Translation

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE FRENCH LCR ON THE CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE TWO ROUNDS OF VOTING (meeting of March 5, 1978)

(For the text of the resolution on the overall political situation adopted by this CC, see ROUGE, No. 495, March 8, 1978.)

The Central Committee minutes are normally distributed via the internal bulletin. There were two counterposed resolutions from the Political Bureau on the question of the campaign between the two rounds: one by Bourgueil (supported by the majority of the PB) and one by Puech (two votes for on the PB). In the course of the discussion, as a result of a disagreement on an amendment, the resolution by Bourgueil was converted into two resolutions: one by Bourgueil and one by Laurent. The results are the following:

-- Bourgueil resolution: 10 for, 19 against, 6 abstentions
-- Laurent resolution: 10 for, 21 against, 10 abstentions
-- Puech resolution: 21 for, 15 against, 2 abstentions

Finally, in the case where the CP calls for standing down, there was agreement between the Bourgueil resolution and the Puech resolution. The disagreements turned around tasks in the case of the CP's not standing down.

THE CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE TWO ROUNDS

For us, this campaign has already begun. But as we have already explained, we refuse to reduce our fight for workers unity to the question of the call for how to vote in the second round. As a result, in our explanations we systematically link:

- challenging the CP and SP so that would unite on the basis of the satisfaction of the main demands and the implementation of workers solutions to the crisis -- the refusal of any austerity of the left.

the struggle for recriprocal and unconditional standing down in the second round in favor of the workers party candidate who comes out on top. While we fight against the refusal of the CP to clearly pledge to vote for the SP (when in the first round the CP yielded places to the progressive Gaullists), we also criticize the SP for its policy vis-à-vis the Left Radicals to whom they have already abandoned a sufficient number of positions to enable them to form a parliamentary group.

These two levels of intervention enable us not only to avoid being opportunist vis-à-vis the SP, but also to counter the "left" language on the theme: we don't want to go into government to administer the crisis and the austerity.

1) IF THE CP CALLS FOR STANDING DOWN

- a) We must nevertheless not make the battle for standing down a simple formality:
- because the effects of the present polemic on the way people will vote on the second round must not be underestimated (due to the harshness of the polemic between the SP and CP, SP members and supporters may refuse to vote for the CP candidate who comes out on top and vice versa -- translator);
- because it is more than ever necessary to give our explanations about the meaning of the class vote in the second round in face of those given by the CP or the SP, waging a special battle in this framework around the question of the Left Radicals and the left Gallists.
- b) Nevertheless, if the CP calls for standing down, the question will appear resolved and the main point of our campaign between the two rounds will have to turn around the meaning that we assign to a

CP-SP victory and the meaning of the battle we must wage so that the CP and SP form a government not in order to make pacts with Giscard and administer the system but to satisfy the demands, break with the bourgeoisie, and implement workers solutions to the crisis.

The situation will thus require that we develop our explanations to the highest level by recapitulating the entirety of our approach of workers unity. That means that in the week that we'll have we must privilege the intervention of the Ligue, the battle around our explanations: leaflet, press conference, public meeting, etc. (as we have already done, we can propose giving speaking time in our meetings to other far-left organizations).

The only organization with which we have a sufficient amount of agreement on workers unity to enable clear explanations is the CCA (Comités Communistes pour l'Auto-gestion). This means that where this organization really exists (especially where there have been mixed candidacies) we would propose a common campaign.

2) IF THE CP DOES NOT CALL FOR STANDING DOWN

a) No matter what forms this refusal to stand down will take, the battle for the call to vote for the workers candidate who comes out ahead will become the question on the agenda. Nonetheless, if we want to wage an effective political campaign vis-à-vis the militants of the CP and prepare for future battles we have to be capable of answering the arguments of the CP leadership.

Marchais explains that the question of standing down, the question of program, and the question of the government are inseparable, since the CP does not want to go into the government to carry out a rightist policy.

For us, the question of standing down is posed in another way: we call for a vote to the candidate of the CP or SP on the second round without programmatic conditions because a defeat of the right and a CP-SP majority would be a tremendous encouragement for the workers.

But we can't content ourselves with answering: "Right now, it's a question of defeating the right, of standing down. Later we'll talk about what a genuine government in the service of the workers would be." Otherwise we will bypass a whole series of questions that the left language of the CP is crystallizing and we will have difficulty taking apart Marchais' arguments to show that ultimately he isn't proposing anything substantially different from the SP.

The guarantee for waging a campaign for unconditional standing down which would have an echo in the CP is being able to respond on both the question of government and of program.

Under these circumstances, one of the guarantees for our being able to bring about the broadest unity around the question of standing down in the factories and trade-union movement is to assure ourselves the means to be able to develop all our explanations on the central political level. Not only on standing down, but on the entirety of our policy of workers unity.

- b) This is why to commit ourselves to a central unitary campaign we can't be satisfied with a simple agreement on the question of standing down. It is necessary that agreement be reached on at least three points:
 - -- a clear criticism of the Common Program;
 - -- the call for unconditional standing down for the candidate of

the CP or SP who is best placed;

-- the battle for a government in the service of the workers; that is, a CP-SP government on the basis of an anticapitalist program. Only the CCA is capable of coming to such an agreement: Lutte Ouvrière and the OCT reject the policy of united front; the OCI reduces this policy to the battle for workers unity. Where the CCA exists, we will be able to wage a unitary campaign with them. In other places this will be solely a LCR campaign.

We'll invite the organizations that signed the agreement Pour le socialisme, le pouvoir aux travailleurs to our meetings, as well as all the workers organizations. If other forces take the initiative to call a meeting on the question of standing down, we'll systematically ask for speaking time.

If for specific local reasons unitary meetings are organized on another basis, this must be approved by the Political Bureau.

c) Once a clear central political campaign has been defined that enables us to put forward all our explanations, we must really take the offensive in the factories (and all the work places) and in the unions on the question of standing down.

The CP's attitude will engender significant agitation such that it will be possible to bring into being on the factory and union levels unitary efforts that go well beyond a simple regroupment of the forces of the far left and which chip off militants of the CP or those influenced by it.

Under these conditions, we must work toward the publication of petitions, statements, etc., on the question of standing down (see the model petition below).

This battle must obviously go through the union structures as much as possible. But faced with the gravity of the situation, we musn't hesitate to find other angles for initiating meetings, getting petitions signed, etc. and trying to systematically publicize them in the factory and the city. The stipulation being that these types of actions go well beyond the framework of the far left and wouldn't simply be actions that can be turned to the account of the SP.

This is why it would be wrong, for example, to want to respond to this situation by an initiative of a petition launched on the national level by one (or several) organization(s) of the far left. We have to work so that, factory by factory, there are petitions or appeals everywhere; we can't lock these kinds of initiatives into the framework of a national petition by organizations which would greatly restrict their base, when on the local level or in one factory such types of appeals will be able to be launched on a much broader basis.

MODEL OF PETITION OR APPEAL

Before the second round we want to recall the demands for which we are fighting against the government and which we want to see satisfied by a government claiming allegiance to the workers (include list of demands).

We know that the mobilization of the workers will be necessary in order that a CP-SP government would satisfy these needs. But we also know from experience that with a government of the right there would be the continuation of austerity and the restriction of liberties; it would be: NO, NO, and NO to our demands.

This is why we call on the workers to do everything possible to

muster their votes in order to assure the defeat of the right by voting for the candidate of the CP or 3P who comes out on top. Not to give these votes on March 19 to the workers party candidate with the best chance of winning is to contribute to the electoral victory of the right and the maintenance of its policy. Not a single vote must be lacking for the candidate of the SP or CP with the best chance of winning.

THE WAY TO USE THE PETITION OR APPEAL

It is necessary to begin now to prepare for such an eventuality in the various mass organizations in which we intervene so that these organizations are ready right after the results of the first round.

In the various mass organizations, we must make sure:

1) that the appeal does not contain any explicit attack on the CP or SP or any explicit reference to their programs;

2) that they explicitly restate the demands and the rejection

of any austerity;

3) that they say that the workers mobilization is indispensable for winning these demands, including with a CP-SP government.

Obviously, it will be necessary on the local level to concretize the call to vote in favor of candidate X of the CP (or SP) with the demand that all the candidates claiming allegiance to the working class stand down in his or her favor.

In the CFDT it will be especially necessary to wage a battle for calling for a vote to the CP candidate where the CP has come out on top. Conversely, in the CGT the relationship of forces only very rarely enables us to get through a call to vote for the SP if their candidate comes out ahead. This is why it will be necessary to get petitions signed by individuals, beginning with signatures of militants who are known in the work place.