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New York, N.Y. 10014  
April 21, 1976

TO ORGANIZERS AND NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed is a draft statement prepared by the leadership of the PST of Argentina explaining their split from the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. Although addressed to the International Executive Committee, the document was not presented at the February IEC meeting. However, Comrade Moreno's remarks to the IEC followed the general lines of this statement. The document indicates it is the position of a number of parties. However, we know that at least one of the parties listed, the Liga Operaria of Brazil, did not discuss or approve the general line of the document.

National Committee members who are in the LTF have already received this document in a mailing from the LTF (March 11). We are making it available to all participants in the plenum since one of the World Movement reports will be taking up the political line of this statement. Even though it is designated as "the first outline" of a draft resolution it remains the only thing in writing that even attempts to explain the PST leadership's break with the LTF.

Comradely,

*Caroline Lund*

Caroline Lund  
SWP National Office

LETTER FROM FORMER LTF MEMBERS TO THE INTERNATIONAL  
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The undersigned are meeting an obligation to explain to the Fourth International the reasons for which they have decided to vote against the LTF proposal for Portugal, why they no longer form part of the faction, and why they continue to vote against the majority position on the Portuguese Revolution (outline).

To the International Executive Committee, February 1976

The undersigned, in their own names and in the name of the Executive Committee of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Argentina), the Liga Socialista (Venezuela), the Liga Operaria (Brazil), the Partido Revolucionario dos Trabalhadores (Portugal), the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Peru), the Liga Socialista (Mexico), [something in Paraguay, but blotted out--translator], and the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Uruguay), undertake the obligation to inform you, and through you the entire Fourth International that they have decided to separate from the Leninist Trotskyist Faction because of disagreement with the line developed in the document, "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution," approved by this faction and published in Intercontinental Press No. 37, 1975 (published in the Internal Discussion Bulletin of the Argentine PST under the title, "Problemas Claves de la Revolucion Portuguesa," Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 4). The main reason for this difference is the refusal of the LTF companeros, especially the leaders of the SWP, to agree with us that "the most important aspect of our activity must be to defend, develop and centralize these embryos of dual power. . ." and that ". . . the manifestations of these embryos have names known to the Portuguese masses. These are: workers and neighborhood commissions, business and building occupations, soldiers committees and assemblies. Our great task is to develop these organs and actions and try to centralize them." (Letter from Nahuel Moreno to Joe Hansen, July 17, 1975, PST Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 2, p. 17.)

Despite the fact that we constitute the large majority of the LTF, we have decided not to contest its name or its organization. This is because the faction has been, in the main, the fruit of the efforts, self-denial and sacrifice of the SWP leadership (sticking to formalities it is more correct to say, a group of SWP leaders). In recognition of this effort and in recognition of these companeros' leading role--which has resulted in so much benefit to our International, we abstain from insisting on the formally "democratic" right that could be ours.

As is implicit in this recognition, we continue to uphold the same criticisms we made earlier of the majority faction, criticisms that lead us to vote against the "First Draft of the Theses for the February 1976 IEC Plenum,"

(PST Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 5). We see no alternative other than to call for a meeting of all leaders of the Fourth International who agree in principle with our criticisms of both documents in order to consider the propriety of constituting a faction or tendency based on a clear political-organizational program.

The ex-members of the LTF who have left it for the stated reasons consider it indispensable to point out the dangerous revisionist tendencies outlined in the document, "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution" and in some other writings by members of this faction. We do this to make it clear that we not only reject this document, in addition we send out our concerned warning against these tendencies.

I) The Strategy, or the Main Task in a Prerevolutionary or Revolutionary Period.

"Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" never indicates that the main task confronting revolutionaries in a period of generalized rise of the workers movement is to develop organs of workers and popular power, whether or not these organs already exist and whatever their characteristics and names if they do exist.

Certain political slogans or tactics are stressed as the main strategic task in contraposition to the above clear Leninist-Trotskyist line. It is insinuated that in a period like this those are the essential kinds of slogans as against "organizational" slogans. The organizational slogans (factory committees, soviets, workers militias) will come along as postscripts, as a consequence of the political slogans. The draft of "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" shows this low regard for organizational slogans better than anything else. The only organizational task put forth here, and this in passing, for the Portuguese workers movement is the creation of unions, without even mentioning the defense and development of the factory committees.

Up to this moment the principled Trotskyist position has been just the opposite. In the first place, every time a process of revolutionary rise in the mass movement has opened, the creation of soviets has been posed as the main task. Thus, at the beginning of the revolutionary rise of the Chinese proletariat in the 1920s Trotsky said:

"The job of the soviets is not simply to call the masses to the insurrection, or to unleash the insurrection, but rather to lead the masses to the uprising, going through all the necessary stages. At the beginning the soviet does not convince the masses with the slogan for insurrection but through other more partial slogans.

Later on, step by step, it leads the masses to this slogan without dispersing them along the way and preventing the separation of the vanguard from the masses as a whole. Normally the soviet is built mainly on the basis of the strike struggle which has a revolutionary perspective ahead of it but is for the present limited to economic demands." (Trotsky, "El gran organizador de denotas," Buenos Aires, Ediciones Yunque, p. 262.)

We are serious about this: the soviet slogan can and must be readied at the beginning of the first stages of mass revolutionary upsurge. But a real progression must be taken into account. The working masses must move toward the revolution and gather under its banner. The soviets are the organizational expression of the centripetal revolutionary development. This implies that during a period of downturn for the revolution when centrifugal tendencies appear among the masses, the soviet slogan is converted into an inert doctrine and, not much better, into the choice of the day for adventures. The Canton experience has demonstrated this in a clear and tragic manner." (op cit, p. 358).

In Spain where there was not a single soviet nor a single factory committee, Trotsky systematically proposed the organization of soviets, by whatever name, from the first moment.

Nahuel Moreno, in his article "Revolucion y contrarevolucion en Portugal" (Supplement No. 1 to Revista de America, July-August 1975), cites some of Trotsky's calls for the development of organs of workers power (juntas), which was "undoubtedly the main task of the day" during all of 1931, as well as his insistence on the same thing following the victory of the popular front in April 1936 (pp. 63-64). Trotsky's preoccupation with the development of the action committees that sprang up in France during the 1936 strike wave is also pointed out in this article (p. 64).

On the other hand, to degrade this principled and essential line to a secondary plane is to ignore the profound transitional, revolutionary and political nature of these organizational slogans. The slogans "Labor Party," "Black Party" or "Chicano Party" in the USA are organizational slogans with a profound political and revolutionary content which is reaffirmed and not negated by the political tactics and slogans we raise in the course of the struggle to bring these organizations into being.

We do not understand why the North American and LTF companeros who give fundamental importance to these strategic tasks of an organizational kind in the USA and never tire of publishing documents explaining their necessity, in turn refuse to raise the organizational-strategical tasks pre-eminently demanded by the prerevolutionary or revolutionary period in Portugal.

The Transitional Program says just the opposite to what the LTF companeros say:

"The problem for sections of the Fourth International is to help the proletarian vanguard understand the general nature and pace of our period and at the proper times provide the mass struggle with organizational measures that are more and more rewarding and combative." (Documents of the Fourth International, p. 192, Pathfinder).

## II) The Role of Bourgeois Democracy and its Bureaucratic and Reformist Appendices in the Revolutionary Process in Imperialist Countries

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According to what flows from the draft of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution" and also from the writings of several SWP leaders, the essential program for the Portuguese revolution at this stage is the development of bourgeois democracy. Democracy so much bourgeois that this draft does not indicate that one axis of the Portuguese revolution was the revolutionary democratic struggle against the church, for the expropriation of its property and for its separation from the state. The agrarian revolution is also forgotten. Nor did it indicate the imperious need to defend such a fundamental transitional, not democratic conquest as the nationalization of more than 70% of the urban bourgeoisie's property.

The final draft has improved or overcome some of these political aberrations by incorporating these points. At first glance it would seem that they have changed the fundamental strategic axis, abandoning the democratic axis in favor of the workers and farmers government axis. But, as is demonstrated by the definitive version of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution," these changes are no more than patches designed to improve the revisionist position of the LTF companeros on bourgeois democracy.

A general theory about the relationship of bourgeois democracy to imperialism and the socialist revolution in a prerevolutionary or revolutionary period springs forth from behind both the draft and the definitive version of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution" as well as from the writings of some of the SWP leaders. This theory is a new edition of Parvus' theory for the advanced imperialist countries.

We can summarize this theory in a schematic way thusly: In the imperialist countries bourgeois democracy is in an absolute contradiction with imperialism, a contradiction that deepens daily. Therefore, we can and we must carry out the workers revolution with a democratic and not a transitional program, although using the method of the Transitional Program; that is, the revolutionary mobilization of the working class. In Parvus' way of putting it: workers mobilization and revolution in order to win a democratic program.

In "Democracy and Revolution," companero Novack says with characteristic clarity that the best defense of democracy is a powerful mass offensive for workers power

and socialism and that this mass offensive "requires the application of a revolutionary program, perspective and strategy. The pivot of this program is the confidence the working masses have in their own independent organizations and mobilizations to protect and extend democratic rights. Decaying capitalism attempts to wrench from the people even those freedoms won in previous struggles." (George Novack, "Democracy and Revolution," New York, Pathfinder Press, 1971, p. 217) (our emphasis).

The SWP comrades confuse an historic tendency with the actual situation of the class struggle. Formal, political bourgeois democracy has not come into absolute contradiction with imperialism and is even further from that contradiction in a revolutionary period. Just the opposite, it continues to be an arm of the imperialist bourgeoisie, it is a part of the bourgeois dictatorship.

Bourgeois democracy would suddenly cease being a vital instrument of the bourgeoisie only if the working class were definitively defeated on a world scale by imperialism (that is, if it became a slave class and was no longer a working class). But in the meantime, as long as the class struggle exists, bourgeois democracy, along with the reformist parties, will continue to be a key piece of the imperialist counterrevolution. If the working class were to be historically defeated, the workers bureaucracy and bourgeois democracy would cease to be tools in the hands of imperialism.

This does not mean to say that we cannot nor should not make tactical use of the deep and significant relative contradictions that regularly occur between bourgeois democracy and imperialism. But these relative contradictions must not be raised to the level of absolute contradictions, even less to the level of a valid program for making the socialist revolution, as against the Transitional Program.

Neither does this mean that in our policy and slogans we should not take into account the "democratic" consciousness or mentality of the working class and the broad masses. We begin with this consciousness and the most pressing needs and go through their experiences with them, but with the aim of leading them to reject, overcome and liquidate bourgeois democracy in consciousness and in fact through the development of the class struggle.

One theoretical consequence of this conception of bourgeois democracy and its relationship to imperialism is directly revisionist: the reformist parties are no longer counterrevolutionary since no one can conceive of these parties without bourgeois democracy. We are not saying they now think these parties have become revolutionary but that, given this conception, they have ceased being counterrevolutionary. If we go very carefully through the two versions of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution" as well as the other writings of the SWP comrades we

shall see that, by omission, there is a clear tendency toward making this theoretical assertion in regard to the Portuguese SP.

In the face of so much reformism the principled Leninist Trotskyist positions on these questions have to be reaffirmed once again.

1. Bourgeois democracy continues to be a tool of the bourgeoisie in the imperialist countries.
2. The class struggle is the decisive factor in deciding the tactical role of democratic slogans in the struggle at any given moment. We defend and develop democratic slogans when they go against the bourgeoisie; we denounce them and attack them when they go against the struggle of the working class. (For example, if during a strike the government invites us to a public debate and a popular vote to determine whether the strike should go on or not, we would accept or reject the democratic invitation depending on which was the best way to bring the strike to victory.)

3. Even when we make use of bourgeois democracy we must make clear to the working class and its vanguard that bourgeois democracy is an arm of the bourgeoisie.

This principled position is in opposition to the conceptions that are currently met with in the International. The majority holds that the revolutionary process will go on restricting bourgeois democracy until the workers revolution totally liquidates it.

The LTF holds to an opposite criterion: bourgeois democracy must go on broadening and extending itself until the workers revolution transforms it into a workers revolution [sic]. This last conception is even rounded off with the assertion that democracy can only be curtailed during a civil war.

On the contrary, we assert that democracy in general and bourgeois democracy in particular is curtailed or broadened in a prerevolutionary or revolutionary period in accord with the needs of the class struggle without waiting for the civil war or the revolution to either restrict or broaden it.

### III) The Constituent Assembly

First of all we want to make it clear that we consider it correct as tactical slogans to pose such points as defense of the Constituent Assembly (CA) against the attempts made by the MFA to dissolve it, and the demand that the mass parties, the CP and SP, form a workers and farmers government and break the pact with the MFA by taking advantage of the majority they hold in the CA. This is correct even though these slogans cannot be used for agitation nor for action and are exclusively propagandistic. These points in "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" are correct, as is

the demand for popular sovereignty and popular suffrage against a non-elected government.

We recognize that during one period we thought the CA was already dead because running on to the end of its term with neither pain nor glory and without the Portuguese masses showing the slightest desire to defend it. Therefore we proposed a new, revolutionary CA. Nevertheless, the facts have turned out differently: The CA we thought was dead decided to lengthen its mandated term although not as the direct result of any kind of mass mobilization but rather as the expression of what is for the moment the top priority counterrevolutionary plan: to drown the Portuguese revolution in the bourgeois parliamentary swamp.

In such a situation these slogans seem to us to be of great importance and they pose the need to complement them with the demand for a government elected by popular vote against the MFA government which no one elected.

Precisely because we do understand the tactical propriety and the great educational and propagandistic value of these slogans dealing with the CA and the workers and farmers government in general (and its particular variant, a SP-CP government based on the CA) we are able to avoid the snare of revisionist content given to these slogans by the LTF leaders. The general revisionist conceptions we singled out in the previous sections are more concretized with brilliant clarity.

The first error lies in not defining the class nature of the CA. The working class has its organs: unions, factory committees, soviets. It is necessary to emphasize that the CA is an organ, not of the working class, but of the bourgeoisie. The LTF gives us a formal, descriptive definition of the CA:

"The only politically representative national body elected by the workers and the masses. . . in which the workers parties have the absolute majority."

This is the classical revisionist method of disguising the class nature of institutions behind the formal facts, such as whether or not they are elected and the proportion of workers parties' representatives in them.

Later on, in their polemic with companeros Frank, Maitan and Mandel, the SWP companeros specifically deny the bourgeois character of the CA by saying that they "overlook the equal sign placed between 'bourgeois democracy' and 'constituent assembly' (by Frank, Maitan, and Mandel), although one would expect that comrades with as much time in the movement as they have should have known better." (Por una linea correcta en Portugal, Supplement No. 2, of Revista de America, p. 32).

Lenin thought the contrary:

"The Soviet Republic is not only the highest form of

democratic institution (compared with the ordinary bourgeois republic crowned with a CA), it is also the only form capable of guaranteeing the least painful transition." (Lenin, El renegado Kautsky, Ed. Cent., 1969, p. 93).

As far as we are concerned, failure to point out that the CA is the maximum bourgeois democratic organ is revisionism. This definition is the only thing that permits us to use the CA tactically in order to educate the workers about the bourgeois, not revolutionary, class character of such an institution. Here we see the other revisionist side of "Key Issues of the Portuguese Revolution." It does not point out that we intervene in and use the CA in order to unmask it so the workers will finally mobilize against it. We use universal suffrage the same way, to suppress it when the moment arrives.

". . . universal suffrage is an instrument of bourgeois domination and. . . only the dictatorship of the proletariat can liquidate this dominion." ("The National Assembly Slogan in China," Writings of Leon Trotsky, p. 167?)

#### IV) The Workers and Farmers Government

It is not necessary to repeat that we agree on the need to incorporate the slogan for the SP-CP to use their majority in the CA in order to install a "workers and farmers government." We fully agree with the LTF up to that point. But from here on we begin to have differences about the workers and farmers government. We believe the LTF has a revisionist position regarding this slogan. Let us see why.

As these companeros see the workers and farmers government in Portugal it has a series of essential characteristics which, as we see it, makes it a bourgeois government.

In the first place, what kind of workers and farmers government does "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" propose when it does not pose the need for an anticapitalist program in order to break with the bourgeoisie? A mere SP-CP parliamentary combination that takes power without a revolutionary program cannot be called a "workers and farmers government." The closest thing to programmatic points in "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" are "the demand that the CA represent the interests of the working masses that elected it and the repudiation of the Pact-program [signed with the MFA] by the workers parties. . . ." (PST Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 2) The first is a generality lacking of significance. How, and with what concrete program is it going to represent the interests of the masses that elected it? The deputies-- who do very little-- perturbed by agitators who would not let them work in peace, voted in the CA for the State of Siege thinking that by doing so they were defending the interests of the working masses. The second point, repudiation of the Pact-program signed with the MFA, is a cor-

rect slogan, but it cannot in any way by itself be the anticapitalist program of a workers and farmers government. The proof of this lies in the fact that even though neither the SP nor the CP has formally repudiated the Pact-program, the crisis and dissolution of the MFA itself is doing away with the Pact-program.

There is, therefore, only one conclusion possible: "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" does not put forth any anticapitalist program for this supposed workers and farmers government. In opposition to such revisionism we maintain, along with Trotsky, that:

"The slogan, 'workers and farmers government' is acceptable to us in the meaning it had for the Bolsheviks in 1917. That is, as an antibourgeois and anticapitalist slogan; but in no case in the 'democratic' sense the epigones later gave it, making over what was the bridge to the socialist revolution into the main barrier in its path.

"We call upon all parties and organizations that support the workers and farmers and speak in their name to politically break with the bourgeoisie and take to the road of struggle for workers and farmers power. Along this road we promise them complete support against capitalist reaction. At the same time we develop an untiring agitation around the transitional slogans which, in our opinion, must constitute the program of the 'workers and farmers government'" (Transitional Program, in Documents of the Fourth International, 1933-40, p. 203) (our emphasis)

Do the authors of "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" believe that the break with the Pact-program is the "transitional slogan" that constitutes the "program" of the SP-CP government?

In the second place, the dynamic of the workers and farmers government, should it appear, is incompatible with the CA since it signifies the last step before civil war. Why is it not said to the workers movement that the installation of this government will be resisted by the bourgeoisie with arms in hand? The SWP and LTF, having indicated that there is no serious crisis in the armed forces, have an even greater obligation: that is, to point out that the MFA will physically and mercilessly crush both the CA and the workers and farmers government it votes in if it is truly an anticapitalist government. Failure to say this to the mass movement is to give the impression that bourgeois organs like the CA and the armed forces can exist side by side with a workers and farmers government without immediate civil war; it is to give the slogan not only a revisionist coloration, but one that is hardly serious and merely propagandistic.

Finally, we say that the workers and farmers government proposed by "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" has no need to prepare itself for civil war with the bourgeoisie

for, at most, this organization is really the CA; that is, a bourgeois organ, since it can be formed without soviets, workers militias or other organs of workers power--the only organs capable of smashing the inevitable blood-and-fire resistance with which the bourgeoisie will frontally oppose an anticapitalist government and program.

The draft of this document, prepared by the SWP, clearly states:

"Dual power does not even exist in Portugal. What have appeared are sporadic and isolated mass initiatives and forms of workers control which can point the way toward the kinds of mass working-class actions in fact capable of establishing dual power.

"Nevertheless, before this can happen key political struggles must be won. The fundamental one is to bring the workers to break with their subordination to the MFA and exercise their right to put a workers and farmers government in power.

"This struggle is at the moment centered on the sovereignty of the CA in which the workers parties have the absolute majority and which is the only national body up to now elected by the population." (PST Internal Discussion Bulletin No. 2).

To sum up: Before organs of workers power can be developed a key political struggle must be won, this is neither more nor less than the installation of a workers and farmers government which means an inevitable civil war.

The final edition of "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" deletes the paragraph we cited, but of course it did not manage to eliminate the fact that this is the spirit of all the documents.

#### V) The Possibility of a Workers and Farmers Government

Although "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" says the proposal for a SP-CP government is "a step to expose the inability of these parties to take this alternative," everything demonstrates that this is not the real thinking of the leading companions of the SWP who drafted the document.

The real political possibility, not just theoretical-historical possibility of this kind of government in Portugal today is opened in the polemic with companions Frank, Maitan, and Mandel.

". . . we do not exclude the possibility that a government not controlled by the bourgeoisie, but which is also not a socialist regime, could come to power in Portugal. We think this possibility is remote but, from our point of view, we do not discard it.

"Lenin and Trotsky foresaw that such cases could occur under exceptional conditions. They characterized this kind of regimes as workers and farmers governments, a transitional form of government.

"The appearance of this government, independent of the bourgeoisie, would open extraordinary opportunities for the construction of a revolutionary party that would rapidly lead the workers to install a workers government. If such a government arises, we are prepared to recognize it.

"Why is it then that comrades Frank, Maitan and Mandel do not mention this possibility since they give so much importance to the political weakness of the bourgeoisie and it is obvious that there is no mass revolutionary party?" (Foley, Hansen, Novack, "Por una linea correcta in Portugal," Supplement No. 2, Revista de America, p.54)

If we make out clearly what this quote says, it means that the leading companeros of the SWP think the possibility exists that the SP could break with the bourgeoisie and take power in Portugal today since a mass socialist party does exist but there is no mass revolutionary party.

We want to make it clear that we do not deny the possibility of this perspective in a theoretical-historical sense, and taking place over several years. We do deny that this perspective is open for Portugal today. "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" holds that "the tendency of the process points to the installation of a workers and farmers government and the organization of soviets on the basis of a workers state" (PST Internal Discussion Bulletin No.4, p. 21).

This statement is politically revisionist for Portugal today both in what it says and in what it does not say.

The assertion that the tendency is toward installation of a "workers and farmers government" means that this is very possible, or at most it means the only possibility to make the revolution in Portugal, even though this is highly unlikely, is to manage that the SP and the CP break with the bourgeoisie and take power in order to establish an anti-capitalist program. This is revisionism because there is not a single chance that the SP and CP in Portugal today will break with the bourgeoisie however great the pressure of the masses. "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" says this very thing in another section and we agree.

The omission in this sentence is much more serious. As the LTF sees it, "the tendency of the process" does not point toward the construction of a revolutionary party with mass influence that can make the revolution. This means that the mass upsurge might force the reformist parties to break with the bourgeoisie, but not that it might split the reformist parties themselves into several massive wings, some of which would orient toward Trotskyist positions; obliged to do so by the objective situation.

We believe exactly the opposite. The Trotskyist parties and groups can only come to have mass influence during a great revolutionary upsurge. Everything will help this come about. This is the tendency of the process and it is the only possibility open for the victory of the revolution and the development of our parties.

There is another contradiction between this sentence and the rest of the document, "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution." If the tendency of the process points not only toward a workers and farmers government, but also to the organization of soviets, how explain the political line of "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" which has a workers and farmers government as its axis but does not mention, even in passing, the "organization of soviets" or similar variants? Is it perhaps that the workers and farmers government will come first and after that the soviets? If so, does this not mean that first comes the antechamber of the dictatorship of the proletariat (the workers and farmers government) and afterward the organs of this dictatorship? Finally, one question that sums up all the others: Must we or must we not provide a slogan and a policy to develop the tendency toward the "organization of soviets"?

Posing these questions and seeing the LTF's replies leads us to one conclusion: the SWP leadership has adopted the revisionist line of denying the soviet strategy during a prerevolutionary or revolutionary period, as it has abandoned the construction of a revolutionary party with mass influence as the only certain possibility at this stage for the victory of the revolution in Portugal.

#### VI) A Dialogue that Demolishes a Political Line

Three very strong circumstances had to merge in order to oblige the three SWP companeros who polemicized with companeros Frank, Maitan and Mandel to make a 180-degree turn in their revisionist political line and slogans. These are (1) the polemic itself, (2) the tremendous pressure of more than three decades of defending, teaching and writing correct Trotskyist positions, and (3) the reality of the Portuguese revolution. Foley, Hansen, and Novack write:

"Our comrades would have directed themselves to the workers in the following way: 'We don't have the least confidence in the Constituent Assembly. Neither do we trust the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties. But you don't agree with us. Alright. Then, why don't you demand of your leaders that they carry out the program they proclaim is to establish socialism in Portugal? The majority of the population has just expressed its desire for this in the most emphatic way. Why don't you demand that they go ahead and establish a workers and farmers government to replace the MFA regime? We will support you in your struggle for these demands.

"Nevertheless, we think that if you put them to the

test you will agree with us that they are fakers who in reality are serving as political agents of the bourgeoisie.

"And don't you think it would be a good idea to broaden the factory committees and neighborhood commissions and the committees in the armed forces and coordinate them on a national scale in order to organize ourselves in such a way as to exert the greatest possible pressure and to unite our forces in the struggle? And don't you agree it would be prudent to begin to organize defense units in view of the obvious intentions of the rightists to destroy all the conquests we have won up to now and to reinstall a totalitarian regime?" (Foley, Hansen, Novack, "Por una linea correcta in Portugal," Supplement No. 2, Revista de America, p. 31).

We can do no less than totally agree with the commentary they make in this dialogue. "Such a posture is completely principled." We would not have been quite so forceful in a real dialogue, neither would we have proposed "defense units" only to fight against the right. We would have followed up on the reasoning in order to raise the following: In case such a government is installed there will be civil war and we must be prepared to defend it by arming the workers. Continuing with this logic, we would have said that we have to do work in the army in order to destroy it because the army will fight with arms in hand against this government. That is, we would be on the alert against not only the right, but also and essentially against the bourgeois government and the armed forces. But these are tactical differences: the important thing is that we are totally and absolutely in agreement that this dialogue represents the only correct policy in Portugal.

But this dialogue goes against the line of "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" in its draft form as well as in its definitive form, and it goes against everything the SWP companeros have written.

The real objective, the principal strategy, the line of this dialogue is not to fight for the CA (in which they don't place "the least confidence"), nor is it for a "SP-CP government against the MFA because these parties are "fakers," "political agents of the bourgeoisie." Rather, this dialogue looks for the means to obtain the development of organizational forms for the workers and mass movements that will allow them to mobilize in a revolutionary way; and it starts at the present level of consciousness of the mass movement. In keeping with the language as well as the politics of the dialogue the explications as well as the slogans are organizational: "Extend factory and neighborhood committees, coordinate them on a national scale," as in "organize defense units."

We leave aside the fact that the existence of dual power in Portugal is accepted in this dialogue. Our line has always been just exactly the same as this: the great permanent, decisive and fundamental task in revolutionary Portugal today is: "extend the factory and neighborhood committees

and the committees in the armed forces and coordinate them on a national scale" as well as, "organize defense units" and work in the armed forces in order to destroy them.

This dialogue, which fully conforms to our political line, could be wrong if the person using it does not agree that it should be modified to the degree that the circumstances of the class struggle continue to change. We say this because we honestly believe that this dialogue is very useful propagandistically but is not to be used in practice immediately. The immediate reality will be great mobilizations around economic and work problems of the working class and, possibly, against the right which is raising its head. But they will not be for the CA or for a workers and farmers government.

If these great economic struggles and strike against the hunger and unemployment plan of the government do not materialize we will still believe that the following kind of dialogue is required:

"We don't have the least confidence in the leadership of the SP, the CP, or Intersindical in the fight against the government's plan to actually lower wages and increase unemployment, because these leaders collaborate with the government in imposing the antiworker plan. But you don't agree with us. OK. Why don't you demand that your leaders defend the wages and give work to the unemployed? Why don't you demand an economic plan to overcome the crisis?"

From here on we would continue with the earlier dialogue: "Why don't you demand that they go ahead and establish a workers and farmers government," etc., ending by calling on them to raise the same organizational slogans, complemented by others like factory and union assemblies, picket and strike committees, Intersindical and workers commissions' congresses, etc.

As we see it, the themes continue to change, but the conclusion, the principal theme is always the same: "extend and develop" the already existing committees and found new ones. That is, the strategic objective is present at all times: extend and coordinate the existing organs of workers and popular power. What we begin the conversation with is tactical, the circumstances of the moment; what we end it with is strategic.

We call upon all companeros of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction who truly believe in the Trotskyist program and in this dialogue to reject the positions in the document, "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution," which has a political line directly opposite to both.

A VERY IMPORTANT NOTE: This is the first outline of the draft resolution. Therefore its circulation must be extremely limited.