youth organization based on the editorial policy of the <u>Young Socialist</u>.

This earlier statement, which is based upon the principles outlined in this

declaration, illustrates the general political views upon which the Young Socialist Alliance is founded. In other resolutions at this conference and at later conferences a fuller political program will be elaborated.

3. The Young Socialist Alliance is the result of a political process which began in 1956 with a crisis which rocked the then existing radical youth groups. A left wing was formed in the Young Socialist League in opposition to the dissolution of that organization and its entrance into the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation on the basis of the reformist views of the SP-SDF. Under the impact of the crisis of stalinism the Communist Party was forced to dissolve its youth organization, the Labor Youth League. Some young people from the LYL and other organizations peripheral to the CP joined with the YSL left wing, young members of the Socialist Workers Party and independents to publish the YOUNG SOCIALIST. In December 1958 in Detroit the Young Socialist Supporters organized themselves into the National Committee of Young Socialist Supporters as a step toward the formation of a national Young Socialist Alliance. Since that time the YS Supporters have grown in strength to the point where they can accomplish the national organization of a revolutionary youth movement.

4. The present policies of the Young People's Socialist League, youth affiliate of the SP-SDF, and the Communist Party youth flow historically from the rejection by their parent movements internationally of a socialist perspective. Since 1914 the parties of the Second International have become allies and defenders of the capitalist system. In theory they have rejected the concept of socialist revolution and put in its place the improvement of capitalism by social reform. In practice the Social-Democrats have consistently taken government posts to aid the capitalists in surviving revolutionary upheavals. After the first World War the Social-Democratic parties were the main props under the collapsing capitalist system and after the Second World War performed the same function with the aid of the Communist parties.

Similarly the Communist International since the rise of Stalin has abandoned its heritage of revolutionary socialism. Under the theory of "Socialism in One Country", the Communist parties everywhere have been transformed into servile tools of the Russian bureaucracy. In practice the Stalinists have played a role fundamentally identical to that of the Social-Democracy. On orders from the Kremlin Stalinist parties in country after country have helped to stave off revolution, to help capitalism to survive.

5. Both groups support in one fashion or another the continued existence of the capitalist system and fear a frontal conflict between the contending class forces. We, as revolutionary socialists, reject completely the concept that socialism can be brought into existence piece-meal. Socialism can only come through the complete overturn of the present capitalist state and its replacement with a workers' state. Such a revolutionary development is the end result of an irrepressible struggle between the capitalist class and the working class. We give our full support to the working class in this struggle.

6. The Young People's Socialist League is not a marxian socialist organization. It and its parent affiliate are not only incapable of leading a social-

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ist transformation of society, they are not even capable of promoting basic socialist education. Today, for example, they favor working within the capitalist Democratic Party rather than supporting independent socialist political action. The leadership of the SP-SDF lines up with the American State Department and the YPSL refuses to disavow this policy. Searching for "respectibility" the YPSL has forfeited any claim to represent socialism before American youth.

- 7. The young supporters of the Communist Party (as yet not nationally organized) are likewise incapable of bringing a revolutionary program to American
 youth. They, even more than the YPSL, are engaged in the class collaborationist
 policies of support to the Democratic Party. The Communist Party youth are apologists for the bureaucratic dictatorship that rules the USSR and other workers' states and as such are compromised before inquiring youth.
- 8. In addition to the Communist Party youth, the YPSL and the YSA there exists a numerically significant grouping of young socialists who have no national affiliation. A number of these belong to campus socialist clubs and carry on organized socialist activity on a local basis. Politically these people may be new to socialism, having not yet made up their minds as to which of the national youth groups they support, or they may be sympathetic in one way or another with one of these three national bodies. While these campus groups are important and should be supported as a way of reaching larger numbers of youth with socialist ideas they can be no substitute for national organization. It is only through national organization that it is possible to publish a paper, send out speakers on tour, really educate socialist youth through organizational responsibility and participation in working out the political views of a national group, and carry out concerted national activity for socialism. In fact one of the functions of a nation-wide youth organization is to aid in the establishment, stabilization and extension of broad socialist campus clubs.
- 9. The revolutionary socialist youth are well aware that by themselves youth cannot lead the working class to power. That is the historic task of a working class revolutionary party. The revolutionary youth played a very active role in the regroupment process in the hope that a regrouped and enlarged revolutionary party with which the YS could establish close relations would emerge. The YS participated in the American Forum--for Socialist Education, local forum groups, and the Independent-Socialist Party in New York State.
- 10. The regroupment process did not result in any new parties being formed. On the contrary older political formations such as the Independent Socialist League and its youth organization, the Young Socialist League, and the American Socialist magazine disappeared. Most of the individuals who had been disillusioned by the CP, left politics rather than try to discover a new, but difficult path. This left only the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation with its right wing reformist anti-class struggle views, the Communist Party, turned into a small embittered sect of apologists for the Kremlin, and the Socialist Workers Party which had grown through the regroupment process attracting to it from all groupings individuals who still wished to struggle for revolutionary socialism.

- ll. The Young Socialist Alliance is in basic political agreement with the Socialist Workers Party. It recognizes that only the SWP of all existing political parties is capable of giving the working class political leadership on class struggle principles. It therefore offers its political support to the SWP.
- 12. The Young Socialist Alliance is an independent organization which elects its own officers and works out its own political views. The YSA bases itself on the principle of the organizational independence of the revolutionary youth organization and opens its doors to all young people regardless of other affiliation who agree with its socialist principles and accept its program.
- 13. The Young Socialist Alliance will, to the best of its ability, bring marxian socialism to American youth. But this is not enough. The only socialism which deserves the name is international socialism. The YSA declares its political solidarity with revolutionary youth in all countries. The present Social-Democratic "International Union of Socialist Youth" and the non-socialist successor to the Young Communist International, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, are travesties on the concept of socialist internationalism. The YSA will work with others toward the creation of a new revolutionary socialist youth international which will represent organizationally the political solidarity of socialist youth.

Editorial Board Jan. 11, 1960

Memorandum on the 1960 Elections

American experience, past and present, has confirmed that, as in all other countries, political parties are organizations of economic classes and in fact are totally incomprehensible unless viewed primarily from this standpoint. Our principled opposition to the Republican and Democratic parties is based on their character as class parties of capitalism. This is demonstrated by the historic orgins of these parties, the unfailing consistency of their policies in defense of the interests of the capitalist class, and the composition of their leading circles.

The pattern of history has shown that at one stage or another the working class feels impelled to organize itself into its own party. That this has not yet been the case in America only indicates that this step is still on the agenda of unfinished tasks. Disillusionment in the capitalist parties is already evident in significant sectors of the working class who see the "politicians" as the opponent on the picket line and in the government bodies. This growing disaffection plus the now accepted theory that labor must be in politics indicates that the historical trend in America likewise is toward an independent party of labor.

The first national conference of the supporters of the Young Socialist translated these general conceptions into the proposition that the duty of socialists is to help the labor movement make its inevitable break with the Democratic Party by propagandizing for a Labor Party. Therefore the conference rejected the policy of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation of supporting the Democratic Party. The conference saw as one of the most effective means for such education the support of independent socialist candidates in the elections against the capitalist politicians. The founding conference of the Young Socialist Alliance re-endorses this point of view.

Apart from these general considerations the 1960 elections have a special import to us.

Recent events (the steel strike, Griffin-Landrum, Kennedy bill) have disclosed that a significant break in class relations has taken place in this country. For over a decade the American capitalist class has been in a position to offer sufficient concessions to the American workers to forstall the independent political development of labor. The post war period, in the main has been characterized by the spirit of class collaboration between the capitalists and the official leaders of the labor movement. It is now evident that the capitalist class feels that this situation cannot be maintained in the 1960's. The capitalists correctly surmise that they are facing such economic ills that there is no alternative except to attempt to cut their labor costs, i.e. the standard of living. This break in policy will undoubtedly result in a rising curve of class struggle in the decade to come.

While this new situation in American politics has not yet produced a mass break with the Democratic party it has already prepared a more receptive audi-

ence for socialist education especially among the youth.

The 1960 elections thus provide a magnificent opportunity for socialists to reach, educate and prepare militant youth to play an indispensable role in the coming decade of class struggle. The Young Socialist Alliance is determined to participate in the 1960 elections to the full.

We commend the Socialist Workers Party for all of its efforts to encourage the broadest socialist intervention in the coming elections. We appreciate the boldness of their venture to field a presidential ticket against the candidates of capital. Theirs will be the only ticket to call for a Labor Party. We recognize that their campaign will provide us with an attractive mechanism to increase our influence on the American campus.

Therefore we offer our support to the candidates of the SWP and pledge ourselves to work actively for the largest possible vote for socialism this November.

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The <u>Memorandum on the 1960 Elections</u> is introduced for consideration by the April conference. In addition this Memorandum, which is in accord with the decisions of the last National Conference (eight-point policy statement).

1. For a labor party by the union movement. As an immediate goal, for independent political action through united and independent socialist electoral opposition to the two capitalist parties..

was adopted as a guide for the immediate electoral tasks of YS Supporters.

Editorial Board Jan. 24, 1960

Draft Resolution on War

(adopted by the Editorial Board, Dec. 28, 1959, for presentation to the 2nd YS National Conference)

War, Clausewitz said, is the continuation of politics by other means. On the simplest level this proposition is incontestably true and applies as fully today as at any other time; when nations go to war they do so because their rulers have decided to use military force to accomplish certain rational and intelligible ends. That these objectives are generally either the robbery and exploitation of other nations or the "defense" of what has already been stolen and exploited changes nothing as to their rational character or political aims.

But on a deeper level this proposition can today be called into question. For centuries war was not merely an instrument of the policy of individual states, but was the basic regulator of the international political system as a whole. Relations between sovereign states depended on the balance of power between them, "power" being measured at different periods in terms of horsemen, footsoldiers, cannon, battleships, tanks or aircraft, and the ability to produce these weapons. The status quo at every given time reflected a given power balance: a nation claiming that the balance of power had shifted radically in its favor, and that it was therefore entitled to "a rectification" of existing frontiers or spheres of influence, had to back up its claim by the use of its new advantage, by war.

But in the age of the H-bomb and the ICBM is this still true? What use is a regulator whose operation would destroy the mechanism it is supposed to adjust? If a full scale nuclear war would certainly obliterate the contending sides and probably terminate human life on the planet, it no longer is a means whereby any nation can reach political ends. (A State decides to go to War only for rational, political motives - not to commit certain suicide.) In short the very enormity of modern war would make it unthinkable, the armaments race would become the best guarantee of "peace."

Unfortunately, political reality is not so simple. What is internal rationality for a given political or social system does not at all coincide with "objective" rationality from the standpoint of the human race. What political aim could, objectively, justify subjecting the human race to even a slight risk of extermination? But even if the odds were high against survival, a sufficiently desperate government could risk everything for a slim chance of victory. The example of Hitler at the end of his rule shows that this limit, bordering on madness, can be reached by capitalist States. And, as we shall see, the forces that produce a Hitler are still at work within the Capitalist system.

furthermore, even assuming that today the deterrence of mutual terror is an effective bar to world war, the argument that modern weapons make war impossible cannot be considered valid in the long run: the flaw is that it leaves out of account the development of military technology.

If war has become "irrational" it is not because present weapons are so horrible, but because neither side possesses an effective defense against the weapons that would be used by the other. However, if there is one lesson demonstrated by the entire history of warfare, it is that every increase in the technique of offense calls forth a corresponding and greater increase in the technique of defense, and vice-versa. At present the offense has a clear lead, inasmuch as anything less than a near-perfect defensive system is inadequate against a H-bomb attack. But who can say that this relationship has become permanent? Whether through adaptation of existing offensive weapons (anti-missile missiles, high-altitude nuclear explosions) or through a new scientific technological breakthrough comparable to the development of the atomic bomb (imagine, for instance, "force-fields" creating an invisible, impregnable wall around every important city) each country may at some future point perfect its defenses to the point where it will feel able to ward off an atomic attack. And when that comes to pass, the fear of destruction will cease to be an invincible deterrent, war would recapture its rights as the supreme instrument of national policy.

Meanwhile, even while the present imbalance subsists, the sway of the nuclear deterrent is not and cannot be absolute. Nuclear weapons are not the only ones in the arsenal: "conventional" arms, themselves far improved over W. W. II levels, continue to be the main prop of each nation's forces. Useless as they would all be in an atomic war, they're still not just for parades. To the extent that all-out nuclear war is made impossible by the fear of total destruction, to that extent "limited war," war in which both sides refrain from using nuclear weapons, remains possible. The Korean War, in a sense, was the prototype for such "limited wars." Despite the danger that a new Korea anywhere in the world would expand into full-scale conflict, this is a risk that can be calculated. A calculated risk is a very different affair from a certain suicide: limited war remains at every moment a practical political possibility, a choice that can be made by rulers despite the existence of the nuclear deterrent.

Thus, despite the new developments in military technology the stricture deriving from Clausewitz continues to apply with all its force: war is possible, not or not only, as an "accident" but as a conscious political decision, as a rational outcome of the present world political situation. The causes of the war danger are political (more precisely, politico-economic,) and these causes can consequently be removed only by political means. The elucidation of these causes and of the ways to counteract them is the object of the present analysis.

Up to this point our presentation has been entirely abstract. But if war and war preparations can be shown to constitute an essential factor in the equation of world politics, we are still not free to choose with which actual states to fill in other unknowns. In fact, no one can have the slightest doubt that if world war comes its main protagonists will be the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and that the dominant factor in present-day international politics is the struggle between these two super-powers.

The <u>fact</u> of this struggle is obvious: not so its causes or significance. To many theorists the basic conflict is an ideological one, between "capitalism" and "communism" (partisans of one or the other side tending to describe their chosen system with the word "democracy.") To others, the U.S.-Russian conflict is essentially a power struggle of a traditional "imperialist" type, in which two great empires pursue policies based on ther "national interests," not on any considerations of an ideological order.

In the debate between these two theses, proponents of both can score weighty points. Upholders of the "power politics" view can point to the evident cynicism of the statesmen of both sides; to the demonstrated ability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to ally themselves against a common enemy (i.e., Nazi Germany) when their mutual interests required it; to the attempts by both sides to establish alliances across "ideological" lines (Russia with a Nasser, U.S. with a Tito:) to Stalin's adoption of Russian nationalism instead of Communist Internationalism as the central internal ideology of the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand, those who see the conflict as mainly ideological emphasize the evident social and ideological differences between the two power blocs and above all the role of "Communist" movements in the rest of the world as allies of the Soviet Union (most dramatically, the effect of the Chinese "Communist" revolution on the balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.).

Posed in these terms this debate cannot but remain inconclusive, since the points made by both sides are valid. We Marxists see the problem in a different way: We analyze the conflict as a power struggle between states of basically different and antagonistic social systems taking place in a determined historical context.

The essential starting point for an understanding of the world-political role of the U.S.A. is simply this: that the U.S. is a capitalist state. This proposition is scarcely a belaboring of the obvious: the apologists for the prevailing social order have exerted every effort to create a complete mystification on this score. The American economy, we are told, is not the "old," "European-type" capitalism, but a "new," "modern," "democratic," "people's" economic system, an economy of abundance which has more or less completely succeeded in solving the old problems of class struggle, poverty and economic crisis.

Capitalism today is not the same as the system described by Ricardo or Marx. No doubt, a man of 60 is not the "same" person he was at 10 or 20. But neither has he become a different sort of animal nor freed himself from the physiological laws governing human beings. American capitalism in the course of the last hundred years has evolved into a system in which all the important sections of the economy are securely in the hands of a small number of financial and industrial corporations, linked to one another by innumerable personal, proprietary, and economic bends, and controlling the economy and society as a whole through their scarcely concealed domination of the government and state apparatus. These corporations, "artificial persons," are in turn owned (to the ex-

tent of a "controlling interest") by a tiny group of the biggest capitalist families (who despite all the "changes" continue to bear names like Morgan, Harriman, Mellon, Du Pont, Rockefeller...) who form the commanding heights of the self-selecting, self-perpetuating "Power Elite" that rules America.

U. S. foreign policy is dictated by the interests of the ruling class even more openly than is domestic policy, for, whereas in the latter the potential power of the labor movement must be taken into account, where foreign policy is concerned the unions in the name of "national interest," are prepared to support every action of the government.

The foreign policy of the U.S. has, ever since the 1890's and the enunciation of the "Open Door Policy," had as its main object the acquisition and control of markets, raw materials, and fields for investment throughout the world. While the old European imperialist powers pursued identical aims through the imposition of direct, colonial domination the U.S., thanks to its ever increasing economic superiority over European capitalism, could nobly reject "colonialism." All it needed to establish uncontested economic sway was an "Open Door," the absence of a <u>rival</u> political domination.

Nevertheless, the "Open Door" could be opened and læpt open only by military force (the war with Spain for Cuba and the Phillipines, the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, the use of the Marines to make and unmake governments in the "Bananna Republics," of Central America and the Caribbean.) Today U.S. military power continues to be used for directly economic purposes (the violent overthrow of the government of Guatemala in order to protect the United Fruit Company., the invasion of Lebanon to safeguard Standard Oil's domination of Middle-East petroleum.) But at the same time this "old-style" imperialist aspect is transcended by the role of the U.S. as leader of a military coalition of nearly all capitalist nations directed against the bloc headed by the Soviet Union.

This latter bloc style s itself "the socialist camp," an appelation containing a portion of truth and an enormous amount of falsehood. It is true that the Soviet Union was founded by the socialist revolution of November 1917. The Russian Revolution established a statified and planned economy in 1/6th of the world.

Since 1917 the Soviet Union, once the most backward capitalist power, has been able, despite the devastation of World War II and a stormy internal evolution, to become the worlds second greatest industrial power. This development constitutes definitive practical proof of the superiority of socialistic economic methods over the capitalist economic system.

Nevertheless, for all its enormous economic successes, the Soviet Union has not become socialist, at least in the sense in which this term was used by Marx and Lenin. For the Marxist tendency of the socialist movement, socialism represents a higher form of society than capitalism: a society in which the people not only will live better than in the most advanced capitalist nation but a-

bove all will be far <u>freer</u> than in the most "democratic" of capitalist countries and will exercise full democratic control over <u>all</u> aspects of social, political and economic life.

Clearly, no such social system exists in the Soviet Union (or, a portion in the other states of the "socialist bloc.") The workers of the Soviet Union still live at a level well below that of Western Europe (to say nothing of the U.S.) Soviet society is marked by the grossest inequality: workers and peasants live in poverty while the top party officials, factory managers, "people's artists," engineers, generals et. al, live in luxury comparable to that of western capitalists. In order to preserve these privileges in a society still suffering from a dire poverty of consumer goods, the beneficiaries of inequality, the bureaucracy, impose a totalitarian dictatorship over the people and meet all attempts at resistance with murderous violence. In no sense can it be said that political or economic democracy exists in the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. thus combines drastically contradictory features. Its economic system is progressive, clearly superior to any form of private capitalism. On the other hand, in the comain of political and social relationships the most regressive aspects of capitalism are maintained and even exalted. Nevertheless, for Marxists it is the economic system which determines the basic nature of a society.

The Soviet Union, in sum, is a transitional society BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: a society in which a privileged bure-aucracy has substituted its own dictatorship for the workers democracy established in 1917 (and in the process, has exterminated virtually all the leaders of the revolution) but in which the economy remains founded on the basic historical accomplishment of the Russian Revolution, the destruction of capitalist private property in the means of production.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has, ever since the mid-1920's, been dictated by the interests of the ruling bureaucracy. Consequently, this policy has been one of Russian nationalism, entirely in the spirit of traditional power politics. Nevertheless the nature of the Soviet Union and the crisis of 20th century capitalism have placed a special and unique stamp on the world-political role of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The relationships between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. develop in a context determined by the historical crisis of capitalism. The century preceding 1914 was the epoch of the flowering of capitalism, a time of relative peace, prosperity, gradual improvement in living standards and above all of economic expansion bringing the entire world into the network of capitalist economy. With the onset of World War I the system began to disintegrate. Since 1914 capitalism has gone through two devastating World Wars, undergone a depression of unprecedented depth and duration, and has lost its power over a third of the world.

In 1917 the Russian Revolution was the first great and durable victory of the working class over capitalism. In 1949 the triumph of the Chinese Revolution constituted a second decisive blow, pointing toward the ultimate victory of socialism on a world scale.

Nevertheless both Russia and China were backward, industrially weak nations. In the advanced capitalist states of Western Europe, despite repeated revolutionary crises throughout a 25 year span, the workers proved unable to shake off the grip of bureaucratic leadership and to seize power. Consequently Western capitalism was able, after the second Norld War, to recover some of its strength and to surpass its best pre-war economic performances by a large margin.

The fundamental cause for the rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy was the isolation of the revolution in a backward country. In turn, the bureaucracy has contributed powerfully to the survival of capitalism ever since its rise to power. Its basic line, deriving from the theory of "Socialism in one country" has been to maneuver among its capitalist enemies, allying itself now with one, now with another. In payment for these alliances, the Soviet Union has used its decisive influence over the world Communist movement to put working class movements everywhere at the service of its allies.

Stalin's policy reached its apogee in the world war II "Grand Alliance" with Chiang Kai Shek, Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle. At the conference of Cairo, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam the Allies decided the post-war division of the world.

The Communist parties or Europe proved to be the decisive force maintaining capitalism in existence, both by their role in the post war coalition governments and by their perpetual efforts to prevent the workers from taking the path of revolutionary struggles. In payment for this service Stalin was allotted the Eastern-European countries as his share of the loot.

But by 1947 the wave of revolutionary unrest had subsided, and the capitalists now felt strong enough to tear up the previous agreement. With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, combining preparation for a new war with an attempt at economic penetration of Eastern Europe, U. S. capitalism called for redivision of the world. The Chinese revolution meant a drastic intensification of the Cold War, and with the Korean war both sides plunged into an all out arms race, keeping the world in a situation where war remained perpetually a sword of Damocles suspended over the heads of the entire human race.

The danger that the struggle between the US and USSR will erupt into a third world war is not the equal fault of the two camps. It was the U.S. which used atomic weapons against the civilian population of defeated Japan in order to threaten its Soviet "ally." It was the U.S. whose generals repeatedly speculated on "preventive war." It was the U.S. that several times went to the "brink" of world war. It was and is the U.S. which has surrounded the Soviet Union with a global network of atomic bomber and missile bases.

There are no drives to war in the internal economic structure of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet economic system investment is not regulated by profitability but by more-or-less rational economic planning; therefore a problem of over-investment is unthinkable. Conquest of foreign territories would not be of great advantage to the Soviet Union: bureaucratic plunder of the Eastern European

countries did help the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet Union, but since 1953 the buffer-zone has in consequence become an economic burden for the Soviet Union. Peace, on the other hand, is a necessary precondition for the growth of a planned economy.

The U.S., on the contrary, had powerful motives to go to war in the 1945-1952 period. It had been the only real victor in the Second World War, ended the war with the worlds greatest military power, and for most of the next decade retained a virtual monopoly of atomic weapons and the means to deliver them. By a victorious war it could hope to recapture the territories that had been lost to capitalism in Russia, Eastern Europe and, after 1948, China.

Fortunately, powerful forces held the U.S. back at the brink of war. In 1945 mass demonstrations by the soldiers abroad and an enormous wave of popular sentiment at home forced the government, against its will, to demobilize the great bulkof the army. The European capitalist powers were too unstable to undertake a new war and the British election of 1945 showed the potential strength of the socialist and anti-war aspirations of the European working class. The unexpected power of the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean revolutions proved to be another powerful factor reversing the 1945 balance of power.

Today the world seems to have retreated far from the brink of war. The structure of international politics remains completely unchanged, the cold war continues, but the hysteria, the spectre of imminent war, are no longer present. Since the end of the Korean war there has been a gradual relaxation of tensions, a more "friendly" relationship between the governments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

This welcome development has been the result of new factors that have counteracted the forces that previously threatened to explode. Most striking and obvious of these new factors has been the unimaginably rapid scientific advance of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb well before the U.S. planners had expected, almost caught up with the U.S. in developing a hydrogen bomb, and now has actually taken the lead in missile development. The result has been the present military stale mate, in which destructive power is so closely balanced, that neither side can expect to survive, much less win, an all-out war.

As we have seen, this present balance is in no way guaranteed to be permanent. But while it lasts no conceivable political aims can be achived through world war.

A military-political stalemate, in and of itself, implies no tendency toward a reduction of tensions. It can easily produce the opposite - an intensified arms race. In fact powerful capitalist voices have argued in favor of such a course, on the double ground that, properly mobilized, the much more highly developed U.S. economy can outstrip the military potentials of the soviet economy, and that the Soviet economy will be severly hampered, or even brought to the breaking point, by the burden of an all-out

arms race.

What then are the causes of the decision of the U.S. to permit a reduction of tensions? There are two major factors at work here.

First of all, the years since the end of the Korean war have seen a steady spread of revolution throughout the colonial world, from Asia to Africa to Latin America. Each colonial revolution has shown an inherent tendency to go beyond "nationalist" bounds, to call into question the very capitalist structure of its economy. Military intervention has repeatedly shown itself incapable of preserving the old forms of colonial rule.

The essence of imperialism is not political rule but economic exploitation. Capitalist imperialism has learnt that in the 20th century its economic interests in the colonial areas can be preserved only it it can base itself on "the new elites," only if it can make the colonial bourgeoisie a junior partner in the exploitation of its country. The tendency of the colonial revolution to become a socialist revolution, as in the Chinese, can be blocked only by the nationalist bourgeoisie, under the leadership of such figures as Masser, Soekarno, Peron, Perhat Abbas, Nehru, Kassem.

In all cases, the nationalist colonial bourgeoisie has been able to consolidate its position only under a "socialist" mask. It is able to do this for two interconnected reasons: its ability to maintain a "neutralist" position in the U.S. - U.S.S.R. power struggle and the willingness of the Stalinists to support it, to put the prestige of the Russian and Chinese revolutions at the disposition of the Nassers.

This situation clearly tends to require a relaxation of international tensions, an intense "cold war" would leave little room for neutralism: forced to side openly with the imperialist camp, the colonial bourgeois regimes would find their mass support cut out from under them while the Stalinist parties could no longer give them their open support. Thus in order to stabilize the social situation throughout the colonial world, in order to contain the colonial revolution within capitalist bounds, the U.S. as leader of the capitalist world has been compelled to accept an easing of the cold war. It is in this way that the revolutionary pressure of the colonial masses, even though they have gained no decisive victories anywhere since the Chinese Revolution, has acted as an effective force for peace.

The second major factor compelling U.S. capitalism to seek a let-up in the cold war has been the serious burden of war production. The U.S. economy is now in the latter half of a prolonged prosperity cycle. In this phase long-term inflationary pressure poses problems of continually increasing seriousness. Chief among these problems are a steady increase in wage costs which place a squeeze upon profits that can no longer be counterbalanced by price increases short of runaway inflation; a steady increase in the burden of depreciation and in the price of new capital goods, demanding increased money profits in order to maintain the same rate of real investment; a shortage of new invest-

ment capital forcing a continual increase in interest rates; and an unfavorable foreign balance of payments causing a dangerous rate of gold outflow.

These problems are inherent in the very structure of modern American capitalism, and can scarcely be eliminated by any means short of 1929-type depression. But they all are aggravated by the effects of the \$\pi\$ \$\pi\$5 billion military budget. Though, at slightly over 9% of total production, military expenditures are at their lowest relative level since before the Korean War, they still make up over half the federal budget and have decisive marginal significance: an increase or decrease in the war budget determines whether the total budget will show a deficit or a surplus, and foreign military aid more than accounts for the annual loss of gold.

The effect of arms expenditures is felt most keenly in the form of high taxes. The 52% corporation income tax and upperbracket income taxes cut deeply into available sources of investment capital - the exise tax and lover bracket income taxes cut into consumer purchasing power which could otherwise permit non-cumulative price increases. If taxes are to be reduced so must the war budget. If the government wishes to avoid contributing to the slow inflationary strangulation of American capitalism by higher taxes or by deficit spending, it must not permit war spending to increase.

But, as the Army, Navy and Air Force never tire of pointing out, the arms race requires continually increasing expenditures, with the accelerated introduction of new, more expensive, weapons and the accelerated obsolescence of the existing weapons stock. Stabilization of the war budget is in and of itself a reduction in the tempo of the arms race. And this is scarcely conceivable without a parallel reduction in international tension.

There are nevertheless extremely potent contradictory forces at work, severly limiting the tendencies toward a substantial cut in the war budget. The specific interests of an important section of the capitalist class, which has made huge investments in industries dependent in one form or another on arms production stand squarely in the way of such a course. But even of higher importance is the contradiction between the long-term world political needs of U. S. capitalism and its current economic requirements.

U. S. capitalism must be prepared for an eventual re-emergence of its basic drives toward war. In the economic rivalry between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., an indefinitely prolonged "peaceful" evolution would clearly result in the victory of the U.S.S.R. This is so for the evident reason that the Soviet Union despite its development into a major industrial power, continues to grow economically at an over-all rate better than twice that which the U.S. has attained over a decade of unprecedented prosperity. Capitalist leaders are conscious that, even if the U.S. continues (against all probability) to grow indefinitely at its present tempo, projection of the differential rate of growth will inevitably give world supremacy to the U.S.S.R. and thus spell the doom of capital-

ism. The <u>only</u> conceivable alternative would be a victorious counter-revolutionary war.

But worse. The laws of capitalist economic evolution are now building up toward a crisis of at least the order of 1929. At this stage of history, however, such a crisis would immediately produce the most profound revolutionary upheavals. For self-preservation, capitalism would immediately be forced to seek its salvation in fascism, that is to say, through smashing of the labor movement, militarization of the economy, and imperialist expansion. In such a case, world war III would be inevitable. Inasmuch as the capitalist system is likely to enter a full-scale crisis well before the soviet Union has enjoyed the twenty or so years required to outstrip the U.S., this latter variant is by far the most dangerous.

How can this danger be averted? How can the capitalist war drives be blocked? The leadership of the Soviet Union has proposed, as the path to world peace, the policy of "Peaceful Co-Existence."

In the early days of the Soviet Republic Lenin and Trotsky used the concept of "peaceful co-existence." For the Bolshevik leaders it had this meaning: while recognizing that if capitalism was not overthrown by a European socialist revolution a new armed onslaught against the U.S.S.R. would be enevitable, they believed it was possible to postpone this inevitable war for the duration of "a more or less prolonged period of peaceful co-existence."

The theory of "peaceful co-existence" now advocated by the Soviet leadership differs in one essential from the theory of Lenin and Trotsky. Khruschev maintains that coexistence can last, not for "a more or less prolonged period" but indefinitely - that permanent peace is possible on the basis of co-existence between the capitalist and Soviet systems.

The reasoning supporting the Khruschev thesis is this: Since the end of world war II the international balance of forces has changed decisively in favor of the "Camp of Peace." The soviet Union has reached at least military parity with the U.S., and the pressure of the international working class and the colonial peoples has also weighed into the balance against war. The capitalists today cannot start a war without facing annihilation, and time is running in favor of the U.S.S.R. It will therefore eventually become necessary for the capitalist world to make a general settlement with the soviet Union on the basis of a program insuring permanent peace through general disarmament, increased trade between the two blocs, and a negotiated settlement of major international disputes. The current detente is, in this view, seen as a major step towards real peace.

Does this theory set forth the way to peace? It is of course, impermissible to criticize it on the ground that it contradicts what Lenin wrote in 1921. This is no longer the world of 1921, the international relationship of forces has certainly altered drastically since the last war, and there is nothing inconceivable in the theoretical possibility of a situation in which capitalism

had permanently lost the effective power to start a World War.

The theory of "peaceful co-existence" thus is not to be rejected a priori - but it must still meet the test of application to reality. And this it fails to do.

what does it mean to say that capitalism has permanently lost the ability to make war? Clearly nothing less than that it has been definitively defeated on the world scale. Three Luniks scarcely justify such a conclusion while the soviet Union continues to lag far behind the U.S. in every branch of industrial development. In a really intense arms race the present military parity could not long endure, for the Soviet military effort already involves major economic dislocations and imbalances, and so could not be accelerated indefinitely. In such a situation there can be no automatic guarantee of permanent peace.

Can the other aspects of the coexistence program ensure the maintenance of peace? If real disarmament were brought about, a new rearmament is certainly scarcely conceivable - but for that very reason, in addition to the reasons brought forward earlier, the idea that U.S. capitalism will accept meaningful disarmament measures appears virtually utopian. Similiaryly, in regard to a major increase in trade with the soviet Union, U.S. capitalists like Rockefeller have already made clear their principled oppo-For such class-conscious leaders trade with the Soviet Union amounts to helping in a process which will eventually destroy their own system. Therefore they pose as a precondition the acceptance by the Soviet Union of "normal" capitalist practices concerning contracts, patents, credit arrangements. Their terms would involve the virtual destruction of the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade and the opening of the soviet bloc to Western economic penetration, eventually leading to the restoration of capitalism.

On the third point of the "co-existence" program, big-power negotiations, the capitalists have no principled objection - quite the contrary. Negotiation is the normal <u>rule</u> of international life through all its phases up to and even beyond the outbreak of total war. At the ambassadorial level the negotiations between Washington and Moscow stayed open even at the height of the "Cold-War."

The essential question is not the <u>form</u> of negotiations but their political content - the political aims of the negotiating parties, the political agreements at which they can arrive. Coexistence is <u>by definition</u> a process of continual negotiation, whether at the summit or at any other level. It is a process which takes place in the terms of power politics.

In these terms what is the real meaning of the Khruschev "co-existence" policy? We have seen that the world political situation has not as yet changed qualitatively in such a way as to give "co-existence" in the mouth of Mhruschev a different meaning than the same word had in the mouth of stalin. And this meaning has always been perfectly clear: a U.S. - U.S.S.R. agreement dividing up the world into spheres of influence. The capitalist sector would stay capitalist, the Soviet sector would remain under

the yoke of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam agreements were exactly such a "co-existence" pattern. Stalin promised to put the world's Communist parties at the disposal of capitalism to prevent postwar revolution and, as Churchill recognized openly, kept his word with perfect good faith. But the explosion of the Chinese revolution and the reassertion of imperialist war drives as soon as the capitalist system was once more stabilized put a violent end to the Yalta pattern.

In the current conjuncture, what does Khruschev have to offer as his side of the bargain? The Communist parties throughout the Cold War continued everywhere to defend the capitalist system, and the capitalist side can count absolutely on the continuation of this policy. If the U.S. capitalists today have chosen to accept a certain relaxation of international tensions it is, as we have seen, for specific, clearly defined, class reasons. The other side of this is that the moment these reasons cease to apply any coexistence agreement will become obsolete.

The Revolutionary Socialist opposition to "peaceful co-exist-ence" is not based on any denial of the necessity for negotiations between the camps, nor an advocacy of world war as the path to socialist revolution.

nor on a fatalistic acceptance of World War III as inevitable, no. We oppose the international policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy because it is based on the idea of "world stabilization," on the preservation of capitalism wherever it now exists.

In reality the preservation of peace depends not on agreements between the rulers of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. but on the evolution of the world balance of forces. In this balance of forces for a long time to come an indispensable part will continue to be played by the menace of a socialist revolution, particularly in the colonial areas. Insofar as a co-existence agreement would tend to free capitalism from this menace it would strengthen the objective forces for war and against peace.

The struggle for peace is fundamentally identical to the struggle for socialism, for in the long run capitalist society will inevitably face the brutal choice: fascism, war, death or socialism, peace, life. In the short run the chance for peace depends on the course of the class struggle on a world scale, on the relative strength of imperialism as against the working class and colonial peoples. As socialists our struggle for peace merges into our participation in these struggles at every point within our power.

As a revolutionary socialist youth organization, we must combat capitalist militarism at all points, and particularly where it comes into conflict with the immediate needs and interests of American youth. War preparations have been responsible for a large proportion of the violations of civil liberties on the American campus: directly in the form of loyalty oaths, indirectly

through pressure on college administrations receiving large research grants from the Defense Department. Compulsory ROTC is a particularly resented form of military intrusion on the first 2 years of college life for many students. All male youth, not only college students, are menaced by the draft. In fact, as technical progress reduces military manpower requirements the draft bears with steadily greater force upon non-student youth, and this inequality may be expected to produce steadily greater discontent among draftable youth. All youth have already been injured physically by nuclear test explosions, and protests against nuclear tests have found very widespread response among American students. It is our duty to participate in all youth and student struggles stemming from these and similar issues, and, where possible, stimulate and give leadership to specific protest movements.

But in the last analysis our main task in the fight for peace is that which we and we alone can fulfill among American youth: a tireless effort to educate young people to a real understanding of the nature of capitalism and its drive to war, of the hypocritical and reactionary essence of Stalinist (and social-democratic) policy, and of the necessity for socialism as the precondition for real peace.

Report of Young Socialist Activities in Chicago since the

June Plenum, 1959 - by Jack Hirsch

Activities before the plenum consisted of a study group around Warde's <u>Introduction to the Logic of Marxism</u>. The leaders of this class carried on what YS subs and sales work took place in Chicago. It was an informal group having no finances or name and consisted for the most part of Dick F., Jack H., and Tom D.. The relations with the SYCC initially were not very tense. They didn't like the idea, but they didn't openly oppose it.

After the plenum, the story of TS work here is that of forming a new club. This involved getting very close political agreement amongst ourselves first, then following this up with organisational consolidation...and then the leap outward.

On the bus from Washington, New Jersey to Newark, I discussed with Jim L. the tactics of forming a Chicago YS club. We came to the conclusion that there were two alternatives: 1. Taking over the SYCC and changing it to a YS club; or, 2. Forming a separate club. We agreed after some argument that the first tactic was the most desirable. It would, if accomplished, take the organization away from our opponents. This would force upon them the hard task of organizing again if they wanted to continue opposing us. The tactic would also give us recognition at the U of Chicago. We would be also at the head of the tradition of the SYCC. The tradition is not all good, as we know, but stillin the minds of people in the political circles here, the SYCC is associated with the YS more than anything else.

Taking over the SYCC meant that we would have to have a majority. After the plenum, the group of Tom D., myself, Dick F., and Mike V., who had come in from school, oriented ourselves towards getting more people around us. We had asked for recognition before the plenum and now had it. But as I said we had the question of a tactic before us. The tactical question was how, as recognized YS supporters, we should act? ... through the organizational form of the SYCC or in an independent organizational form.

We organized a telephone campaign to get people to the class on Warde's book. We went to a meeting held by the son of an instructor at Henry George School of Social Science. At this meeting we weren't able to get our point of view over very well. After the meeting there was a party where we simply announced our class on Dialectical Materialism and invited everyone to come. The next Sunday afternoon which is when we hold our classes two or three people showed up and were interested. They were high school students.

We set up a meeting at which we planned to take over the STCC. This fell through. We had counted on a person who said he was with us but it became clear to us that he was not yet ready to vote with us yet. So our first tactic failed.

We proceeded with the second tactic: Building a separate club with the purpose of getting forces to take over the SYCC later. We were not sure how formal we should make our new organization and so we simply decided to simply call ourselves a YS supporters group. Our class on economics (leaflet enclosed) is sponsored by the Young Socialist. Even our party on the 26th of September was sponsored by the YS. But I'm getting ahead of myself.

We started having regular business meetings weekly, before the classes and we elected officers: a secretary, Tom D., treasurer, Mike V., and a corresponding secretary, myself. We sent out the class leaflet and got a good response, two girls coming we had never seen before. We got at least four contacts to every class by phoning our contacts beforehand. One class even had twelve attenders. Only in the last few weeks has there been a drop in attendence. I believe this was due to a combination of factors. 1. some overconfidence on our part which resulted in doing less contact work, 2. the beginning of the school year which took some of our contacts to other parts of the country.

Upon hearing news of our successes Ed wrote that letter. In your answer you made the point that all people interested in supporting the YS should join the YS group. This was a new turn, in my opinion. It was a national move in a local situation and represented a change from our tactic of attempting to get a majority in the SYCC. We in the YS group are glad that this organizational step was taken by the national movement, in your person. We think it was a correct move. But it did raise a question in our minds, especially mine, this being: since the national move is correct now, were we correct in trying to get a local majority in the past? Perhaps it was unnecessary waste of time, I thought. I spoke to Jim R. and Rose about this when they came through Chicago and what we all thought after some discussion was that the past tactic was correct and so, also is the present contradicting national move. It was necessary to try and get a local majority, but this was not possible as soon as we thought and it was necessary to do the next thing to further the YS in Chicago.

Jim G. has now applied and has been accepted as a member in the YS group. With school starting our composition has "smallified". Nike V. has gone to Schimer College, and has taken ten YS's with him. Although not yet ready to start a formal club there, he has plans to speak to individuals. Dick F., in spite of our efforts to dissuade him, still plans one of these months to go away for several years. Marilyn McC., a YS subscriber and regular attender of our classes will probably join us soon.

We are starting a club on the U of C campus which has the YSA program but no organizational ties as yet. We set up a booth on "Organization Night", an evening set aside for new students to become familiar with students' organizations. We passed out two hundred of the enclosed leaflet. We got twenty-five signatures on a mailing list and had much lively discussion. Our booth was next to the YPSL's and the main question was what was the difference between us and them.

That's about how it stands now. You will be informed of current developments through the minutes.

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Report received by the Editorial Board - Oct. 20, 1959.

Phelps Letter on Electoral Action

Philadelphia
December 1, 1959

To the Editorial Board re: Electoral action in 1960

(Here is some preliminary thinking on electoral action as a contribution to your current discussion. Sorry I did not have it in to you in time for yesterday's EB meeting.)

There is a need for some sort of youth formation as a vehicle through which we can express our support to and actively campaign for socialist candidates in the 1960 election year. The matter is on the agenda for our next club meeting, Sunday, Dec. 6. We hope to then open a discussion on the question. Incidentally, this will certainly be one of the big questions for discussion-bulletin contributions and I think we can provide good educational material through a well-modulated discussion toward a realistic, inspiring participation in 1960.

In Pennsylvania the Socialist Workers Party and the Socialist Labor Party will be fielding 1950 Presidential tickets — or, at least this is expected unless the ballot rules dictate otherwise. What is to be our relation to them?

First, there is the matter of a choice between the two. This is necessitated because of the tremendous emphasis we have placed in past elections upon the tactic of achieving electoral coalitions on the basis of principled opposition to capitalist candidates. But this choice is quickly resolved on several planes: (a) the YS has a programmatic affinity with the SWP in comparison with the SIP, who refuses to support any of the actions of the working class and Negro people for immediate demands; (b) Who is for a united electoral effort (i.e., who is for a principled and effective socialist electoral block — with us or anyone else)? Certainly not the S.L.P. And, we run the 'risk' of their rejecting our support just as they have rejected our past proposals (made through our participation in the UI-SC). (c) The anti-socialist attacks of the SIP (just as those made by the SP) upon SWP campaign efforts, taking the SWP into the bourgeois courts over the use of 'socialist' in the ballot designation would seem to disqualify supporting the SLP on these grounds alone.

Secondly, how should our support in relation to the socialist ballot party be expressed? That is, how can we best utilize our strength in the campaign — to organize ourselves and other youth for socialist electoral politics? This question must be answered with particular reference to our main orientation: the problem of reaching out to students on campus. I think the answer is partially different for different clubs. Some of the determining factors will be: (a) the club's roots on campus; (b) their past electoral stands; form of participation, etc.; (c) the state of the local radical community; (d) and forces, including the strength of the ballot party in relation to the youth group.

In Philadelphia, I would like to see our club participate in the response to Annette Rubinstein's Call for an Independent Socialist Committee to support Socialist candidates in 1960. I would like us to at least probe what forces lie in this area of response. At the same time it would seem to be a good vehicle for those youth not yet willing to give total programmatic support to a

'ballot' party (or any other kind of party). If, through this form, youth from other groups and right from the campus can be organized around the campaign, it will have served the ends of an advance for the socialist movement in 1960 ... and the same is true if we are able to thereby stimulate adult support for the campaign.

(This, of course, is the result of cautious preliminary thinking. However, it seems realistic. We feel that it will probably be a realistic approach for other areas. In line with this, a national prospect which furthers this approach and which benefits by it should be the concomitant.)

Nationally, I believe Annette Rubinstein's tour can be very helpful as groundwork for student participation in the 1960 campaign. WHATEVER DEVELOPS LATER IN TERMS OF A 1960PERSPECTIVE FOR THE YS, WE SHOULD GIVE OUR PRESENT SUPPORT TO EFFORTS TOWARD AN I.S.C., with which we can play a role and through which we can reach out to campus youth — especially in the initial stages.

I look forward to hearing the fruits of last night's EB discussion. I am sure that my thoughts are not original and are basically embodied in your entire approach; however, the emphasis I hold important — within the context of time and forces — is in the essential, immediate participation in the I.S.C., nationally. That means, especially, in Dr. Rubinstein's tour; our role in getting her on campuses, to talk with key area people, etc..

A. Phelps

