

To the PC: excerpt from Theses adopted at congress of Italian section July 7-10. Rough translation.

II. Build the GCR; Build the revolutionary party!

a) The crisis of our organization.

The Revolutionary Communist Groups, Italian section of the Fourth International, is now beginning to emerge from a period of crisis which had threatened the very existence of the section. What is most pertinent today is not so much to center attention our ~~focus~~ on the objective reasons--which did exist--that obstructed the building of our organization, but to eliminate a series of subjective weaknesses which, if we maintain them or slip into them again, can continue to block our development. We have recognized a number of weaknesses and errors on the political-organizational level, and we intend to confront these problems in a positive sense, making concrete proposals that show how to combine our political orientation with the construction of our organization. These proposals will be further clarified and explained at our ^{Comino} ~~next~~ national organizational conference. Other mistakes, on the other hand, were of a more specifically political character.

a) The vision--held by the majority of the International at that time--of the period as ~~one~~ characterized by the imminence of decisive conflicts. Even if this hypothesis were correct, we should have equipped ourselves for building the organization in the medium-long term through an orientation that would have enabled us to take advantage of these struggles to consistently ~~make~~ reinforce our ranks. But in fact, this prediction contained an underestimation of the hold of the reformist apparatuses and the role played by them; the qualitative leap in the political situation was supposed to occur through a "bypassing"

of the bureaucracy by broad sectors of the masses, led by the anticapitalist and antibureaucratic vanguards, which would be able to do this in a generalized and conclusive manner even in the absence of a revolutionary party.

b) More generally, the false concept that we didn't have the means to build the organization before these "decisive events," which in fact led us to give up any orientation toward building our own organization in the medium-long term; rather it led to an orientation of trying to have an influence on the

most consistent organizations of the far left. This implied an overestimation--in our perspective of construction of a revolutionary party--of the so-called "tactic" toward the far left groups, and had as its result the muddying of our overall political identity. This clouding of our identity and the lack of any credible, centralized perspective for building the organization led our comrades to adapt to the strong localistic and sectoral pressures, to leave the organization, or, if they remained, to give the organization a more and more federalist character.

c) Our inability to confront the problem of building the organization, even if we understood the importance of this on an abstract level, left our comrades vulnerable to movementist types of pressure (the most recent obvious example was in relation to the Movement of '77) and to the influence of the clichés of a far left which tried to address itself to a wide range of problems with sophisticated and articulate arguments but was barren of trad-

itions and wrong in its theoretical suppositions. The progressive loss of our identity necessarily led to a dimming of the very reasons for our existence and of the importance of the intervention of a group--even if small--whose point of reference is the programmatic nucleus of Trotskyism.

Having recognized these errors, the current national congress must achieve a clear rectification of them. This will enable us to map out a comprehensive proposal for building the organization based on our fundamental principles, functionally linked to the framework of political confrontations in which we are operating, and with the understanding, agreement, and involvement of our membership.