forum

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Minutes of January National Committee Meetings

and numerous articles, documents and leaflets for the elucidation of the masses





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FORUM Policy

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Bourgeois Parliamentary Procedure — Mike Parker

Many comrades used to movement rules of procedure at meetings have a difficult time at union meetins, conventions, etc. which stick (or more often claim to stick) to Roberts Rules of Order. For the convenience of such Comrades a summary of the various rules are contained on the rev. page. This table doesn't contain all of the fine points but should put you ahead of most of the phony parliamentarians that abound at such meetings. A few additional points:

1) Only one motion at a time may be on the floor and there is a strict rule of precedence. The motions on the reverse of the page are listed in order of precedence.

2) To Take From the Table: Because it is so easy under Roberts to table something (no debate, majority vote) it is also eady to "Take from the Table". Takes precedence over no pending question but has the right of way over new main motions is business of this class is in order.

3) To Reconsider: Introduction of motion is privileged (may interrupt business) but consideration has same rules as main motion. Once motion to reconsider is made, no implementation of original motion can be made. If reconsideration is carried, then business reverts to situation just before vote of original was taken (i.e. debate is on motion to reconsider - no debate on original motion). Motion may only be made in same session or next session of meeting. After that motion to rescind is required.

4) Point of Parliamentary Inquiry Directed to chair, may interrupt speaker if necessary.

5) Point of Information: Directed toward person who has floor, he may or may not choose to entertain information. Comes off speaking time of one who has floor.

6) Call for a Division: Any individual has the right to call a Division (a count of the Ayes and Nayes) in any case where he doubts the decision of the Chair on a voice or hand count.

7) Debate: Unless other rules are provided for debate, the rules are that everyone may speak twice on each debatable question before the body for no more than 10 minutes each time, except that no member may speak a second time when anyone who has not spoken once desires the floor.

8) Call of Move the (Previous) Question: In Roberts, there is no distinction between "call" or "move" the previous question, and the procedure is that the body votes on whether it wants to end debate (2/3 necessary). Normal usage, however, is that somebody calls the question. If anybody objects, the question is not called and debate continues (usually the chair recognized the person who objected.) If somebody wishes to force a vote on closing debate he "moves the question."

9) Votings: In all cases unless otherwise specified in by-laws or constitution, majority or 2/3 refers only to those voting ayeo or nay (e.g. a vote of 3 in favor, 2 opposed and 346 abstaining is a majority vote and the motion passes). Motions which are not passed are defeated - i.e., a tie vote means a vote is defeated.

10) Quorum: The presumption is that a quorum is present unless a Quorum call is made. Thus business is official even if conducted without a quorum so long as no one calls for a quorum. A Quorum call can not be called out but must be made by someone who has the floor under normal procedure. Once a quorum call has been made and it is found that there is not sufficient quorum, then the only official business that can be conducted is setting the time of the next meeting and/or measures necessary to achieve a Quorum.

ALL OF THE RULES AT A GLANCE

	Motion	Debatable	Amendable	Requires a Second	Vote Required	In Order When Another Is Speaking	Can Be Reconsidered	Motions to Which It Applies	Motions Which Apply to It
PRIVILEGED MOTIONS	Time for Next Meeting (when privileged)	No	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	No	None	Amend
	Adjourn	No	No	Yes	Majority	No	No	None	None
	Recess	No	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	No	None	None
	Question of Privilege (treat as Main Motion)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Majority	Yes	Yes	None	All
	Orders of the Day	No	No	No	None; it takes ⅔ to postpone special order	Yes	No	Any special order	None; except to postpone orders
INCIDENTAL MOTIONS	Appeal	No	No	Yes	Majority	Yes	Yes	Any decision of the chair	Lay on table Close debate Reconsider
	Point of Order	No	No	No	None; unless appealed; then majority	Yes	No	Any motion or act	None
	Objection to Consideration of Question	No	No	No	⅔	Yes	Yes	Main questions and questions of privilege	Reconsider
	Reading Papers	No	No	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	None	None
	Withdrawal of Motion	No	No	No	Majority	No	Yes	Any motion	Reconsider
	Suspension of Rules	No	No	Yes	⅔	No	No	Any motion where needed	None
SUBSIDIARY MOTIONS	Lay on the Table	No	No	Yes	Majority	No	No	Main questions, appeals, ques. of privilege, reconsider	None
	Previous Question (close debate)	No	No	Yes	⅔	No	Yes	Any debatable motion	Reconsider
	Limit or Extend Limits of Debate	No	Yes	Yes	⅔	No	Yes	Any debatable motion	Reconsider
	Postpone to a Definite Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	Main motion, ques. of privilege	Amend Reconsider Limit or Close debate
	Refer or Commit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	Main motion, ques. of privilege	Amend Reconsider Limit or Close deb...
	Amend or substitute	Yes	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	Main motion, limit debate, refer, postpone, fix time of next meeting	Amend Reconsider Close debate
	Postpone Indefinitely	Yes	No	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	Main motion, ques. of privilege	Limit or Close debate Reconsider
	MAIN MOTION	Yes	Yes	Yes	Majority	No	Yes	None	All
	Reconsideration*	Yes, if motion to which it applies is debatable	No	Yes	Majority	Yes	No	Any motion except adjourn suspend rules lay on table	Limit debate Lay on table Postpone definitely
	Rescind*	Yes	Yes	Yes	⅔ of members present; majority when notice to rescind was given at previous meeting	No	Yes	Main motions, appeals, ques. of privilege	All

*These are treated as if they were main motions.

THE WORKERS PARTY AND THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM

By Ernest Erber

(Outline of two lectures delivered before Local Philadelphia of the Workers Party, June, 1944.)

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1. Socialist Programs Have a Scientific Basis
2. How Our Scientific Program Was Developed
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I N T R O D U C T O R Y N O T E

The recent pre-convention discussion in our party stimulated a widespread interest in the theoretical roots of our program of transitional demands. A number of branches organized educational discussions in response to this interest. However, their efforts to find available reading matter on the question were not very fruitful. The National Education Department was not in a position to undertake the preparation of new material on the subject. It decided to reissue the only study outline the Party had published on this question in the past and which was no longer available.

This outline was first presented in the from of two lectures to the Philadelphia Branch in the Summer of 1944. The date of its writing should be noted in view of the fact that some of the references to the post-war period are general and on the historic scale, rather than attempts at precise relation of the transitional demands to a concretely analysed post-war economic situation. It was thought advisable to leave the outline in its original form and get it into the hands of the party as soon as possible rather than delay it for necessary revisions in line with the more exact analysis of the post-war situation made by our party today. Another reason for the decision to refrain from a re-writing is that the National Educational Department plans a much more thorough and comprehensive study outline on this question. It will appear as one of the Blue Cover Series. Until then, the present edition should prove a valuable stop gap.

Ernest Erber
National Educational Department

WHAT IS A PROGRAM OF "TRANSITIONAL" DEMANDS?

1. Socialist Programs Have a Scientific Basis

Socialists, that is, Marxists, differ from all other political movements in that their activities are based upon a scientific examination of the sociaty we live in and its history.

This examination of society and its history, begun by Marx and carried on by other great Socialist thinkers, has resulted in a whole series of conclusions. The latter have been tesèed against the background of nearly 100 years of histroy. They have been riched, expanded, added to, or altered in the light of experience. This series of conclusions or body of theories is the scientific program of our movement.

The main tenents of this program are:

(a) the theory of historical materialism

(b) the labor theory of value and surplus value

(c) the theory of the class struggle

(d) the theory of the class character of the state

(e) the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and

(f) the theory of the classless society of socialism.

2. How Our Scientific Program Was Developed

Socialism, that is, Marxism, is a science.

Its theories are, therefore, developed like those of any other science, i.e., by a sober, scientific analysis of all facts, data, and experiences at hand. The materials that the Marxian scientist deals with vary from the history of revolutions to a government census report, from the trends of international tfade to the lessons of the latest strike.

However, no matter what his materials, the Marxist seeks always to produce one thing: a truthful statement of conditions and of their trend or direction of development. In this he yields neither to the pressure of the ruling class nor to the prejudices of the workers. Once the Marxist deviates from seeking the truth, in order to please this or that interest, he becomes a navigator without a compass and sinks to the level of the politicians and professors of capitalism who lie and deceive for a living.

Marx began the great work of seeking the truth for the working class. He developed our philosophical views (dialectical materialism), our method of interpreting history (historical materialism),

our analysis of capitalism (labor theory of value), and our understanding of the class struggle. This work was carried on by Lenin who developed our views on the nature of the state, on the need of a revolutionary party, on the form of the proletarian dictatorship, and on the nature of the proletarian revolution. These views were further enriched by Trotsky with our theory of permanent revolution. In addition to these there have been countless other contributions, great and small, by the many thinkers and activists of the working class movement of many countries.

All of these theories lead to the one final conclusion: that capitalism is unable to continue and must give way to the Socialist Society.

As active participants in the making of history, Marxists aim all their activities toward that final goal: to abolish capitalism and establish Socialism

3. Can We Educate the Working Class to Socialism?

If we are to abolish capitalism and establish Socialism we must have the power necessary to do it. This requires that we have on our side the active majority of the population, above all, the decisive majority of the wage workers.

How can they be mobilized behind our movement to establish Socialism?

We attempt, of course, to educate as many as possible to understand our scientific program. However, the conditions of life under capitalism are such that the great mass of the workers are not able to study and learn the involved and complex theories necessary for such an understanding. Only an exceptional handful or workers are in a position to do this.

A large number of workers are able to understand our views about the need to abolish capitalism and establish Socialism. The worker has much experience with capitalism that makes him sympathetic to what we say. Our description of what Socialism is and how it will work sounds attractive and practical to him. But this understanding, too, comes only to a minority of the workers. The combined forces of capitalist propaganda through school, press, radio, movies, church, and other means closes the minds of most workers to an acceptance of Socialism as a practical solution to their difficulties.

Meanwhile, the conditions of capitalism force the mass of the workers, regardless of what they think of Socialism, to constantly struggle for a better livlihood, or at least to defend what they have. As part of the working class, we Socialists take part in this class struggle. Because we have a scientific program we do not take part blindly as do the mass of workers. We know the causes of the struggle, we can interpret its stages and we know the ultimate solution, Socialism.

But it became obvious to Socialists almost from the outset that it was quite impossible to give the workers any guidance or direction in the day to day struggle if the only goal the Socialists aimed at was Socialism. To achieve Socialism would truly win the class war for the workers. But before an army can win a war it must win battles. Each battle aims at a certain immediate and practical goal. Once this is achieved, the army aims at the next objective. To give intelligent direction to the working class in its day to day struggle the Socialists developed a program of:

4. Immediate Demands

The immediate demands raised by the Socialists varied, of course, from country to country and in accordance with the prevailing conditions.

However, they all had one thing in common: they were demands that could be achieved within the framework of capitalism.

It was highly improbable that most of them would be realized under capitalism. However, what we must remember is that their adoption would not require a break in the system of capitalist property relations.

Such immediate demands usually were of two general catagories, political and economic.

The political demands were concerned with the establishment and expansion of democratic institutions, Socialists living in monarchies, like Germany and Russia before 1914, called for a republic. Socialists in France called for women's suffrage. Socialists in America called for direct elections, abolition of the Senate, election of all judges, referendum on war, etc. These are examples of the political demands.

The economic demands were concerned with improving the wage earners' position. They were demands for unemployment insurance, old age pensions, eight hour day, adequate relief for the needy, public works, jobs for the unemployed, etc.

The Socialist programs before 1914 were therefore written in two distinct sections. The first section was a statement of the scientific program of Socialism. The second section was a statement of the immediate demands for which the Socialists asked the workers to fight as the next stage in their struggle. They were often referred to as the "maximum" program (i.e. Socialism) and the "minimum" program (i.e. reform under capitalism). The classic Erfurt Program of the German Social Democratic Party (published in this country under the title of "The Class Struggle", by Kerr and Co.), written by Karl Kautsky, was an example of this. It in turn was the model for practically all the party programs of the old Socialist International.

What happened in practice with these programs? Did they serve as an effective guide to the Socialists in leading the working class and fighting for Socialism?

What happened in practice was that a great gulf was created between the "maximum" and the "minimum" demands. The "maximum" demands became the basis for holiday speeches and manifestoes, as on May Day. The "minimum" demands became the basis of the day to day work in elections, trade unions, and in legislative bodies. The pre-war Socialists found no way to bridge the gulf (no that they tried). The out and out reformists in the party said that Socialism would be the result of a gradual achievement of more and more immediate demands until capitalism would grow into Socialism almost unnoticeably. The orthodox Marxists opposed this concept of piecemeal Socialism and said that Socialism would be the result of a catastophic end of capitalism and the introduction of a Socialist order. But until then they too saw in the immediate demands the only practical basis of day to day struggle. They looked to the workers beeing educated in this day to day struggle until a majority were prepared to fight to the "maximum" program of Socialism. Meanwhile the gulf remained unbridged.

5. Lenin Finds a "Transitional" Bridge

The program of the Russian Socialists (both Menshevik and Bolshevik wings had the same program) was based on Kautsky's Erfurt Program. It was superior to the latter in that it restored Marx's classic phrase of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in place of Kautsky's more general wording which indicated that the working class would rule through a parlimentary democracy. However, it too followed the classic division of a "maximum" program and a "minimum" program. This sufficed throughout the years of preparation for the revolution. The Bolsheviks educated a generation of Marxists on the basis of the scientific program of "maximum" demands and steered the party through periods of upheaval and of reaction on the basis of their "minimum" program. (The latter was condensed for popular presentation into the so-called "three whales" of Bolshevism; the republic, land for the peasants, and the eight hour day.)

However, in the summer of 1917 the economic and political situation of revolutionary Russia was such that the "minimum" program no longer sufficed. The old order had broken down and the government showed no signs of being able to keep the cities from complete starvation. Production, transportation, and distribution were rapidly reaching a state of complete paralysis. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had become a tremendous force and were seriously aiming at taking power. They already had a majority of the industrial workers behind them. These were traditionally Socialist in their views. The Bolsheviks had won them over by showing that they fought consistently for a Socialist solution. But the millions of peasants, the middle class, the peasant soldiers in the garrisons and at the front, and the less advanced workers, first had to be convinced that the Bolsheviks deserved power on the basis of a practical program. Lenin gave them such a program.

In this program Lenin took a completely new point of view. Whereas the old programs proceeded from a division of those demands that could be achieved under capitalism and those

that could be achieved under Socialism, Lenin proceeded by asking, "What is necessary to solve our problems?" and proceeded to give the answers without regard to "whether it can be achieved under capitalism" or not.

He pointed out that economic chaos would engulf the country unless they immediately brought about the unification of all banks, the nationalization of all monopolies and trusts, the opening of all books and accounts of the capitalists for inspection by the workers, etc. All of this must proceed under the control of the workers through their elected committees. Was this Socialism? Of course not. Was this capitalism? Hardly. Would it work? Was it a stable plan? Lenin offered no guarantees. This is at least a solution in the right direction.

But the Kerensky government will not adopt this program, the workers answer. And Lenin says, "Of course not. That is why we must transfer all power to the Soviets, that is why we need a government of the workers and poor peasants."

The old "maximum" program gave the workers a glimpse of the Socialist future. It showed them the whole s-stem and all of its workings. But it seemed too far away for most workers to see and understand. Lenin took the workers right up close. They could not see the whole thing. They did not know how its various parts would fit together. Nor did they care. This was for hte bourgeois economists to worry about. The workers looked into a window marked "nationalized banks" and it looked like a practical proposition. They supported it. And to achieve this and many other solutions they placed the Bolsheviks in power in the Soviets and the Soviets in power in the country.

Lenin had "sold" them on Socialism without regard for labels.

Lenin's program to fight economic chaos was not the presentation of the Socialist future as the alternative. It was a program of drastic, yet practical, proposals for a way out of the crisis. It was offered without regard for the "limits of capitalism". Actually, it was impossible to achieve this program and leave capitalist property relations undisturbed. But the masses said, "Give us the solution and let capitalism take care of itself."

Lenin said his program "is not yet Socialism, but it is no longer capitalism."

Lenin had found a program of transiton from capitalism to Socialism. That is why his demands were referred to as"transitional" demands and his program a "transitional" program.

Lenin had found the bridge between the immediate demands of the day to day struggle and "maximum" demands of the Socialist society.

PART TWO

THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM ON THE AMERICAN SCENE

6. Can the American Working Class Be Educated to Socialism?

The American working class lags behind that of every other country of the world in its political development. With the exception of England, the workers of every European country have in the past espoused Socialism in some form as the goal of their struggles. Even the English Labor Party has adopted its own brand of Socialism as the goal of the class struggle. But the American working class has for a hundred years of organized existence remained immune to a Socialist perspective. The historical reasons for this are the subject for a separate study. What concerns us now is the inescapable fact that the American working class has lived through a world war, through a decade of economic breakdown of capitalism, and now through a second war without showing any signs of the acceptance of Socialism as the alternative to capitalist society.

It is now the year 1944. The prospect for the post-war period is one of turbulence and violent social conflicts. The workers will learn much in this period. But who will say that there is still time in America for the piecemeal education of a Socialist working class? The great struggles are too close upon us. The final decisions between the working class and fascism will certainly come long before a Socialist working class will be trained. Yet the great social struggles and the rise of fascism will pose the Socialist solution squarely before the workers. How will they come to accept Socialism?

7. The American Working Class Will Accept Socialism in Form of a Series of Specific (Transitional) Solutions

Historical development has cast the thinking of the American workers in the most piecemeal, day-to-day "practical" form. They have, consequently, rejected Socialism in theory. But they will be all the more practical in accepting it in practice.

How else will the workers of this country be able to answer the overwhelming logic of the situation when capitalism can provide no jobs, except through increasingly more radical Socialist measures. Already the post-war plans of most unions show a lack of faith in the ability of "private enterprise" to provide a going economic life. The post-war plans of the UAW go further than any in this direction and link up their planning with great reliance upon government intervention and control over economy, including nationalization of many basic enterprises.

Of course, none of these measures are called socialistic by the unions. Nor will the even more radical steps be thought of as Socialist. Even when the capitalist press will howl "Socialism" and "Communism", the workers will deny it or ignore it. If the banks close down again the workers will become convinced that only

nationalization of the banks can bring security to their savings and their homes. If raw materials and foodstuffs accumulate in the countryside and people are in want in the cities, the workers will become convinced in favor of direct government distribution.

In this sense the redent Brewster "stay-in" is of tremendous symptomatic significance. The contract was cancelled. There was no work to be done. The workers were to go home and look for an employer elsewhere. But the workers thinking transcended these accepted patterns of "wage-slave" behavior. They no longer thought "normally" about a lay-off because down in their bones they felt that these are not normal times and that normal solutions are out of place. The long years of the depression still leave their trace upon the workers' thinking and the long shadows of the coming post-war depression already are cast over their minds. The Navy and Brewster said, "There is no work, look for a job elsewhere." "Why elsewhere?", the workers asked. "We will stay in the plant and look for something to do here. These are our jobs and here we will work. Instead of looking individually for another job we are more secure in staying here and looking for another contract and raw materials with which to work."

The idea of a "stay-in" for a contract and jobs will soon forge a link in the workers' thought to its next, higher stage; workers control of production.

It is in this fashion that the American workers will accept Socialist solutions to their problems and carry through a Socialist revolution.

8. The Nature of the Problems That Will Face the American Working Class

The American working class will only accept such thoroughgoing measures when it becomes inescapably plain to everyone that they are the only way out. The question then arises, "Will the crisis of capitalism prove so insoluble that only these measures can affect a solution?"

The basic premise upon which a program of transitional demands must rest is that the social order is in such a state of crisis that only revolutionary economic measures assure a way out. If such a crisis has not gripped society, if normal measures within capitalism can provide a solution, then a program of transitional steps to Socialism becomes meaningless. Worse, it serves to misdirect the Marxists and throw them off their course so that they lose touch with the main stream of the working class in struggle.

It is our contention that American capitalism has been in a state of crisis since 1929. The days of "normal" capitalism are over for good. The depression of 1929-39 was relieved only by the war, which is but a different form of capitalist crisis. Even if we have a period of "civilian goods" prosperity after the war, it will be both brief and very limited. It may prove that no more

than a year, at most two, will suffice to once more stock the market with automobiles, refrigerators, and radios. If it was possible to turn the nation into an arsenal for the world, it will prove far simpler to turn out an over-production of consumers goods. Nor will such a form of "prosperity" affect the whole working class. Miners, steelworkers and other basic producers cannot be employed on civilian orders at the rate they have been on war work. Unemployment in any one branch of economy means lack of purchasing power for civilian goods and affects, in turn, production elsewhere. One of the worst immediate victims of peace production will be the farmer. The lag of farmers' purchasing power will react swiftly upon industrial production.

The crisis of 1929 was not accidental. It was not the result of one single cause. It was the accumulation of the multitude of contradictions inherent in capitalist economy. These have not been eliminated by the war. They have been held in check temporarily through the operation of the abnormal war-time economy. With peace, the depression of 1929-39 will strike the United States with redoubled force. Events will move swiftly, dramatically and chaotically. From manpower shortages and labor drafts we will pass within a few months to mass unemployment of millions. From rationing and material shortages we will pass within a few months to over-production and stagnating surpluses. From the fever pitch of war we will pass suddenly to the chilling paralysis of depression.

This condition of capitalism is the "final crisis". It is the normal condition for an over-aged and out-dated economic order. The system has been in a state of decay on a world scale since 1914 and in this country since 1929. The depth and range of the decay is so penetrating and all-embracing that no phase of American society escaped its effects. That is why it is proper to speak of it as a "social crisis". This denotes that it is more basic that a conjunctural crisis that capitalism has always known and has always overcome in accepted economic channels. The social crisis will only be overcome by going beyond the framework of capitalism for a solution.

9. Why All Workable Solutions Will Violate Capitalist Property Rights

In the face of such a catastrophic breakdown of capitalist economy, all "immediate demands" will soon appear to be pitifully inadequate. What meaning will it have to speak of public works, adequate relief, and similar measures when 20 million will be unemployed, (i.e. about half of the working class), when many plants will be completely shut down and others will work at 50% capacity, when farm surpluses sill pile up and hungary people will search for a hand-out in cities? Of course, Socialists will fight for immediate demands like public works, jobs and relief. But as a party that offers a way out this would seem fantastically insufficient. And with each month that passes and sees capitalism unable to organize production, the inadequacy of all proposals that operate within capitalist economy will become increasingly obvious.

All sorts of capitalist proposals will deluge the country.

Some will want to tinker with taxation, others with foreign trade, others with government aid to business, others with subsidies to farmers, etc. These will all operate like Roosevelt's "pump-priming". They will produce as much water as was used to prime with. They cannot produce more for the well of capitalism is bone dry.

The workers will hear all this "monkey business" once more, as from Hoover and Roosevelt from 1929 to 1939. It all seems exceedingly complicated to them, really unnecessarily complicated. Soon the charm of the capitalist medicine men will wear off. Workers will realize that these people either don't know what must be done or don't want to do it. The breakdown of one plan after another that limits itself to capitalism will cause the workers to examine, in that characteristically simple and direct approach of the working class, the nature of the problem. Here are idle factories - and here are hungry people. We must bring together idle machines and idle men and we must bring together surplus food and hungry people. Never having been exposed to mumbo-jumbo of a college course in economics, the workers will take the short cut.

They will act the way the Brewster workers approached the problem of lay-offs. "We are laid-off? Like hell. We will stay right here and find something to do." The workers will likewise reason, "We are locked out and left to rot in idleness while the machines rust. Let us take over the factories and set them in operation through our own factory committees."

"But this is illegal," the capitalist press will shriek. To which the workers will answer, "Then it must be made legal. A government which says it is legal for a man to go hungry but illegal for a man to work must be changed. We will establish a government which says it is illegal to lock up a factory and throw men on the streets."

Such thinking by the workers is plainly revolutionary, whether they consider it so or not. It simply means that the institutions of capitalism have come into conflict with the needs of the majority of the people and latter are trampling these institutions underfoot to achieve the right to live.

10. The PLATFORM OF THE WORKERS PARTY As a Transitional Program

The Socialist revolution, however, will not come about as the result of blind action by the masses. The class war is like any other war. The army needs a general staff that plans out the strategy and directs the day-to-day battles. The Socialist revolution is but the last campaign in that class war. The revolutionary Socialist party must guide and direct the actions of the working class toward the logical and ultimate goal of the class struggle, the establishment of Socialism.

As pointed out in the beginning, the whole theory of Socialism is based upon our scientific program. But for the day-to-day

struggle we can only direct the actions of the working class, if we have a platform of demands that coincides with (a) the level of the workers thinking and their demands and (b) the practical answers to the objective problems that confronts us. This is what the platform of the Workers Party seeks to do.

It combines both immediate demands, i.e. those coinciding with the workers current level of thought and demands, and transitional demands, i.e. those that indicate a solution to the deep-rooted social and economic problems confronting the people.

Our transitional demands are no more radical that the evils they seek to combat. Nothing less than these transitional solutions will be worth discussing in the face of the grave post-war collapse of economy.

Of course, they do not sound reasonable to the bulk of the workers today. If it were our aim to sound reasonable to the workers today we could find many pleasant things to tell them. But these would all be either lies or half-thuths. It is not the role of honest Socialists to enter into such lying contests with capitalist politicians who are experts in telling pleasant lies to the people. We set our sights higher and aim to the future when the facts of life will bring home the truth of our views upon the bones of the workers. Yes, we note the level upon which workers think. We try to continually find common voice with them in their daily needs and demands. LABOR ACTION is doing an excellent job of this. It speaks about wages, prices, job freezing, the "no strike" pledge "the Little Steel Formula", and countless other problems that today occupy the thinking of the trade union movement.

But this is only the necessary level at which our public education begins. We would be less than honest and stupidly shortsighted if we did not tell the truth about what the workers will face and how to overcome it. This is the duty of a party that aims toward Socialism. Only in this manner will it grow and wield influence.

It is necessary to say that capitalism will not provide prosperity. That there will be millions of unemployed. That factories will by idle. And at every stage of the workers thinking about these facts, we must indicate along what lines the solution lies. We must seek constantly to push masses into action to achieve this or that object toward a solution. In this way we build the indispensible bridge or transition in the workers' thinking between the immediate problems of today and the Socialist re-organization of tomorrow.

The Platform of the Workers Party stresses three main concepts toward a break with capitalist forms of economy and government. Every step in realizing them will be a step on the road of revolution. These concepts are:

Firstly: Workers Control. This means much more in our use of it than it did to the Europeans. With them it meant the right of workers to examine the corporations' books, to check on profits

on salaries, on other "business secrets". We use it in the widest meaning of independent working class intervention in management and supervision and governmental authority. In this sense we call for workers control of production in industry, for workers control of rationing and distribution, and for workers defense guards to protect the workers' organizations against fascist violence.

None of the above are compatible with capitalism. They all go beyond the framework of the normal relations in capitalist production, distribution and government. Yet in the post-war period when production breaks down, when distribution is strangled by the profit bottleneck, and when fascist violence rises, these demands will achieve the character of increasingly pressing immediate demands.

To the extent they will be realized, they will transter to the working class a measure of power in economy and government -- a revolutionary power. Since the old capitalist state apparatus will still remain and since ownership will still rest with the capitalists, thiswill be a period of dual power. It will be resolved only by the workers learning from their experiences and going forward to complete power or by the counter-attack of the capitalists to break the workers' movement.

To the degree that these transitional concepts are popularized among even limited numbers of workers today, the job of educating the working class to understand what it must do will be immeasurably easier tomorrow.

The second concept that the Platform stresses is the confiscation of the great concentrations of private wealth.

This too will increasingly be regarded an urgent necessity during the post-war economic stagnation. Industrial and business life will practically be at a standstill. Workers will be without wages, farmers without cash for their crops, and small business will fold up on an unprecedented scale. As in the depth of the last depression, people will everywhere ask, "Where is the money? During the war everyone had a pocketful of money. Now it had disappeared." And out of this query will emerge a more and more vocal answer that "the rich have it," that the bloated profiteers of the war are sitting out the depression on their money bags while the "little man" is losing his all. Huey Long caught the popular fancy with his demand that the wealth must be shared. It strikes people as the height of immorality for a part of the population to roll in wealth while unemployment and distress stalk the country. In addition, it seems quite practical to make the plutocrats disgorge part of their booty for the common good. "They have too much. We have nothing. Their system has cornered all the chips. We are broke. If the game is to go on we must have a re-distribution of chips. Give the poor people some money so they can start life over again."

In addition to this great urge toward confiscation of concentrated wealth, there is the very realistic need to find sources of taxable wealth if the government is to finance schemes to revive economy. The last depression saw all sorts pf sales taxes and other indirect taxes levied upon the people. These prove very

unpopular. But beyond this, they are insufficient for any really drastic measures to provide jobs. It is estimated that housing alone will require 50 billion a year if we are to seriously tackle the problem of replacing the slums with decent houses. This is somewhere near half of the present war budget. Such sums can only be spent by confiscatory taxes upon great incomes and a steep levy upon capital wealth. Even the modest programs of the UAW and the CIO would require very heavy taxes upon wealth to provide the funds.

The platform of the Workers Party seeks to educate workers to understand this need. We call for the expropriation of the 60 Families, "the plutocratic 3% of the population who own 96% of the national wealth!" We call for 100% tax on all war profits, above a 5% maximum on invested capital. We call for a $25,000 ceiling on all individual income. We call for a graduated capital levy on all accumulated wealth over $50,000.

These are not"practical," it can readily be seen, if we grant the existence of capitalism. For instance, the expropriation of the 60 Families would mean the expropriation of the capitalist class for all practical purposes. A reduction of war profits to 5% of invested capital would make it unprofitable to operate plants in most instances. The corporation would do better by investing in government bonds. Yet the solution of economic difficulties after the war will make these steps appear as indispensable. The worker will not give a hang whether they can be achieved within or without capitalism. He feels that it is just and moral. Further, he feels that it is necessary. And still further, it appears as a simple and practical procedure.

Thirdly, our platform stresses nationalization. This is the necessary first step in organizing socialist production. When proposed as part of the theory of socialism, American workers find a dozen objections. Yet we have seen how readily in war-time industrial disputes the workers have taken to the idea of the "government taking over." This, of course, has usually been a farce as in the case of the railways and the mines. Yet the important fact for us to note is that striking workers have time and again, when facedwith the problem, declared that they were willing to go back to work for the government but not for private employers. The hostility to "Socialism" seems suddenly to vanish when confronted with a specific situation and a specific way out. Mere government operation of plants, even when legitimately that and not a fake, is not socialism. This needs hardly to be dwelt upon But,if this concept is linked with workers control, it becomes a mighty weapon in forging a transition to the idea of complete nationalization. If we see the Brewster stay-in repeated elsewhere during the post-war crisis, and if the workers advance to demand not only a contract but that the government take over the title to the plant, and,if the workers propose to democratically organize the operation of it, we have wedged our foot into the door of socialism and every advance pushes the door open more widely.

That is why our platform calls for conscription of all war

industries. "Nationalize the banks, big industrial monopolies, and transportation systems. No handing over of government-built and owned plants and facilities to private ownership!"

The already immediate and burning political importance of the government-owned plants indicates how vastly important this problem of nationalization will be after the war. The Baruch-Hancock report seeks to prepare public opinion for re-privatizing the plants. It is extremely important to capitalism that this be done. Yet the political repercussions among the people will be great when they see what now amounts to some 25% of our heavy industrial capacity turned over to private ownership, and that at a time when it becomes ever more evident that private ownership cannot provide work.

Related to the problem of nationalization is the demand for an annual wage. This too cannot be a workable system under capitalism. The chaotic nature of capitalist production requires a very flexible relation with wage laborers. Industry must be in a position to hire in mass when they need them and fire in mass when they don't need them. Only a planned economy can pay an annual wage. Our public education on the demand for an annual wage will prove, if we know how to use it, one of the mightiest levers in our platform. For linked up with the idea of annual wage, which proves extremely popular with workers will be government planning and nationalization. We will press for an annual wage but at all times link it with the need for planning. Without planning an annual wage will prove an illusion. But planning must be nationwide and government directed. This can only work if the government owns the key industries, banks and systems of communication, transportation and distribution. Annual wage, planned economy and nationalization under workers control will prove our three mightiest demands.

11. The Workers Government as the Crowning Demand of Our Platform

None of our transitional demands appear practical without the assistance of a friendly government. The workers think that certainly a congress like the present one and even an administration as allegedly friendly to labor as Roosevelt in the height of the New Deal would oppose measures such as have been outlined. "These are all good but the politicians will never allow it."

To this we answer: "But you say the workers all agree with these ideas once they understand them. If the workers are the majority of the population, as they are, why should they tolerate a government that opposes what they want. Why can't the working class establish its own government - a workers government?"

In this way we crown all our other transitional demands with the demand that becomes a key to their realization, i. e., a workers government.

Just what kind of a government is a workers government? This is open to many possible interpretations. This is exactly as it

must be at present. What is important right now is to firmly implant in the minds of the American workers the idea that they are the mass and they have a right to their own government. Until workers agree to this concept it is useless to discuss with them the exact form and structure of a workers government. They will in all probability first conceive of a workers government in very narrow parliamentary channels, i.e. the election of a workers administration in contest with capitalist representatives. Such a conception is, of course, a tremendous leap forward in the thinking of the American workers.

However, our scientific program of Socialism is based upon the concept that the state is an instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling class, that the capitalist state is built and designed for the purposes of maintaining capitalism, that the lessons of every social revolution have shown that the new ruling class destroys the old forms and provides its own class structure. We understand that the victory of the working class in the struggle for power will establish the working class as the ruling class (dictatorship of the proletariat). The factory committees, trade unions, and workers and farmers councils will be the base upon which such rule will rest. The slogan of "A Workers Government" does not mean some sort of government different from and in addition to this. For us, a workers government, to be truly that, must be a dictatorship of the proletariat. However, we use the slogan of "A Workers Government" to instill the idea of workers controlling their own destiny. They may interpret the exact form of such a government differently at each successive stage of the struggle. We aim, of course, to help them draw lessons from their political experiences so that in the end they will agree with us that a workers government means working class rule based upon the class institutions and organizations of the workers. In this sense we say that the slogan "A Workers Government" is algebra and a dictatorship of the proletariat is arithmetic. We aim in time to concretize the algebraic formula with our more specific formulation.

12. The Labor Party as a Means to Fight for the Transitional Demands

"But how can we get a workers government," the workers will ask. We say that the first thing we need is a party - a party of the workering class. "We must have our own working class party - a Labor party independent of all capitalist parties."

As with the concept of a Workers Government, the workers will conceive of a working class party - i.e. a Labor Party - in very general and usually reformist terms. But that does not mean that we should help him think that way. Our main job is to make him think about the indespensable need of a party of his own - a class party. This too is algebra. We pour one content into it and the workers, still very backward as yet, pour a different content into it. Our point of agreement is upon the need of an independent party of the class to establish the voice of the working class in control of government.

It is our task to tell the workers the truth. We must always base ourselves upon the objective situation as we analyze it and understand that sooner or later developments will press our solution upon the mass of workers. That is why we call for demands that are an economic and political transition to Socialism. We frankly and bluntly say that short of these demands there will be no serious dealing with economic breakdown after the war. We also frankly say that if the workers want to achieve these demands they must have a workers government. And we are equally frank in telling the working class that the first step toward a workers government is the organization of its own class party dedicated to this program. That is why our Workers Party platform is also a platform for the coming Labor Party. That is why we propose it in part, and sometimes in total, for adoption by the Labor Party movement.

Will we succeed in this? This is quite unlikely at present. However, here and there aspects of our ideas will find their way into the thinking of groups of workers and through them into the platforms of Labor Parties. As time goes by, particularly after the war, the validity of our ideas will be more and more widely accepted.

But if the Labor Party is not organized with our platform demands? If it is organized with very mild, reformist demands? Shall we shun it? Shall we stand aside and say we sill not soil ourselves with it until it is prepared to accept our advice? Of course not. A party is alive to reality as to produce our platform will hardly be that sectarian. If the Labor Party is organized on a reformist platform, we will support it provided it is genuinely based upon the working class and is independent of capitalist parties. But in giving it our support we do not give it our blind confidence. We take part in its work but we also take part in its deliberations and discussions. We take part and constantly strive to gain more and more adherents for our transional demands, for we know that the Labor Party must come to accept that way out if it is to prove a worthwhile instrument.

child care...

WHO NEEDS IT?

In our society, women are defined in terms of reproduction rather than production. Yet, over 1/3 of our working force is women, most of whom are married. In addition, there are many student-mothers. On the Berkeley campus alone, there are 5,000 non-academic workers who have 1,900 pre-school children who need child care. The United States is the only industrialized country in the world which does not have a public day care systen for women.

WHAT IS AVAILABLE?

Each working mother or student must find care for her own children and her work or schoolwork depends on it. Most women use sitters either inside or outside of their home. They pay up to $25 per week for one child. The centers available have long waiting lists and restricted hours. In any case, mothers usually do not know what is really happening to their children, but because of economic necessity must work.

The AFSCME Local 1695 has 92 demands to improve wages and working conditions which they first presented to the University 2 years ago. All of the demands such as a fully paid health plan, wage increases, etc., ar e important but the child care issue is of top priority.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

Students and working mothers must have day care centers - a day care center on campus which would be open to all campus workers and students who need child care. They must be client controlled so we have a say in the care of our children. The centers must be free - financed by the University. They must be open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week so all workers and students who don't have 8-5 hours can also benefit. And, they must be professionally supervised. The University is the largest employer in the area; if it provides a child care center, the other centers which are available will be open to workers who are not connected to the University.

Women must work together to combat the male chauvanist society and demand free birth control, free abortions, and an end to sexual discrimination in education and on the job. We must support AFSCME and Women's Liberation demands - but this is only a beginning. Ultimately, we can do this only with building a new society which will liberate all oppressed people. Women must participate and struggle around the issues that directly effect them to ensure their own needs.

GO TO THE NOON RALLY AND DEMONSTRATION
FRIDAY, JANUARY 16
AFSCME 1695 & WOMEN'S LIBERATION

I.S. Women's Caucus, Berkeley Campus International Socialists

International Socialism
International Subcommittee
6 Cottons Gardens
London E.2

24th November, 1969

Lutte Ouvriere IS(US)

Comrades,

We have been instructed be the annual conference of our organization to organise, together with other revolutionary socialist organizations in other countries, an international conference. We believe that this is necessary, given the enormous potentialiteis for growth and intervention that now exist in the class struggle for revolutionaries in many countries. A prolonged period of defeat for revolutionary ideas has led to a fragmentation of experience and isolation of the militants in different countries. Faced with new possibilities it is important now that we try to overcome this. But at the same time, we must not make the mistake, made so often in the past, by the various "Fourth Internationals" of building world korganizations superficially before any of us have a genuine basis in the class.

Therefore we suggest the calling of a conference of revolutionary organizations, at which:
1. There would be a debate over fundamental perspectives.
2. Decisions would b4 taken about systamatising for the immediate future regular cooperation on a federal basis.

We think that this conference should be jointly sponsored by the three organizations- L.O., I.S., and I.S.(U.S.) - at least, and that arrangements for it should be decided jointly by negotiations between the three groups.

Basis decisions that must be taken are:
1. Date and place
2. Other organizations to be invited
3. Agenda

We suggest that the venue, for reasons of convenience, accommodation, ease with the police and visa difficulties, should be London. If this is not possible, than perhaps Dublin, Amsterdam or Brussels. In order to leave time for adequate preperation it should not be earlier than summer 1970 and possibly as late as spring 1971.

Two sorts of organizations should be invited:
a) Those originating in the Trotskyist tradition
b). Those groups of more recent origin with little history and traditions as yet and theorectical approaches that have not yet been crystalised.

Particular problems, however will arise with
c) The sections of the different F.I.s. We suggest that whther we invite these depends on our assessment of their work in particular countries.
d) The hard spontaneist groups. Again we suggest only inviting those that exist as viable organizations and might be open to debate over fundamentals.

Agenda
We suggest to following main sessions: At each the sponsoring organizations will each present documents that should be circulated at least two months before the conference.
a) Perspectives for western capitalism
b) Perspectives for the Third World
c) Perspectives for the Stalinist States
d) The relationship of the revolutionary orgainization to the working class.
e) Possibilities and opportunities for international cooperation between revolutionary organizations.
We would like to hear the respomse of L.O. and I.S.(U.S.) to our proposals, ao that we can make further preperations jointly.

THE MEANING OG TRANSITIONAL POLITICS WK Detroit

Unfortunately I was unabel to complete a planned article on the anti-war dixcussion in time for the NC. However, I feel I must comment on the various concepts of a transitional approach which began to come out in this discussion.

The concept of a transitional programis based on concrete reality, ie., the nature of capitalism, of theclass struggle, and of its effect on the consciousness of the working class. Our basic analysis is that the very nature of capitalism and of the struggles which this system forces upon the workers points in the direction or workers control, etc. Transitional slogans and demands must flow from the concrete struggle which workers are engaged in; they must be a synthesis and crystalization of this struggle. In other words, the conscious element flows from the objective reality and inter-acts with it. An example which comes readily to mind is the demand for workers control of the production line. The workers are forced to struggle against the continual speedup and resultant abominable working conditions. The dema nd for workers control flows from the existing struggle, gives it direction and points to workers control of society.

A transitional program is not a way of manipulating peoples minds. It is not"., a way of drawing out the contradictions between their illusions and their goals, in such a way that action which seem perfectly reasonable to them, run head-on into the realities of power and property in this society"[1] This essentially idealist concept starts with conscious revolutionaries who seek to change the minds of others[2] who have certain "illusions" and "goals" by convincing them to struggle for things which seem "reasonable"to them. The contrast between this and the approach which starts with a concrete struggle based on objective conditions and seeks to give it direction should be obvious.

The appearance of such absurd concepts in our movement is a symptom of the long isolation of the revolutionary movement from the working class. It is the other side ot the coin of the concept expressed by SDS"crazies" that the approach should be to blow the minds of the "workers" of whoever will listen by beginning the revolution now.

Not unrelated to the above is the oncept of theneed to win liberals to radicalism. There are, we are told, two kinds of liberals: the establishment liberals (whom everybody is against) and "liberals for whom liberalism is the best way to change and improve on a social order of ehich they are more or less critical."[3] This second category, moreover, includes "The overwhelming majority of the American working class, blacks and other oppressed monorities, and most dis-affected middle class types..." According to this "analysis" society is divided into two groups, the rulers and the ruled. Among the rulers there are reactionaries, conservatives, liberals. Among the ruled there are also these categories as well as, presumably radicals and revolutionaries. The only difference

between workers and other sectors of the ruled is their potential power. In terms of consciousness there is apparently no difference whatsoever. It is long overdue to limeit the use of the one dimensional scale of determining conscious (conservative, liberal, radical, etc.)

Consciousness has a definite class character! There is a world of difference between a middle class liberal and a working class "liberal". If a group of fank and file workers organize an independent electoral campaign in some locale, even withliberal (i.e. reformist) illusions we would probably support it even while criticizing its program; we would certainly view it differently from a middle class liberal political activity. Workers seeking to obtain political power for themselves is to a certain extent transitional even if it contains the contradictionof a reforminst program. The middle class is powerless as a class and this is reflected in their consciousness. They must in the long run turn either to the ruling class or to the workers for support. A liberal independent electoral campaign engaged in by liberals counterposes dependence upon the rulers for reform to political power for the middle class. Political power is objectively a dead end for the middle class and the demand for same is not transitional. Of course we should seek to work with middle class liberals who are moving in a radical direction, but in so doing we must seek to win them not just to a radical or even "revolutionary" approach byt to a working class approach

It is my opinion that it is this lack of a class analysis which is behind the current anti-war dispute and that this question is far more important than the question of the sectarianism of the NAC (which admittedly existed, at least initially).

TAX-FREE BONDS AND THE ANN ARBOR RENT STRIKE by Dave Friedman
Passed by the NAC - 5-0

One of the demands of the Ann Arbor rent strikers is that the University of Michigan construct housing, to fill a serious need and end the monopoly of local landlords. Given the dominant role of the University in Ann Arbor and its susceptibility to student pressure, there is nothing wrong with this demand -- although ISers should consistently point to the capitalist state of which the University is but an institutional appendage. This is simply a part of our socialist responsibility to broaden the social horizons of students so that their campus struggles teach them something about the larger class society in which they are set.

It is essential that ISers function in a critical capacity with respect to struggles like the rent strike, even where we are playing a leading role as organizers. There is no dichotomy between effective organizing and political criticism. On the contrary, it cannot hurt a struggle to explain some of the political misconceptions of the participants. That kind of criticism can only help -- it is, in fact, our chief contribution as socialists.

This brings me to the matter of tax-free bonds as a means of financing housing construction. I understand on the basis of sketchy reports from Ann Arbor, that the rent strike organization has proposed or is considering proposing, that the University implement the above mentioned demand by use of tax-free bonds. This is a serious political mistake, for it has the general effect of pitting a student struggle against the economic interests of the working class, which pays for those bonds. We are informed (again in a very unclear fashion) that the Ann Arbor ISers have not made this proposal -- but it also seems that they have not publicly criticized it and explained what is wrong with it. Judging from the document by Eric Chester, it appears that the ISers themselves do not understand what is wrong with advocating this method of financing University construction of housing.

The oldest tactic of ruling classes is to pit one section of the population against another. When it becomes necessary to make cons essions to black demands, it is done in such a way that white workers foot the bill. When workers win wage increases, their employers raise prices and attempt to arouse public hostility to the "self-centered" strikers. Now we see that when students demand low-cost housing, if they are successful, that housing is apt to be built through forms of fund-raising that fall most heavily on the working class (as Eric admits in his document). The fact that tax-free bonds are "progressive" by comparison with other methods used by capitalist institutions to raise money -- this is beside the point. Such an argument is "lesser-evilism" in the classic sense, like comparing McCarthy to Humphrey and choosing the former. Either way, the working class pays, and the rich (the corporations) get off.

There is a way out of this dilemma, for socialists who are not committed to the maintenance of capitalism or its moethods of oeration. Along with the demand for University build housing should go proposals for truly progressive forms of taxation -- on corporate profits, for example. This requires, of course, that the movement have a broader political outlook and an understanding that Ann Arbor's problems cannot be solved within the confines of Ann Arbor and the University (unless it is to be at the expense of the working class). But the IS should be pushing this deeper perspective in any case, even while wholeheartedly supporting the immediate struggle.

possible. Our job is to move on from there, not to propose and defend the compromises.)

NOTE: If it ~~xx~~ is true that the Ann Arbor IS has not publicly identified itself with the proposal for tax-free bonds, then there is no urgency for the national organization to publicly dissociate itself (e.g., in the I.S.) with this position, as was proposed at an earlier NAC metting. However, this document should be placed before the Ann Arbor membership, to be discussed, criticized and voted-upon (perhaps as a "sense motion"). If the branch disagrees, the NAC should be informed why (and whether it is the analysis that they disagree with, or whether they think we have our facts wrong about the local situation). Finally, the NAC should be informed of precisely what role ISers are playing, politically and organizationally, in the rent strike. This is important not because the NAC should be issuing directives to local branches on their activities (there are a number of reasons why the NAC should not do this), but in order that the IS as a whole can learn from the experiences of its parts, and so that our political debates are based at least in part on ongoing activities rather than abstract theories alone.

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Added note by Mike Urquhart

This motion is not intended as a critique of the Ann Arbor IS, but rather as what we believe the IS's orientation towards tax-free bonds should be. That is why we would like it placed on the floor of a meeting to be discussed and voted upon. The N.O. meant to include Chester's document in the mailing also, since this document refers to it. However, we are far behind in our office work and do not have time to do stencils of it now. We hope to get it out in the next mailing. His document was not a motion for the Ann Arbor branch, but rather an econimic examination of tax-free bonds.

It might be argued that "tax the rich" is a fine slogan but something for the future, while the Ann Arbor movement is fighting for housing NOW. All right, we realize that certain demands are more propagandistic and educational, while others can be won in the immediate struggle. One of the reasons that Ann Arbor students can win only limited gains is that the working class is not involved in struggle over broad political issues. Let the rent strike demand University-built housing now, and let the University and the state figure out how to raise the money -- and let the rent strike declare publicly that it opposes (in general, not just in this case) government policies that deny people low-cost housing and then place the financial burden on those least able to pay (students and workers). This proposal -- which ISers ought to put forward even if it is likely to be defeated -- is the opposite of what seems to be going on. Instead of declaring that their struggle is in solidarity with those working people, the rent strike is proposing financial measures that the tax the workers to pay for student housing. (It is no answer to argue that cheap housing would permit more working class kids to live in Ann Arbor. That would still be a token amount. And anyway, the Ann Arbor IS has not seen fit to come out for Open Admissions, presumably because that, too, could not be financed through the normal capitalist methods.)

If the rent strike is strong enough, it may win its housing, and the University may go right ahead with tax-free bonds regardless of the wishes of the strikers on methods of financing. (The University could pass the buck to the state government on the issue of money, and there is no way of getting around this because the University really is an arm of the state, with limited autonomy.) At this point, the Ann Arbor movement (which, hopefully, would not collapse from its victory, but would continue in new forms) would be in a position to criticize the methods of financing, as anti-working class. But if the rent strike itself proposes tax-free bonds, it is in no position to complain if and when the proposal is accepted. And it has little to say to workers, when they react hostilely to "those middle class students" who are adding to their tax burdens.

The same is true for the IS. If we are to play a constructive role in the xx movement, we must be in a position to point out particular errors and misdirection. To the extent that the Ann Arbor struggle adopts an attitude of narrow self-interest on the housing issue, it will have no place to go when the rent strike is over (whether it wins, loses or draws). That is something we should be aware of NOW, as socialists who x view these struggles in a historical context. And what we are aware of, we should state publicly, not in an obstructionist or sectarian fashion, but as the most important contribution that we have to make to the immediate struggle.

(Part of the problem seems to be this: Eric in his document seems to feel that in order for the movement's demands to appear reasonable to the base of support, in order for the demands to be winnable, the movement must take responsibility for figuring out how the capitalist state, or particular institutions, can implement those demands more-or-less within the system. This is a dangerous position for socialists, for it leads directly, as the movement gains power, to the historical role of the Social Democracy in taking responsibility for the preservation of the capitalist system. It would make it very hard for us to support demands for the elimination of class, race, and sexual tracking in the schools, jobs for all etc.. If the movement's immediate xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx demands are "impossible", our rulers will make some concession that is

Tax Free Bonds

Eric Chester
Ann Arbor IS

Tax-free bonds are bonds issued by state and local governments or agencies for the purpose of raising funds for construction. Normally the federal government taxes interest receipts as it does any other kind of income flow. In establishing the original income tax about fifty years ago, Congress exempted receipts from state and local bonds and all attempts at repealing this measure have failed.

First, an examination of the positive features of the operation of this law. State and local governments bear the burden in the present federal system for virtually all of the expenditures on social welfare. Education, mass transit, welfare, and roads are all primarily funded on the state and local level. The federal government primarily spends funds on warfare and related activities, such as veterans benefits and interest payments on the federal debt.

Accompanying this cleavage on the expenditure side is one on the receipt side, taxes. State and local taxes are regressive, that is, those with low incomes pay a higher percentage of their incomes in taxes than do the rich. The chief regressive taxes are the property tax and the sales tax, altho gh most states also have heavy excise taxes on beer, wine, liquor and cigarettes. Corporate taxes at the state level are minimal and are bound to remain so since corporations can move to escape taxes. On the other hand, federal taxes are based on the income tax and the corporate profits tax.

Both types of federal taxation are studded with loopholes. Nonetheless, federal taxation is, overall, progressive, unlike state and local taxation. Further, both the House and Senate have passed tax bills which reduce personal taxation, increase corporate taxes, and plug some loopholes used by rich individuals.

Viewing the entire structure, state and local government expenditures are for social welfare but their funds are extracted from the poor. The federal government tends to tax corporations and the rich, but it spends money on wars. Clearly pressure should be exerted to force the federal government to divert funds to subsidize social welfare functions sponsored on the local level. Tax-free bonds are a mechanism which achieves this transfer, although inefficiently.

Explicitly, the exemption of state and local bonds from federal taxation allows these agencies to issue bonds at lower interest costs. America has a well-developed capital market in which investos secure different kinds of assets depending on their tax bracket, their estimate of the future, their analysis of the risk involved, etc. Inthis case, the capital market balances demand so that the extra real yield from a tax-free bond relative to a regular bond at a given interest rate is balanced by lower yields from the tax-free bond.

The effect a removal of the exemption would produce is fairly clear. Yields on state and local securities would increase sharply and potential construction costs for school buildings, roads, hospitals, woudl soar. There are two possible results this might have on social welfare spending. First, local governments might ignore the increase costs and continue thier previous rate of construction. Since these units tax regressively, the end result would

be increased taxation for the poor. Most studies have shown that this is the likely outcome. Alternatively, construction schedules might be curtailed and vital social welfare expenditures cut. Neither choice appeals.

The crucial problem with the tax-exempt bond is that it gives a tax break to the rich. This occurs because of the different marginal tax rates for individuals. Federal income tax is nominally progressive, that is, the higher the taxable income, the higher the rate of the income tax. The other tax rate is that for corporate profits and bank-received interest. This rate is 48% and it is a flat rate. Therefore only individuals facing an effective tax rate over 48% will buy tax-free bonds.

To demonstrate the tax loophole involved in this process, let's use a numerical example. Let us assume that regular corporate bonds are being issued with a yield of 9%. Now, banks would have to deduct from this 9% return 4.5% in taxes (assume 50% tax rate for simplicity), so that the effective rate of return with be 4.5% (9-4.5). Now the yield on tax-free bonds will be driven down to 4.5% since the demand for bonds with a yield greater than this will be larger than the supply. Now this 4.5% yield will still be attractive to those individuals in a tax bracket higher than the corporations and banks face. They will snap up these bonds and will gain a substantial bonus in the process. In our example those paying 70% on marginal taxable income would have to deduct from the 9% yield on corporate bonds 6.3% (9 x .7) so that the real yield would be 2.7%. Thus rich individuals are reaping a bonus of nearly 2% on return from investments because of tax exemptions of state and local bonds.

Thus the issue of whether the federal government should exempt state and local bonds from taxation involves contradictory forces. On the one hand, provisions to subsidize interest costs of local governments for worthwhile projects by the federal government should be supported because of the more progressive tax structure of the federal government. On the other hand, the specific means used to accomplish this goal are inequitable, since a tax break for the rich accompanies the transfer of funds from the federal to the local level. Several solutions to this question have been proposed, of which the easiest is that 25-30% of the interest payments of state and local units would be returned to the borrowing unit by the U.S. government. This would approximately match the benefits of the present exemption without creating a loophole for the rich. Outright repeal of the exemption without an accompanying revision should not be supported. The sharp increase in interest payments by state and local units would overwhelm any increase in equity due to increased tax payment by the rich.

This analysis of the overall effects of tax-free bonds is not directly relevant to the issue of the housing program. There are two basic questions: First, whether University-built housing would have positive effects. Second, whether issuing tax-free bonds to build housing would further add to a tax advantage to the rich. On housing: 1) First, it must be recognized that any bonds issued by the university are tax-free. Opposition to a demand that the University issues these bonds to build low-cost housing is in effect opposition to any University-financed housing. (or for that matter, any housing built by local or state governments that is not directly funded by federal aid). 2) Any housing not built by tax-free bonds will be substantially higher in rental level. Interest payments are a significant part of housing costs. (Research is now being done which will pinpoint the dollar amount of

this difference). 3) Higher rents for the proposed housing are regressive in several ways. A: Part of the IS program is that the housing be open to non-students with low incomes. Higher rents will effectively squeeze them out. B: A major goal in demanding substantial University-built housing is to undercut the market and drive down rents in all of Ann Arbor, both community and student rents. C: While Univ., of Michigan students come from upper middle-class backgrounds, their living standards are rotten. People are shoved into small apartments which fall apart and are not kept up. There is a clear difference between the living standards of students and their parents. D: High cost of living in Ann Arbor is a factor which maintains the University as a citadel of the well to do. While the primary channeling function is accomplished by the K-12 schooling system, an added barrier in the high cost of sending students ot the "better" schools in Michigan are because of Ann Arobr's exorbitant living costs. 4) Alternative forms of subsidization are regressive or unavailable. Federal funds at low interest rates are sharply limited in quantity and would only build units for several hundred. State or local funding would be more regressive since it would be based on the sales or property tax.

On the tax break for the rich, the difference between marginal changes and the average gain must be kept clear. As pointed out above, the tax rates for the rich occur because the individual income tax has progressive tax rates for the higher brackets. The rich pay up to 70% of their taxable income, and this rate descends for taxable income in lower brackets. Corporations and banks pay a 48% flat rate on profits and interest payments and they are the primary investors in this society. The capital market equilibrates the tax-free bond rate to the regular taxed bonds, so that they return to the final (marginal) buyer of bonds is equal. Otherwise if the net return (after taxes) is not equilibrated, investors will shift bonds by purchases and sales. To use the previous example of corporate tax at 50%, regular corporate bonds yield 9%, then tax-free bonds will yield 4.5% (9% X 50%). Rich individuals who would pay 70% on taxable income above a certain level would invest in tax-free bonds since the 6.7% yield is 1.8% greater than the net yield on corporate bonds.

The tax break received by the rich on tax-free bonds depends on varying marginal tax rates based on the progressive individual income tax. The 48% corporate and bank profit tax puts a ceiling on this break at the equilibrating rates (in our example 9 and 4.5%). Corporations and banks are prepared to supply virtually infinite amounts of funds to the tax-free and bond market since any small shift downward will make tax-free bonds more attractive than corporate bonds. That is, using our example, if the yield on tax-exempt bonds moves upward to 4.501%, banks will be prepared to buy virtually infinite amounts and the yield will return to 4.5%.

Now if the only buyers of bonds were individuals, any increase in the supply of tax-free bonds would lower the bond price and raise the interest rates. This would occur because interest rates of tax-free bonds would have to increase so that individuals in tax brackets below that which had previously provided funds for tax-exempt bonds would shift funds out of corporate bonds and into state and local securities. The existence of corporations and banks with huge sums of investments in securities which are taxed at a high flat rate changes this situation. An increase in the supply of tax-free bonds will only lead to a shuffle in portfolios and no significant

shift in the differential between taxed and non-taxed bonds.

Overall, tax-free bonds are both progressive in that they shift funds from the federal to the state and local level and are regressive in that they provide a tax haven to the rich. Certainly a more equitable method of shifting funds into state and local construction could be devised and such efforts should be supported. Yet this is not the concrete issue which faces the IS vis-a-vis the housing program.

A demand that universities build low-cost housing open to both students and non-students is a demand which both leads to greater equity and provides the possibility of building an alliance with community people, as well as having a potential for radicalization of students. In order for university-built housing to significantly moderate local landlord super-profits, it would have to rely on a roundabout federal subsidy, tax-free bonds, for initial capital. Such a federal subsidy, given the present state of the securities market, would not involve a significant break for the rich through an increase in the difference in interest yields between bond types. A federal subsidy is justified in this case, given the lack of an alternative subsidy, the progressive structure of federal taxes, (both corporate and private), and the benefits to lower income groups of such university-built housing.

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Reference: Ott and Meltzer, Brookings Institute. Tax-Exempt Bonds.

PROPOSAL TO FURTHER INCREASE I.S. CIRCULATION Gay S.

At the NAC meeting of 11/25/69 the NAC passed a motion (see minutes of same date) essentially stating that the organization begin to see the role of the I.S. as more central to its work and to make distribution of the I.S. a high priority organizationally. The intent of the following proposal is to further concretize the intent of that motion.

At this point it is planned to expand the run of the I.S. to 7,500 copies by April and 10,000 copies by June 1970. In order do assure that these figures are realistic and jive with our real ability to circulate the I.S. (as opposed to comrades keeping 30 copies in their homes rather than 15) the NAC proposes the following:

1. Each club immediately assign one highly responsible comrade to act as a liason with Kit. This person is to be responsible for assuring the organization of I.S. distribution and to be responsible for aiding Kit in soliciting articles for his or her area. (The name of the liason is to be forwarded to both Kit and the N.O. immediately.)

2. The distribution of the I.S. at national and local movement adtions, rallies and meetings take presidence over, though not exclude, mass leafleting. This means that truly adequate, as opposed to token numbers of comrades be assigned to sell the I.S. in addition to or rather than leafleting.

3. That the I.S. liason work out as regulara schedule as possible for the hawking of the I.S. (all comrades should be involved in this activity in some way). This should not include only one's own campus but any other concievable place, for ex., other campuses in your area, high schools, conferences and rallies of other movement groups, Moratorium activities, etc. Although it is recognized that probably few comrades actually enjoy "hawking" the I.S., many comrades have stated that they have found it quite easy to do so, selling 25-50 in one to two hours.
*At this point clubs are only assigned 15 copies of the I.S. per member. Stretched over a a period of a month, the selling of 15 papers does not seem to be a great burden. If we are to increase the press run it should probably be assumed that along with increasing our general circulation in bookstores and news stands, subscriptions, etc., we will also have to increase the numbers of papers permember to each club. Therefore adequate and consistant selling of the I.S. will be necessary.

4. That all clubs make it a practice of selling the I.S. at meetings of other radical and movement groups, including conferences, forums, etc.

5. I.S. liasons and MAL's approach both campus and community based bookstores, newsstands, etc. about the possibilites of carrying the I.S. The general way this is handled is on a consignment basis with our recieving 12¢ and the store keeping 8¢ per copy. (The N.O. will provide forms for this.) Papers for the stores will be sent to the liason who will be responsible for seeing that they get there, money and extras are picked up, etc.

6. The I.S. initiate a subscription drive beginning January 1, 1970. That the goal of the organization be 5 subs per member by the end of February (1,500). To facillitate this the N.O. will provide "handi-dandi" subscription forms (printed on our own press and capable of being carried on person at all times).
*The I.S. liason should keep the N.O. informed semi-monthly onthe number of subs club has sold and any interesting sales ploys or gimmicks discovered (like relatives).

It is to be remembered that the purpose of the above, although most importantly is to expand circulation and make the use of the I.S. more central to our work, is also to immediately increase working capital for the paper enabling the I.S. to pay for itself (thereby assuring to continuance) and to get us out of debt. For this reason clubs should consider the sale of both the IS and IS subs to be an extremely high priority - approaching a disciplined activity. (In areas where chapters are not campus based and most domrades based and most comrades work, thereby making selling the IS extremely difficult, a liason should be appointed anyway and different quotas can be arranged.)

SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION AND ITS PRESS

Motion submitted to the NAC by Kim Moody; passed 4-0

The socialist press has always been central to the building of the socialist movement. Lenin stressed the importance of revolutionary party's press in raising the consciousness of the working class, and in giving the party a coherent central life transcending its local activities. Indeed, a relatively small socialist organization that attempts to reach large numbers of people, be they workers, students or anti-war activists, has no other means of conveying its total politics than its press. Mass leafleting, while necessary, is at best ad hoc, getting across only a short message concerned with basically one aspect of our politics. Forums, meetings, etc., of course, reach an even smaller audience and are also limited in what they can convey. The newspaper remains, for us, the only way to comment on and analyse a mutliplicity of issues, and more importantly, to put across an overall program. Our ability to make our active participation in arenas or struggles political, rather than merely tactical, depends to a great degree on the aggressive use of the IS and on the content of the paper. As important as this, is the role that IS can play in unifying the activity and political line of the organization in its work. As it stands now, the organization, though formally a national organization, in reality still functions as a loose federation in which the NAC and NC have no meaningful or consequential way of even conveying, let alone enforcing, its decisions. When Lenin spoke of the role of the press in giving coherence to socialist organization he was speaking largely of this sort of function. That is, the press actually conveys the political line, as well as the general politics, of the organization. It is hardly necessary to make the leap to a democratic centralist organization, however, for the press to play an important central political role. If we are to become a real national organization, the IS must become a more central and serious organizational task.

In the last year, the IS (newspaper) has become a relatively high quality paper, at least when compared to what is around. The IS has become usable, and has been used by comrades to a greater degree than in the past. This is due primarily to the persistance and hard work of its editor, Kit Lyons, rather than to a serious organizational orientation toward building our press. The general attractiveness and relevance of the IS that is the result of Kit's labors has made it possible to distribute IS to a far greater degree than in the past. At the Washington Nov. 15th March, for example, only 20-30 comrades were able to sell 1,000 copies in a few hours. Furthermore, wherever comrades have pushed IS on their campus, individuals have been able to sell more than 50 copies, with little more effort than it takes to pass out leaflets in a short period of time. This indicates that, at last, it is possible for us to make the IS an important aspect of the work of the organization. So far as increasing circulation, it is simply a matter of chapters intensifying distribution work and of putting this work on a regular organized basis. In this context, the NAC proposes that chapters make the following activities high priorities:

1) That the distribution of IS at national and local anti-war actions, rallies and meetings take precedence over, though not exclude, mass leafleting. This means that truly adequate, as opposed to token, numbers of comrades be assigned to sell IS in addition to or rather than leafleting.

2) That chapters make a practice of selling IS, at meetings of other radical and movement groups, including conferences, forums, etc.

RESOLUTION ON
WORKING CLASS PERSPECTIVE

Ken F. Detroit IS
Will F. Cleveland IS
Cliff H. Cleveland IS

"Talk is cheap." -- Hegel

At the IS. National Convention last August, the organization made several qualitative turns in matters of structure and program. Perhaps the most significant was embodied in the "industrialization" program. Basically, what was involved was the understanding that IS must begin to seriously involve itself in the arena of working class organizing, specifically in the mass production industries.

This perspective was greeted with enthusiasm at the convention. The enthusiasm has not abated in the three months that have followed. Nearly everyone feels that entering the industrial area is a fine idea. The problem is that nearly everyone feels that it is a fine idea -- for someone else.

Frankly, we feel the need to take the organization to task for what is, in our view, a serious failure to follow through on this important political commitment. Today, three months after our national convention, only the most tentative of beginnings has been made in developing industrial cadre. The vast majority of our membership apparently feels quite content in remaining where they always have been; the Berkely's and Ann Arbor's of the country, or at best in white-collar jobs. Moreover, a real note of self-delusion seems to be creeping into our politics. Many comrades seemingly feel that the only commitment needed to make a working class orientation a reality is to intellectualize abstractly about working class programs, occasionally writing a leaflet directed at workers.

Where industrial cadre do exist, they are quite small, and often faced with a serious manpower crisis. Our home cities of Detroit and Cleveland provide excellent examples. Between us, we have a grand total of five comrades in plants. All five, by the way, had been working in shops for some time before joining IS, which is in itself revealing. In both cities, the manpower shortage has reached crisis proportions. Excellent political opportunities in a variety of arenas have been missed simply because the resources --specifically people -- were so badly lacking.

To speak blunty, we are beginning to feel like the IS's "prole" tokens; to be dragged out of the closet when needed to score a point in debating some rival group, and ignored the rest of the time.

What we propose is that the membership of IS begin to make good on their political commitments. We do not expect or desire every member to forsake the groves of academia and come rushing into the nerest sweatshop. But it is essential that comrades, in some numbers, begin to move to the major industrial cities (Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, etc.) to do work in the following areas:

1. Working and organizing in basic mass production industries
2. Organizing women workers in both industrial and office jobs
3. Attending school and organizing at predominantly working-class universities, community colleges, and high schools
4. Serving as back-up for industrial cadre; doing research, helping produce literature, etc.

(Note: this list is by no means inclusive; many other areas of work exist. These four are in our view the most important.)

Finally, we maintain that it is the responsiblity of the national organization to recruit comrades to do this work. Every branch of the organization -- the NO, the NAC, the NC, all regional organizers, everybody --should accept this responsibility and begin at once to implement this program. Each local labor fraction should write up a prospectus of their work and send it to the NO as well as to the labor fraction executive committee. This will facilitate coordination.

The importance of this program cannot be emphasized too strongly. A cursory glance at the history of the American Left reveals all too clearly the fate which awaits a socialist organization whose base remains predominantly middle class. The opportunities for developing a base within the working class clearly exist; sound programmatic ideas have existed for some time on how to exploit them. What is now needed is quite, quite obvious.

R.S.V.P.

Motion on Implementation of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution.

Bill P. New York

While the intent of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution is basically correct, it suffers from the obvious problem of being just another resolution that some body passes and then is not taken seriously after that so taht nothing is ever done about it.

The I.S. currently is faced by the problem of being primarily oriented towards the middle class student, anti-war and radical movements. Even with all of our talk about industrialization, etc., we are not orienting in any major fashion towards the working class. And while people fear that we are presenting twelve different points of view to the class and thereby confusing them, they are forgetting about the reality of the organization; namely, that with only isolated exceptions the only people who are having any contact with the working class are those few people who are industrialized. It is clear that that should not be the case in an organization with our politics. None-the-less, it is. Therefore, a fundamental change in the organization is necessary. In this regard, the Detroit/Cleveland resolution is correct; the organization must pull people out of areas where we have an abundance of people and place them in areas where we already have some industrialized cadre, but no one to back them up.

The failure of the National Labor Fraction to function in any cohesive way represents more than just a reflection of the lack of functioning of local labor fractions. Rather, it stems from the lack of orientation by the organization as a whole towards labor, and the total failure of the I.S. to back up comrades who are industrialized. The complete lack of discussion on the NAC in the past three and a half months is a clear indication of this. The organization has failed to comply with its own decision: That labor would be the major theoretical discussion within the organization. Secondly, the NAC passed a long list of pamphlets. Yet none of them could be used by our industrialized members in any large numbers. All, including the Moody and Winkler pamphlets, were addressed to the middle class student, anti-war and radical movements. This is but another manifestation of the problem; the national organization is not attempting to back up its industrialized members. Finally, many comrades feel that the organization made a committment to building the mid-west (due to its being the center of industrial America) wiht the perspective of moveing the national office there in a year. That is obviously impossible as long as people in the I.S. are unwilling to move.

The nature of the organization is not going to change to any substantial degree until we begin to change the relative numbers of people in the midwest and elsewhere. This is the fundamental point of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution. Specifically, people who move to the mid-west should be seen doing the following: 1)Working and organizing in basic production industries. This means that rather than concentrating our meager resources at this time on small shops or teachers, we concentrate in places where there are large numbers of people. 2) Organizing women workers in both industrial and office jobs. 3) Attending school and organizing at predominantly working-class universities, community colleges, and high schools.

It seems essential that we change the emphasis away from the "elite" schools and place them on schools such as Wayne State and CCC. Given the economic background of the people who attend colleges like these and the quality of those schools, it is going to be the people who are recruited off of these campuses as well as out of shops and offices who are going to comprise the bulk of our future industrialized cadre. 4) Serving as back up for industrialized cadre. Concretely, this means participating in the arenas which are difficult if not impossible for industrialized people to work in in, that is, on the campuses, in the anti-war movement, etc. Furthermore, it means that research into the labor scene in these cities must be carried out by these "backup" people. This must be seen as fundamental for the future growth of the I.S. Therefore, the following are proposed:

1. That the discussion on the transitional program must be seen as being of prime importance for the organization as a whole in the months between now and the next convention.

2. The national secretary is directed to find someone to re-write The Fight For Socialism as per the recomendation of the National Labor Fraction that met at the convention.

3. The resident steering committee of the NLF along with the NAC are to draw up a list of pamphlets and other literature directed towards the working class, within the next two months and the NAC is to find people to immediately begin the writing of them.

4. The various execs, because they are the continuing leadership bodies of the local chapters, are mandated to:1) begin discussions with all comrades to elicit information as to who is willing to industrialize by June or can be convinced to do so, or move to areas where they can actually support industrialized comrades. That the execs conduct these discussions from the point of view that industrializing a significant portion of our existing membership is our most important political perspective, and evaluations of present political activities reports should reflect a recognition of this primary perspective. 2)That the execs should evaluate the overall progress of this decision as measured by the number of comrades who are willing to either industrialize or otherwise become politically active in areas which have large portions of the membership in mass industry. The execs are further mandated to communicate the strenghths and weaknesses of the political presentations they are making in favor of realocating personnel to carry out the perspective of this motion. These reports are to be sent to the NAC for discussion with copies to NC members, so that the NAC can present to the next NC (or convention if they are at the same time) a concrete proposal for relocation of personnel.

5. That MALs are to send in reports similar to those demanded of the execs.

These motions are seen as disciplined motions and are mandatory for all chapters and members.

TOWARD A WORKING-CLASS ANTI WAR PROGRAM

Dave Finkel, passed by January . NC as amended

The resolution below is not intended to re hash the same debate that occured during the IS's recent attempts to formulate a position on the Vietnam Moratorium. To summarize that debate briefly: my perspective, which was essentially adopted by the NAC majority, was to make political exposure of the liberal character of the Moratorium (despite the presence within it of unorganized student radicals) an important aspect of our anti war work in the student arena, as poosed to emphasizing "critical support" (a euphemism for using October 15 as an excuse to distribute our laudatory leaflets with warmed over versions of the standard criticisms of a single-issue middle-class movement which we, and SDS, have been presenting since the dawn of the Neolithic era.). In the present state of the IS, unfortunately, any such perspective took on the appearance of ultra left abstentionism, due to a programmatic vacuum which left us with nothing to build concretely aside from the Moratorium. With all its rhetoric about "independent" for the anti war movement, the IS seems to have little of its own. This resolution will attempt to lay the groundwork to remedy this situation, by defining the role of the IS in developing the newly emerging and potentially immensely powerful forces in the anti war movement (which in no way suggests the abondonment of student anti-war work). In order to do this it is necessary to indicate briefly a conception of where the anti-war movement is today, though without attempting a comprehensive analysis.
(NOTE: the above is simply an int duction and was not submitted to a vote)

THESES ON THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

1. The Moratorium is dead -- laid to rest on schedule, as its organizers intended. The December Moratorium (see Chicago Sun-Times, 12/7/69) is a bloc between Sam Brown and Joseph S. Clark, president of the United World Federalists. This outcome was entirely predictable and unavoidable. It was impossible to drive a wedge between the Moratorium's leadership and its rank-and-file, because "as a nationally organized activity"[1] the Moratorium had no rank-and-file. This is not to be confused with its popular base, which was enormous but incapable of independent organization because it had virtually no defined politics. Certainly much of this base was receptive to speeches expressing left-wing criticisms of the Moratorium leadership, but within the Moratorium framework it was virtually impossible for this sentiment to take a political form, i.e. consciousness of the need for a power struggle against that leadership.

2. The first nationwide anti-war upsurge, during 1965-67, gave rise directly to a plethora of radical-led single-issue anti-war committees (SMC) and to the rapid growth of a quasi-revolutionary left wing (SDS). This development will not be repeated this time, except in places previously unorganized by the anti-war movement (these will be fertile areas for political organization, but generally IS has no strength there). The organizational upshot of the Moratorium will be a left-liberal electoral drive, in no way independent of the DP. This outcome is essentially unavoidable at the present time; that is, intervention by radicals in the electoral arena will be ineffective. This is partly because of the specific illusions entertained by anti-war youth at present: they are taken in not by the DP as such, but by the importance and effectiveness of a Congressional opposition to Administration policy. For this reason they will

support DP candidates on the basis of expediency, i.e. those are the types who can get elected.

3. The November 15 Mobilization constitutes an event of historic importance as a summing-up of a crucial development within the U.S. in the last decade -- the enourmous weakening of popular patriorism by the shattering of the illusion of American international invicibility. The March on Washington was notable for its incredible size and for the presence of previously uninvolved strata, most importantly sections of the labor movement. It also summed up major weaknesses of the middle-class anti0war movement: first, its isolation from the black movement, which is profoundly anti-war but was virtually absent in Washington. Second, its limited independence of the capitalist political establishment, illustrated by the emphasis on peaceful protest, March-Against-Death tactics, and the obvious dependence of the Mobilization on its coincidence with the Moratorium and the reflected legitimacy of the endorsement given the latter by liberal politicians (almost none of whom endorsed the March itself, for sufficiently obvious reasons). In this context, the demonstrations at DuPont Circle and the Justice Department -- disorganized, politically semi-incoherent, with almost no leadership -- represented something of a radical pole, appallingly feeble but important for its presence. This might also be said of the Labor Dept. demo, though that was especially appalling.

4. The prospects for further mass mobilizations in the immediate future are not good. For the Spring, local marches (which will have liberal backing, and may be larger than ever before) are more likely than another national mobilization (which probably wouldn't have liberal support and couldn't match the numerical standard set by Nov. 15) Keeping in mind that the last big mobilization before this one was the Oct. 1967 Pentagon happening, shortly before Clean Gene appeared, we may anticipate a similar "moratorium" in honor of the 1970 elections. Our task in the mass anti-war arena, as far as marches and demonstrations are concerned, will be to establish a political presence at the local marches as we did in Washington; conditions for this will be more favorable locally than in Washington, since we can hopefully do some actual organizing and programmatic recruitment (the final section of this resolution will attempt to lay the basis for this).

5. While the conjunction of circumstances that made Nov. 15 possible will not immediately reappear, the disillusionment and anti-war sentiment will continue to spread. If the war is still in progress by 1971 (after the elections) as we beleive it will, there will be undoubtedly yet another wave of anti-war activity, the explosive nature of which will surpass anything yet seen. Our basic task in the next year is to build the forces that will spark this explosion: a reorganized left wing of the student movement and a radical, anti-war base in the working class. We may see within a year to eighteen months a series of small but explosive anti-war strikes. Taken in connection with the ecnomic strike wave, this development could point toward a genuine political crisis for the capitalist establishment in this country.

6. Should the war end or greatly de-escalate within the next year, the domestic class struggle will receive perhaps an even greater thrust. Besides its significance as a severe setback for American imperialism, this development would spur demands for de-militarization, including the end of American foreign occupation generally, and give added impetus both to the economic demands of the working class and the social and economic demands of the black movement. The next several years at least will be marked by the struggles of oppressed and exploited Americans for the satisfaction of needs long frustrated. The loss

of authority which the government has sustained through its defeat in Vietnam will make these struggles all the sharper. Thus, an emphasis on spurring those demands flowing from the militarist-imperialist policies of the state will advance the class struggle on an all-around basis.

CONCLUSIONS

IS regards its primary responsibility, as far as anti-war activity is concerned, as the building of anti-war consciousness within the working class. Our purpose is not only the involvement of masses of working people in anti-war actions of the existing type, but the development of anti-war activities built and shaped by the working-class movement itself in accordance with workers' own needs.

Anti-war agitation is a crucial component of our work in the shops. Working people know who pays for the war, and they don't like it. The responsibility of revolutionary socialists is to point out: (1) the connection between the needs of the war economy and the intensified attacks on workers' standards of life and work; (2) similarly, the connection between workers' defensive struggles against these attacks and the demands of the anti-war movement; (3) the roots of imperialism in the capitalist economic system. For example, war is inseparable from profit in that a 100% tax on corporate profits (as opposed to attacks on workers' standards of living) during wartime would prevent such wars from being wages. This holds true, of course, for World War II no less than for the war against Vietnam.

One point must be emphasized here: this is not intended to build a "single-issue working class movement". Quite the contrary: because of their essential roles in production and their position as the principal brunt of the economic squeeze, workers are affected by and thus are driven to deal with the societal crisis as a whole, embracing the war, taxes the black rebellion, the urban decay. Being (unlike the upper and student strata of the middle class) threatened by all of these at once, workers perceive all of them together, although not necessarily in a consistent fashion.

This in fact is the key to the motivation for the working-class anti-war program. For the society as a whole, the war has been the major catalyst in generating social unrest in the last six years, causing a radical upsurge among the youth and creating an opening to the left for the entire society. Explicitly anti-war agitation within the working class, in the context of an over-all class program, will play a key role in working-class radicalization on a multrissue basis. We realize that anti-war propaganda (which is objectively anti-patriotic, whether or not presented explicitly in that form) meets with a highly uneven response among workers; but among workers as among other strata, disgust with th war has reached the point where it represents the feelings of the majority, hence the basis of success is clearly present. This is particularly true of young workers, among whom we can expect the greatest receptivity in all our work.

IMPLEMENTATION

1. Transitional Program. In its completed form, the IS transitional program for the working class must clearly explain the role played by the war in the exploitation of working people, in killing them both on the job and in the Army. Demands must be raised for the immediate unconditional end of the war, dis-

mantling of the Permanent War Economy, and the mobilization of resources under working-class control to guarantee employment for all and construction programs designed to meet needs of life, health, etc.

We must raise support for workers' struggles in the anti-war movement as a whole, making it clear that Vietnam and future Vietnams, as a product of imperialism, will only be stopped by ditching the war economy, and that the only force capable of doing this is the working class. We must point out that the arms economy is the motor force behind the inflation, and that the assault on wages and working conditions necessary to maintain corporate profits in the stagnating economy have brought workers militancy to the fore. We must relate this to the anti-war movement as a whole, stressing the need to link the war with the inflation and the new strike wave. We must pose this as an alternative to a strategy limited to mass marches and Weatherman tactics which a large section of the anti-war movement has come to see do not provide a strategy for ending the war.

Our orientation to the strikers themselves must begin with support for their immediate demands, but must go beyond this to raising demands which will help direct the attention of workers towards the root of the problem: the capitalist system itself. One way of doing this is by exposing the class collaborationist role of the union bureaucrats. In the G.E. strike, for example, we demand that Meany's boycott of G.E. be extended - the government, as G.E.'s largest consumer, must be forced to comply.

We must also demand the scrapping of the arms economy and its reconversion into a system that produces for social needs and provides productive jobs for all. These demands flow from the relation of the arms economy to the inflation and the growing inability of capital to provide for social needs, especially in the major urban areas. By raising these demands, we help focus the attention of workers on the entire social system.

In putting forth this orientation, we stress that the only way to end the war economy is through a movement led by the working class aimed at workers' control.

The recent calls of the liberals (for the reordering of priorities) leaves the tax burden on the working class. In order to expose this, we must demand that the burden of all government spending be shifted from the workers to capital.

2. Role of the press: As in our working-class program as a whole, the I.S. will play a crucial role. Emphasis must be placed on the eight-page monthly supplement to the I.S. proposed by Kit Lyons, "primarily devoted to political articles on topics of general interest to workers" and printed for mass distribution. It is important that every issue contain material directly relevant to the war, both in its international significance and its domestic effects. Whenever finances and other considerations permit, special issues of the supplement consisting of twelve rather than eight pages should be published, to prevent the danger of the paper becoming an anti-war sheet to the serious detriment of other issues. The I.S. supplement is not only for the use of all branches in carrying out their work. It is expected that the supplement will be distributed at factory gates, etc., so that the press will build the anti-war program of the entire organization and concretize the working-class orientation of that program.

3. Working-class organizing. In the present embryonic state of the Labor Fraction, it is impossible to dictate forms of organization. Generally speaking, however, the rank-and-file shop organizations built by industrialized comrades will hopefully be arenas of anti-war organizing as well as of other political and economic struggles. Agitation along the lines of the National Work Stoppage, and local actions based on that agitational perspective, are of special significance. Calling upon union leaderships to respond to rank-and-file support for for an anti-war work stoppage by endorsing and mobilizing support for such a stoppage may be an effective menas of exposing that leadership. Where the existing anti-war movement serves as a useful vehicle in this work, i.e. where participation in local anti-war marches (perhaps in connection with a work stoppage) plays a constructive rather than disorganizing role in building the shop movement, that vehicle should be energetically used. In the form outlined here, these proposals suffer from vagueness; the Labor Fraction is asked to give special consideration to developing the anti-war aspect of the working-class program of the IS in a more concrete form.

4. Tasks of non-industrialized comrades. A working-class program is not merely a matter of direct activity in the shops, although abstracted from such activity it becomes wholly strile. In the context of a program of anti-war agitation in the shops, and with a working-class press based on an over-all political approach but giving special attention to the question of the war, we may hope to transcend our role as socialist "educators" and become a genuine working-class tendency within the over-all anti-war movement. The task of comrades engaged in non-proletarian arenas will be to develop programs and local organizations by which the anti-war movement, and IS in its own name, can appeal directly to the working class.

The importance of this work, particularly among students, must be emphasized. The potentiality for a new mass student upsurge next year (late 1970-71) following the quiescense of this school year, will be enormous. Two main obstacles presently face the student movement: first, the weariness of several years of losing struggles and the illusions provided by the Moratorium and the hope that the war is finally ending (all this flows from the isolation of the student movement from a social base); and second, the disastrous wreckage of the organized left wing (a circumstance related of course to the first problem). It is critical that at least the foundations of a reorganized left wing be laid by the time that objective developments have swept away the weariness and some of the illusions. Politically, this foundation must a working-class orientation, both in its attacks on the University and in its approach to societal problems generally. On campuses we hold our own anti-war meetings and debates, in cooperation with other radical groups where possible. Most importantly, we carry out ourselves and in coalition with other radical groupings where feasible and politically advisable, pro-working class activities that we advocate for the anti-war and radical movement. The development of cadre on the basis of this orientation will allow radicals to take full advantage of the opportunities that will arise next year. This must be not only understood by ourselves, but explained by example and education to other radicals as well. One simple means of carrying out this perspective is the recruitment of students to participate in the distribution of the working-class I.S. supplement.

Within local anti-war and radical groups, it is not sufficient simply to propagandistically counterpose to the conception of a Congressional opposition that of a movement based in the working class. IS perspectives within the radical movement must aim fundamentally at building direct links between radicals and the

working class movement, rather than having purely educational functions for the radicals themselves. Thus we would urge strike support activities, projects around demands which reflect immediate and actionable working class issues like taxation, day care centers, housing, transit, employment, and so forth. We would also advocate educational activities around major, though less immediately actionable demands (which would fall in the same kinds of areas just listed). In all such activities we would call upon the radical movement to see itself as not merely a support group, but as a political organization, putting forth educational demands, analysis, strategy, and tactics. We would fight for such a political approach by putting forth our transitional program, and action and education proposals based on that program. These are campaigns which embody in practice the conception of a movement based in the working class and therefore capable of directly linking the war to other social questions. On this basis we may hope to attract a number of radical and radicalizing students, by giving them a concrete perspective that looks ahead beyond the immediate electoral swamp.

Within the anti-war movement, we must counter the coalition organizing committee approach, which makes no effort to democratically organize the masses who are called on to participate in the periodic demonstrations. Our goal should be rank and file groups wherever possible and on the largest scale possible. Recognizing that the prospects for building such groups are not good at the present time, we relate to given activities by fighting for rank and file control at the local level, in the organization of the activities (e.g. campus strikes) and in the determination of the politics.

Even where it is possible to build rank and file organizations, we recognize that they are not ultimately viable on a single issue, middle class basis and we counterpose a radical program and working class orientation. We propose that mass demonstrations flow naturally from rank and file organizations, in which people develop politically by participating in day to day decision making: discussing, planning and carrying out programs. We counterpose this to the passive participation in rallies and marches so typical of anti-war mobilizations.

* * * * * * * *

[1]Note: the phrase "as a nationally organized activity" is taken from the NAC resolution and refers to the Moratorium as a coordinated whole and a political strategy rather than simply a series of local demonstrations. This coordination and strategic conception were of a liberal character and self-consciously opposed to radical alternatives, and succeeded both because of widespread anger against the war and the demoralization of the left. It was in this sense, i.e. that of national organization and the politics of that organization, that the Moratorium had no rank-and-file and in which the NAC called for this exposure.

THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY

By T.N. Vance

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Motion: The Los Angeles Chapter of I.S. initiate a campaign within the anti-war movement for an anti-war, pro-working class electoral campaign using the PFP primary as a means of getting on the ballot.

submitted by Mike Hannon L.A. I.S.

GENERAL POSITION OF IS ON THE PEACE & FREEDON PARTY

The recent debates on our relationship to the Peace & Freedom Party, both in Los Angeles and in the Bay Area, were unfortunately vived examples of the all too prevelant tendancy in IS to substitute demagogic Marxistical name calling for reasoned analysis. The words "working class", "middles calss", and "petit bourgeoisie" fleww back and forth with marvelous imprecision.

"Working class" has a particularly fluid character in IS discuasion. It often changes shape whithin the confines of a single sentence. It is never very clear whether the term refers to a Marcian class (i.e., synonomous eith proletariat)), to some find of social-ogical category or to some metaphisical entity sitting at the right hand of God.

If, when we talk about working class perspectives, orientation toward the working class, a workers party, etc., etc., we mean to designate some definate, concrete category useful as a tool of political analysis, then we had better start by defining theat category.

If we are to define working class in Marxian terms, then what we are talking about is all producers of surplus value who sell their labor power for wages. That category includes college professors, social workers, garbage collectors, and bank tellers as well as p production workers in heavy industry. Allo f them are contributors to the collective production of surplus value -- at least according to Marx. If some of our comrades believe that Marx should be revised on this point, the burden is upon them to justify the revision.

The reason classes such as proletariat and bourgeoisie are significant catagories is that those two cilasses, in capitalist society, are in necessary and unavoidable conflict. Every gain by the one is a corresponding loss to the other. If we follow the revisions proposed implicitly by some of our comrades and restrict the labve "working class" to industrial production workers only, defining the balance of wage workers as "middle class" or some other non-worker classification, then we must ask the significance of the division. Can one say that every gain by a factory worker is necessarily made at the expense of education workers? Does a social worker's conquest of power to strike necessarliy cut away and limit the rights of a man on a Chevrolet assembly line? If not, then we are talking about differences of an entirely different kind than the differences tha that separate such Marxist catagories as proletariat and bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, just such a division of the proletariat into two categories, working class and so-called middle class, is present in the thinking and argumentation of many of our comrades.

This became painfully apparent in the recent discussion on Peace & Freedom. One of the documents submitted at the Bay Area meeting descrebed P&F as a group of "middle-calss intellectuals". Another comrade repeatedly characterized it a "petit bourgeois party". When, inprivate discussion, I attempted to pin the latter down by asking him where he found all of the small proprietors and independent professionals in Peace & Freedom (if you're going to clal a party of several thousand preple "petit bourgeois", you might at least point to three or four petit bourgeios in it), he replied " Yes, they may work for wages and produce surplus value but their consciousness is petit bourgeois and not working class. That is what makes them petit bourgeois, their consciousness."

Magnificent. Marxists now base scientific socialism on such metaphysical qualities as "consciousness" and hold that to be more important than mere material relations like the person's relationship to the means of production.

RESOLUTION ON WORKING CLASS PERSPECTIVE

Ken F. Detroit IS
Will F. Cleveland IS
Cliff H. Cleveland IS

"Talk is cheap." -- Hegel

At the IS. National Convention last August, the organization made several qualitative turns in matters of structure and program. Perhaps the most significant was embodied in the "industrialization" program. Basically, what was involved was the understanding that IS must begin to seriously involve itself in the arena of working class organizing, specifically in the mass production industries.

This perspective was greeted with enthusiasm at the convention. The enthusiasm has not abated in the three months that have followed. Nearly everyone feels that entering the industrial area is a fine idea. The problem is that nearly everyone feels that it is a fine idea -- for someone else.

Frankly, we feel the need to take the organization to task for what is, in our view, a serious failure to follow through on this important political commitment. Today, three months after our national convention, only the most tentative of beginnings has been made in developing industrial cadre. The vast majority of our membership apparently feels quite content in remaining where they always have been; the Berkely's and Ann Arbor's of the country, or at best in white-collar jobs. Moreover, a real note of self-delusion seems to be creeping into our politics. Many comrades seemingly feel that the only commitment needed to make a working class orientation a reality is to intellectualize abstractly about working class programs, occasionally writing a leaflet directed at workers.

Where industrial cadre do exist, they are quite small, and often faced with a serious manpower crisis. Our home cities of Detroit and Cleveland provide excellent examples. Between us, we have a grand total of five comrades in plants. All five, by the way, had been working in shops for some time before joining IS, which is in itself revealing. In both cities, the manpower shortage has reached crisis proportions. Excellent political opportunities in a variety of arenas have been missed simply because the resources --specifically people -- were so badly lacking.

To speak blunty, we are beginning to feel like the IS's "prole" tokens; to be dragged out of the closet when needed to score a point in debating some rival group, and ignored the rest of the time.

What we propose is that the membership of IS begin to make good on their political commitments. We do not expect or desire every member to forsake the groves of academia and come rushing into the nerest sweatshop. But it is essential that comrades, in some numbers, begin to move to the major industrial cities (Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, etc.) to do work in the following areas:

1. Working and organizing in basic mass production industries
2. Organizing women workers in both industrial and office jobs
3. Attending school and organizing at predominantly working-class universities, community colleges, and high schools
4. Serving as back-up for industrial cadre; doing research, helping produce literature, etc.

(Note: this list is by no means inclusive; many other areas of work exist. These four are in our view the most important.)

Finally, we maintain that it is the responsiblity of the national organization to recruit comrades to do this work. Every branch of the organization -- the NO, the NAC, the NC, all regional organizers, everybody --should accept this responsibility and begin at once to implement this program. Each local labor fraction should write up a prospectus of their work and send it to the NO as well as to the labor fraction executive committee. This will facilitate coordination.

The importance of this program cannot be emphasized too strongly. A cursory glance at the history of the American Left reveals all too clearly the fate which awaits a socialist organization whose base remains predominantly middle class. The opportunities for developing a base within the working class clearly exist; sound programmatic ideas have existed for some time on how to exploit them. What is now needed is quite, quite obvious.

R.S.V.P.

Motion on Implementation of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution.

Bill P. New York

While the intent of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution is basically correct, it suffers from the obvious problem of being just another resolution that some body passes and then is not taken seriously after that so taht nothing is ever done about it.

The I.S. currently is faced by the problem of being primarily oriented towards the middle class student, anti-war and radical movements. Even with all of our talk about industrialization, etc., we are not orienting in any major fashion towards the working class. And while people fear that we are presenting twelve different points of view to the class and thereby confusing them, they are forgetting about the reality of the organization; namely, that with only isolated exceptions the only people who are having any contact with the working class are those few people who are industrialized. It is clear that that should not be the case in an organization with our politics. None-the-less, it is. Therefore, a fundamental change in the organization is necessary. In this regard, the Detroit/Cleveland resolution is correct; the organization must pull people out of areas where we have an abundance of people and place them in areas where we already have some industrialized cadre, but no one to back them up.

The failure of the National Labor Fraction to function in any cohesive way represents more than just a reflection of the lack of functioning of local labor fractions. Rather, it stems from the lack of orientation by the organization as a whole towards labor, and the total failure of the I.S. to back up comrades who are industrialized. The complete lack of discussion on the NAC in the past three and a half months is a clear indication of this. The organization has failed to comply with its own decision: That labor would be the major theoretical discussion within the organization. Secondly, the NAC passed a long list of pamphlets. Yet none of them could be used by our industrialized members in any large numbers. All, including the Moody and Winkler pamphlets, were addressed to the middle class student, anti-war and radical movements. This is but another manifestation of the problem; the national organization is not attempting to back up its industrialized members. Finally, many comrades feel that the organization made a committment to building the mid-west (due to its being the center of industrial America) wiht the perspective of moveing the national office there in a year. That is obviously impossible as long as people in the I.S. are unwilling to move.

The nature of the organization is not going to change to any substantial degree until we begin to change the relative numbers of people in the midwest and elsewhere. This is the fundamental point of the Detroit/Cleveland resolution. Specifically, people who move to the mid-west should be seen doing the following: 1)Working and organizing in basic production industries. This means that rather than concentrating our meager resources at this time on small shops or teachers, we concentrate in places where there are large numbers of people. 2) Organizing women workers in both industrial and office jobs. 3) Attending school and organizing at predominantly working-class universities, community colleges, and high schools.

It seems essential that we change the emphasis away from the "elite" schools and place them on schools such as Wayne State and CCC. Given the economic background of the people who attend colleges like these and the quality of those schools, it is going to be the people who are recruited off of these campuses as well as out of shops and offices who are going to comprise the bulk of our future industrialized cadre. 4) Serving as back up for industrialized cadre. Concretely, this meand participating in the arenas which are difficult if not impossible for industrialized people to work in in, that is, on the campuses, in the anti-war movement, etc. Rurthermore, it means that research into the labor scene in these cities must be carried out by these "backup" people. This must be seen as fundamental for the future growth of the I.S. Therefore, the following are proposed:

1. That the discussion on the transitional program must be seen as being of prime importance for the organization as a whole in the months between now and the next convention.

2. The national secretary is directed to find someone to re-write The Fight For Socialism as per the recomendation of the National Labor Fraction that met at the convention.

3. The resident steering committee of the NLF along with the NAC are to draw up a list of pamphlets and other literature directed towards the working class, within the next two months and the NAC is to find people to immediately begin the writing of them.

4. The various execs, because they are the continuing leadership bodies of the local shapters, are mandated to:1) begin discussions with all comrades to elicit information as to who is willing to industrialize by June or can be convinced to do so, or move to areas where they can actually support industrialized comrades. That the execs conduct these discussions from the point of view that industrializing a significant portion of our existing membership is our most important political perspective, and evaluations of present political activities reports should reflect a recognition of this primary perspective. 2)That the execs should evaluate the overall progress of this decision as measured by the number of comrades who are willing to either industrialize or otherwise become politically active in areas which have large portions of the membership in mass industry. The execs are further mandated to communicate the strenghths and weaknesses of the political presentations they are making in favor of realocating personnel to carry out the perspective of this motion. These reports are to be sent to the NAC for discussion with copies to NC members, so that the NAC can present to the next NC (or convention if they are at the same time) a concrete proposal for relocation of personnel.

5. That MALs are to send in reports similar to those demanded of the execs.

These motions are seen as disciplined motions and are mandatory for all chapters and members.

TOWARD A WORKING-CLASS ANTI-WAR PROGRAM

Dave Finkel, passed by January . NC as amended

The resolution below is not intended to re-hash the same debate that occured during the IS's recent attempts to formulate a position on the Vietnam Moratorium. To summarize that debate briefly: my perspective, which was essentially adopted by the NAC majority, was to make political exposure of the liberal character of the Moratorium (despite the presence within it of unorganized student radicals) an important aspect of our anti-war work in the student arena, as poosed to emphasizing "critical support" (a euphemism for using October 15 as an excuse to distribute our laudatory leaflets with warmed-over versions of the standard criticisms of a single-issue middle-class movement which we, and SDS, have been presenting since the dawn of the Neolithic era.). In the present state of the IS, unfortunately, any such perspective took on the appearance of ultra-left abstentionism, due to a programmatic vacuum which left us with nothing to build concretely aside from the Moratorium. With all its rhetoric about "independent" for the anti-war movement, the IS seems to have little of its own. This resolution will attempt to lay the groundwork to remedy this situation, by defining the role of the IS in developing the newly emerging and potentially immensely powerful forces in the anti-war movement (which in no way suggests the abondonment of student anti-war work). In order to do this it is necessary to indicate briefly a conception of where the anti-war movement is today, though without attempting a comprehensive analysis.
(NOTE: the above is simply an introduction and was not submitted to a vote)

THESES ON THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

1. The Moratorium is dead -- laid to rest on schedule, as its organizers intended. The December Moratorium (see Chicago Sun-Times, 12/7/69) is a bloc between Sam Brown and Joseph S. Clark, president of the United World Federalists. This outcome was entirely predictable and unavoidable. It was impossible to drive a wedge between the Moratorium's leadership and its rank-and-file, because "as a nationally organized activity"[1] the Moratorium had no rank-and-file. This is not to be confused with its popular base, which was anormous but incapable of independent organization because it had virtually no defined politics. Certainly much of this base was receptive to speeches expressing left-wing criticisms of the Moratorium leadership, but within the Moratorium framework it was virtually impossible for this sentiment to take a political form, i.e. consciousness of the need for a power struggle against that leadership.

2. The first nationwide anti-war upsurge, during 1965-67, gave rise directly to a plethora of radical-led single-issue anti-war committees (SMC) and to the rapid growth of a quasi-revolutionary left wing (SDS). This development will not be repeated this time, except in places previously unorganized by the anti-war movement (these will be fertile areas for political organization, but generally IS has no strength there). The organizational upshot of the Moratorium will be a left-liberal electoral drive, in no way independent of the DP. This outcome is essentially unavoidable at the present time; that is, intervention by radicals in the electoral arena will be ineffective. This is partly because of the specific illusions entertained by anti-war youth at present: they are taken in not by the DP as such, but by the importance and effectiveness of a Congressional opposition to Administration policy. For this reason they will

support DP candidates on the basis of expediency, i.e. those are the types who can get elected.

3. The November 15 Mobilization constitutes an event of historic importance as a summing-up of a crucial development within the U.S. in the last decade -- the enourmous weakening of popular patriorism by the shattering of the illusion of American international invicibility. The March on Washington was notable for its incredible size and for the presence of previously uninvolved strata, most importantly sections of the labor movement. It also summed up major weaknesses of the middle-class anti0war movement: first, its isolation from the black movement, which is profoundly anti-war but was virtually absent in Washington. Second, its limited independence of the capitalist political establishment, illustrated by the emphasis on peaceful protest, March-Against-Death tactics, and the obvious dependence of the Mobilization on its coincidence with the Moratorium and the reflected legitimacy of the endorsement given the latter by liberal politicians (almost none of whom endorsed the March itself, for sufficiently obvious reasons). In this context, the demonstrations at DuPont Circle and the Justice Department -- disorganized, politically semi-incoherent, with almost no leadership -- represented something of a radical pole, appallingly feeble but important for its presence. This might also be said of the Labor Dept. demo, though that was especially appalling.

4. The prospects for further mass mobilizations in the immediate future are not good. For the Spring, local marches (which will have liberal backing, and may be larger than ever before) are more likely than another national mobilization (which probably wouldn't have liberal support and couldn't match the numerical standard set by Nov. 15) Keeping in mind that the last big mobilization before this one was the Oct. 1967 Pentagon happening, shortly before Clean Gene appeared, we may anticipate a similar "moratorium" in honor of the 1970 elections. Our task in the mass anti-war arena, as far as marches and demonstrations are concerned, will be to establish a political presence at the local marches as we did in Washington; conditions for this will be more favorable locally than in Washington, since we can hopefully do some actual organizing and programmatic recruitment (the final section of this resolution will attempt to lay the basis for this).

5. While the conjunction of circumstances that made Nov. 15 possible will not immediately reappear, the disillusionment and anti-war sentiment will continue to spread. If the war is still in progress by 1971 (after the elections) as we beleive it will, there will be undoubtedly yet another wave of anti-war activity, the explosive nature of which will surpass anything yet seen. Our basic task in the next year is to build the forces that will spark this explosion: a reorganized left wing of the student movement and a radical, anti-war base in the working class. We may see within a year to eighteen months a series of small but explosive anti-war strikes. Taken in connection with the ecnomic strike wave, this development could point toward a genuine political crisis for the capitalist establishment in this country.

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CONCLUSIONS

IS regards its primary responsibility, as far as anti-war activity is concerned, as the building of anti-war consciousness within the working class. Our purpose is not only the involvement of masses of working people in anti-war actions of the existing type, but the development of anti-war activities built and shaped by the working-class movement itself in accordance with workers' own needs.

Anti-war agitation is a crucial component of our work in the shops. Working people know who pays for the war, and they don't like it. The responsibility of revolutionary socialists is to point out: (1) the connection between the needs of the war economy and the intensified attacks on workers' standards of life and work; (2) similarly, the connection between workers' defensive struggles against these attacks and the demands of the anti-war movement; (3) the roots of imperialism in the capitalist economic system. For example, war is inseparable from profit in that a 100% tax on corporate profits (as opposed to attacks on workers' standards of living) during wartime would prevent such wars from being wages. This holds true, of course, for World War II no less than for the war against Vietnam.

One point must be emphasized here: this is not intended to build a "single-issue working class movement". Quite the contrary: because of their essential roles in production and their position as the principal brunt of the economic squeeze, workers are affected by and thus are driven to deal with the societal crisis as a whole, embracing the war, taxes the black rebellion, the urban decay. Being (unlike the upper and student strata of the middle class) threatened by all of these at once, workers perceive all of them together, although not necessarily in a consistent fashion.

This in fact is the key to the motivation for the working-class anti-war program. For the society as a whole, the war has been the major catalyst in generating social unrest in the last six years, causing a radical upsurge among the youth and creating an opening to the left for the entire society. Explicitly anti-war agitation within the working class, in the context of an over-all class program, will play a key role in working-class radicalization on a multi-issue basis. We realize that anti-war propaganda (which is objectively anti-patriotic, whether or not presented explicitly in that form) meets with a highly uneven response among workers; but among workers as among other strata, disgust with the war has reached the point where it represents the feelings of the majority, hence the basis of success is clearly present. This is particularly true of young workers, among whom we can expect the greatest receptivity in all our work.

IMPLEMENTATION

1. Transitional Program. In its completed form, the IS transitional program for the working class must clearly explain the role played by the war in the exploitation of working people, in killing them both on the job and in the Army. Demands must be raised for the immediate unconditional end of the war, dis-

mantling of the Permanent War Economy, and the mobilization of resources under working-class control to guarantee employment for all and construction programs designed to meet needs of life, health, etc.

We must raise support for workers' struggles in the anti-war movement as a whole, making it clear that Vietnam and future Vietnams, as a product of imperialism, will only be stopped by ditching the war economy, and that the only force capable of doing this is the working class. We must point out that the arms economy is the motor force behind the inflation, and that the assault on wages and working conditions necessary to maintain corporate profits in the stagnating economy have brought workers militancy to the fore. We must relate this to the anti-war movement as a whole, stressing the need to link the war with the inflation and the new strike wave. We must pose this as an alternative to a strategy limited to mass marches and Weatherman tactics which a large section of the anti-war movement has come to see do not provide a strategy for ending the war.

Our orientation to the strikers themselves must begin with support for their immediate demands, but must go beyond this to raising demands which will help direct the attention of workers towards the root of the problem: the capitalist system itself. One way of doing this is by exposing the class collaborationist role of the union bureaucrats. In the G.E. strike, for example, we demand that Meany's boycott of G.E. be extended - the government, as G.E.'s largest consumer, must be forced to comply.

We must also demand the scrapping of the arms economy and its reconversion into a system that produces for social needs and provides productive jobs for all. These demands flow from the relation of the arms economy to the inflation and the growing inability of capital to provide for social needs, especially in the major urban areas. By raising these demands, we help focus the attention of workers on the entire social system.

In putting forth this orientation, we stress that the only way to end the war economy is through a movement led by the working class aimed at workers' control.

The recent calls of the liberals (for the reordering of priorities) leaves the tax burden on the working class. In order to expose this, we must demand that the burden of all government spending be shifted from the workers to capital.

2. Role of the press: As in our working-class program as a whole, the I.S. will play a crucial role. Emphasis must be placed on the eight-page monthly supplement to the I.S. proposed by Kit Lyons, "primarily devoted to political articles on topics of general interest to workers" and printed for mass distribution. It is important that every issue contain material directly relevant to the war, both in its international significance and its domestic effects. Whenever finances and other considerations permit, special issues of the supplement consisting of twelve rather than eight pages should be published, to prevent the danger of the paper becoming an anti-war sheet to the serious detriment of other issues. The I.S. supplement is not only for the use of all branches in carrying out their work. It is expected that the supplement will be distributed at factory gates, etc., so that the press will build the anti-war program of the entire organization and concretize the working-class orientation of that program.

3. Working-class organizing. In the present embryonic state of the Labor Fraction, it is impossible to dictate forms of organization. Generally speaking, however, the rank-and-file shop organizations built by industrialized comrades will hopefully be arenas of anti-war organizing as well as of other political and economic struggles. Agitation along the lines of the National Work Stoppage, and local actions based on that agitational perspective, are of special significance. Calling upon union leaderships to respond to rank-and-file support for for an anti-war work stoppage by endorsing and mobilizing support for such a stoppage may be an effective menas of exposing that leadership. Where the existing anti-war movement serves as a useful vehicle in this work, i.e. where participation in local anti-war marches (perhaps in connection with a work stoppage) plays a constructive rather than disorganizing role in building the shop movement, that vehicle should be energetically used. In the form outlined here, these proposals suffer from vagueness; the Labor Fraction is asked to give special consideration to developing the anti-war aspect of the working-class program of the IS in a more concrete form.

4. Tasks of non-industrialized comrades. A working-class program is not merely a matter of direct activity in the shops, although abstracted from such activity it becomes wholly strile. In the context of a program of anti-war agitation in the shops, and with a working-class press based on an over-all political approach but giving special attention to the question of the war, we may hope to transcend our role as socialist "educators" and become a genuine working-class tendency within the over-all anti-war movement. The task of comrades engaged in non-proletarian arenas will be to develop programs and local organizations by which the anti-war movement, and IS in its own name, can appeal directly to the working class.

The importance of this work, particularly among students, must be emphasized. The potentiality for a new mass student upsurge next year (late 1970-71) following the quiescense of this school year, will be enormous. Two main obstacles presently face the student movement: first, the weariness of several years of losing struggles and the illusions provided by the Moratorium and the hope that the war is finally ending (all this flows from the isolation of the student movement from a social base); and second, the disastrous wreckage of the organized left wing (a circumstance related of course to the first problem). It is critical that at least the foundations of a reorganized left wing be laid by the time that objective developments have swept away the weariness and some of the illusions. Politically, this foundation must a working-class orientation, both in its attacks on the University and in its approach to societal problems generally. On campuses we hold our own anti-war meetings and debates, in cooperation with other radical groups where possible. Most importantly, we carry out ourselves and in coalition with other radical groupings where feasible and politically advisable, pro-working class activities that we advocate for the anti-war and radical movement. The development of cadre on the basis of this orientation will allow radicals to take full advantage of the opportunities that will arise next year. This must be not only understood by ourselves, but explained by example and education to other radicals as well. One simple means of carrying out this perspective is the recruitment of students to participate in the distribution of the working-class I.S. supplement.

Within local anti-war and radical groups, it is not sufficient simply to propagandistically counterpose to the conception of a Congressional opposition that of a movement based in the working class. IS perspectives within the radical movement must aim fundamentally at building direct links between radicals and the

working class movement, rather than having purely educational functions for the radicals themselves. Thus we would urge strike support activities, projects around demands which reflect immediate and actionable working class issues like taxation, day care centers, housing, transit, employment, and so forth. We would also advocate educational activities around major, though less immediately actionable demands (which would fall in the same kinds of areas just listed). In all such activities we would call upon the radical movement to see itself as not merely a support group, but as a political organization, putting forth educational demands, analysis, strategy, and tactics. We would fight for such a political approach by putting forth our transitional program, and action and education proposals based on that program. These are campaigns which embody in practice the conception of a movement based in the working class and therefore capable of directly linking the war to other social questions. On this basis we may hope to attract a number of radical and radicalizing students, by giving them a concrete perspective that looks ahead beyond the immediate electoral swamp.

Within the anti-war movement, we must counter the coalition organizing committee approach, which makes no effort to democratically organize the masses who are called on to participate in the periodic demonstrations. Our goal should be rank and file groups wherever possible and on the largest scale possible. Recognizing that the prospects for building such groups are not good at the present time, we relate to given activities by fighting for rank and file control at the local level, in the organization of the activities (e.g. campus strikes) and in the determination of the politics.

Even where it is possible to build rank and file organizations, we recognize that they are not ultimately viable on a single issue, middle class basis and we counterpose a radical program and working class orientation. We propose that mass demonstrations flow naturally from rank and file organizations, in which people develop politically by participating in day to day decision making: discussing, planning and carrying out programs. We counterpose this to the passive participation in rallies and marches so typical of anti-war mobilizations.

* * * * * * * *

[1]Note: the phrase "as a nationally organized activity" is taken from the NAC resolution and refers to the Moratorium as a coordinated whole and a political strategy rather than simply a series of local demonstrations. This coordination and strategic conception were of a liberal character and self-consciously opposed to radical alternatives, and succeeded both because of widespread anger against the war and the demoralization of the left. It was in this sense, i.e. that of national organization and the politics of that organization, that the Moratorium had no rank-and-file and in which the NAC called for this exposure.

THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY

By T.N. Vance

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Motion: The Los Angeles Chapter of I.S. initiate a campaign within the anti-war movement for an anti-war, pro-working class electoral campaign asing the PFP primary as a meand of getting on the ballot.

submitted by Mike Hannon L.A. I.S.

GENERAL POSITION OF IS ON THE PEACE & FREEDON PARTY

The recent debates on our relationship to the Peace & Freeflom Party, both in Los Angeles and in the Bay Area, were unfortunately vived examples of the all too prevelant tendancy in IS to substitute demagogic Marxistical name calling for reasoned analysis. The words "working class", "middles calss", and "petit bourgeoisie" fleww back and forth with marvelous imprecision.

"Working class" has a particularly fluid character in IS discuasion. It often changes shape whithin the confines of a single sentence. It is never very clear whether the term refers to a Marcian class (i.e., synonomous eith proletariat)), to some find of sociological category or to some metaphisical entity sitting at the right hand of God.

If, when we talk about working class perspectives, orientation toward the working class, a workers party, etc., etc., we mean to designate some definate, concrete category useful as a tool of political analysis, then we had better start by deflning theat categoty.

If we are to define working class in Marxian terms, then what we are talking about is all producers of surplus value who sell their labor power for wages. That category includes college professors, social workers, garbage collectors, and bank tellers as well as p production workers in heavy industry. Allo f them are contributors to the collective production of surplus value -- at least according to Marx. If some of our comrades believe that Marx should be revised on thid point, the burden is upon them to justify the revision.

The reason classes such as proletariat and bourgeoisie are significant catagories is that those two cilasses, in capitalist society, are in necessary and unavoidable conflict. Every gain by the one is a corresponding loss to the other. If we follow the revisions proposed implicitly by some of our comrades and restrict the labie "working class" to industrial production workers only. defining the balance of wage workers as "middle class" or some other non-worker classification, then we must ask the significance of the division. Can one say that every gain by a factory worker is necessarily made at the expense of education workers? Does a social worker's conquest of power to strike necessarliy cut away and limit the rights of a man on a Chevrolet assembly line? If not, then we are talking about differences of an entirely different kind than the differences tha that separate such Marxist catagories as proletariat and bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, just such a division of the proletariat into two categories, working class and so-called middle class, is present in the thinking and argumentation of many of our comrades.

This became painfully apparent in the recent discussion on Peace & Freedom. One of the documents submitted at the Bay Area meeting descrebed P&F as a group of "middle-calss intellectuals". Another comrade repeatedly characterized it a "petit bourgeois party". When, inprivate discussion , I attempted to pin the latter down by asking him where he found all of the small proprietors and independent professionals in Peace & Freedom (if you're going to clal a party of several thousand preple "petit bourgeois", you might at least point to three or four petit bourgeios in it), he replied " Yes, they may work for wages and produce surplus value but their consciousness is petit bourgeois and not working class. That is what makes them petit bourgeois, their consciousness."

Magnificent. Marxists now base scientific socialism on such metaphysical qualities as "consciousness" and hold that to be more important than mere material relations like the person's relationship to the means of production.

The problem with making political analysis like a sophomore class in sociology rather htan as Marxists i s that it leads directly in to major strategic errors. One such error is to overemphasize the revolutionary potentail of trade union struggles in production industries while, at the same time, undervaluing the significance kf political work among white-collar and service workers.

The Peace and Freedom Party is, if one looks at its actual composition, composed mostly of teachers, writers, students, social workers, transport workers (the lagge ILWU registration in P&F in San Francisco) and similar occupations. All of these are workers in the Marxist sense of that word. With the exception of a few professionals (including myself) there are no petit bourgeois. Although such persons may be denominated middle class as if it were identical to Marx's petit bourgeoisie. Such persons are not in a special and precarious class position vacilating between great capital on the one hand and the proletariat on the other. They sell their labor power for wages and the laws of capitalist economy apply as much to them asto assembly line laborers.

All this is compounded by the romantic notion that the fordes of the revolution will be drawn from the ranks of horny handed manual laborers -- embodiments of proletarian virtue. To such "scientific"socialists, airline pilots, although they form unions and go on strike against their capitalist employers really don't make it as proletarians because they don't sweat enough and because their wages are too high.

At one point in the Bay Area discussion, I mentioned "tillers of the soil" among other production workers. "They're not workers at all; they're peasants" contributed one of the great thinkers of the last cenury from the back room. The idea that such feudal classes as peasants exist in mid-twentieth century America is further proof that the Marxiam of manu of our sociological-romanticist comrades is as mechanical as it is shallow. Workers for wages on corporate farms are as much workers as those who produce automobiles rather than food.

If historical materialism is valid, then consciousness is determined by class position and not vice versa. If the basic Marxist critic is valid, then it is the inherent contradiction between capital and the entire proletariat that will cause the breakdown of the bourgeois dictatorship. The fact that Imperialism makes possible their granting of special privileges to certain categories of workers should not lead us to the conclusion that such workers should be ignored . Reverse elitism is still elitism.

The fact that the Peace & Freedom Party is not primarily composed of laborers in heavy industry should not be taken as justification for abandoning that party. For reasons that I need not describe here, the Democratic Party cannot be used as a vehicle for our electoral activities. Non party electoral campaigns (write-ins are largely exercises in futility which reach few people and do not take advantage of the access to the mass media provided by a qualified party. The Peace & Freedom Party is a useful vehicle for reaching those elements of the American working class which comprise its membership.

Peace & Freedom was created by a tremedous effort, very largely the work of members of IS. Although, it may have taken time away from internal politicing, it cannot be said that the time devoted by IS members to P&F was detrimental to IS because our membertripeld during that period when we were so engaged.

IS has a labor fraction which very properly carries on its agitation in the work places and trade unions where its members spend their lives. The bulk of IS membership, however, is not employed in heavy industry and has no more legitimacy in running off to factories whith its leaflets than had the "white liberals" of the early, intergrationist civil rights movement.

Those of our comrades who are unwilling to enter Industrial occupations themselves will

certainly find a more fruitful area for their own revolutionary labors among those workers who are most similar to themselves in background, education, cultural and lifestyles, i.e. the kinds of workers that comprise the bulk of the Peace & Freedom Party,

This motion is substantially identical to the Haberkern motion passed by the Bay Area IS. It calls for our running an anti-war candidate (at least one) within the Peace & Freedom Party. Necessarily, such a tactic means that, in order to avoid the so-called "albatross problem", we must take at least enough responsibility for P&F so t hat opportunits like the Reverend Hensley do not embarrass the party to the extent that it becomes useless for our purposes.

While Peace & Freedom may not be a party of production workers, it is composed of people who ar3 properly considered members of the working class and is not is any sense a pro-capitalst party. Encouraging registration into and activity in the Peace & Freedom Party is encouraging a break with the pro-capitialist parties and is certainly in line with the long term revolutionary strategy of IS. A Peace & Freedom Party is a valuable political tool which should not be lost in a deluge of mushy sociological - romantic rhetoric.

Morgan Specter (L.A. I.S.)

I should introduce this brief paper by thanking Comrade Hannon for printing his motion clearly across the top of the first page of his polemicpolemic, else I would have had some trouble finding it in the text itself. For all of Comrades Hannon's caustic analysis and wry wit (which those of us who have known him for a while are all too well aware of) the proposal itself does little to illuminate and clear up the real problems surrounding the relationship of IS to the Peace and Freedom Party.

A very real problem, one which strikes me before any other, is that of defining what it is we are talking about NOW when we mention the PFP. This is not simply an empirical problemsof listing, as Comrade Hannon does, the occupational areas of the bulk of its membership, rather, what real life (if any) does the Party have, and what actors are present in the arena other than those I.S. members which Haberkern and Hannon would have us commit to it?

During our discussion in the Los Angeles club prior to the Bay Area Convention, I and two or three other comrades made it clear that in our belief, the extent to which PFP will be a viable arena for IS in 1970 is the extent to which life has been breathed into it from quarters other than our own. It was additionally our perspective (which I believe still valid given the dismal reports on the Convention) that if there is little real in that arena that we should not feel the weight of history on our shoulders and begin arain the previous process.

The only thing real which either Haberkern or Hannon can point to in PFP is that it could really mean something IF, etc., etc., etc. Because the arena as a whole offers nothing, and because the antics of Reverend Hensley may only make a joke of the state-wide organization, it would be a mistake to continue to deal with PFP in terms of "keeping it on the ballot" on a state or national basis.

I am not convinced by Hannon's arguments to the contrary on this question. The mere existence of a skeleton party is not a guarantee of anything. Not is its mere presence on the ballot. Attempting to mount a campaign which would have as its net effect the maintenance of PFP's ballot presence would, in my view, be a fantastic waste of time and energy. I agree with Joel Geier's argument that the possibilities of success are almost nil, but even if suchaad hoc unified political activity were possible, I would view it with caution unless something more exhilarating than the ignominious Senatorial and Presidential campaigns of 1968 was in mind, This does not seem to be the case, and another feckless search for "the right man to carry the banner" hardly seems worthwhile at this time.

However, there is a value to PFP yet, and that is to be found in those small districts where some organization has continued to this day. Since IS itself participated in the failuee of an electoral effort organized from the top with no substantive base, I oppose anything which would put us in that position again. Hannon repudiates independent campaigns on the basis that they do not command access to the media, yet Cleaver probably commanded more media atten-

tion than anyone else connected with the Party, and it seems clear in retrospect that that itslef meant little.

But at the base level, in those areas where some real structure exists and has been kept alive, real possibilities exist for using the organization to mount campaigns that command the attention of those communities as a whole. In some of those areas, campaigns have already begun. Insofar as it is possible for IS to relate to such campaigns, or assist materially in their development both in terms of candidates and programs, we should definitely do so. Participation in such campaigns, while correct from any number of perspectives, including the propaganda angle expounded by Comrade Geier, also has the advantage of allowing us to concentrate our political activity and carry our case directly to the people oursleves and in our own terms, rather than paying undue attention to our media presence which places us at the mercy of those whom we attack.

Another point. Before I.S. as a party(?), can justifiably think in terms of providing or helping to provide a vehicle for the working class or the anti-war movement or both in the electoral arena, we should first do our homework in those arenas. The renascent anti-war movement is currently caught in a struggle between liberal Democrats who have revitalized it for their own purposes, and those like ourselves who are seriously interested in seeing it take on a meaningfull independent life. As we begin to realize significant successes in forging a consciuosness in the anti-war movement that it should be independent of all aspects of the capitalist machinery, including its parties, we can then, and not before, begin to aid in the re-development of an independently organized political voice for it. IS should consistently oppose the "romantics" who completely and for all time eschew the value of electoral politics, and we must always be ready to participate in helping build (or re-build, as the case may be) a "PFP" when the progress of the movement itself justifies it. However, it would be an error to expend great time and energy trying to hold on to something which, on a state and national basis, represents nothing.

As for the problem of relating to the working class, I would only say that it is alsways our responsibility to struggle for the re-development of a consciousness some thirty years dormant that the working class as a whole and particularly the industrial proletariat (satisfying in part, I hope, Comrade Hannon's demand for precise phraseology) has nothing ot gain and everything to lose by remaining strapped to the Republicrat Parties. This also involves combatting, by the way, the false consciousness that led significant portions of the working class into an independent politics on the right. At the very least, we should use such local PFP campaigns as are suitable to the purpose for propagandizing the working class. Beyond that, wuch work as Comrade Weinberg and others have been developing of consistent communication with factory workers through labor committees should be encouraged and led by ISers in every city where we organize. Again, as militant and independent rank-and-file activity goes beyond its sporadic nature of the moment and begins to take on greater stability (which is a result of the development of true consciousness), which development I would hope our Comrades

would be in the forefornt of, serious attention should be paid to the problem of developing the proper electoral vehicle for that section of the class. We cannot wait for the development within the working class to take place should, for example, the process in the anti-war movement towards real independence comes to fruition, but neither should we gloss over the real necessity of involving ourselves actively in it at all times.

SPECIFIC MOTION

I. That I.S. members should not at this time concern themselves with attempting to salvage what remnants that are of the PFP on a state or national level.

II. That where local organizations exist, we should participate in their community campaigns, and seek to develop the level of their programs.

III. That we continue to work within the anti-war movement for an independent strategy, with the perspective in mind that one result of this independence would be the development of an independent, anti-capitalist electoral party.

IV. That insofar as possible we use existing PFP organizations to develop communications with industrial workers or, if that is not possible, with "white-collar" segments of the working class. That where contacts on an on-going basis with industrial workers cannot be made through the device of local PFP campaigns, we seek to establish and develop such contacts on our own or in concert with other grops who share our perspective on this question.

V. Tjat we push within these campaigns that are mounted for a multi-issue program, opposing such provincialism as is evidenced in the Davidson campaign in Venice.

VI. If in other states (and this is only intended as a contribution to a national discussion) statewide campaigns seem real, we should urge anti-war candidates to run as PFP and not in the DP, or run anti-war campaigns through PFP in direct opposition to such campaigns in the DP, as seems called for in our perspectvive to the anti-war movement as a whole.

This perspective should not be interpreted as a death wish extended to PFP or any counterpoints for all time, but rather as a realization that such a party must grow from t-e process of the movement as a whole, and not be the result of political manufacture, inspired by our understanding that a PFP is a real necessity at certain points in the development of the struggle for socialism.

Let my windiness in brevity seve as a warning to those who would encourage me to write at length on other topics.

Draft Resolution on Peace and Freedom Party
David E. (L.A. I.S.)

"The I.S. as a matter of tactics, do not endorse P+F and similar electoral campaigns at the present juncture. In the anti-war movement and elsewhere we challenge the legitimacy of the electoral process under monopoly capitalism. We regard the primary task of the Left at present as the creation of an extraparliamentary opposition capable of exemplary and mass direct action against the ruling class and its agents."
This should be a matter of discipline at least to the extent of I.S. members not being candidates.

JUSTIFICATION:

Too many IS arguments revolve around taking abstract and ahistorical "positions". The question of strategy and tactics (we are at point A and want to get to B; how do we start?) is usually not considered. Hence there will be no quarrel with the principle of political action outside the two-party dictatorship.

But the left is fragmented, tiny, and demoralized, confined to a few metropoli and college towns--a minority of students, a handful of intellectuals, and a minority (though growing) of ethnic minorities. The numbers in disciplined formations of whatever line is miniscule even in the left milieu, and they tend to interact eith one antother rather than with potential constituencies.

The world situation is one of continued high tension in most places and war in a few places between imperialism and third-world insurgencies. Due to economic problems, notably balance-of-trade and inflation, the mother country is entering a period of retrenchment (if it can manage it) but not withdrawal. This retrenchment requires the suppression of black and other movements at home, and probably an incomes policy or some other form of attack on real w wages. A similar recession is already beginning on campus--the beginnings of corporatization and rationalization of higher education. Similar processes are already under way in other public bureaucracies even as "movement" analysis and world-view are spreading among them (the two trends are probably related). France (May 1969), Italy (now), and to a lesser extent W. German SDS are already examples of the reality of extraparliamentary direct challenges to bourgeois rule in industrial societies, along with the civil rights movement, the Resistence, FSM, Columbia, SF STate, etc. As conflict sharpens in our traditional constituencies, in both the "middle-class"working class and the "labor-metaphysics" industrial wokring class, our redoubtable dialecticians tell us the way to fight A.P.Giannini, General Motors, and friends is by challenging Mickey Mouse Reagon--at the ballot box! A magnificent rise to the challenge.

Yet the fact is that every <u>successful</u> electoral party, even avowedly socialist ones, has been conservatized by its experience. In other words, a successful P&F will give us Harold Wilson, Hollywood style. An unsuccessful one will guve us nothing at all, and will have diverted our scarce money and organizers into something that will evaporate come November, for two years at least, leaving us at best with the bureaucratic shell of a line on the ballot and maybe a few new recruits (a sectarian goal, if that's the main one). It will have also

served to strengthen the popular definition of politics as what happens on election day, to which the public reacts with a great yawn, and cynical jokes, and rightly so. Far from providing an alternative to the Republicrats, it will confirm everyone's view that "this is a free country, even kooks can get on the ballot, and you can see how popular the system is by the number os votes they get compared to Reagan-Unruh and Murphy-Hayakawa."

What about pushing to get the anti-war movement to support P&F? That is so much ritualistic bullshit. The libs won't. The New Left types will say, "If you're for it, then do it," so we'll end up with the main responsibility for it anyway, and the weight of the albotross on our shoulders.. With our numbers, we aren't going to push anything as amorphous as the anti-war movement (as a whole) into anything. So that version is the same thing as going into P&F and "taking it over".

The power of the movement has been its ability to get people to break with conventional definitions of politics, with bourgeois legality, with the ritualism of the Old Left. Remember we are talking about defeating imperialism, grinding the heel of revolution into the face of the bourgeoisie, giving people a sense of the possiblity of liberation, of collective control of their own destiny, energy for a twenty- or froty-year struggle. Electoral campaigns of the size of P&F are bloodless, enervating, demoralizing, and lead to the evaporation of the organization on Election Day.

12/4/69 OPPORTARIANISM David Friedman

From the IS program-in-brief: "In Vietnam, we favor the victory of the NLF over the imperialist -- but we believe that the new regime will establish bureaucratic class rule, not a socialist society .... (and) that socialism cannot be achieved in these (bureaucratic collectivist) countries without the overthrow of the ruling groups."

From the MAC anti-war resolution (10/28): "It should see itself as an independent movement which looks to the replacement of both parties as the only viable way to bring any significant change to our foreign policy. Yet a middle class movement cannot do that alone, it needs to link up with the working class." (Emphasis added)

1. There is great pressure within the movement against criticism of the NLF. I believe that the IS has been yielding to this pressure in our public work (leaflets, articles, speeches at meetings). Often this takes the form of "forgetting" to explain or even to mention our position. Sometimes it just seems "inappropriate". I am not impugning the honesty or courage of any comrade, but we are not immune to the pressures of the radical milieu. In this milieu, certain subjects seem inappropriate primarily because our positions are unpopular.

Our attitude toward the NLF is an important test of our theory of bureaucratic collectivism -- in a situation where all the popular "Marxist" theories lead to political support for the NLF. Our analysis of Stalinist movements and regimes is basic to our conception of socialism as a world-system distinct from and hostile to all class societies. IS support for an NLF victory, based on the principle of self-determination for the Vietnamese people, must not become confused with the classless and erroneous view that Stalinism is a lesser-evil in the Third World. Our class point of view is internationalist. We reject the notion of orienting toward workers in one country, peasants in another, etc.... wherever POWER seems to lie for aspiring Saviors and petit bourgeois radicals.

2. On the question of independent political action, I ask only that the MAC stand by its own position, as quoted above. We have two basic things to say to the anti-war movement: It should adopt a multi-issue, working class program, and it should break with the Democratic Party. I assume that "the replacement of both parties" refers to electoral action. Do we pose ~~this dual strategy~~ to the anti-war movement in a dialectical way, raising independent political action and a working class transitional program together, explaining the interrelationships and implications? Or do we separate the two ideas and say that electoral action should wait until after there is a firm working-class base? (NOTE: I am not suggesting that the IS support every independent campaign regardless of its program, or that we de-emphasize militant mass action.)

Independent electoral action and a working class program are mutually-reinforcing ideas. Insofar as any movement of social protest counterposes itself to the capitalist parties, it must attempt to win the allegiance of masses of people not simply on one issue (although a single issue like the war might be dominant), but on the larger question of how the society should be governed. Today in America, this necessitates a multi-issue, working class appeal. Conversely, to the extent that sectors of the anti-war movement adopt a working class program, it should be used to break workers out of the Democratic Party and into activities which directly challenge the capitalist parties for control of the state. This kind of electoral action goes hand-in-hand with the effort to stimulate political strikes and working class radicalism. There is no guarantee against bad campaigns, but we do not advocate them and we do not have to support them. Independent political action will find few adherents among the hard liberals and affluent middle class section of the anti-war movement. And none among the politicians and careerists. Here is an opportunity for radicals to break out of their isolation, a message for them to bring to workers and the anti-war movement. Of course they won't do it, but that is no reason for the IS to capitulate to the anti-electoralism which is part-and-parcel of the political bankruptcy of the radical left. (To be continued)

MOTION ON PERSPECTIVES TOWARD THE PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

1. The IS support and encourage the mounting of a statewide PFP campaign in the 1970 elections.
a. We realize that finances and other problems make a full slate probably impossible.
b. Unless we hear more positive information on his projected campaign, we oppose the candidacy of Rev. Kirby Hensley for Governor.

2. We push for adding more labor-directed demands to the existing PFP program, and for orienting the campaign primarily toward the working class. Such demands would include extending the state and federal wages & hours acts to all workers (including agricultural workers), a $3 minimum wage, the 30-hour week with double-time for overtime, repeal of the Taft-Hartly & Landrum-Griffin acts, repeal of the state "hot cargo" and secondary boycott laws, state and federal systems of free medical care for all, repeal of the sales tax, a $15,000 homestead exemption on property taxes, ~~etc~~,

3. The IS take responsiblitie for one local campaign (e.g., the Alameda County State Senate seat), if necessary putting up the candidate and running it on a militant, class-conscious basis. (The new transistional program being prepared in NY should be of assistance in this.) This campaign should not merely be directed to the workers, but should raise thequestion independent political action by the working calss nature of the state as embodied in labor legislation, strikebreaking, etc.

Tom Condit
East Bay Community Branch

MOTION TO BAY AREA CONFERENCE BY JOEL GEIER

MOTION: The Bay area International Socialists reaffirms its position in support of independent political action. Within the anti-war movement and other movements of social protest, we will continue to propagandize for no support to the capitalist parties and for independent political action as a vehicle to the formation of an independent pabor party. While favorable to the construction of a broad radical party we believe that the current radical movement, due to its limitation to middle class intellegentsia elements who are now in process of ideological crisis, self-definition, differentiation and dissarray, does not today provide the basis for unified independent political action. Therefore the IS will not initiate the reconstruction of the PFP as a broad radical party, believing this to be currently impossib le. Instead the IS will carry on its owm propaganda and will attempt to run its own candidates as revolutionary socialist propaganda campaign. Such candidates could run using the PFP ballot slot without in any way committing ourselves to building the PFP.

AMENDMENT TO MOODY [illegible] PENDENT POLITICAL ACTION PERSPECTIVE

by Chris Hobson

(Note - this is based on material from pp. 1 and 11 of my motion, if people wish to compare.

ADD AT END:

When does IS raise the idea of middle-class electoral action. Essentially, we never make this our major slogan for a movement or organization, even when coupled with the idea of a "working-class orientation." Rather, we urge action around programmatic demands, with a working-class orientation, in order to build continuing, struggle-oriented organizations. As socialists, we attempt to substitute the concept "what you can do for yourself," and the idea of struggle against the rulers, for the electoral "what I can do for you"; we recognize that independent voting alone does not do this, thus we never raise the idea of electoral action outside the context of some ongoing activity of which it can become one expression. In generaal, then, we raise the idea in specific situations in which voting can be a way of registering support for an organization or program, as well as of recruiting individuals into organizations which engage in continuing struggle of a non-electoral kind.

In using electoral action as an educational tool, one of our central messages is that significant change can never be won by electoral action.

"Program" means not just demands, but a set of actions which could, if taken, open a way out of the social impasse, yet which require new social power to become realizable. Thus what we offer in an electoral campaign is not a series of slogans m but a set of solutions for the social crisis - we press our "transitional" program because it is the only program which can solve the social problems of the epoch. But, stated out of the context of a movement, this becomes a set of "what I can do for you"promises. Thus, electoral action should not be undertaken as an initial organizing tool.mm Rather, the electoral campaign becomes the means by which a mass-based movement, the beginning of a proletarian movement, acquaints society as a whole with its immediate program for society as a whole.

When I.S. itself becomes directly active in an electoral campaign, it directs agitation primarily to the working class. It makes appeals mmm for endorsement from labor unions, in all cases, however, raising these through direct agitation among the workers rather than through negotiating with friendly bureaucrats. Similarly, I.S. seeks endorsement form rank-and-file caucuses and from insurgent "dual" organizations (of the DRUM type), again raising the question in membership meetings.

The NC believes that the conditions [illegible] for electoral action of the type described herein, whether for I.S. on its own or for a broader movement - such as the anti-war movement - do not exist nationwide in 1970, and probably not in any local area. Therefore I.S. shall not undertake or agitate for a national electoral program in 1970. In local situations, decisions about undertaking and agitating for electoral action shall be based on the perspective herein. In general, I.S. chapters shall not undertake or agitate for electoral campaigns using the Peace and Freedom slot on the ballot.

MOTION FOR BAY AREA CONVENTION - By Ernie H.

Motion" The Bay Area chapters of IS initiate a campaign within the anti-war movement for an anti-war, pro working class electoral campaign using the PFP primary as the means of getting on the ballot.

GENERAL POSITION OF IS ON ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS BY ANTI_WAR MOVEMENT

1) The IS sees an independent working class party as the immediate step in the building of a socialist movement. As long as the labor movement its rank and file as well as its bureaucratic leadership remained tied to the patronage machines of capitalist positics no programmmatic approach to the evils of American capitalism is possible. All slogans and program, no matter how left they sound, remain mere campaign promises.

2) The IS rejects the anti-electoral position of the bulk of the left. This attitude is another symptom of the refusal (or inability) of the left to fight for political support for its programs from those sections of the population, especially the working class, who are not yet oppressed minorities and radical intellecturals. If movements from below whether in the street or the shop refuse to challenge the DP at the polls they can be and have been isolated from their mass base. No matter how militant a struggle is if it refuses to try and win the majority of the working class to a political program it will be reduced to another fragmentary protest movement. The Black revolt that began in the cities in 1966 disintegrated precisely because it never found a political voice that could fight the DP for the allegiance of black people.

3) The IS sees an independent party as the principle vehicle for the transitional political program tha t can bridge the gap between, the often militant, immediate struggles of workers, students and oppressed minorities and a full socialist program. The present approach of most of the left including those elements in SDS who are getting involved in working class organizing, is often most similar to the old social-democratic method of fighting militantly on day to day issues, holding out the long range hope of socialist revolution and remaining pretty vague on the ground in between. To adopt this appraach is not to go beyond the independent political action slogan, it is to return to the reformist community organizing of a few years back.

4) The first task of an independent radical party is to win liberals (the majority of the wlrking class) to a radical program. The most serious weakness in the politics of the New Left is its tendency to talk as if the main eneny were liberals. This tendency confuses two (at least) distinct political types. There are liberals who have a firm position in this socity and see liberalism as the best political tactic for preserving it (the Roosevelts-Kennedy types is the most obvious example). There are also liberals for whom liberalism is the best way to change and improve on a social order of which they are more er less critical. Thexx overwhelming majority of the American working class , blacks and other oppressed minorities , and most disaffected middle class types belong in this second category. Within the mass movement designations like liberal, radical and even revolutionary describe an individuals position in a spectrum of attitudes held by people moving into opposition. The difference between Bobby Kennedy and his supporters was a class difference, the difference between most

former Keennedy supporters and the New Left radical is a difference in consciousness.*

5) The middle class composition of the anti-war movement and therefore of any political party of electoral campaign based on that movement means that it will suffer from the violent oscillations that are characteristic of this heterogenous social stratum. Nevertheless, it has become obvious in the last ten years that movements among the middle classes especially students and lower order functionaries has had a catalytic effect on other struggles especially those of workers. The strike wavb that everyone expects in 1970 and that has already started to build comes at a time when the political bankruptcy of capitalist parties has already been made apparent. It was the anti-war movement that contributed most to this exposure. As Lenin points out in his polemic against Left Wing Communism,"no one can predict the incident which will precipitate a crisis in advanced capitalism. It is the job of the revolutionary to understand how to exploit to the fullest these crises when they occur" The major political function of the agitation over the war from a socialist point of view is that it exposes the political collapse of liberalism. The most effective way to exploit that agitation is to move it as far as it will go into opposition to liberalism and the DP.

6) The IS program for the PFP is essentially that of the Richmond program ~~g~~ based on four major points:

ii) A pro-working class policy which supportsthe struggle of workers against the attempt to solve the crisis of imperialism and the permanent war economy by attacking the working conditions and living standards of the working class.

i) An anti-imperialist democratic foreign policy which opposes to imperialist intervention, not isolationism but an alliance with the forces struggling for national liberation and social revolution.

iii) Support for the self defence of Black and other oppressed minorities against the totalitarian police measrure with which their demands for an end to racial oppression are met.

iv) Opposition to the attempt to turn the university and other cultural institutions into apologists for and managers of the reactionary foreign and domestic policies of American capitalism and the consequent oppression of the student movement and the attacks on Academic Freedom aimed at purging the university of "subversives".

*One political consequence of this fact is the possibility of united action with liberals, even in the electoral arena, when liberals are willing to break with capitalist positions at least to the extent necessary to maintain the effectiveness and independence of the anti-war movement. It goes without saying that such blocs are only possible so long as the radicals remain free to point out the inconsistency of the liberals in refuding to go all the way in breaking with capitalist politics and so long as radicals remain free to make clear their own political position.

(We received a report that this motion was passed by the bay area conference. NAC)

INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTION: METHOD AND A PERSPECTIVE

Mike Monheit

I. Objective basis for Independent Political Action.

Independent political action as a strategy for the working class and the major area of class struggle and advance is a result of the monopolization of capitalism and state intervention in the economy and local class struggles. It is the bourgeois state which participates in collective bargaining, and in alliance with the trade union bureaucracy attempts to remove the settlement of labor-capital wage and working condition struggles from effective control of the workers. It is the state which lowers real wages and increases profit by directing ever increasing amounts of tax money into arms production. In addition, the general need for centralization of finance and allocation of investment requires a struggle against the present state to show its inability to carry out such centralization of economic planning to the working class.

For these reasons, which are the result of the attempts of the bourgeois state to patch over the protracted crisis of capitalism, political struggle against the state becomes necessary, both for the working class to defend its living conditions under capitalism and to learn the nature of the bourgeois state. That is, our viewing of the necessity for workers to engage in unified political struggle grows ouf of the economic development of capitalism, or the "objective conditions." The need for a unified, democratic, responsive working class party must be part of our transitional program. Such a program begins with the basic felt needs of the working class, and formulates a unified set of demands for their satisfaction. In addition it must formulate the way that the set of demands can be fought for and ultimately implemented (which adds up to socialism).[1] Independent political action represents the organizational form which will enable workers to struggle for the kinds of demands that we believe they will have to raise to succesfully protect and improve their living conditions (and thereby destroy capitalism).

However, though a transitional program embodies the objectively necessary ways that the felt needs of the working class can be satisfied, we do not confuse felt needs with consciousness. If I have the conscious need to retain my construction job, this does not at all mean that I agree that the only way I can be guaranteed job security is by a struggle for full employment for all, expansion of useful construction, and reduction of hours with no loss in pay. This lack of understanding can (and does) exist despite the objective needs of construction workers. Therefore, the fact that our transitional program takes the felt needs of workers and carries them to their logical conclusion does not mean that workers will be receptive to the whole program. In general, what <u>seems</u> possible to part or all of the working class will depend upon the particular history of that movement. Workers may know that strikes can protect their wages to a limited extent, but feel that the government is "impartial," is doing the best any government could do, or they may feel powerless in the face of an immense, organized, armed force (army, police, etc.). We always present our entire transitional program, and never hide the fact that we are revolutionary socialists. But we emphasize and bring to the fore those aspects of our program which are most likely to immediately reach all or a section of the working class. What is most appropriate depends upon close contact with the working class, and <u>a careful assessment of the</u> consciousness of the workers.

1 The ideal organization necessary for struggle for a particular demand or set of demands and the actual organizations that would implement them, that is esercise power, are more or less identical.

In general, we seek out those situations where the illusions, false consciousness of workers are most clearly and recognizably contradicted by the real situation. For example, G.E. workers believe that higher prices are necessary for them to receive higher wages; "where else can the money come from -- G.E. must make a profit or it cannot function." But higher prices by G.E. and other companies like it have forced the value of their wages down, which in turn has driven the workers to strike. Higher prices therefore contradict the false consciousness that what's good for GE is good for its workers. Here a demand for wage increases with no price increases might lead G.E. workers to a higher consciousness. In this situation, we would emphasize the demands against the particular company because the workers at G.E. do not clearly see the relation between government policy and inflation (nor can they yet by and large), or that they have the power to do anything about it. By putting forth such a demand, we would not be directly challenging the arms economy, which is the major source of inflation, but we would be urging workers to fight to the limits of non-political activity and then see the need for political organizations and struggles. Therefore, what we push to the fore in the form of slogans depends upon both the objective conditions, and where false consciousness of the workers is weakest.

II. Criteria for Independent Political Action Slogan and Emphasis

A. Working Class.

In general we must assume that workers are conservative in the psychological sense. They do not move on to new and uncertain forms of struggle unless they are convinced the old ones are inadequate. In the case of independent political action, this can only come about when workers realize or are about to realize that their demands and felt needs cannot be met without a political struggle and organization of some kind. When struggles leading to that realization have yet do be begun, we emphasize slogans and demands which can catalyze such "preliminary" struggles. Until struggles leading to that realization are being fought out, independent political action must remain a secondary slogan, with the primary emphasis upon demands upon individual corporations which expose their inability to maintain workers' present living conditions and the role of state policy in the decline of wages and ineffectiveness of trade unions. Our national "line" can only be determined by a careful analysis of the major industries, and an attempt to appeal to the "average" consciousness of the more volatile sections of the working class. Because our program is constantly put before workers, any underestimation of the speed or direction of development will be soon apparent, provided we are in close touch with major working class struggles. Any over-estimation will show itself in boring, poorly attended meetings in every aspect of our activity.

B. Middle Class

The middle class, unlike the working class, cannot by itself acquire confidence in its ability to struggle, to win its aims by acting independently of any other class in society. This is due to the lack of common, cooperative, role in society, and to the middle class role in capitalism being to perform tasks which are not immediately essential to capital accumulation (a student movement may take years before corporations begin to feel a loss in profits because of the de-

crease in talented essential executives or engineers; an industrial working class movement's effects can be felt in an hour). Nor can middle-class movements long remain mobilized around objectively revolutionary demands without realizeing subjectively what is implied. This means that, unlike workers, middle class people (students, professionals, engineers, professors, shopkeepers) cannot experience progressively greater degrees of confidence in their own power. In fact they can have little power independently of the two major classes in society. Workers who engage in independent political activity could win immediate partial victories, middle class movements can only win the most illusory and paper victories (like LBJ not running for President). Therefore, while we call for independent political action for middle class people, i.e. independent self action and organization around our program, our tactical suggestions are determined by what kinds of actions and demands will reach and catalyze the working class. Our task in terms of political allegiance is to break workers and middle class people from the Democratic Party. But this does not necessarily mean encouraging middle class people to run or support candidates (even around our program) merely because the expression of their allegiance to the Democratic Party is expressed electorally in election years. What we must counterpose is the use of tactics that can bring workers into motion in struggles for their own and congruent middle class demands. Such tactcs may include industrialization, demonstrations, mass leafletting, doorbell ringing, electoral campaigns, etc., depending upon what is most likely to reach workers at any given time. What we say and what we tell middle class movements to say in the course of utilizing these tactics directed to workers, is our whole transitional program, emphasizing those aspec ts that seem most relevant at any given time to workers' consciousness. Whether we support other middle class independent electoral or other political attempts depends upon their immediate effects upon the working class, direction of development, probable bourgeois political developments and their effects on such movements, the programmatic and people content of such movements, etc. If a movement that we critically supported decided to use electoral action despite our position, we would push for such action to have our program. We do not passively accept the movement's own conception of what kinds of activity it can engage in. Electoral campaigns may seem easier to implement than industrialization, attempting to organize consumer or open admissions committees, but at present such campaigns pay off less. Many people (including people in IS) are afraid of non-electoral activity forms as the latter require personal confrontations with non-radical individuals, as well as face to face conflict with direct political opponents (New Democratic Colaition, PL, YSA, hopefully labor bureaucrats, etc.).

III. 1970 Through the Elections

For the working class we advocate Independent Political Action and organization around our program, but this is a subsidiary slogan. Despite the objective impossibility of countering the most pressing threats to working class living stadards (inflation, taxation, housing, education, mass transportation), through trade union or industry-limited activity, most workers are not now ready to move directly to full political organization. This is because the crucial link between the workplace and the above mentioned aspects of decay has not been made. This link is vital because it connects up the workplace, where workers through prior struggle experience, feel a sense of power (a result of a long history of official strikes, and wildcates), with the political arena where workers may abstractly see the need for action but feel helpless and powerless.

Concessions from the government on the basis of spreading of movements raising anti-inflation demands (such as wage increases with no price increases) against individual corporations will have to be won first by and large. Workers must first learn that 1) they can cause the government as well as private companies to grant them concessions by their own activity, through struggles in a relatively secure arena (trade union and wildcat activity), and 2) that such limited forms of struggle are insufficient to win serious improvements. The latter can happen, of course, only by such struggles being fought out. Struggle organizations can begin in separate shops around such anti-inflation demands as mentioned above, link up industry wide, and eventually class wide as confidence and understanding of the relation between government policy (taxation, the war, the arms economy) grows. There may be simultaneous development of working class open admissions, better housing, or fair consumer prices committees. These committees would at first see themselves as mere pressure groups, and later, as shop struggles grow and political shop-based movements begin to appear, link up with such struggle organizations and become part of a class political movement. Of course we would support any working class political organizations and campaigns provided they are 1) not dominated by reactionary demands (racist demands, escalation of the Vietnam war, etc.) or 2) they are not campaigns mounted to draw reign upon leftward moving grass roots workers movements. Once such movements have been coopted by such bureaucratic maneuvers we would probably critically support them.

B. Anti-war and radical student movement.

We do not advocate independent electoral action for the anti-war movement because 1) most workers (who are white) are hostile to the movement as a result of the movement's failure to relate to non-black working class needs programatically, or to support non-black struggles in any visible sense. 2) Most workers are hostile to middle class people who believe that they are morally superior to workers or that workers are stupid and uncouth ("culturally deprived").

Most workers identify all demonstrators as the same as the black movement cheering section oriented SDS, as well as snobbish. In the latter category they are largely correct. To break down such animosity requires personal contact and mutual participation in struggles. Electoral action by its nature maintains personal isolation between campaigners and their would be "constituents." Political campaigning is generally lecturing, not discussion which would encourage participation. 3) The tactics for the working class in the next year outlines above requires different specific demands in each area and each company; campaigns tend to be too macroscopic in their programmatic emphasis. 4) Our analysis indicates that at this time large sections of the working class are not about to leap into the political arena, and that even if they were, middle class electoral action is not the best way to catalyze that development. A series of middle class campaigns at this (or any) time wont result in real partial victories in terms of the war or anything else. Given these conditions, a middle class campaign will result in the demoralization and loss of self confidence by the student and anti-war movements opening the way for further stalinism in the one [illegible] and co-option by the Democratic Party in the other. Furthermore, such a campaign, especially if it becomes known to workers, will teach them the wrong lesson, namely that independent political challenges cannot effect government policy. Electoral action will not expose the electoral system or the bourgeois parties;it will "expose" independent political attempts as futile.

We do not advocate independent political action abstractly, as this will be taken as electoral action. We advocate for the anti-war and student movement that they, out of their various felt needs (ending the war, making a revolution, etc.) relate to the working class using our strategy for the period (transitional program) and tactics for the next year. (see IV, A).

C. IS Electoral Activity

The arguments against I.S. placing electoral action on the top of its agenda are similar to those for the anti-war movement, except that IS is smaller, and must be more careful as to how it arranges tactical priorities. In a large IS, electoral campaigns in some localities might have seconday tactical value with industrialization and other direct working class organizing attempts having the highest priority; in the present organization, at most we will be able to engage in two tactical forms of organizing activity. Electoral action would drain our resources to the utmost (petition drives, etc. etc.) and for numerous earlier stated reasons would have minimal tangible results. Campaigns might bring in a few new people, give others a few good ideas, but they cannot at present catalyze a working class movement.

Neither the I.S. nor the radical student movement nor the anti-war movement would be strengthened by running their own campaigns. Such campaigns by, for example, the New Mobilization committee would indicate a political break with the Democratic Party or by some fragment of SDS a break with ultra-left sectarianism. Hence they would be a progressive sign. But it is the breaking of political illusions about the Democratic Party that we must aim at. We therefore do not advocate that middle class movements act out one possible symbol of such a break with the Democratic Party or ultra-leftism. Rather, we advocate the political strategy which will enable middle class movements to relate to wroking class movements or potential movements. Therefore we advocate the strategy and tactics of III. A & B.

IV. Other Documents: A Few Brief Comments

A. The Urquhart Document

This document fails to make clear to our satisfaction 1)the distinction between Independent Political and Electoral action, and 2)does not even hint at what forms of political action are most appropriate for the next year, although it does make clear that such actions would be predicated on asking the middle class anti-war movement to orient to workers.

B. Moody Document.

This document fails to distinguish explicitly between Independent Political Action for the working class as an objective necessity and the kinds of struggles we can expect workers to be drawn into in the next year. It also does not specify the relative weight to be given to electoral action for the anti-war movement or for IS itself.

The sum of what would be advocated by us for the anti-war movement would add up to independent political (not electoral) action by that movement. We would put forth our whole transitional program, emphasizing the medium range perspective of a workers party for the working class. But we would not ask the anti-war movement to call for a working class party at present, but rather that it call for struggles directed against particular

CRITERIA FOR ELECTORAL ACTION BY I.S.[1]

(Resolution for January 1970 NC, submitted by Chris Hobson, Chicago I.S., NC)

I. CRITERIA

(1) Any electoral action campaign undertaken by I.S. must be based on the I.S. transitional program.[2] The distinction between the T.P. and an ordinary electoral platform is well put by Kim Moody (draft Transitional Program, introduction): "A transitional program differs from a platform in that it is not just a series of good looking demands or promises, but a total program in which the various demands depend to a great degree on each other." What this means for electoral action is that slogans will, of course, be used to publicize the campaign, but that a-1 agitation, whether personal canvassing or public speaking, must connect these slogans to the T.P. and stress the interconnectedness of the whole

I.S. does not raise the slogan "Independent Political Action" for all movements and organizations with which we have contact, regardless of circumstances. Rather, we raise our program as a whole; we raise this specific slogan when circumstances make plausible a perspective of electoral action conforming <u>in general</u> to the criteria in this and other paragraphs. In such cases, our own participation in such action would not follow automatically, but would be judged on the basis of how closely these criteria had been met.

(2) All electoral canvassing must be on the basis of the full politics of the campaign, rather than arguments about "right to get on the ballot," etc.

(A) Agitation must be directed primarily to the working class. In all cases, appeals for endorsement from local or district union councils, etc., shall be made from the floor at meetings, and not through negotiations with friendly bureaucrats. I.S. shall seek endorsement from rank-and-file caucuses and from insurgent "dual" organizations (of the DRUM type), again raising the question in membership meetings.

(B) Electoral action campaigns may be undertaken only when there is a working-class base for the politics of the campaign, sufficient that meeting registration requirements, etc., does not require submerging the politics of the campaign. This is not only a rule against submerging politics, but also a rule of themb for judging when a constituency is sufficiently receptive to justify the effort of an electoral campaign. The NC does not consider that the presence of the Peace and Freedom Party on the ballot in certain states constitutes compliance with this requirement.

(3) I.S. participation in electoral campaigns must be explicitly socialist; this means that:

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1. NOTE: Only this section - NOT the section headed "Argument" which begins on the following page - is to be voted on by the NC. Since the "Argument" section is quite long, readers who cannot avoid skipping are advised to read first section IV, beginning on page 11. That and the present section contain the author's general orientation to electoral action.

2. An immediate problem of course is that the Transitional Program does not yet exist. But the problem we are addressing is that of undertaking E.A. on minimal politcs, whether or not a T.P. exists in written form.

(A) Participation in any alliance for the purpose of electoral action must be based on our own independence, i.e., our right to build with literature of our own, etc. In general, we exercise this right. We do not demand absolutely that a campaign have our politics before we support it (in general, we apply such a criterion much more strictly to middle-class based campaigns, which need to be quite close to our politics to serve a useful purpose, than to campaigns which might be undertaken by workers' organizations) but we always take the opportunity to raise our politics. Within the campaign, we raise our T.P. and attempt to make it the program of the campaign; externally, we raise it and relate the demands of the campaign to it, making this our practice in literature, speeches, etc.

(B) In general, we raise the perspective that social change cannot be won by electoral action.

I. CONCLUSIONS

The conditions for realizing the criteria stated above do not exist on a nationwide basis at present, and probably do not exist in any local situation. Therefore:

(1) I.S. shall not undertake or agitate for a national electoral action program in 1970.

(2) In local situations, decisions about undertaking and agitating for electoral action shall be based on the criteria stated above, which shall be construed as applying to all I.S. local branches.

* * *

ARGUMENT[3]

I. PAST PRACTICE

I.S./ISC's past venture in electoral action, Peace and Freedom in 1967-1968, was characterized by inflated expectations. Shortly after the successful registration campaign in California, Michael Friedman wrote in New Politics:

> As this is being written, the Peace and Freedom Party is barely born, and subject to all the hazards of a corrupt and threatening world. It may die in infancy, unable to survive its immediate environment. Or it may grow and come to represent, in the strength of its maturity, the powerful potential of people in motion against their oppressors and exploiters. [New Politics, Spring 1968]

Granted, this was written in the flush of victory. But it was said by a socialist in a magazine intended for socialist readers, and must be taken as

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3. Rather than an explicit argument for each point stated above, this section contains: (I) a brief critique of PFP (this is of course incomplete - complete treatment would require a lengthy paper); (II) brief remarks on our general tasks in the next 1-2 years; (III) comments on electoral perspectives of other I.S.'ers for 1970; (IV) a final brief section on general orientation to electoral action. As stated before, the present "Argument" section is not to be voted on by the NC.

a serious assessment. (Certainly it was the assessment PFP organizers tried to project publicly.) Nor was this assessment based on illusions about PFP's immediate character. With complete clarity, Freidman stated:

> The PF is now based on the middle class, albeit with an ideological orientation to the Black Power movement. While the members of the party may be in sympathy with these struggles, only a real base among workers and black people will save it from dissolution or ultimate capitulation to the Democratic Party.... In pressing for such an orientation within the PFP, socialists will be fighting, not for some abstraction, but for the very survival of the party.

It is clear that the author believed that PFP could transform itself in this way - that it had "the potential of being an arm of these [black and working class] struggles," of being, in short, a transitional vehicle for large masses of the dispossessed. In fact, of course, despite some cooperation between PFP and labor in local situations, and some ongoing contacts, this transformation never happened; PFP, as it were, both dissolved and capitulated as most of its registrants even in California drifted back into the DP.

Did this result from mistakes in applying a basically sound methodology, or from the methodology itself? This has never been discussed in ISC/I.S. Hardly anyone will now defend the practice of PFP, even as regards California, much less the rest of the country. But if the fault was in "mistakes," where has been the searching analysis of these mistakes which one might expect from socialists - the analysis of the factors which kept the basically sound expectation of PFP as "an arm of" the oppressed from being realized? The silence itself suggests that no such easily identifiable "mistakes" are responsible. But if the fault was in the methodology, where has been the discussion of this? PFP in 1967-1968 has simply been swept under the rug - thus it is no surprise to find it squishing up underfoot in 1970.

I believe the methodology was wrong in four ways.

(1) The conception of "counterposing" "independent political action" to the DP. Implicit is that the crucial point is that people's immediate struggles should declare organizational independence of the DP. One finds in much I.S. thinking a conception of the DP as a magical institution, i.e., as possessing an institutional attraction independent of the reformist illusions of people who vote for it. This leads to a conception of "breaking from" the DP as almost a kind of puberty - something irreversible which changes one's perceptions qualitatively. Yet it is clearly reformist illusions which prop up the DP, not vice versa. To "break from" the DP does not in itself break these illusions. To "break" on the basis of reformist illusions - including illusions about the efficacy of "independent political action," one of the chief problems in any such effort - is a victory for the DP; it leads you back in, but tired and discouraged. To "break from" the DP as a break with those illusions, of course, is a victory for us. Clearly then what counts is not the mere counterweight of an independent campaign, but whether that campaign is capable of shattering reformist illusions. The failure of PFP in this regard may be most clearly illustrated by looking at the black vote, a part of which was ready to break from the DP, and in a left direction. Black voters, at least in my experience, regarded Dick Gregory and Eldridge Cleaver just about interchangeably, that is, as expressions of protest. Both these protest votes and electoral abstention - a much more significant phenomenon in 1968; nearly all blacks who voted swung back into the DP - represented "breaks from" the DP, yet they did not signify the crystallization of a force of permanent opposition to the capitalist parties. Merely the announcement that a given party so conceives itself will not bring about this situation. On the one hand, PFP was unable to draw any of this sentiment into itself; on the other,

robably few people who were in PFP took seriously the official position that FP was a permanent opposition party.

(2) PFP "counterposed" to the DP a two-issue (in some areas more) campaign rather than a campaign on the basis of a full transitional program. his may seem to be an unimportant difference: simply plug in a full program nd what difference does it make? In fact, a lot: it means you no longer uild your campaign around one or two attractive demands somewhat to the left f what the DP can offer. This latter strategy - that of PFP - may sound transitional" but is in fact what made the campaign incapable of functioning ransitionally, that is, moving many of the people it involved for more than few months. Single- or dual-issue organizing can be effective in some circumstances. Paradoxically, one would be where people brought a single demand o the DP, and were rejected (analogous to MFDP in 1964). I am not however uggesting that socialists should organize campaigns like this. Another would e when the single issue became the vehicle of an ongoing action movement hich (as in various New Left cases) then began to embody the conception of n opposition from below (see Hal Draper's "In Defense of the New Radicals," ew Politics, Spring 1966). This does not happen in an electoral campaign, irst because the independent "pressure" campaign is an established variant f the two-party system and attracts many people despite the organizers' conception that the new party must be a permanent opposition (sophisticated liberal defenses of the tactic can be built precisely on the argument that the issues will be absorbed and the party disappear) and second, because the DP can lways (and in a period of ferment, will always) move to offer "attractive" andidates who appear to offer feasibility in place of purity. Thus the ingle- or dual-issue electoral campaign does not go beyond liberal ideology, ut on the contrary is part of it - for the participants and the constituency, egardless of the conceptions of the organizers. Though organizationally it ay take people outside the DP, it will yield them up again if it has not done o ideologically. The vehicle for doing this must (among other things) be ased on a full program. Only agitation around a transitional program can how the voter why the DP will not work, i.e., because it can absorb any number of demands but not a program. (There are indeed cooptive problems with the idea of transitional program as well, but that is for another analysis.) he alternative, the issue-oriented campaign, is basically a variant of the protest vote" campaign - valuable enough in its own terms, but hardly to be egarded as a transitional vehicle.

(3) Using electoral action as an organizing tool - that is, using it as an initial contact mechanism in the hope of setting up an ongoing organization.

(A) This creates a largely middle-class movement. This occurs, first, ecause it is largely middle-class people who flock to electoral campaigns - articularly when these are based on one or two issues rather than a total rogram and hence, however much they may move consciousness on these issues, lo not raise the conception of a proletarian movement. This characteristic f electoral campaigns may be responsible for an impressive initial success as the middle class flock in, but it makes the campaign top-heavy with this class from the start. In addition, the socialists who work in the campaign spend much of their time convincing other middle-class people of the importance of the working class: no doubt a valid activity in itself, but no substitute for actually reaching that class. More fundamentally, using electoral action as an initial organizing tool, in the sense just defined, makes it nearly impossible to involve the working class because this class is of all classes the most justly cynical not just about the two parties, but about electoral politics in general. This may be even truer of the white sector of this class - which we all recognize as the most ambivalent element - than of the black, for while many black voters are refusing to vote as a protest,

many white voters stay home or vote DP out of total cynicism. These people correctly see the electoral system as marginal to their real needs; at the same time, until they are active on an all-round basis, they will continue to vote DP for the sake of marginal benefits. They are hardly likely to become deeply involved in an independent electoral campaign if it does not grow out of ongoing organizing activity. Such a campaign would involve a few people - and perhaps recruit them to I.S. - but leave the majority of the dissatisfied elements of the class untouched. Thus using electoral action as an organizing tool in a vacuum means that the campaign is liable to remain in the class where it began - the middle class.

(B) The electoral campaign as an organizing tool in vacuum is incapable of confronting the electoral illusion. In everything we do, one goal of socialists should always be to break through the illusion that electoral action can by itself bring significant social change. It should be our goal to break through the "This is what I can do for you" of electoral politics and replace this by the "This is what you can do for yourself"of socialist politics. The action movement (e.g., New Left) sidesteps the first problem through the second, relying on the movement itself to embody and generate the deeper commitments which lead to a consciousness that power must be sought, and that change cannot be achieved electorally. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, it clearly cannot be applied in an electoral campaign. The electoral campaign must meet these questions head-on. This indeed is its greatest pitfall, and in my view cannot be overcome when electoral action occurs in the absence of ongoing organizing work, or as an attempt to generate the same, rather than as its result. The theme of the inadequacy of electoral action can indeed be propagandized, but quite aside from whether or not this was done in PFP (it was done fitfully at best), this propaganda will hardly be convincing in the absence of ongoing organizing. People will then be drawn in on the basis of their electoral illusions. When these are shown false, disillusion is a more likely result than deeper commitment. Even well-based movements, like the Lowndes County Freedom Movement, have in this way fallen apart overnight. One might ask, cannot the electoral campaign be used as a vehicle to involve people in an ongoing action movement? The answer is that it can, but only for a small fraction of those initially attracted. The rest, having come in on the basis of electoral illusions, drift out on the same basis. Thus a movement of this kind fails to do its work: it neither breaks people from the Democratic Party, not destroys their illusions about the electoral system.

To summarize, politicization involves, above all, raising the question of power - showing people that they have none, that they will win their needs only by struggling to get it. (The working class is ahead of the middle class in this respect: it knows it has none, and this is why it is generally unrecruitable for ongoing electoral politics.) Raising the question of power is just what electoral action in a vacuum cannot do: for Walter Reuther's "Write your congressman" it substitutes "Vote Socialist" (or "Progressive"). It may verbally point to the need for an action movement, but this misses the crux of the difficulty: first, that the electoral form of the campaign argues against this agitational point, at least for all except the most involved; second, that those who are justly cynical about elections will not respond at all.

(4) Finally, the mechanics of electoral campaigns. The problems in this field could be discussed endlessly; I will take up two only. (A) The problem of opportunism in qualifying for the ballot. The 1967-1968 PFP campaigns showed many examples of canvassers melting PFP's politics away to nothing to get that precious signature: "Eldridge Cleaver? He's a black leader who believes in working with whites." More recently, we hear a proposal to run I.S. candidates on the PFP ticket - proving perhaps that PFP's politics never meant anything. Of course, anything of this sort can be justified, if you are in the mood, by the importance of getting on the ballot and "bringing your politics to a far greater audience." Thus (B) the impossibility of getting real politics across in an electoral speech. For most people who hear an electoral speech (or television appearance, etc.) by a minor party candidate, this is the only exposure to his program; particularly for people who are not yet politically sophisticated, the amount of learning which occurs from hearing one speech is small indeed. Thus on the one hand, concealing your politics in canvassing is justified by getting on the ballot; on the other, communicating your politics in an electoral speech is next to impossible. Again, both problems are obviously functions of the electoral campaign undertaken in the absence of previous ongoing organizing work.

I would say that these methodological misconceptions: the idea of "counterposing" to the DP organizationally but not ideologically; the related conception of a two-issue campaign as "transitional"; the idea of the electoral campaign as an organizing tool in a vacuum; the failure to appreciate the de-politicizing effects of various aspects of the electoral mechanism, again when approached in a vacuum: account quite well for the failure of Peace and Freedom in 1967-1968 to transform itself in the direction charted by the article quoted above.

There are, of course, individual exceptions to every general observation made here. We are all aware that some of the best I.S. people came from PFP; aware, too, of individual places in which ongoing organizations came into being, some with a working-class linkup. Still, it would be poor methodology to base our analysis on exceptions: to acclaim these cases and not recognize that the vast majority of people whom PFP touched, it left in almost the same place as it found them.

II. SOME CONTOURS OF THE NEXT 1-2 YEARS

The question of electoral action at the present time must be seen in the context of the situations of the movements in which we are active - the anti-war and working-class (a little) movements - and the prospects for the development of these situations in the next 1-2 years. To see the question in any other way would be to raise the slogan of "independent political action" abstractly, without regard for whether such action would in fact lead the movement forward from its present situation.[4]

The Moratorium is dead - laid to rest on schedule, as its organizers intended. The organizational upshot of the Moratorium will be a left-liberal electoral drive, in no sense independent of the DP. This outcome should be seen as essentially unavoidable at the

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4. Most of the next 3 paragraphs is lifted verbatim from Dave Finkel's resolution on anti-war action. Property is theft.

present time; intervention by radicals in this arena, in an attempt to counterpose independent alternatives, will be fruitless. As much is admitted in a draft perspective, "Independent Political Action," by Mike U., which proposes this as a slogan for work in the anti-war movement even though "the prospects for this program being accepted [by the Moratorium] are almost nil." The purpose of course is seen as agitational; but within the Moratorium, there is no one left to agitate toward: the Moratorium committees in most places have become lifeless bureaucracies and even if they involve numbers of people in periodic actions - which is unlikely - they now lack, if they ever had, the potential to involve many people organizationally.

What of the other wing of the anti-war "movement," the Mobe? The November 15 Mobilization was an event of historic importance as a summing-up of a crucial development of the last decade - an enormous weakening of popular patriotism through the loss of the war and the bankruptcy of its politics. The March on Washington was notable for its enormous size and for the involvement of previously uninvolved strata, particularly sections of the labor movement. It also summed up major weaknesses of the middle-class anti-war movement: first, its profound isolation from the Black movement, which is bitterly anti-war and was virtually absent in Washington; second, its limited independence of the capitalist political establishment, on which the Mobe leaned heavily for legitimacy. In this context it can be seen that the prospects for further mass mobilizations in the immediate future are not good. Keeping in mind that the last big mobilization before this fall's was the October 1967 Pentagon affair, immediately after which appeared Mr. Clean, we may expect a similar dampening of activity in honor of the 1970 elections.

But while the conjunction of circumstances which made November 15 possible will not immediately reappear, the disillusionment and anti-war sentiment will continue to spread. If the war continues in 1970 (after the elections) there will undoubtedly be yet another wave of anti-war activity, the explosive nature of which will surpass anything yet seen. Our fundamental task in the next year is to build the forces which will spark this explosion: a reorganized left wing of the student movement and a radical, anti-war base in the working class. We may see within a year to eighteen months a series of small but explosive anti-war strikes. Taken in conjunction with the economic strike wave, this development would point to a genuine political crisis for the capitalist establishment.[5]

Orienting toward these developments should be the strategic conception underlying I.S.'s work as a whole. The question of anti-war agitation directed toward the working class has been approached in Dave Finkel's resolution on this subject, which I support. The question to be asked about electoral proposals is, to what extent do they contribute toward this strategic aim? In the student movement, our task will be to resuscitate a radical pole; otherwise the depradations of Weather types and the wooden rigidity of PL-WSA will discredit radicalism and drive the entire campus to the right. In this light it is critical to remember that students who begin to move left do not move into a vacuum which only we inhabit; if we conceive our task with respect to students as a limited one, one

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5. Should the war end, on the other hand, economic and social demands would be spurred, and our task would be to stress re-conversion, services, opposition to new imperial ventures elsewhere, etc.

of "breaking them from" the DP, other tendencies will stand forward with all the attraction of revolutionary ideas. In politicization as in revolution, there is no stability, people are either drawn toward the revolutionary pole or slide back toward the DP; thus our task with respect to the student movement must be to develop ways to constitute ourselves a locus of open radical activism. With regard to the working class, on the other hand, our critical task is to join economic struggle (which is inevitable) to political grievances (particularly, but not exclusively, about the war) so that this class enters into direct action movements of a transitionally political kind. The working class at present has the potential to go beyond what is inevitably at best a protest vote, and realize its power to end the war in the streets. In the light of this analysis we can examine recent I.S. proposals about electoral action.

III. RECENT I.S. PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTORAL ACTION

We have argued that it should have been predictable that the perspective of Michael Friedman toward PFP - that it would transform itself into "an arm of" black and working-class struggles - would not come to pass. A more debased version of the PFP perspective has now been offered by the Majority resolution of the Bay Area I.S., passed in November, 1969. This perspective is based, implicitly, on the expectation that I.S. cannot, in the next couple of years, play a radicalizing role directly in the working class. Instead of transforming the class nature of PFP, this resolution argues, we shall revive PFP as a middle-class movement - specifically, an outgrowth of the anti-war "movement" - which, as such, will play a "catalytic" role with respect to the working class.

Precisely the analysis cited at the beginning of this argument indicates, of course, that if an electoral party cannot merely appeal to, but rather, involve actively the dissident sectors of the working-class and black populations, it will die. In this case, even if the short-term effect on the working class had been "catalytic," the long-term effect would be disillusioning. But in fact, long and short term, the new PFP can be expected to have no effect on the working class at all.

Why not? The Bay Area resolution is keyed to the expectation of affecting the consciousness of workers; specifically, it bases an argument for allying with anti-war movement liberals on the need to win over "liberals (the majority of the working class)." It is incredible that an organization supposed to be based on a scientific understanding of the working class could give birth to a parenthetical phrase of this kind. Workers, of course, are not liberals. They do have reformist illusions, and do vote (generally) for liberal candidates. To argue from this that they are liberals shows no understanding of the class. There is no easier way to win popularity (opportunistic though it might be) among workers than to curse liberals. Workers feel absolutely no identification with the middle-class liberals with whom this resolution suggests allying; they feel bitterly the class difference, and while they have illusions (of course) about peaceful change, they look with bitterness and contempt on the "good government" concerns of middle-class liberals. Further points could be cited but the problem is clear: while it is of course true that until a pre-revolutionary period,

the bulk of the popular masses places itself behind reformist leaders from the upper classes, it is absurd to deduce from this that they are ideologically the same as these leaders, or even the same as the upper class constituency which also follows them. On the contrary, socialist strategy must analyse and base itself on the differences between these strata. Yet this resolution draws a distinction between the class of Bobby Kennedy and his voters, and between the ideology of middle-class liberals and student radicals, but none between the ideologies of Kennedy's working-class and middle-class constituencies. Any resolution so foggy in a critical area can hardly be a guide to action.

This almost unbelievable methodological error, however, only points up what should have been obvious anyway: THAT THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE BAY AREA RESOLUTION WHICH DIFFERS IN ESSENTIALS FROM THAT OF THE PFP IN 1967-1968. Then what is different - the period? No analysis of this. Same methodology - same results. As before, an alliance with the Black Panther Party might make a difference; but (a) this is now unlikely for reasons I need not cite, (b) a campaign which could only be made viable by the allies it picked up would not be one in which we brought something of value either to the Black Panther Party or to the class as a whole, but on the contrary, one in which we - like the RYM factions of SDS - existed parasitically on the basis of the alliance. In any case, the effect on the mass of black people, like PFP's in 1968, would be slight. Thus it is to be expected that the reaction of workers and black people to new PFP, as to old, will be one of indifference.

Will this campaign, however, have a "transitional" effect on the middle-class movement, and thus make the latter "catalytic" with respect to the working class even though the campaign itself is not? This after all appears to be the perspective of the resolution.

Part of the answer has already been given - an electoral campaign which peters out ignominiously can hardly have this effect. More fundamentally, however, we may refer back to the factors already cited with respect to the original PFP. Its effect on middle-class people, as well as the working class, was virtually nullified by (a) the two-issue nature of the campaign, which fit squarely into the framework of the electoral system; (b) the inability of the electoral campaign, undertaken as an initial organizing device rather than as part of an ongoing movement, to raise the question of power. For both these reasons, PFP spoke to liberals not transitionally, but on the contrary, as liberals, and passed like a ripple on the water, leaving only a residue of small baseless PFP organizations which ISC had the good sense to liquidate as fast as possible. Even within the limited framework of the Bay Area Majority resolution - that of moving the middle-class movement a little to the left - what analysis is offered to show that new PFP will turn out differently?

Surely the author would not argue that four issues instead of two make the difference? On the contrary, the only analysis offered for the entire perspective of the resolution is the contention that workers are liberals. The whole point of this appears to be to lay the basis for an alliance with liberals - not, however, with the working-class "liberals," but with middle-class peace movement libs.

The demands proposed for the campaign appear to be watered down to attract this group: no. 4 speaks of the "attempt to turn the university and other cultural institutions into apologists for and managers of" state policies, although universities have been agencies of the ruling class of the moment for about the last thousand years; no. 3 is a mush - although it raises the slogan "self-defense," on closer examination it focusses essentially on opposing repression; this simply meets liberal consciousness where it is at, or very near there. The point here is not criticism of the specific demands, but criticism of the methodology they imply: these programmatic points, as well as the analysis which precedes them, are explained only as the abasement of our politics before the imagined critical necessity of reaching the middle-class movement. Even if it were true that the middle-class anti-war movement were likely to be the critical force in social ferment in the next year or two, approaching it on this basis would almost destroy our ability to play a left role: imagine recruiting (on the basis of point 4) people who believe in a lost "essential nature" of the university, then trying to argue against either PLP or the tough-sophisticate type of administrator who is able to argue baldly and convincingly that the "essential nature" of the university requires urban renewal! Thus neither in the middle-class movement (in an active sense, this will be mainly a student movement) nor in the working-class movement would the Bay Area Majority perspective allow us to play the catalytic role we must play if the opportunities of the next 1-2 years are not to be squandered.[6]

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6. I saw Mike U.'s draft, "Independent Political Action," too late for treatment integral to the text. In a sense this is not necessary, for while this is in one respect an advance over the Bay Area document, it offers no way out of the latter's difficulties with the working class. The U. document notes that E.A. cannot expect to attract more than a few working class votes unless "it is carried out under at least part of our program." On the other hand, while it argues that the viability of a party depends on "a massive influx of people," and that "one of our prime arguments for independent electoral action must be the catalytic role of such action on the working class" [emphasis added], the document offers no analysis to show that an electoral campaign even on a pro-working class platform could draw such an influx or play a catalytic role. With respect to the middle-class anti-war movement, the resolution has essentially an agitational orientation - it admits that an electoral program would not be accepted and argues that this aside, such should in any case "not be a high priority." Thus the resolution is essentially a bow in the direction of the old arguments about the transitional effects of such programs, but with no arguments to show why or even whether they would play such a role now. On the other hand, with respect to the working class movement, it is certainly true that the electoral campaign "can only serve this [catalytic] role if it accepts a pro-working class orientation," but this is not in itself sufficient for such a role. On the contrary, we argue here as above that if such a campaign is not part of continuing struggle activity, there will be little response except in a few exceptional locales. There is no sign, and never has been, that the "catalytic role of such action on the working class" has ever been more than a wish.

IV. THE USE OF ELECTORAL ACTION BY SOCIALISTS

The specific criteria we suggest for electoral action by I.S. were stated at the outset; those were phrased as limitations because of our view that I.S. has in the past approached this question in a cavalier manner. Here we wish to suggest the attitude toward electoral action by socialists which those criteria embody.

(1) We relate transitionally to broader movements, organizations, and newly political individuals by raising our whole program. We do not raise "independent political action" as a catch-all slogan, least of all do we imagine that a decision to undertake independent electoral action imparts a transitional character to a movement whose politics have not yet broken with the current norm (which will vary from period to period). Rather, we concentrate on the politics, whether these are expressed electorally or some other way. When a movement or organization begins to move in the direction of our perspective, then if the question of electoral action arises we press the orientation that electoral action be viewed as a tactic (i.e., judged circumstantially), while pressing our view that real change can never be achieved electorally.

(2) When do we raise the idea of electoral action? Essentially, we never make this our major slogan for a movement or organization, even if such action would be with a "working class orientation." Rather, we urge action around programmatic demands, with a working class orientation, in order to build continuing, struggle-oriented organizations. Second, as socialists, we attempt to substitute the concept "what you can do for yourself" for the electoral "what I can do for you"; we recognize that independent voting as such does not do this, thus we never raise the idea of electoral action outside the context of some ongoing activity of which it can be one expression. In general, then, we raise the idea in specific situations in which voting can be a way of registering support for an organization or program, as well as of recruiting individuals into organizations which engage in continuing struggle of a non-electoral kind.

(3) "Program" means not just demands, but a set of actions which could, if taken, open a way out of the impasse, yet which require new social power to become realizable. Thus what we offer in an electoral campaign is not a series of slogans but a set of solutions for the social crisis - we press our "transitional" program because it is the only program which can solve the social problems of the epoch. But, stated out of the context of a movement, this becomes a set of "what I can do for you" promises, and moreover, one less believable than the Thanksgiving turkey of the Democratic machine. Thus the electoral campaign becomes the means by which a mass-based movement, the beginning of a proletarian movement, acquaints society as a whole with its immediate program for society as a whole. But this is in the future, not in 1970 or 1972.

In the past, I.S. has "counterposed" to the abstract anti-electoralism which it deplores, not an understanding of how people begin to move politically, but an equally abstract pro-electoralism. One I.S.'er (David Friedman, "Opportarianism") writes that he "assumes" that the slogan about opposing both parties "refers to electoral action." Why? Surely what counts is that people are

won to opposing Democratic and Republican candidates - and on the basis of understanding why these parties can never satisfy their needs - rather than the form this opposition takes. In some circumstances a third party campaign may be the best way to achieve this, in others not. Surely it is sterile to insist on "independent political action" as a general method.

To be insistently clear, we are not arguing that electoral action is always wrong. But electoral politics - a movement which is limited to mobilizing for elections - is always wrong, and electoral action in a vacuum is indistinguishable from this in practice. Talk about the "dialectical interrelation" between electoral and shop agitation, while perfectly correct in the abstract, avoids the hard question of whether, when the dialectical interrelation does not yet exist, electoral action in a vacuum leads towards it or peters out. We say the latter. In our view, electoral action is a specific tactic (or a general strategy: we would argue, an incorrect one) for a movement - not a device for organizing one where it doesn't exist, or for "injecting" consciousness of a higher order through introducing better slogans. All the dialectics in the world will not make a bombshell out of a flash in the pan.

December 21, 1969

A COUPLE OF WORDS ON TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM AND DIALECTICAL THINKING 1/1/70, D. Friedman

1. Consider the demand that industrial contracts be limited to one year and that workers have the right to strike at any time over shop-floor grievances. Bosses and union leaders alike will bitterly oppose this demand -- not because it is incapable of being realized under capitalism, but because it leads inevitably to greater rank-and-file militancy and it raises the idea, in embryonic form, of workers directly controlling the day-to-day decisions at the workplace, not through a contract enforced by the capitalist state and used to discipline the workers, but through their own muscle. From our point of view, this is a transitional demand, part of a transitional program aimed at workers control of production and the state. But the typical militant worker knows nothing of transitional demands -- he (or she) has not read Marx, Lenin and Trotsky. From his point of view, the demand makes sense because it meets an immediate, concrete need -- the freedom to fight back against inflation and speedup, without being disciplined under the terms of his own contract.

Demands of this sort occur naturally to socialists, who study the history of class struggles and learn from their own experiences. For the working class, it is natural, too, but not on the intellectual level -- for capitalist society systematically deprives the workers of access to their own history, and educates them to relatively unimaginative, concrete forms of thought. The fight for socialism comes naturally to the working class because, in its material relation to the means of production, it is the direct competitor of the ruling class: the struggle for higher wages must oppose the profits of the employer and the inflationary tendencies of the employer's state; the struggle for decent working conditions challenges the bosses' right to decide how production is to be carried out (and to what end); the struggle against imperialist war finds itself opposed to the economic requirements of the system and the ultimate coercive arm of the state, the armies (which, fortunately, are drawn from amongst that same working class and can be won over in time of crisis). The American working class is extremely backward today, divided against itself, lacking class consciousness and a socialist section (even of the reformist variety). Nevertheless, there is only one road for the class, other than war and misery, and that is the road to socialism. In this sense, the ideas of revolutionary socialism are inherent in the class: they spring up again and again in "unexpected" revolts and revolutions. Our job always is to involve ourselves in the class struggle, whatever its level in a given period, and our greatest contribution is a transitional program which points the way, based on a scientific analysis of the social forces and concrete conditions. Such a program can only be developed by revolutionaries, although reformists may hit upon a few of the same demands from time to time, and the class (which has reformist illusions, but in its practical efforts tends always to exceed those intellectual boundaries) moves in that direction when it is in motion, but without full awareness.

2. There has been much debate recently about whether the Democratic Party rests upon reformist illusions, or whether reformist illusions rest upon the Democratic Party. Such formulations are u*n*d*i*a*l*e*c*t*i*c*a*l (excuse the expression). If our main concern is to give a scientific description of reality, we must say something like the following: "The Democratic Party could not win the support of the masses and carry out its part in the governing of the country, were it not for the many-faceted reformist and liberal illusions of the masses. At the same time, the D.P. as an institution works very hard and consciously (at the leadership level) to perpetuate these illusions; one of its methods being to offer itself (or its left wing) to the people as a vehicle for social change (a free gift, so to speak: "Please eat me.") instead of building their own vehicles. When a person breaks with this party for a time, let us say over the war policy, he may retain a host of reformist illusions (and these may lead him right back into the D.P. under the pressure of lesser-evilism), but for a time he is somewhat more independent, inclined to seek new ideas and political alternatives -- because he does not think that his affairs are being handled for him Up There. All this, of course, is something of an understatement."

INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTION AND THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

- Moody as amended, passed by NC

As the 1970 Congressional elections draw near, much of the anti-war movement, its leadership and active base, looks toward support of liberal politicians as the most important activity of the anti-war movement. Thus, as in 1968, but on a larger scale, tens of thousands of anti-war activists will spend much of their political time working for the election of Democratic and Republican "doves" and, thereby, re-enforcing the stranglehold of bourgeois politics on the movement. As in the past, IS must point out the error and folly of fighting imperialism through the bourgeois parties or any sort of capitalist politics. In place of electoral or other political action within the confines of the twin capitalist parties, the IS must call on all genuine opponents of the current imperialist war, and of imperialism generally, to wage the struggle outside these parties and to work toward the formation of a political party of opposition.

Yet, the basic problem facing the anti-war movement, the reality that underlies both its weakness and its virtual inability to remain politically independent, is not primarily one of tactics, but rather one of social composition and character. Unfortunately, the anti-war movement is essentially middle class in character and to a lesser extent in composition. For this reason, it has neither the cohesion nor the strnegth to maintain its independence; or to put it more accurately, to win its independence. Thus, except in the most socially abstract and merely tactical sense, the concept of indpendent political action for the anti-war movement is inseparable from the notion of a concrete orientation toward the working class. The primary political notion that the IS has to advance to the anti-war movement is that that movement must turn to the working class as its primary social base. This conception flows from the over-all notion (and proposed content) of a transitional program for the period, the central strategic concept of which is the need for an independent working class party. The concept of political action that we fight for in the anti-war and other middle class or declasse movements is derived from this strategic idea, a working class party, and not from any socially abstract party or political activity.

Specifically, this means that IS urges the anti-war movement to direct its actions, slogans and demands toward the working class and its material and political needs. Toward this end, the IS fights for its transitional demands and programs, e.g. the 11 points passed in the NAC anti-war resolution. As part of this program, the IS calls on the anti-war movement to break with all capitalist politicians and parties and to engage in political actions, including electoral action that is genuinely directed at working class people on the basis of program and attempts to draw workers into the action. Electoral action has little value for middle class movements, unless it is based on some consciousness of the need to activate and orient towards the working class. Furthermore, electoral action should not be viewed as an initial organizing technique where the anti-war or student movement is weak or fragmented. IS counterposes this approach toward electoral action to one-shot, moralistic protest campaigns, or sectarian efforts which merely serve the needs of small groups on the left. In cases where movement organizations run independent campaigns based on the general politics of the radical movement, we may support and participate in them as a means of pushing the strategy and program described above. This kind of decision will depend on the character of the local movement: the nature of mass participation, leadership and overall politics, as well as an evaluation of the alternatives in the given context.

REPORT AND EVALUATION ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NAC AND THE IS SINCE THE CONVENTION

The Ann Arbor convention decided to establish a disciplined national organization, with a resident political leadership in N.Y. whose purpose was to make political decisions on those national political questions that faced the organization. Though the reasons for taking this step were sound, there were a number of problems. First was the fact that of those people who are now in the national leadership, ~~xxx~~ on the NC or NAC, the political experience of those comrades in a national organization was almost nil, not to speak of the fact that many had been in the organization less than two years. However, experience can only be gained by acting, and we could only develop such leadership by taking such action. Yet the problems that confront the organization today cannot all be explained as growing pains of a new organization and leadership, though these have been considerable. There was also the problem of the hostility at the convention which was the reflection of unresolved and undiscussed political differences at the rank and file level. This should have been taken more seriously as a significant problem for the new organization. Finally, the fact that most of the recognized and experienced political leadership is not playing a leadership role in the organization today. It was in this context that the NAC took office to try to lead the IS in the Year ahead.

CONCEPTION OF THE NAC:

"The NAC may act for the organization on all political and organizational matters except as otherwise provided for herein between meetings of the NC." (constitution)

"We expect the NAC whenever possible to take political positions on the events of the day unless in its opinion taking such positions will seriously divide the organization." (list NC meeting)

"When an event is of significance both for the national organization and for a particular local chapter, the NAC will work out a general line in consultation with the local chapter involved." (1st NC)

"The NAC, in view of the present stage of development of the IS, should whenever feasible consult with the NC on questions of major political importance. This means a certain greater emphasis on consultation than would be required at a more developed stage." (1st NC)

The above four motions were the extent of the conception of the NAC developed by the convention and the first NC meeting. Behind these motions in the minds of many people was a conception of what a socialist organization is and how its leadership should function. The conception was that we needed a strong political NAC to set the program and politics for members to carry out in those arenas where comrades from different parts of the country were active. In order to really intervene in a national arena, we had to have the unity and decisiveness which only a strong national leadership could provide. Failing this, we might be able to intervene effectively on a local basis, but would not be able

to do so nationally, rather appearing with many faces. Or worse, those comrades who were active would get together and make policy themselves, in a completely undemocratic manner. Though this was not an important problem in the past, it will become increasingly important as the organization grows and its influence becomes greater. Another function, it was felt, was to oversee the functioning of the various branches, to give guidance and direction, and to prevent any programs which we felt were contrary to the decisions and politics of the convention.

It is for the above reasons that the second motion states that it "expects" the NAC to take political positions, where the constitution only allows for it.

The way the NAC was chosen, however, seriously undermined this conception. It was done on a fairly apolitical basis, that is, people were not chosen on the basis of their political perspectives for the coming period, but rather because they were in the mainstream of the old ISC's politics, whatever those are. There was also the fact that a major factor in the choices was the availability of personnel. Hence, the main political definition of the NAC concerned those issues which were not ones to be acted upon in the coming period.

A SHORT HISTORY:

Structure: The first few meetings of the NAC were mainly concerned with unfinished business from the convention, and the establishment of a structure and apparatus for the organization. Most of these concerned dues, establishing liasons with the National Labor Fraction, getting a National Student Fraction Exec, as well as liasons for the I.S. Most of this has been a failure. No functionning apparatus exists. Reports come in intermittantly if at all. National fractions hardly exist, and there are no liasons nor ongoing communication in them. It is even impossible to get replies to personal letters sent out. Hence we have an NO and NAC which is separated from the rank and file, and no functioning national fractions. If we are to function as a unified national organization, then communications is of the utmost importance. This can only be done if an effective apparatus is set up. The telephone is not an acceptable substitute.

Literature: To this date only one new pamphlet has been written. (L. Landy's on Chinese Women) Two others (Two Souls and the Teachers pamphlet) are being done by NEFP. Several others were promised, such as Cuba and Imperialism, but no manuscripts have been produced. We did not even receive replies to many of the requests for pamphlets which we sent out. The lack of literature is especially important with regard to labor. No literature exists which is directed at workers. We have been unable to find someone to rewrite the "Fight for Socialism" and none other was projected. The NAC has not done enough on this aspect and must play a more forceful role in developing this type of publication in the future. However, this will be impossible

without the cooperation of the organization. We simply cannot write everything ourselves.

Political Discusssion: The first political discussion undertaken by the NAC concerned the anti-war movement. This was forced on us by the press of events, and with the number of activities kept us busy for several weeks. The first decision on the Moratorium was unfortunate, and pointed out a continuing problem with regard to political documents. In the first place, the documents were vague with regard to exactly what was expected of comrades in other clubs. This is not the same as the fact that the documents must of necessity overlook situations which arise from specific circumstances. For there was a great deal of confusion as to what activities were expec ted, and which were ruled out. Secondly, the documents did not bring out the political differences that existed on the NAC clearly enough. This was especially true with the Urquhart, Friedman, Finkel documents. These were serious problems, and not totally excusable by the greenness of the NAC. In the beginning there was a tendency to vote on the NAC's discussion, rather than on how the document was likely to be interpreted by other members. However, the fireworks that this discussion touched off were not excusable. The first replies and the chain reaction that followed, were of an extremely factional and polemical type. Now polemics are a legitimate form of debate and argumentation in a political organization. As often happens in polemics, much of the politics was lost in the fire of the exchange. But worse, they led to a hardening of attitudes without any further clarification of politics. Hence, one got the idea tha many factions exist within the organization, when in actuality no tendency's politics are defined enough to form a faction.

The importance of the anti-war discussion for the future functioning of the NAC was that it pointed out the political differences that existed on day to day political questions, not only in the rank and file, but on the NAC as well. For a while the NAC was deadlocked with a 2-2-1 split, and hence there was no functioning majority. It is not clear at this point to what extent the situation has changed since Vicki took her place on the NAC. However, the divisions on the NAC hindered its ability to take decisive leadership, and the divisions it saw within the organization did not encourage it to try. Several criticisms have been raised informally with regard to political decisions not made by the NAC, such as on SDS and student program. To a certain extent these are valid. However, an evaluation of this will have to wait for the NC and what it considers the future role of the NAC to be.

The Yalta Affair: This again is an example of the problems with the organization. Some comrades have objections to what they believe was the political methodology of the ISL, and particularly to the slogan for a Democratic Foreign Policy. They wanted this in the introduction to the pamphlet. The NAC did not feel that this discussion should be held now, and that without the discussion no such repudiation should go into the introduction. It essentially

sidestepped that political question, which was a mistake, since methodology is one important area where there exist now undefined differences, which influence votes on positions but are not themselves discussed. Also, to avoid lengthy discussion the NAC chose to use an editorial note explaining that we no longer used the DFP slogan. This too sidestepped the political question of exactly what our position on that slogan should be. Finally, the NAC was not aware of the instructions given on the introduction by the last NO, and this led to much confusion. Thus, finally the whole introduction was rejected and a simple one substituted for it. What this points out is that it would be very difficult for the NAC to pass on any document, whether an introduction or a pamphlet, because of the underlying political differences. This would be true if we still conceive of trying to put out pamphlets that represent the line of the organization, since on most questions the organization has no line.

National Organizing: The biggest failure of the NAC, however, lies in the area of national recruitment. The three new clubs that exist, Madison, Long Beach and Boston, were established mainly independently of any action by the NAC. This is partly due to the lack of finances to send people to other areas. However, the NAC has not spent enough time on this, andit must take a higher priority in the future if we are to grow significantly by the time of the next convention. Estimated current membership is 305. At the time of the convention it was 234.

Finances: (See separate financial report) The main failure here is the failure k to raise independent money. The last NC voted to have a fund drive. This has not been done. It was felt that no more money could be raised from the membership, and the NAC' had no firm ideas on how to raise independent money. The money pledged from LA we have never received. Those attempts to contact outsiders friendly to the IS have only raised $200 for publishing new pamphlets. From the report you can see that the situation is serious. However, we will be receiving about $2900 in the beginning of January.

Discipline: The question of discipline was a hotly debated one at the convention and the NAC was given the power to make its motions disciplined. However, the feeling of the NAC was that rather than making all motions disciplined, we would depend in the beginning mainly on the self discipline of the membership, and only use discipline where it was necessary to the smooth functioning of the organization, such as at a national convention of some broader organization, or to prevent what we felt would be a bad mistake, such as the picture in the current I.S. Thus we did not make the anti-war resolution a disciplined motion. However, at a national anti- war conference that might be necessary. In the original conception of a socialist organization, it was assumed that the leadership would be disciplined in order for it to be decisive and have the organization function in a unified way. However, given the political differences and current state of the organization, which were explained above, this is not possible at this time. An NAC, lacking the respect of its membership and the authority resulting from that, cannot gain it through the use of discipline.

writing. Duplicating facilities will be available.
b. The body will discourage long motions submitted at the last minute, especially in the midst of debate.
c. Only people with speaking rights may submit motions.

4. Attendance
a. The NC meeting shall be open to all IS members. Nonmembers may attend only by by invitation. Such decisions shall be made by the NC or NAC.
b. If lack of facilities interfere with the funtionaong of the NC meeting (overcrowding, excessive noise, etc.) attendance may be restricted to the participants.

passed unanimously

Motion: That Sandy Spector be seated at the next NC as she was not present at the convention and could not have attended the first NC immediately following the convention. This NC should be considered the first one that she has missed. passed (18-1)

Motion: To accept agenda a recommended by the NAC. passed (18-1) Chester against.

Anti-war Perspectives
Presentation by Finkel and Friedamn
Vote on document as basis for amendment. Finkel passed (see roll call vote).

Amendments:
1. Add to Implementation section one (Jack G.)

We must raise support for workers' struggles in the anti-war movement as a whole, making it clear that Vietnam and future Vietnams, as a product of imperialism, will only be stopped by ditching the war economy, and that the only force capable of doing this is the working class. We must point out that the arms economy is the motor force behind the inflation, and that the assault on wages and working conditions necessary to maintain copporate profits int the stagnating economy have brought workers militancy to the fore. We must relate this to the anti-war movement as a whole, stressing the need to link the war with the inflation and the new strike wave. Wemust pose this as an alternative to a strategy limitied to mass marches and Weatherman tactics which a large section of the anti-war movement has come to see donot provide a strategy for ending the war.

Our orientation to the strikers themselves must begin with support for their immediate demands, but must gor beyond this to raising demands which will help direct the attention of workers towards the root of the problem: the capitalist system itself. One way of doing this is by exposing the class collaborationist role of the union bureaucrats. In the G.E. strike, for example, we demand that Meany's boycott of G.E. be extended - the government, as G.E.'s largest consumer, must be forced to comply.

We must also demand the scrapping of the arms economy and its reconversion into a system that produces for social needs and provides productive jobs for all. These demands flow from the relation of the arms economy to the inflation and the growing inability of capital to provide fro social needs, especially in the major urban areas. By raising these demands, we help focus the attention of workers on the entire social system.

In putting forward this orientation, we stress that the only way to end the wat economy is thoough a movement led by the working class aimed at workers'control.
passed.

NAC Meeting January 2, 1970 (NC Steering Committee)

Present: Mike U., Vicki I., Kim M., Dave Fr., Dave Fi.
Others: Gay S., Bill P.

Motion: To withdraw Urquhart anti-war document. passed (5-0)
Motion: To recommedd the acceptance of the following designated alternates to the NC: Gay Semel for Sandy Spector, Ian Mcmahan for Dick Broadhead, Bill Gerchow for Jack Bloom. passed (5-0)
Motion: To recommend that Sara B. of the Resident Steering Committee of the National Labor Fraction be given speaking rights on the NC. passed (5-0)

NC Saturday, January 2, 1970

Present: Mike U., Vicki I., Kim M., Dave Fr., Dave Fi.,Gay S., Bill P., Ron T., Peter D., Ilene W., Jack G., Kit L., Marilyn M., Chris H., Sally Y., Eric C., Bruce L., Dave H., WK., Bill G., Ian M., Ernie H.,

Agenda
1. Agenda & Preliminaries
2. Anti-war Perspective
   a) debate & vote on major documents (Friedman, Finkel)
   b) debate & vote on amendments
3. Independent Political Action
   a) debate & vote on major documents (Moody, Hobson, Haberkern)
   b) debate & vote on amendments

Preliminaries

Motion: To seat the following alternates as designated by NC delegates:
Gay Semel for Sandy Spector (by phone)
Ian McMahan for Dick Broadhead (by phone)
Bill Gerchow for Jack Bloom (by phone)
Eric Chester for Nancy Holmstrom (wrttien) passed unanimously

Motion: To accept the following rules for NC.
1. Voting Rights
a. Voting shall be restricted to NC members and seated alternates
b. An elected alternate shall be seated upon written designation from an absent NC member (or phone designation). Remaining vacancies shall be filled from the list of alternates, in order of selection. Substitiutions shall be for the entire 2-day meeting, not session by session.
c. The NAC has proposed that absent NC members be permitted to designate substitutes not on the official alternate list. This question has been put to the NC by mail ballot, as it represents a deviation from the constitution.

2. Speaking Rights
a. All NC members and seated alternates, all NAC members, national officers and the I.S. editor shall have speaking rights. This is a maximum of 22 people.
b. The authors of resolutions shall have speaking rights during the debate over their resolutions. The National Office staff may speak on organizational matters.
c. No one else may speak . Exceptions may be made (e.g., alternates who travel great distances to attend the meeting), but these must be wieghed against the severe time limeitations which will become apparant as the meeting proceeds.

3. Motions
a. All motions and amemdmenst (other than procedural) must be submitted in

Statement on Jack G. amendment by Ernie H.: While I agree with the general argument there are formulations, such as the equation of Weatherman tactics and mass marches, which imply a position on the mass anti-war movement with which I disagree most strongly.

2 Add to Implementation section, end of first paragraph on Transitional Program. (Ron T.)
The recent calls of the liberals (for the reordering of priorities) leaves the burden on the working class. In order to expose this, we must demand that the burden of all government spending be shifted fromthe workers to capital.
Passed (see foll call)

3. (Mike Monheit) In last paragraph of document, delete "Thus we might agitate. etc." and substitute"Thus we would urge strike support activities, projects around demands which reflect immediate and actionable working class issues. like taxation, day care eenters, housing, transit, employment, and so forth. We would aslso advocate educational activities around major, though less immediately actionable demands (which would fall in the same dinds of areas just listed). In all such activities we would call upon the radical movement to see itself as not merely a support group, but as a political organization, putting forth educational demands, analysis, strategy, and tactics. We would fight for such a political approach by putting forth our transitional program, and action and education proposals based on that program."
Passed (all for, Ernie H. abstaining)

4.(Mike Monheit) Second to last paragraph , third sentence form the bottom, before the sentence beginning "The development of cadre, etc." Insert:
"On campuses we hold our own anti-war meetings and debates, in cooperation wiht other radical groups where possible. Most importantly, we carry out ourselves and in coalition with other radical groupings where feasible and politically advisable, a pro-working class activities that we advocate for the anti-war and radical movement.
Passed (all for)

5. (Mike Monheit) Section on Conclusions, sentence beginning "Quite the contrary" chnge to read:
"Quite the contrary: because of their essential roles in production and their position as the principal brunt of the economic squeeze, workers are affected by and thus are driven to deal with the societal crisis as a <u>whole</u>, etc.
Passed (all for)

6. (Mike Monheit) Section on conclusions, second paragraph, change"the program of the anti-war movement" to "the anti-war Movemnet's demand for immediate withdrawal"
Motion: That sense of the above be adopted and referedto the NAC for stylization.
Passed (all for)

7. (Dave Fr.) Add the following paragraphs:
A RANK AND FILE ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Within the anti-war movement, we must counter the coalition organizing committee approach, which makes no effort to democratically organize the masses who are called on to participate in the periodic demonstrations. Our goal should be rank and file groups wherever possible and on the largest scale possible. Recognising that the prospects for building such groups are not good at the present time, we relate to giben activites by fighting for rank and file control at the local level, in the orgainization of the activities (e.g., campus strikes) and in the determin-

ation of the politics.

Even where it is possible to build rank and file organizations, we recognize that they are not ultimately viable on a single issue , middle class basis and we counterpose a radical progra and working class orientation. We propose that mass demonstrations flow naturally from fank and file organizations, in which people develop politically by participating in day to day decision making: discussing, palnning and carrying out programs. We counterpose this to the passive participation in rallies and marches so typical of anti-war mobilizations.
Passed (all for)

Motion : Strike the work "ultimately" in the above.
Fails. (Chris H. for, Bruce L., WK, Sally Y. abstaining, all else opposed)

6. Move to Strike the last sentence of the second paragraph under Theses of the Anti-war Movement section which reads as follows: "In other words, reformist illusions are the basis of the strength of the Democratic Party, not vice versa."
Tabled until after the Independent Political Action discussion- if not taken up then, to be taken up by the NAC.

Motion: To accept Finkel document as amended. Passed (see roll call)

Motion: (WK) I.S. should participate in the activities of broad coalitions it they represent significant numbers of people in motion. Passed (all for)

Motion: (WK) Working in broader coalitions we should push for the following:
-rank and file control of the activities
-anti-capitalist, pro-working class militant politics, demonstrations, slogans, etc.
passed (all for)

Motion:(WK) We should not be in the leadership of organizations of activities which have not been won to our political approach.
Passed (all for - Chester abstaining)
Motion (Ilene W.) That the above motion be disciplined. Withdrawn

Motion: (WK) Transitional demands and slogans flow most basically from the struggle of the working class and are not a means whereby we may place ourselves in the leadership of broad middle class liberal (or even radical) groupings where we donot have clear political leadership.
Passed (all for)

Motion: (WK) We should seek opportunities to build radical coalitions for more militant, anti-capitialist, pro-working class activities; where possible we should call such in our own name; such demonstrations should, of course not be in conflict with broader demonstrations unless they are so clearly pro-establishment that we must differentiate ourselves from them.
Passed (all for)

Motion: (WK) The demand for pro-working class activities means the following:
-solidarity with existing working class struggles
-demands which relate the war to its effect on the working class
-ALL POLITICAL DEMANDS, SLOGANS, ETC. MUST BE COMPREHENSIBLE TO MILITANT WORKERS -- WE MUST CONTINUOUSLY OPPOSE "RADICALISM" WHICH FURTHER INTENSIFIES THE ALIENATION OF THE STUDENT

RADICAL MOVEMENT FROM AMERICAN SOCIETY IN GENERAL AND THE WORKING CLASS IN PARTICULAR!!!
-where possible attempts should be made to invblve rank and file workers in anti-war activities.
Passed (Ron T., Bruce L., Jack G., Eric C. opposed - all else for)

Motion: (WK) While these motions are addressed sprcifically to anti-war activity, ti is intended that the sense of them would apply to similar activities.
Passed (all for, Mike U. abstains)

Independent Political Action
Presentations on Haberkern, Moody and Hobson Documents

Vote on each one as basis for amendment (see roll call)
Haberkern - Failed
Moody - Passed
Hobson - Failed

Amendments to Moody

1. (KIm M., Gay S., Ilene W., Bill P.) Add to the third paragraph following the sentence ending with "..draw workers into the action."
"Electoral action has little value for middle class movements, unless it is based on some consciousness of the need to activate and orient towards the working class. Furthermore, electoral action should not be viewed as an initial organizing technique where the anti-war or student movement is weak or fragmented."
Passed (see role call)

2. (Ron T.) add to the above amendment:
"In this context, electoral action should be seen as primarily educational and in general only effective where there is a short range potential for reaching a working class base."
Failed (see roll call)

3. (Dave Fr.) Replace Moody's last three sentences by the following three paragraphs:

Electoral action is a tactic which may correspond to a variety of strategies, even when it is outside the Democratic Party. The SWP campaigns, for example, are explicitly counterposed to independent political action. The Freedom and Peace Party was part of the CP's triple-p;ay strategy, in which it also ran its own candidates and supported Eugene McCarthy. Other possibilities include one-shot efforts to blackmail the Democrats, and moral pvotest campaigns (although thses usually stay within the Democratic primaries). We welcome all splits in the liberal camp. But we only support those that emerge from or align themselves on the side of the great social struggles of this decade, the movements of working people and the black morority. This is the meaning of political independence today in America, even though the Vietnam war is a driving force in that direction for millions of students and other middle class elements. On this baisis, we may critically support and participate in independent campaigns arising out of the anti-war movement, which have programmatic deficiencies but do orient toward the more basic social conflict within the society.
Failed (see roll call)

A less ambiguous development, more likely in 1972 than in 1970, would be the emergence of sentiment for independent political action on the part of massed of radicals or radicalized anti-war militants. Electoral campaigns based on the general politics of the radical movement, independent of and hostile tothe Democratic Party, would be a big step in the right direction--even if lacking in programmatic coherence and a firm ideology. Radicals would be forced to discuss program in a serious way, and methods of relating to the working class. A permanent party could not be built without winning the active support of thousands of workers--and this in turn depends on the speed with which workers' struggles become radicalized -- but every effort toward this end is to be encouraged. In such campaigns, we would push the perspective outlined above (the Moody resolution) and fight against any "purely electoral" tendencies. We would seek fo have our transitional program accepted by the rank-and- file, adopted by the organization, and used in all political wrork.
Failed (see roll call)

We anticipate few opportunities in 1970 to apply our strategy on the tactical level, and in this sense it will be largely educational. At every opportunity, along with the rest of our program, we explain the strategy of independetn political action in tis fullest sense, counterposed to Democratic Party politics and the anti-electoralism fo the radical left. But we do not regard these as symmetrical phenomena. Those who believe that it is possible to refrom or "use" the Democratic Party are still tied to the system in a very basis way, and this is reflected in other appectsof their politics as well. Radicla anti-electoralism (as distinct from cynicism, apathy or bther apolitical attitudes) is a tactical mistake on the part of people who reject permeationism and recognize the wwindle of bourgeois democracy. Lacking political self-confidence and a oonsistant working class perspective (which in turn makes it difficult for them to build solid orgainizations of their own), they leave the electoral arena to the parties of the ruling class. Out job is to show them how to use that arena in a revolutionary manner. This is difficult, but no more os htan a hundred other problems that will be encountered on the road to socalism.
Failed (see role call)

4. Amendment (Chris H.) see enclosed. Failed (see role call

Motion: To accept Moody document as amended. Passed (see roll call)

Saturday January 3
Agenda
1. Presentation and Repot by National Secretary
2. Discipline, Role of NAC
3. Labor Perspectives--Relocation of personnel, National Office, etc.
4. Finances: National, local and regional travellors
5. I.S. - Editorial Policy - Functionaing (distribution)
6. Literature (new pamphlets, etc.)
7. Financing National meetings
8. Appeal past NAC decisions
9. Election of new National Officers - Next National Convention - Next NC

Motion: Delete the following sentence from the second paragraph under Theses on the Anti-war Movement section in the Finkel Anti-war perspectives document. "In other words, reformist illusions are the basis of the strngth of the Democratic Party, not vice versa."
Passed (see roll call)

Motion: Add above sentence plus..."which in turn reinforces these illusions."
Failed.

National Secretary's Report

Discipline & Role of NAC

Motion: (Mike U.): That one person be prt in charge of communications to and from the NAC for each club. Job of this person is to keep the NAC informed every 2 weeks of the political functioning of the club, and to carefully read the NAC minutes and bring to the attention of the club any relevant points.
Passed (all for)
Motion: (Mike U.): TOn the $2900 we will receive) This money is not to be used to hire a regional or national traveler. Such and expense is not worthwhile at this time, and would deplete these meagre resources vey rapidly. Instead an attempt should be made to hire a full time organizer for Detroit (who could do some travelling). Secondly, money should be allocated for people to make one shot trips to visit a particular area. Thisrd, one or two national speaking tours should be set up.
Passed (all for)
Motion: (Mike U.): The major political responsibility of the NAC between now and the next convention be to prepare for the convention, coordinate nationalfunctioning, including setting a political line for national meetings and arenas, and finally that it organize discussions aimed at clarifying existing political differences within the organization.
Passed (all for)
Motion: (Ilene W.) Add to the above between the words "organize discussions".. and .."aimed at clarifying.." the following: "based on the development of a transitional program".
Passed (see roll call)
Motion: (Mike U.): That the NAC continue acting as it has in the past with regard to discipline. Tabled.

Labor Perspectives
Detroit-Cleveland Motion (see enclosed)- Passed as sense motion (Eric C. opposed, all else for)
Motion: (Bill P.) (see enclosed)
Point 1 - Passed (Eric C. against, Ernie H. abstaining, all else for)
Point 2 - Passed (Ernie H. and Eric C against, Ian M. and Sally Y. abstaining)
Point 3 - Passed (Eric C. opposed, all else for)
Point 4 - Passed (Eric C. opposed, Bill G. abstaining)
Point 5 - Passed (Eric C. ppposed, all else for)
Amendment: (Bill P.) Next to the last sentence under point 4 add: Execs are to send reports on what exists in these cities and how many people they think they need and for what. Passed
Motion(WK): That points 1,2,3 andthe reports requested in points 5 and 6 are to be considered mandatory. Passed

Motion: (Kit L.) That we move the National Office and the paper (I.S.) to Detroit by the end of the year (1970) Passed (all for)

Finances (see financial report)

I.S.
Proposal (Gay S.) (see enclosed) Passed(all for)

Proposal for Workers' Power suppliment (see Forum #3) (Kit L.)
With understanding that name can be changed. Passed (Eric C. abstain-in, all else for)

Motion: (Dave H.) One of the major gaols for the development of IS and the Wokers' Power suppliment shaould be combining the primarily student oriented and primarily worker oriented sections into a single national news and agitaitional paper appropriate for distribution in shops, on campus and among anti-war activists.

When and if sufficient copy for a seperate analytical-theoretical publication is being written, such a publication should be established. Passed (see roll call)

Amendment(Bruce L.) Substitute for second paragraph of Dave H. motion the following: At such a time that such an integrated newspaper is implemented, an analytical-theretical publication should be established. Failed (see roll clall)

Statement (Ron T., Bruce L., Jack G.)
We voted against Dave H.'s motion because without specification of the content and style of such a newspaper, the motion is muddy and vague. We are for a unified newspaper. We would, however, oppose attempts to exclude semi-theretical articles or to simplify analysis in order to reach less-radical sectors befroe a theretical organ were in existance to carry theoretical and semi-theoretical material.

Statement (Ghris H.)
I abstained on this motion for the following reason: the central question regarding a unifird newspaper is not whethter such an organ is desirable - everyone agrees with this in general - but the question of timing. Can a unified organ be established in the short run, say the next year, or does the nature of the present period - the low level of development of working -class consciousness at present - preclude such a step in the near future? Dave H's original motion answered that question. As I do not believe the varying consciousness of different sectors will allow establishing a unifies newspaper in the next year, I would have voted against the original motion. The removal of the phrase "in the next several months" through a "friendly" amendment removed all substantive meaning from this motion, leaving an apple-pie statement. There was no meaningful basis for my voting either for or against the motion in this form, and its passage merely obscures the central question noted above.

Motions from the Women's Caucus
1. Regional travelers and speakers for proposed tours must be chosen on a political basis. Whenevre possible org anizing trips should be assigned to women comrades. When organizing for the I.S. they will emphasize women's liberation, as well as discussing the entire politics of the IS. They will see that women's liberation is an integral part of the politics on which people are recruited (men should do the same). Though we realize that the finances of the organizationare limited, in cases where a woman volunteers to speak and feels that she wants another woman to speak with her, the organization should aid in financing both women.
Passed (see roll call)

2. On membership:
Where women are being recruited to the organization, they must be recruited on a political basis, and thorough political discussion must be held with them, as with men.
Amendment (Chris H.)
In both cases, women's liberation must be an integral part of these politics-this includes a commitment to struggle against the oppressed position of women in society (not simply, but not excluding, struggling against job inequality, or the unequal position of women within radical organizations). Just as we do not recruit overt racists to IS, we likewise do not recruit overt male chauvinists. As on other issues, we do not insist that potemtial members share every nuance of our position before being recruited, but we do insist that they share the general commitment outlined above.
Passes (all for)

Amendment to Women's Caucus motion #1 (ernie H.)
delte the section beginning with "When organizing for the IS.." and ending with"...politics on which people are recruited".
Failed (see roll call)

National Convention
Motion on time: Convention be in June. Passed(11-8, 1 abstention)
Motion: that NAC set the exact date by the end of January. Passed
Financing: (Dave H.)
In order to relieve the financial burden on comrades who are members of the NC or of one or another fraction or other national body of IS, in going to and from meetings of national bodies, a travel expense fund will be established on the natational level to be administered by the NAC. Money for this fund will be dollected by the NAC through a regular dues increase earmarked specifically for the travel fund of through regular assissments of the membership by the NAC.

The amount of such a dues increase or special asessments will be determined by the NAC and subject to change by it.

The money will be distributed in such a way that travel expenses for all comrades attending national meetings will be reduced tothe point where any comrade will be financially able to attend national meetings with only a small or nominal personal financial burden.

Amendment (Ilene W.): The above does not include conventions.
Passed as amended

Motion: (WK) The total cost of bringing all delegates will be divided equally amongst the delegates. The NAC will reaaarch other methods to find funds to build a traveling expense fund. Passed

Motion to reconsider Dave H's motion: Dave H's motion fails.

Motion on Place (Gay S.) Convention be held in Detroit, aomeone from the National staff will come to Detroit shortly beforehand if nedessary. Passed

Literature
Move to table to the NAC. passed

Appeal of past NAC decisions
Motion (Eric C.) Any paper criticized by the NAC or a member in a key list mailing, must also be mailed in the same mailing. Passed

Next NC
Tabled to NAC

New National Secretary
In the event that Mike U. is drafted, Gay S. will become the new National Secretary. Passed (all for)

ROLL CALL VOTES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Mike U.	1	-	-	Y	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Kim M.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Vicki I.	2	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Dave Fr.	2	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N
Ron T.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Peter D.	2	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N
Ilene W.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
Bill P.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Jack G.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Kit L.	2	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	-	-
Marilyn M.	2	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N
Chris H.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	-	Y	A	Y	Y	N
Sally Y.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Eric C.	A	N	A	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	-	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Bruce L.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Dave H.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	A	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Gay S.	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
WK	1	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	N
Bill G.	2	Y	Y	A	A	Y	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	N	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	N
Ian M.	2	Y	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	N	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N
Ernie H.	2	A	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y

Key

1. Anti-war documents (1.-Finkel, 2-Friedman)
2. amend. Jack G.
3. " Ron T.
4. Finkel as amended
5. Ind. Pol. Action Ernie
6. IPA Kim
7. IPA Chris
8. IPA amend. #1
9. IPA " Ron T.
10. IPA " Dave Fr.
11. " " "
12. " " "
13. " " Chris
14. IPA as amend.
15. deletion
16. Ilene
17. Dave H.
18. Bruce amend. to DH
19. Women's Caucus motion
20. WC motion amen EH

Baltimore Report
Don B.

This area report covers the activities of Baltimore IS from the national convention in September through the October 15 moratorium.

When we returned from the Ann Arbor convention, we were not able to begin functioning as a group immediately, since at that time it was not certain how many people would be active in the chapter, and there was some doubt as to whether there would be a group here at all.

Our perspectives discussions up to this point had centered on four possible arenas of activity, in addition to factory activity, which it was generally understood would take primacy for the 4 members who are industrialized.

The four were SDS and the New University Conference, both at Johns Hopkins University, the Baltimore women's liberation group, and the Baltimore Defense Committee, the general, umbrella organization of the adult left here (of which more below).

For reasons involving both our own resources and the objective possibilities of SDS and NUC, these groups were rejected as more than peripheral arenas, and an orientation toward the Baltimore Defense Committee (BDC) and women's liberation was decided upon.

We began attending steering committee meetings of the BDC (which are in reality much closer to general membership meetings) at the end of September, but so far, due to the fact that we have not yet worked a specific perspective for the group, we have had little effect (any experiences comrades have had with similar groups would be much appreciated). I believe much the same situation holds true for women's liberation, although I haven't discussed this with the comrades active in the group recently.

The moratorium last week was probably the largest demonstration ever held in Baltimore. About 5,000 people took part in a downtown rally at noon, and around 6,000 marched from Johns Hopkins after a mid-afternoon rally to a second rally downtown late in the afternoon, which about 12,000 people eventually attended.

Under the umbrella of "immediate withdrawal", the politics of the moratorium here contained sharply divergent tendencies. For example, speakers at the Hopkins rally ranged from former Senator Ernest Gruening, who put forward the standard left-liberal rhetoric on the war (about how it's illegal, a tragic mistake, etc.) through Paul Lauter, national director of Resist, who gave a fairly militant, anti-imperialist speech (although without a working class orientation) to Zeke Boyd, of the Labor Committee, who presented their usual economic program tied to an attack on the war.

My own random observations of people in crowds found an even broader range of politics present with no particular political level predominating, except, perhaps, youth newly involved in the anti-war movement with a vaguely radical consciousness (left of Mc-Carthy-Gruening, but right of the organized left-wing groups).

More or less at the last minute, and with relatively little political pre-discussion, we prepared a leaflet (copy enclosed) and distributed nearly 1,000 copies at the teach-in at Hopkins and at the downtown rally in the evening. This was the first public action we have taken in our own name here.

BDC, as I indicated above, is a general adult left umbrella group, I think I should elaborate on this, however, in order to avoid giving misimpressions.

Although its functions include serving as a political clearinghouse for single-issue groups, and coordinating anti-war activities in the city, it bears little resemblance to groups which perform similar tasks in other cities (such as the Peace Parade Committee in New York).

For example, the BDC initiates activities on its own, and is by no means confined to anti-war actions.

It is a membership organization in the sense that it has a core of activists numbering between 25 and 50 rather than a united front committee of the left sects. The factional, sectarian atmosphere of the Zoo Parade Committee is noticeably absent in the BDC. In fact, we are the only sect which is operating as a group within BDC, although, in a loose sense, other tendencies have followers in the BDC (i.e. -- there are a few people who identify with Weatherman, others who vacillate between us and RYM II, etc.).

Most of BDC's members are recent graduates of the campus left, and broadly speaking the milieu is student radical. Again, however, factionalism and crazyism are much less evident in BDC than in SDS.

Most BDC members are consciously anti-capitalist. However, the group doesn't have a coherent, specifically working-class orientation, although I think some of its members would be open to such a line. This is probably the point around which we should try to center discussion.

In general, the atmosphere in BDC is fairly healthy, and in the long run the possibilities for making contacts and recruiting are pretty good, although I doubt we will recruit anyone from BDC in the next month or so.

Baltimore Women's liberation is relatively political and quite serious. Some of its members publish a journal and it held a fairly good demonstration here about two months ago.

From what I understand, the possibilities for pushing a working-class orientation in the group are good, and its members are more receptive to anti-stalinist politics than is generally the case on the new left. I have also been told that there are good possibilities for recruiting.

While we have a number of contacts from a variety of arenas, I think it will be some time (months, at least) before we recruit any of them. So, barring anything unforeseen, we will probably stay about the same size for the immediate future.

We are only slowly adjusting to operating in a more organized and formal manner. While there has been some improvement along this line over the situation when I came here, it has still proved much too easy to fall back into the old, informal, sloppy pattern of functioning. This goes for everyone, including me.

This will have to do for now, as there isn't much more concrete to tell you about, and I want to get this in the mail. I'll write you again in a month or so -- hopefully, by that time, we will be functioning better, and will have a better idea of the situation in our arenas.

10/20/69

Detroit IS Report, 11/14/69

The situation within the local at present could best be described as digging in and holding on. Once the initial burst of activity that followed the formation of the local passed, we have found that the situation dictates work on consolidation; principally because the main arena we are involved in does not lend itself to quick organizational growth.

At present we have a total of eight members; three comrades working in auto plants, a public school teacher, a social worker, an economist and a student at Wayne State. In addition, a social worker is ready to join. We lost a labor fraction comrade last week when he elected to move to Cleveland for largely personal reasons (he is in no sense lost to IS and is working to pull together a Cleveland local).

We feel, for obvious reasons, that the most important arena we are involved in is the industrial one. Having made a long-term committment to this kind of work, we are forced to ride out some obstacles to sustained political work, most of which are inherent in this kind of activity. This involves comrades being forced to explor different jobs before getting settled, lasting through the 90-day probationary period, dealing with the general physical and mental weariness of a factory job which limits other political work, etc., etc. At present, we are well on the road to having a stable 3-man industrial cadre, well settled in jobs (this situation will improve around December when two of the three will hopefully have completed their 90 days). This is of course hardly overwhelming but we are satisfied that it is a beginning. One of the comrades is involved in an extremely hot situation in his plant; the other two feel that there is potential in their situations.

Because of the need for political cooperation with other groups working in plants, we have succeded in reconstituting the old Revolutionary Workers Committee, a formation that was temporarily shelved in September because it was involuntarily becoming an IS front. Our goal is to achieve an effective coalition with other groups on the basis of a minimal program (revolutionary socialist, anti-Stalinist, committed to intervention in the shops). At present the RWC consists of us, a small group of people who split off from the Spartacists (?!) and came to Detroit to work in shops, people from the United Caucus, plus several independents, with a verbal committment from some other groups (News and Letters, NOC, etc.) to participate in some way. At present, the group is at the level of perspective discussions, with real political cooperation in action a real possibility in the near future.

As yet we have been unable to successfully intervene at Wayne State. We have one comrade going to school there, who is quite capable but also quite new to the scene and used to Berkeley, which presents problems. The political situation at Wayne is very unsettled, with RYM II the leading tendency to the extent that anyone is (they unfortuneately captured a

new organization launched at the beginning of the year, due principally to the incompetance of some News and Letters people), but with most students outside the defined political groups and in various ad hoc committees springing up around various issues. A strong movement to oppose expansion into ghetto has seen heavy going due to a highly cooptive administration; its future is unclear. The drive to unionize student assistants, which nearly blew the campus apart last spring, is for the moment dormant, but has high potentiol. The liberals are hyperactive through the moratorium (more on that later). Other activities include the coming Midwest and Labor Fraction conferences, the Labor newsletter, and regional organizing. The Labor Fraction conference is scheduled for Thanksgiving; we have procured a good meeting hall, but it costs bread, and we're continuing to look for cheaper places. We have procured an A. B. Dick offset press to produce the labor newsletter; it needs some work, should be operative this week. We had hoped to put out the first issue before the conference; we have recieved very few articles, but should be able to make do for one issue. On the Midwest conference: a joint meeting of Ann Arbor-Detroit IS last Sunday voted to hold the Midwest conference at a different time and place than the labor fraction conference, preferably either the weekend preceeding or the weekend following Thanksgiving, and in Chicago. We are contacting the Chicago comrades, plus others, to get their response. Regional organizing: There are lots of contacts in the Midwest, and we've been trying to make trips, but have been limited by our sparse resources. A weekend trip to Cleveland was fairly successful; we have two members with several people around them and interested in IS, three of them steelworkers. Dennis S. had made contact with a good group of people in Flint, but unfortunately hasn't followed it up. Other members and/or contacts are in Toledo, Defiance (Ohio), Ypsilanti and Rochester Mich. At the joint Ann Arbor-Detroint meeting it was voted that the two locals would collaborate to insure systematic regional travelling in the area, that as many people as possible would be involved in the travelling, and that a two-person committee would coordinate and schedule. Dan E. and Ken F. of Detroit volunteered to be interim coordinators.

To summarize, we're working to consolidate, dig in, establish ourselves in the city as an ongoing organization. Until and unless some comrades manage to get involved in the campus arena, no growth can be expected in the immediate future. Future reports will probably dwell in more detail on specific areas of work, particularly the Revolutionary Workers Committee, which merits considerable description.

This section submitted 10/27/69

ADDENDUM TO REPORT: ON THE MORATORIUM

Since the moratorium issue is causing some controversy within the organization, a report on what happened in Detroit on Oct. 15 may be relevant. The demonstration was, first of all, huge. Twenty to Thirty thousand took part which for Detroit is frankly incredible (the biggest pre-

vious anti-war march was 3000 in 19[illegible], last fall's march drew 15000). In addition, the political tone was much more to the left than in other areas. It was, of course, organized by the left-libs with a little help from their friends in [illegible]-NMA, but the structure was free enough to permit all kinds of people to participate. There was heavy black participation; black high school students have been in motion since last spring and used the moratorium as a vehicle to further that motion. Many high schools struck, and their presence injected some political issues into the demonstration.

Our analysis of the situation is roughly this: large numbers of new people were swept into political activity by the moratorium. Most of these people are essentially liberal in their politics (when they have any). The crux of the matter, however, is that they are probably destined to go through the same bitterly frustrating experience that we all went through three or four years ago, of marching in bigger and bigger numbers against the war, but seeing very little effect take place. If this is correct, the libs have called into being a movement that they will be unable to control and which will explode in their faces. For this reason, the moratorium is clearly a good arena to work in.

One possibility locally is doing leafletting at plants, and using the contacts that we and others have in shops, to try to organize a workers contingent for the Nov. 14 moratorium. The anti-war sentiment in the shops, at least in Detroit, is certainly high enough to make the idea at least somewhat realistic. (At Ford Rouge on Oct. 14, the committeemen and stewards in the skilled trades unit sent a petition to the local and international leadership demanding that a walkout be called for the day of the moratorium, and the black caucus in the assembly plant made noises in that direction.) We are at present discussing the idea with other people.

DETROIT I.S. BI-WEEKLY REPORT 11/14/69

Unfortunately, lots of bad news to report. Our industrial cadre has been temporarily decimated by illness and general bad luck. We are, however, hopeful that the travail is only temporary, and that both comrades will be able to resume work in a short time. We are further consoled by the knowledge that our luck cannot get any worse.

Our main problem at the moment is simply a lack of resources, especially people. There are numerous political opportunities inherent in the current scene in Detroit, and we have come up with many good ideas on how to exploit them programatically. But we simply do not have enough people to make any of the programs real. The problem is reinforced by the fact that our inability to involve ourselves at all in the Wayne State arena makes it very hard to gain new contacts and build a periphery, much less recruit new members.

We are currently working on two papers, one an analysis of the situation in industry in Detroit and among auto workers generally. The central premise of the paper is that a major battle will be fought when the contract talks with the Big Three come up next fall, and that the level of

rank-and-file militancy is so high that the UAW bureaucracy will have great difficulty containing it. The paper should be in your hands within a week or so.

The second paper contains our response to the debate going on within the NAC, and in the organization generally, on the question of the Moratorium and the anti-war movement. The main theme will be that both (or all) sides in the debate badly overlook and ignore the issue of a real working-class perspective for the anti-war movement, which we feel is the most curcial element in the whole situation. We realize that it is not entirely unexpected that a chapter primarily oriented toward the industrial arena, such as ours, would hold such a position; but we feel that the political logic of our position goes beyond our subjective inclinations. This paper should be ready in about one week.

Also, Detroit I.S. and Cleveland I.S. are working on a joint position paper dealing with the implementation of a real working class orientation within the I.S., containing specific programmatic proposals. It should be finished in time for the National Labor Fraction Conference, where it will be submitted.

One of the bright notes of the last two weeks has been our success in establishing much-needed contact with the other locals in our geographic region (Chicago, Ann Arbor, Cleveland). We were highly impressed by the Chicago people, and got a real shot in the arm from talking to them. In addition to a lot of personal rapport, we found ourselves quite close to them in terms of both general political perspectives and specific orientation (i.e. towards the shops). We have serious differences, on the other hand, with the Ann Arbor comrades in both of the above areas; we also feel that their chapter is in no sense monolithic or rigidly dogmatic, and that continued contact and dialogue is very important. Given the close proximity (40 miles) between the two cities, we have planned a series of joint meetings.

The Cleveland group is quite small, and even more problem-ridden than we are. I urged the two members (Bill F. and Cliff N.) to begin writing you reports, so you should get a detailed report soon. In any case, they are very short on people, and are in a highly factional city.

Chicago I. S. Report # 2 Chris H.

I have delayed this report a little in order to be able to comment on the November Moratorium events; apologies. This one will deal with: November Moratorium; other University of Chicago; GE strike; women's liberation; industrialization program; members and contacts; other organizations.

1. Moratorium. As mentioned in the last report, the popularity of the October Moratorium took us by surprise. Immediately after it, we began thinking about policy toward the November Moratorium. The result was the perspective enclosed ("I. S. Policy toward the Moratorium," an internal document) which argued for (a) raising our position in Moratorium mass meetings if these occurred, (B) organizing a radically focused action for November Moratorium.

(A) Them. The Moratorium group at UC, as mentioned in the last report, is by no means as open as elsewhere. There had been one meeting before the first Moratorium; a committee was elected there. After October 15, this group argued that their election constituted a mandate for deciding the politics of the Moratorium for all time - thus, no mass meeting. Our estimate was that dissatisfaction amoung Moritorium rank and file was not great enough to make it profitable to agitate publicly for such a meeting. The activities planned by the Moratorium for November had a decidedly right-wing character and reflected the alliance between Student Government liberals and YPSL (yes, oh yes, YPSL has reappeared at UC) i.e. canvassing for Al Raby, former civil rights activist, who is running for Illinois Constitutional Convention on what can only be described, in every way, as a progressive platform (SG libs); picketing supermarket around grapes (YPSL). On the other hand, the SG (left?) wing alliance pushed through building for Washington The canvassing and picketing activities drew virtually no participation - a total of about 15 people. Clearly the Washington march is keeping the Moratorium alive this month. Next month will probably be a blank at UC - it is in the middle of finals. Thus January will be the date on which athe Moratorium will survive or fall. We are considering whether to make a push on the Moratorium organization then.

So as not to seem entirely negative, it should be mentioned that Champaign-Urbana (U. of Illinois) has what seems to be a really fine Moratorium group. They used to be an SDS chapter (and, I think, were into Pee and Free a year and a half ago) and have split from SDS. They are rank and file democrat types; intensely suspicious of outsiders and we heard of them only through a community organizer who used to be in our caucus in SDS. There's no PL or Weathermen, a few RYMII on neighboring campuses. The U. of I group apparently are explicitly anti-imperialist, oriented toward community organizing (???) and chucked out a National Moratorium rep who came down to look them over. Our friend has made us a contact there, who has two or three people with her, and we will probably be going down in December tofollow up.

(B) Us. The first part of our planned activities having

proven unimplementable, we concentrated on the second. We made an alliance with the local NUC chapter, which is basically New Left academics with a recent small influx of hard social dems. This called for leaflets building to a demo against the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and the Stevenson Institute for International Affairs, both of which mix innocent schlorship with concultation (but the Center is tied to the State Department, Stevenson to Kennedy liberals-on-the-outs). The exigencies of this alliance cut down the content of the first two leaflets, but the third got in some analysis (nos. 1and 3)are enclosed). The second part of the intended alliance is on-going activity (a) against university institutes or individual professors, (b) with a working class focus, probably GE (see below).

Despite a cold snap (24 degrees), about 50 people participated in the demonstration Nov. 14. Aside from the weather- which reduced to about zero the number of people drifting in to the demo - other limiting factors were (a) the relatively sophisticated analysis required to understand the targets; (b) the low level of all political activity at UC this year, probably related to last spring's events; (c) the fact that N. T. is unknown on campus - this was the first action to make our name generally known, with coverage from the campus paper, etc,. The number of people participating was at the lower edge of what we would define as a success. Spirit was high, heightened by high jinks (tongue in cheek).

Postscript: I should mention the Moratorium rally. As before, this was called a "convocation"; the accent was on the big names - Ernest Gruening, Caesar Chavez. There were no educational activities, like teach-ins, planned. About 1/3 fewer people came to the rally than in October, and a high proportion of these left when it was announced that Chavez wouldn't show (The Moratorium uses these big names in a throughly contentless way). So this time the Moratorium was a spectator sport, and one whose novelty was wearing off.

3. <u>Other University of Chicago</u>. (A) We have had a "curriculum" program - leafleting two freshman gen. ed. courses with critiques of content. One leaflet unsophisticated, the other (Freud) pretty good. (Enclosed) The original idea was to work to form caucuses in the courses. This turns out to have been way premature. People thought we were too disrespectful toward the professors, etc. These reactions could be broken down in conversation but not otherwise. We have abandoned the "caucus" perspective until later. There is one section of one course where several of our members and contacts have been attending, mainly as auditors. So far the professor (member of one of last year's disciplinary committees and a former S.P. luminary- Maynard Krueger) has ordered two of us to stop attending class. We plan to leaflet on this. One highly successful by-product of the program was a speech by Naomi Weisstein on the status-quo content of Freudianism; this was attended by about 60 people, high by UC standards.

(B) Women and Child Care. The Child Care center issue, which was prominent last year, is smoldering this year. There is a fairly liberal women's group pushing it in a very unclear way. The old women's liberation group, Women's Radical Action Project (WRAP), is limping, hampered by diffusion - there are (a) new people, (B) "unpolitical" - actually very political - "sisterhood" people, (c) RYM II, (d) a couple of PL, (e) ourselves. Our participation is hampered by the fact that our women members are industrialized, we have one close contact who is able to attend, but only one. WRAP has adopted a semi-RYM II program, apparently after a fight with PL. Our women regard WRAP as an unviable proposition this year.

3. GE Strike. We have been to the picket lines from time to time - reception friendly, but no concrete role for us. The plant is Hotpoint, worker's are in Sheet-Metal Workers. There was a fairly significant black workers' insurgency here in 1968, but there seems to be no bitter memories. Nor, at the moment, is there a significant resentment against the union leadership. Our thoughts on support have centered on the idea of leafleting in working class areas - shopping centers or appliance stores. The leaflet would call for a boycott of GE goods as concrete support; it would focus on the importance of the working class seeing itself as a class. We hope to involve UC people in this part of the on-going program mentioned above.

4. Women's Liberation For some monthes this scene in Chicago has been confused. The core of the UC group, WRAP, consisted last year of women who are now in Weatherman; WRAP is on uncertain ground as mentioned above. Other groups were politically in flux. On the weekend of Nov. 1, an all Chicago women's conference was held in a suburb, with the intention of forming a Chicago Women's Liberation group. Our women participated, presenting a ten-page paper.

The conference has to be understood in the context of growing, and contradictory, political differentiation in the women's movement, at least in Chicago. In Chicago, since 1967 a fairly vital women's movement has grown up in conjunction with "the" movement. Two tendencies which existed elsewhere - the tendency to subordinate women's liberation to immediate program, as represented e.g. by PL, and the tendency toward a movement separate or at least autonomous from the general movement and concerned only with women's politics in particular, and conversely, most women who were prominent in the movement were heavily involved in women's liberation. Many felt, however, a tension between these commitments, questioned the possibility of working effectively for women's liberation while remaining active in integrated organizations, etc. Since the breakup of SDS and the absorption of a number of WRAP women into Weather men, the gravitational center which as it were held the whole thing together has been removed, and these tendencies have begun to appear. On the one hand, WM essentially represents the negation of women's liberation politics, as does PL; these groups were not present at the conference, though it was not clear whether they had been systematically excluded or

whether this simply represented their non-participation in women's liberation. On the other hand, present were:

Curselves; RYM II, about whom more in a moment; and a large contingent of "sisterhood" people. The theoretical leadership of this group argues that class analysis does not apply to women(two versions; simple, that Marx and other class analysts were men; sophisticated, that women's oppression does not flow from a position vis-a-vis production but from caste, etc.) and that a "new" mode of analysis, caste analysis, must be developed. Partly from the denial of the validity of class analysis, and partly from the argument that caste analysis has not been worked out so "we don't know", this group can deny the relevance of class to women's organizing, i.e., argue for classless - that is middle-class organizing. To the argument that class divisions will appear or have already appeared in the women's movement, it responds that "it may be" that the common bond of women's oppression will overcome this. This group generally indulges in contentless Marxist-baiting whenever points of this kind are raised - we are dogmatic, etc. On the other hand, this group argues that it is socialist and revolutionary; it argues that caste liberation will precede and make possible class war, though it is not clear if this means a literal separation into two stages or an argument about <u>political</u> primacy.

Our analysis was that the large bulk of not-very-political women fall in this group. The paper we prepared argued (a) for the existence of class divisions within the caste of women, and for their relation to the general class divisions in society; (b) for organizing working women, largely on the traditional grounds we use in arguing about the working class - concentration, collective consciousness, etc.; it was argued that offices and not production lines was the most profitable point of concentration; (c) for the relation between women's politics and general revolutionary socialist politics; (d) for the need for a conscious political leadership, i.e., a cadre organization of women with revolutionary socialist politics to give political leadership. At least one subsidiary matter should be mentioned : it seems incredible, but, apparently on the strength of a reference to men as the immediate agents of oppression, one L. S. woman who read this paper interpreted it as saying that "men were the enemy", not capitalism, as being "anti-men", and as calling for struggle against men and not against capitalism. On the contrary, the paper explicitly made the opposite of every one of these points. (My own opinion was that the discussion of class differences among women was weak; this is a matter we are discussing in the branch)

This paper was fairly well received in the conference, though there was a good deal of false liberalism (liberal falseness?) - people who you knew did not share your analysis at all would compliment you on the paper. Discussions with RYM II women revealed them to be in a halfway house between their women's politics and their RYM II politics. There was a contradiction between their recognition that black and Latin organizations are shitty on women, and their argument that the women's movement must be "under the leadership of black and brown women" who may have <u>less</u> developed politics on the women

question but perhaps more developed politics on imperialism. While recognizing the justice of Young Lords women forming a separate women's organization, they fudged on the question whether they would do the same thing as regards RYM , etc. Most important, it was never clear whether they were, as they sometimes seemed, trying to subordinate the women's movement to "anti-imperialism," their version.

It was clear however that there was tremendous political differentiation among the participants. Mainly because a large number did not want to face this fact, the question of the proposed women's organization was discussed before the question of its politics, and in fact the conference ended with no discussion of politics. Instead, an interim meeting of political "heavies" was scheduled, at which political differences were to be thrashed out. This resulted in the adoption of "principles of unity" of an extremely vague sort: "anti-imperialist", but it was impossible to define imperialism, because political differences began to come out. There was a verbal commitment to democracy in the principles, but because of the general nature of these principles, this has, this has little real significance. The second full meeting of the organization has yet to occur, but the feeling of our women is that the political schizophrena of the group will prevent it from functioning effectively. We will meet in a few days to consider how to relate to it in the future.

My apologies for the length of this item but I felt it was important to go into it at length because of (a)the intrinsic importance of the matter, (b) the misunderstanding of our position which at least one I.S. woman had.

Two notes on the women's conference: (a) WH and PL were not excluded; (b) apparently RYM II's mechanical anti-imperialism etc., they appear to have been more or less irrelevant to the discussion; our paper did not particularly win people but its discussion of women's politics/class politics was such that it did become the focus of questions, and of subsequent discussion.

5. Industrialization Program Since last time, more comrades have found jobs; we now have two men in a single shop, a factory which makes small metal parts for valves. Political prospects not clear yet. Backbreaking, shitty work.

6. Members and Contacts Our effective membership is still confined to the people working at UC, and the North Side comrades, mainly industrialized. The UC group has been cut down in effective size.

7. Other Organizations (A) "SDS" at our campus is PL/WSA. as I think I have mentioned. They have attracted a smallish number of non-hard WSA people on the strength of the SDS name. Their main program has been the "campus worker-student alliance". They pushed a petition for a free meal for cafeteria workers (they certainly start at a low level). That got plenty of signitures, of course. They then called a boycott of the

relevant cafeteria. In point of fact this wasn't a boycott, they blocked the doors and kept the people out by force. While disapproving almost totally of the methods of organization, etc., we regarded both the demand and the door-blocking as acceptable, hence the two of us who were present joined the line. The following day(God bless them) they reversed, and had a voluntary boycott - which of course was pretty unsuccessful, since they had blown much of their support. The status of this struggle is unclear; the university will suspend and perhaps expel participants; our position will probably be one of opposition to discipline, support for the demand, defence of the tactic in principle, an attack on the methods of building the struggle. I thought I'd mention this since the next issue of New Left Notes-Brazzaville will probably carry an article on how brilliant the whole thing is.

(B) Absoulutely everyone has climbed abord the GE strike bandwagon, with RYM II and"SDS" scheduling demonstrations. The Panthers have put out a city-wide leaflet, which I enclose - it's not at a politically high level, but it's good.

11/14/69

Long Beach Report

The major problem in the Long Beach branch is that it was formed by and only includes new members. Most of the twelve members have had some experience in movement organizing (in high school, SDS, and Peace and Freedom) but no one is familiar with the was IS conducts itself as an organization.

One of the most important arenas for us is Harbor General Hospital. We have one comrade working in the laundry room and have recruited another. They have started a Revolutionary Union caucus with two other workers and have begun puttting out a news letter called "Workers Power" (which is attached). The unit they work in is made up mainly of Black workers and CO's. There is a rival group calling itself Marxist--but they refuuse to work with us and are content with throwing around "revolutionary" slogans--they have also begun a paper. The union which is extremely burreaucratic is negotiating for its first contract, so most of our activity is to go around pressing for wider demands other than the union leadership asks for.

Because of our general lack of theory we hx use our general membership meetings for education purposes and discussing general persepctives, while conducting most of our activities through our labor and campus fractions. We have beguna weekly picket line supporting the GE boycott with the hopes of eventually organizing a Long Beach strike support committee that could relate to more than this particular strike and would raise issues the union leadership won't raise. We are in the process of forming a Women's caucus which will be of tremendous value for working within the Women's Liberation Movement. One ISer was in the WLF leadership before joing IS. We are the largest radical tendency in Long B Peach (there is one CPer with two syympathizers, no Plers, and 4 RYMites who have virtually no influence). We have organizied a book store which is in the process of moving, but which is the only radical bookstore in Long Beach. We are working at Long Beach State College and hopefully at ;Long Beach City College. (Long Beach is a city of around 350, 000; the home of very large McDonald-Douglass Aircraft--over 15, 000 workers in the UAW, a large oil town and a major Pacidic Port). We are hoping our new bookstore will be able to ;contain a coffee house for GI's because there are many sailors aroun d Long Beach. They have therr own group called Movement for a Democratic ;Military which has an excellent program (written up by Jack Weinberg in the LA Free Press). We have also been attending educational meetinggs of the LA IS.

Gene L.

Copy of the text of Harbor Hospital leaflet, at the top there are two clasped hands.

WORKERS POWER

This paper is published bb y a workers committee at Harbor Hospital as a communications media among workers. This paper will carry various views on current topics. We feel this media paper is vital to all workers who want fundamental and revolutionary change. We believe such change is necessary for us to gain control over our lives.

We workers do not have control over our lives. It is we who bear the burden of taxes, war, and poverty; yet we have no control over America's political, military, and economic institutions. Corporations choose the men we vote for, generals choose the wars we die in, and corporation profiteers determine our wages and prices by monopoly despite our needs. This privileged few, this ruling class, denies us our human dignity, our freedom and democracy, and our pursuit of hhappiness. We will tolerate this no longer!

Only by workers taking collective actinn can we gain control of our lives. This collective action means control at work through bargaining andstrikes with or without the union. The union is only meaningful when it serves the workers. A meaningful union is for workers power. And workers power means collective action.

"Workers' Power" is for all workers. We are forming a Revolutionary Union Caucus. With your support we will be your voice for reaching other workers who wish to understand the revolutionary socio-political changes taking place. But to understand fully we must ACT. This paper will give examples of how people have struggled. All articles and political thoughts will be considered and printed as long as we have the money and resources to print.

We feel the need for an indpendent paper not run by slow moving union"leaders", not silenced by unelecged administrators, nor limited by revolutionary phrase mongers.

We will not be part of the silent majority. We want what is rightfully ou s. We're standing to speak for ourselves. We are revolutionary working people uniting to ;take control of our lives.

This MEANS A NEW AMERICA, A WORKING PEOPLES" AMERICA

If you are interested in or have questins about the Revolutinary Union Caucus now form ing, please call 1 632-8213 after 7 pm.

REMEMBER LAST YEAR?

Last year, around June, local 434 was getting organized. The County union was at the time trying to negotiate a contact with the County supervisors. The union ;wanted the bbase rate of $385 raised, but the suupervisors refused. Here at Habor General, the union sentiment was running high, and, in protest to the supervisors' refusal, the laundry workers had a 95% effective walkout for one day. The day after the wildcat action the Supervisors raised the base rate to $417.

The union, of course, claimed the credit for their bbargaining effort. The union claimed it had successfully negotiated a $32 xx raise for all employees, but that was a fasle claim. Only the base rate went up $32,; the rest of us got only a $xxx $22 raise which was barely enough to recover what inflation (rising prices) had eaten away. In effect, the $22 raise was no raise at all!

There was also much enthusiasm by many union officials for the one day wildcat walkout. But when the shit started coming down in the form of petty punitive measures and general harrassment, the union was very fast to disclaim any association with the xxx walkout. That's the very same walkout that got the $32 raise in the first xxx place. !

The union was very quick to remind everyone that it was merely following the letter of the law, the one whichh forbids County employees to strike or walkout or do anything else that might force the County to start providing decent incomes for us workers. And when the County laid down a ~~dx~~ new rule requiring the firing of anyone who participates in any ~~xx~~ wildcat action, the union "leaders" are nowhere around.

It's time for the union to start taking some real action to insure worker's a fair income. The union should (although it is not now even included in its list of proposals) demand that the County recognize our inherent right to strike, which is the only real power working people have. Otherwise, we're only going to be ignored ~~x~~ and abused by the County.

I've proven my loyalty and committment to the union cause. Now it's time for the uunion to prove itself to me!

UNIONS HAPPENING

Everywhere unions are struggling on behalf of their members. Recently, the IUE and UE united in a massive struggle against one of America 's giants, General Electric. For the last 20 years, GE has ignored the righteouus demands of its 150,000 workers. Well, all 150,000 are now on strike. The type of contract they receive will determine the types of contracts workers throu hout America, including us, will receive. Please--boycott all GE products, including Hotpoint.

I hope no one is purchasing grapes. Caesar Chavez and ~~xx~~ and the United Farm Workers are carryyng on a historic struggle agains t giant corporate grape growers, including the worst offender of all--Safeway. Another product that should be boycotted is the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner whose workers have bbeen on strike for two years now. Please don't buy it, it's a shitty ruling class paper anyhow.

We must remember that all workers are natural borothers and sisters, and that they fight the same struggle as we do. We must support all strikes and boycottts is we expect the same support in the future. UNITE AND FIGHT!

Support the GE Strikers

BOYCOTT GE

GENERAL ELECTRIC WORKERS AT PLANTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN OUT ON STRIKE SINCE OCT. 27 in what promises to be a long and bitter struggle for modest demands. In Chicago alone, 10 people were arrested on the first day. The workers are fighting the 4th largest corporation in the US and they need the support of other working people. It's no accident that they have received very little publicity. It's no accident that the government threatens to get an injunction if the strike goes on too long and hurts the war effort - in a war that no one wants. When push comes to shove, the only allies working people have are other working people. One of the best ways to aid the strike is to boycott GE. This can be especially effective at Christmastime. Public support also warns the government not to intervene and makes the press take note of what's going on. Please support the GE workers by refusing to buy GE or Hotpoint products.

Why the GE Strike Matters

The newspapers have called the GE strike "the most important strike in 20 years." For once the papers are telling the truth. The strike is important because:

- The electrical industry has never really been unionized. GE owns so many companies that its workers are in 13 different unions. No single union has ever been able to hurt GE. GE wants things to stay that way. It wants to defeat this strike so the 13 unions will go back to fighting each other instead of GE. And the strike has to be won so that electrical workers can fight in unity.

- Industry is scared because 1970 is a year of big contracts in the major industries. The government and business are eager to fight inflation - caused by huge war expenditures - by enforcing "wage guidelines" - in other words, to protect profits by keeping wages down. This first strike against a giant company will set a pattern for the whole year. If GE wins, other companies will be encouraged to hold the line. If the workers win, workers in other industries all across the country will be encouraged to fight hard. THE GE STRIKE IS CRUCIAL FOR ALL WORKING PEOPLE.

Society in Crisis

America is in a new period of crisis and as in all such periods, business and government try to make working people pay the price. The government has spent over $100 billion trying to hang on to Vietnam. Schools are overcrowded, pollution is poisoning the air, there is too little housing. It won't be any different if the war ends - military officials have said the military budget won't be reduced if the war ends - we will still have to pay military contractors $80 billion a year. Inflation will keep biting into paychecks. Taxes on working people will be increased to pay for things which corporations like GE produced - like air and water pollution.

Business and government offer a solution. They say the only way to stop inflation is to keep wages down - "cool off the economy" - create more unemployment - postpone spending for schools or public transit. All the problems will get worse. Profits, of course, will keep going up as they have each year since 1965. A DIFFERENT SOLUTION WOULD BE TO CUT MILITARY SPENDING - but the big corporations and the military won't accept that. GE (for example) owns plants in 23 foreign countries. It depends on the military to keep those countries "stable." "Stability" means that GE takes profits out of those countries and that workers there - as in the US - have to be kept under control. The "solution" business and government have for the crisis in America is a solution in the interests of business, not working people.

A Different Solution

The GE strike shows how working people are forced to fight, to keep their conditions from getting worse. BUT EVEN WINNING THIS STRIKE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. Even when the GE unions unite, workers in each industry still fight separate battles against separate companies.

BUT WORKING PEOPLE FORM A CLASS - the workers in all the different companies have essentially the same interests. But just as GE tries to keep its workers divided into 13 unions, government and business try to keep the whole working class divided.

RACE IS ONE WAY. Black people demand construction jobs. The white worker thinks, "Ok, **but** construction is slowing down - what about my job?" That's exactly what business and government want him to think! It lets them off the hook. Instead of opposing black demands, white people should support them - AND demand that the government step up construction to provide enough jobs for everyone, white and black - paid for from corporate profits.

MEN AND WOMEN are also divided. Women workers are paid less, get worse jobs. Most men think women should stay at home and take care of the children. But this makes women little better than slaves. The point is, the economy needs some jobs to pay lower wages - so they are divided up by sex, and profits stay high. The economy needs children to be born and brought up, but business doesn't want to pay for it - so women slave away at home without pay. Instead of accepting this, women and men should demand CHILD CARE CENTERS, controlled by the clients themselves, and paid for out of corporate profits.

IMPERIALISM. Patriotism is good but the government uses it to fool people. The government says we should stay in Vietnam because it would hurt "American prestige" to get out. BUT THEY SHOULDN'T HAVE GOTTEN US INTO VIETNAM IN THE FIRST PLACE. The US government isn't protecting the Vietnamese when it has killed 2 million of them since 1961. The Vietnamese are fighting for the same things US workers need - the farmer is fighting to own his own land, the worker for a decent wage (strikes are illegal in Vietnam). They are also struggling against foreign control - first France, now the US, rules Vietnam through hand-picked dictators. Only a small group of generals and landlords actively supports the presence of the US. A US victory would be a crushing setback for the Vietnamese people. We do not support the NLF leadership. We think the NLF will betray the Vietnamese workers - it will use the workers to gain power, then set up a dictatorship. We should support the workers then. But we should also support them now, when they are fighting to get the US out. That means demanding IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES FROM VIETNAM. NO "AID" TO SAIGON DICTATORS! HANDS OFF VIETNAM!

Working people can only defend themselves if they unite as a class. But more than that in the long run, working people can organize society on a new basis, that of Socialism: control of society by working people and in the interests of all, not of private profit. That's a long way ahead. But the way to start is for working people to see all workers' struggles - black and white, women and men, blue collar and white collar - as their struggle. Boycotting GE is one way to begin.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS (I.S.) - Chicago chapter

Contact: I.S., 1212 E. 59th St. 60637

TOWARD A WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT

Already, more and more workers are moving into opposition to the war. It is not only their direct participation in those activities already held, but also on the shop floor, by petitions or merely through discussions that working class anti-war feelings are growing. The working people make society go, and can also make it stop. As anti-war sentiment grows in the working class, the idea of a NATIONAL WORK STOPPAGE readily presents itself. Where the moratorium failed, one million workers could succeed, completely bringing this country to a halt, and in the process beginning a movement that could end the war.

Before the national work stoppage becomes a real possibility, anti-war sentiment is going to have to be greatly increased among working people. To do this, however, the MOVEMENT MUST BECOME MULTI-ISSUED, for workers react to the war on the basis of its direct effects on their living conditions: inflation, taxes, speed-up, and unemployment. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that these grievances will be met with an end to the war unless the movement struggles over them now. Nixon has continuously emphasized that many defense programs are awaiting the money currently allocated for the war. Thus the anti-war movement, if it is to appeal to and hope to build anti-war sentiment among working people, should push for the redress of these grievances too, SUPPORTING THOSE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLES THAT DEVELOP, such as the G.E. Strike and the N.Y. Telephone Wildcat. The following are some of the demands the IS believes the anti-war movement should raise if it is to move in that direction.

DEMANDS

NO MORE IMPERIALIST WARS; withdraw from all foreign countries, end the draft. PRODUCTION FOR NEED, NOT PROFIT; end the $40 billion/yr inflationary arms production, and convert to social and consumer goods. GUARANTEED FULL EMPLOYMENT; reconstruction of the cities and expansion of public services. UNIVERSAL, FREE HIGHER EDUCATION; end the upper and middle class monopoly. FULL EQUALITY FOR WOMEN; end discriminatory hiring and public school tracking, equal pay for equal work, repeal all abortion laws and a full day-care program. NO MORE WAR TAXES; end taxation of working people, tax corporations, banks and the rich. NO WAGE CONTROLS OR GOVERNMENT STRIKEBREAKING; stop subsidies to grape growers. FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION for all minorities, right of local communities to control their schools. FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, including GIs. BUILD A POLITICAL PARTY OF THE WORKING PEOPLE that will fight for and carry out these programs.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS
874 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y. 10003

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During the course of Nixon's speech on Nov. 3rd, he clearly reiterated his previous position that he will ignore the views and will of the American people in order to achieve "his" ends in Vietnam. He also stated that "North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that." Though we tend to disagree with this statement, the import of the speech is clear. In order to withdraw all the troops from Vietnam, the movement will either have to force his administration to do it, or in the long run replace it with one that will. This is no easy task.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ALTERNATIVE

Already, part of the movement, through the Moratorium Committees, has been looking to politicians in power as their way to end the war. Prominent speakers at many of the moratorium rallies have been the McCarthys, Kennedys, and even the Harrimans. Yet it is precisely these people, in a liberal Democratic Party administration, who were the architects of this war, its major advisors and congressional promotors. TO LOOK TO THESE PEOPLE NOW WOULD BE A DISASTER. Their objections to this war are not the result of a change in politics, nor do they repudiate any of the decisions which led us into the war. They object only to its messiness, and favor instead sophisticated counterinsurgency methods. They recognize that the extravegance of this war, both in economic terms and the enormous loss of lives, coupled with mass discontent at home, no longer serves the corporate interests they represent. They fear the growth of an uncontrolled anti-war movement and seek to keep that movement within safe channels - inside the Democratic Party. Once there, the movement's power will be nullified, freeing the politicians to continue their various imperialist ventures abroad.

INDEPENDENCE NOT ENOUGH

An independent movement, as exemplified by the mass marches and rallies, is not enough. The mobilizations served a significant function, propagandizing and building the movement. Yet now, when massive numbers of the population have moved into opposition to the war, that function becomes diminished. The main problem facing the movement now is to take these people and turn them into a militant force. It is mainly on this question that the New Mobilization has nothing to say. ITS ONLY PROGRAM IS MASS MARCHES, AND THESE ARE NO LONGER ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN A MOVEMENT.

It is precisely the composition of the most active segment of the anti-war movement which makes the problem of direction so acute. Composed mostly of middle class people, students, and professionals, the movement lacks the social weight and cohesiveness necessary to become a significant and powerful force by itself. In the past it has vascillated between left-wing adventurism and Democratic Party liberalism. Even the moratorium, calling for a work stoppage, and appealing to the same base, was unable to interrupt the functioning of society, and hence of the war effort. The only solution then is to move beyond this base, that is, towards the working class.

I. S. leaflet distributed at Washington Moratorium, Nov. 15.
Written by Gay S. and Bill P.

WAR AND WORKING PEOPLE

On November 3, after much secrecy about a new foreign policy, President Nixon finally addressed the American people. But despite all of his talk about a secret time table for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, his message was the same as Johnson's: the war in Vietnam shall continue.

As we keep pouring billions of dollars into an unending, unpopular war abroad, we are faced with inflation and urban decay at home. The burdon of this falls most heavily on working people through the death of their sons, higher taxes, speedups, unemployment, an actual decrease in real wages over the past few years, deterioration of our cities, insufficient housing, schools, hospitals and transportational facilities. Inflation runs rampant due to the huge arms budget (30 billion for Vietnam alone), Funds will continue to be funneled into arms and other war-related industries at the expense of working conditions, real wages and urgently needed services.

The war must be ended and it must be ended now. Yet the only alternative the "system" offers to the Nixon-Johnson war policy are the liberal politicians who, now that the majority of the people oppose the war, have adopted an anti-war position in order to make themselves popular. If any of these politicians honestly favor ending the war it is because they feel it cannot be won and has become more trouble than it is worth. Their primary concerns are the interests of big business. They see the anti-war movement as a tool to serve their political careers and to force certain minor changes in the system.

If we are to end the war we must realize that the politicians are neither willing nor able to end the war now, prevent future wars like it and change the foreign policy that caused it. American corporations each year gain tens of billions of dollars in profits from the underdeveloped countries. "Foreign aid" - paid for in taxes by American workers - maintain in power governments which cooperate in the exploitation of their work-force and resources. As in Vietnam, America's "friends" are dictators and tiny rich groups at the top of societies in Latin America, Asia and Africa. American corporations take advantage of low living standards and cheap labor abroad, to get higher profits than they make from their own, better organized working class. Both Democratic and Republican politicians represent a system which is incapable of adopting a democratic, anti-imperialist foreign policy. The liberal democrats would do no better if they were in power.

We must also remember that when millions of people protested the war on Oct. 15th, Nixon did nothing. But if millions of workers all over the country protested by calling a NATIONAL WORK STOPPAGE, it would be the beginning of a movement that could end the war. Workers have always seen the need to fight around poor working conditions and inadequate wages as, for example, the G.E. Strike or the N.Y. Telephone Wildcat. But bad conditions such as forced overtime, speed-ups on the line, the tax surcharge and the reduction in real wages are only increased and in some cases initiated by the war. Organizing a NATIONAL WORK STOPPAGE, then, is an excellent way to bring together the growing number of militant rank and file actions within the labor force, and to unite these actions with the anti-war movement. But more than that, or-

ganizing is a necessity not only to end the war, but additionally, to be able to fight ever increasing economic burdens being placed on working people - because these struggles are one and the same.

We feel that it is a good thing that trade unions and groups like the Alliance for Labor Action are helping to bring working people to Washington. But it must be remembered that these same union leaders have consistently failed to protect our living standards and, more often than not ignored our working conditions. This is not surprising if one looks at the ties between the Democratic Party and the union bureaucrats. It was the Democratic Party that got us involved in the war in the first place and which on the local level does not hesitate to send in the cops to protect scabs as they are doing for G.E. now. And, just as the union leaders have repeatedly sold out the workers, so will the Democratic Party again sell out the anti-war movement.

Dependence on a party we do not control has undermined militancy and self-reliance. A new party must be built, to represent black and white workers and all the poor and oppressed in this country. Such a party will have for its goal a democratically-controlled society which does not need to oppress foreign peoples and intangle itself in imperialist wars.

Given the crisis facing the country internally (both working conditions and the urban crisis) it is clear that only a social group with the enormous potential power of the working class can force an immediate end to the Vietnam war. Similar mass working class actions can force other needed changes. If the movement is to grow, its concerns and demands must be broadened. The demands should include:

NO MORE IMPERIALIST WARS - Immediate withdrawal from Vietnam and all other foreign countries - An end to all military and foreign aid to corrupt and reactionary puppets - An end to the draft and the abolition of the standing army.

PRODUCTION FOR PEOPLE'S NEEDS, not waste production and war profits- end the more than $40 billion annual production of inflationary arms-waste products, turn arms production into production of needed social andconsumer goods.

GUARANTEED FULL EMPLOYMENT through production for need, reconstruction of the cities and expansion of needed public services such as housing, schools, transportation, hospitals, etc.

UNIVERSAL, FREE HIGHER EDUCATION - end the upper and middle class monopoly on higher education and the militarization of our universities by making higher education a universal right.

FULL EQUALITY FOR WOMEN - end the discriminatory hiring of women and high school tracking of women into service roles, equal pay for equal work, repeal of all abortion laws, and full day-care programs.

NO MORE WAR TAXES - end taxes on the working people - no taxes on income under $15,000 - abolish sales taxes - tax the rich, the corporations and banks to pay for needed programs and services.

NO MORE WAGE CONTROLS OR UNEMPLOYMENT as a means of fighting inflation caused by the war and arms budget.

NO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO GRAPE GROWERS - not one penny for strike breaking.

---cont.

3 Gay S. and Bill P.
Washington Nov. 15 leaflet

FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, American Indians - for community control of the schools and open admissions.

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE ARMY AND SOCIETY AT LARGE

BUILD A POLITICAL PARTY OF THE WORKING PEOPLE that will fight for and carry out these programs - the working and poor people can never win these programs or even protect their interests through the Democratic or Republican Parites and their politicians, liberal or conservative.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS is committed to the building of a movement for workers' control of industry and the state, a socialist democracy opposed to capitalist and bureaucratic collectivist ("Communist") class rule and exploitation.

MADISON LEAFLET

GENERAL ELECTRIC WORKERS ON STRIKE!
BOYCOTT GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTS!

WHY A BOYCOTT?

A nationwide boycott of General Electric products has been called for by the A.F.L. - C.I.O. The purpose of this boycott is to aid the G.E. workers in their present strike. We urge everyone tosupport this call by not buying products manufactured by General Electric.

WHAT DO THE G.E. WORKERS WANT?

For over seven weeks, 150,000 workers in 13 unions have been striking against the General Electric Corporation. The workers are united in demanding a pay raise, skill differentials, better grievance procedures, more union security, and most important of all, a cost of living escalator clause.

WHY ARE PAYCHECKS BUYING LESS?

As a result of the war in Vietnam, workers' real wages have not kept up with continued inflation. Since 1965, the average real wage of workers has declined. It is estimated that, during the 1966 contract, the average electrical worker suffered an inflationary real wage cut of 27½¢ per hour. Meanwhile G.E.'s profits rose 14.8% from 1966-68 and an astounding 11% during the third quarter of 1969. G.E. can easily afford to pay the wage demands of the G.E. workers. However with wholehearted backing by big business and the government, and under the pretense of combatting inflation, this corporation, the 4th largest in the U.S., has turned the G.E. struggle into a test case for keeping the workers' wages down while allowing corporate profits to rise. In fact, it is the vast expenditures on arms production and the war in Vietnam, not workers' wage demands, which drive up prices. G.E., profiting from its many war contracts, contributes heavily to this inflation.

WHY IS THEIR STRUGGLE OUR STRUGGLE?

The G.E. workers are faced with a long struggle to assert workers' needs over corporate profits. G.E. management refused to enter into fair negotiations. Their first contract offer has fundamentally remained unchanged. This tactic is one more way that management tries to break union struggles. At present, the workers are receiving strike benefits of $12 per week. Every week is crucial to the workers at G.E. and to their families. The outcome of the strike is important to labor throughout the entire country for if the strikers are defeated it will be used as a precedent to prevent workers' wage demands from keeping up with the rising cost of living. We can help in labor's struggle by supporting the call for a boycott of all G.E. products.

COME TO THE AFL-CIO RALLY ON THE G.E. STRIKE! - THURSDAY, DEC. 18 - 7:30 pm. Madison Labor Temple - 1602 South Park Street

SUPPORT YOUR FELLOW WORKERS - BOYCOTT G.E. PRODUCTS
Student Labor Committee - 251-0942

Leaflet to build GE demonstration -- NY IS

STUDENTS, ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT: SUPPORT B.E. STRIKERS

The recent, massive mobilization in Washington was again an affirmation that the majority of Americans are opposed to the continuation of the war in Vietnam in any way. But even as the size of anti-war sentiment steadily increases, the war continues. In the past, activist sections of the movement have vacillated between Democratic Party liberalism and futile, terrorist adventures, neither of which have made a dent in the ever growing war machine. Mass Marches for immediate withdrawal, having been seen as an end in themselves, not the prerequisite for effective action, have also failed. It is precisely for this reason, the size of anti-war sentiment and the failure of its organized expressions, that the anti-war movement must begin to develop a strategy for becoming a militant force capable of ending the war.

Part of the explanation for the recent phenomenal growth of anti-war sentiment is that millions of Americans are beginning to recognize that the war is responsible for an inflationary spiral which is increasingly eroding the real wages of working people. Our society is decaying; while atrocities are committed in Vietnam, we are unable to provide adquate schools, housing, transportation, medical care or full employment at home. Grants for graduate schools are drying up, a meaningful open admissions program cannot be funded, yet the government continues to subsidize the arms industry with cost-plus contracts.

But as our society continues to reach a crisis and inflation continues to rise, forces are being let loose which have the potential to effect real social change. Working people, the most powerful sector of an industrial society, due to their ability to bring that society to a halt, are beginning to move against the economic consequences of the war. The new rise in workers' militancy, as evidenced by the G.E. strike and the N.Y. telephone wildcat, is a result of a decline in real wages directly atttributable to war inflation and war taxes.

Where a Moratorium conducted largely by middle class people failed, a million workers could succeed: interrupting the functioning of society and in the process beginning a movement capable of ending the war and the policies behind it.

Clearly our movement must begin to act in ways which can help to raise the present struggles of workers against the effects of the war to a struggle against the war itself. Support for the G.E. strikers, who are presently battling one of the country's largest corporations, is one way.

We must support not only the demands of the G.E. strikers (Equal Pay for Women, Higher Wages, Better Working Conditions) but we must also demand a real solution to inflation and the conversion of the arms industry to production for social needs. In addition, we must support the boycott of G.E. goods proposed by George Meany, but demand that this boycott be carried through to an extent which Meany and the union bureaucracies in general, because of their ties to the government will be against: a boycott of G.E. by its largest customer, the U.S. government. G.E. is the second largest military contractor; its share last year was $1,620,000,000.

Demands such as these will link the anti-war movement and the new wave of workers' activity, and provide the only course capable of ending the war and changing social priorities. They point to a social system where production will be carried out for social needs. The only such system is socialism: the direct control of production and distribution by working people themselves.

END THE ARMS ECONOMY!!
FULL BOYCOTT OF GE - NO MORE GOVT. PURCHASES FROM GE

NOVEMBER 15th AND AFTER

leaflet - Boston I.S.

On November 15, hundreds of thousands of people will be in Washington, demanding the IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL of all American troops from Vietnam. Many of them will be students who have played the most active role in opposition to the war. But

STUDENTS ARE NOT ENOUGH

For it is those who have to work for a living who are the overwhelming majority of the people. They produce the wealth of this country. They build the factories and the schools. They build the roads. They produce the goodsthe goods and provide the services.

They also build ships and planes for the war. They load cargoes which are shipped to Vietnam. They make supplies which keep the war going. They pay taxes. They send their sons. Only those with investments abroad and war profits at home benefit from this war and

ONLY THE MASS ACTIVE OPPOSITION OF WORKERS CAN STOP THE WAR IN ITS TRACKS

In face of conditions which have worsened because of the war - rising taxes, inflation, and cuts in public services - working people have already fought back as never before: through strikes (like the one against GE), ghetto rebellions, welfare protests, community organization (like the one for rent control in Cambridge), etc. But even if the war were to stop tomorrow the struggle against those business and financial interests which started it will continue. It will be a struggle against the unemployment, poverty, racism and effects of a permanent war economy which are necessary to keep those same interests in power. So now it's time to struggle against the CAUSES, not only the effects.

Wear a black arm band on Nov. 15 to show your support for the Washington march and IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. No doubt, some excuse will be given to keep the war going. So the fight must go on AFTER Nov. 15. Speak to the people you work with about the war and talk about how YOU can organize to stop it now!!

* * * * * * * *

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS stand for socialism: collective ownership and democratic control of the economy through workers' organizations established by a revolution from below.

Berkeley IS Women's Caucus Leaflet

What Do Women Really Want?

Last Thursday about 80 women went to Harmon Gym to enroll in the karate class there. They were told that they could not enroll. They started to chant, soon the campus cops were there and threateded to arrest the women on trespass charges. Eventually, the women left. The Chairman of the P.E. Department was out of town.

On Friday the women met outside the classroom where the karate class was meeting and demanded to be let in. The campus cops were there and again threatened arrest. When the men students came out of the class, the women chanted "scab students". The women with some men supporters then marched to the Chancellor's office where they met with 2 vice chancellors and presented them with 13 demands. The vice chancellors will meet with them again on Tuesday, Jan. 13.

This is not an isolated incident, but typical. Women cannot take many other courses in the P.E. department which are offered to men, e.g. fencing, squash, and handball. Women are expected to take only those P.E. courses which are consistent with traditional ideas of feminity, that is those courses that de-emphasize physical strength and muscle development. As a result women who do develpp their muscular potential are considered abnormal. The vast majority of women being physically weak are vulnerable and dependent. They are prone to all forms of physical attack and therefore require the protective presence of a man.

Of particular importance are the emotional overtones of rape as well as the possible physical damage. Many women feel that some knowledge of self-defense such as can be given by a course in karate is necessary to combat this danger. This may not be all the answers for women, but women have the right to take the course and find out. As it is, there are about 6-7 raper per week on the campus. Most of these attacks are on female workers and they occur at times when students are not around such as late at night and during quarter breaks. The working women on campus should alos be allowed to take a class in self-defence on University time which would aid in their self-defience.

Women's physical dependence results in an absure inability to perform many daily tasks such as fixing household items or knowing what to do when a car breaks down. So, men are forced into playing roles (like opening car doors) which assume all women are very dependent.

At an institutional level discriminationa against women is masked by "protective" laws in California. Some of these laws have a humane basis and should be extended to cover men, such as the right to a coffee or lunch break every two hours. Other laws discriminate against women such as the law requiring separate bathroom facilities. (in this case, the employer only hires men). Other laws such as the laws

restricting the amount of weight a woman can lift should be based on individual ability rather than sex. The University participates in sexual discrimination on levels other than courses. Women want open admission to the University on both undergraduate and graduate levels. We want an end to discrimination in hiring and more women faculty.

As a result of exaggeration of physical dependence, women become psychologically as well as physically dependent and lack self-confidence. Physical dependence lies not only in lack of physical strength but also in our biological functioning.

For true liberation, women must have free access to birth control methods and information, free and legal abortions on demand and child care facilities. Child care centers must be open 24 hours a day for seven days a week in order to accommodate all workers. They must be professionally supervised, client controlled and employer financed.

I.S. Women's Caucus Berkeley Campus International Socialists

OPEN LETTER TO THE TENANTS UNION

At tonight's meeting we are deciding whether to initiate a mass rent strike in Berkeley. Only a small portion of the renters in Berkeley are represented here and we clearly do not presently have the forces to change the entire real estate structure in the city. But rarely do organizing strikes begin with all or even most of the potential strikers involved. The strike itself is an organizing tool to win support and new strikers. The most important question we face tonight is what strategy we use in carrying on this strike to mobilize the thousands of Berkeley renters not present at this meeting and to win the support of the thousands of individuals and families who own their own homes.

THE LEGAL STRATEGY AND THE STRIKE

The legal strategy outlined here tonight is one good tactic but we must not rely on it if we wish the strike as a whole to make some significant change in the position of Berkeley renters.

1) All the complicated legal procedures involved will be burried in the courts and it will be difficult if not impossible to focus community interest or mobilize support around invisible and intricate legal acts.

2) Despite the Legal strategy there will be some landlords who will slip through the complicated plans presented here tonight and will face evictions within the next couple of months. If we have no strategy to protect them and do not even make a serious attempt to defend them in some other ways we will only succeed in demoralizing potential strikers. The theory that when renters see somebody else being evicted it will make the renters more militant is simply wrong. In fact the reverse is true. Most renters know how rotten the situation is. The reason they have not acted up to this point is from a feeling of powerlessness. The very conception of the BTU is to show renters that through collective action they can protect themselves and accomplish changes. If we do not prepare to protect tenants in ways other than depending on the courts we will only succeed in reinforcing the powerlessness that people already feel.

3) Some of the toughest landlords will see the cases all the way through the courts and their tenants will then face eviction. We must begin now with collective action to prepare to protect these tenants from eviction.

4) We must not count on courts handling our cases by normal procedures. In mass political situations the courts have been known to alter procedures and to make even flagrant political rulings. We must not underestimate either the landlords' lawyers or the political power of the landlords and therefore the possibility of the courts finding some procedure to torpedo our legal strategy. In general the courts are on the side of the landlords, not radical movements.

5) Winning mass political support for the rent strike can enhance [illegible]ly our chances in the courts. To the extent that we can win mass political support, we will undercut the ability of the courts to act flagrantly against us. To the extent that a landlord knows that his troubles with his tenant will not be over even after a court grants an eviction order, the landlord will be more likely to settle in the early stages while his case is in court.

6) Finally, the legal strategy is based primarily on tenants who are "uncollectables" and therefore, against whom a large court damage judgements are no real threat. We must develop other strategies to appeal to the working class black and white tenants

of Berkeley who are just as much screwed by the landlords but who can be very seriously hurt by large court damages.

TO BUILD MASS POLITICAL SUPPORT

Building a mass movement has many different aspects. We are not proposing tactics of small terrorist groups. On the contrary, Every aspect of a political campaign must be oriented toward winning mass active support so that there will be thousands of people in the streets willing to take militant action IF NECESSARY to defend the rights of tenants. And further we must win over the bulk of the Berkeley Community to at least passive support for our movement.

At the beginning such a campaign will entail a large variety of actions designed to publicize the rent strike and explain the issues to the Community. We here present only a few possibilities for such actions. We hope that these will stimulate numerous other ideas. But again, the main aim is to build the massive community support we need to successfully defend tenants in the streets a s well as in the courts and make the strike as a whole successful.

A) Most important, every tenants building group jointly with the BTU, must take on the responsibility to completely organize their own building. Through canvassing of their immediate neighborhoods and some of the tactics proposed below they could attempt to get the commitment of residents of the surrounding area to help defend against evictions. Every tenants group should begin now discussing and preparing means of defending the building against evictions or at least making evictions as difficult as possible, including such techniques as mass sit-ins, barricades, etc.

B) Hold regular open houses to which the Press and community are invited with placards around the building pointing out gross building code violations, rent, the history of the landlord, etc.

C) Tenants collectives should regularly picket their landlords' homes, hold sit-ins in his offices, etc.

D) Tenants might publicly (i.e. with press invited) take all rats and roaches or garbage on the premises and deposit them on the landlords' property.

E) The BTU might launch a campaign on the city council to insist that they tour various striking properties to see how bad the conditions are.

F) The BTU should issue its own regular publicity throughout Berkeley and not rely on the establishment mass media.

TOWARD WELL-ORGANIZED COLLECTIVES

Ultimately our ability to mobilize mass political support and win this strike will depend on the organization and initiative of the tenant building groups. We must not allow ourselves to sit back and wait while the strike is in the courts or we will only succeed in dissapating our movement so that we can not act when it is necessary. We urge all tenants to devote their energies toward organizing in their buildings and in the surrounding communities. We have the possibility not only of making Berkeley a better place to live for renters but also of developing a movement which can go beyond the question of rents to take on other issues and replace capitalism with a socialist system which can provede the freest development for every individual.

International Socialists P.O. Box 910 Berkeley, Ca. 94701

RESOLUTION ON THE GE STRIKE SUBMITTED TO SDS REGIONAL

SUBMITTED BY JACK GERSON
INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS

The GE strike presents the opportunity for the radical movement still largely campus oriented, to demonstrate its workingclass perspective in more than rhetoric. The strike is a test case for the Nixon Administration's policy of halting inflation by a direct assault on wages (through maintaining profits). If management succeeds, a precedent will be set for upcoming confrontations in auto, construction, and railroads.

Our orientation must be two-fold. First, we must raise support for the G.E. workers in the anti-war movement as a whole, making it clear that Vietnam and future Vietnams will only be stopped by ditching the war economy, and that the only force capable of doing this is the working class. The arms economy, with its guaranteed cost-plus contracts for the giant defense corporations, is the motor force behind the inflation. The assault on wages and working conditions necessary to maintain corporate profits in the stagnating economy have brought workers militancy to the fore. We must relate this to the anti-war movement as a whole, stressing the need to link the war with the inflation and the new strike wave. A large section of the anti-war movement has come to see that it has no strategy for ending the war; that neither mass marches nor Weatherman tactics can bring an end to the war. That movement, and especially the section of it on campuses, is going to be open to the fact that only by relating the war to the present struggles of workers will the anti-war movement have any strength The GE strike should be the vehicle for drawing these links.

As radicals, our orientation to the strikers themselves must begin with support for their immediate demands, but most go beyond this to raising demands which will direct workers' consciousness towards the root of the problem: the capitalist system itself. One way of doing this is by exposing the class collaborationist role of the union bureaucrats. George Meany, under pressure from the strikers, has called for a boycott of GE products. We must insist that GE's largest customer be forced to comply in order for the boycott to be really effective. GE's largest customer is the U.S. government (purchasing more than 20% of total sales). When the GE strikers press for a government boycott, Meany and friends will be hard pressed to maintain their two-faced position.

We must also demand the scrapping of the arms economy and its re-conversion into a system that produces for social needs and provides productive jobs for all. The arms economy, as already noted, is behind the inflation (an indirect attack on wages) as well as the direct attack on wages causing the GE strike. The end of the arms economy coupled with production for social necessities would mean a redirection of priorities inimical to capitalism. By raising this demand, we will help the strikers expand their consciousness from GE to the entire social system.

This orientation will enable the radical movement to develop into a consciously pro-working class movement, in practice as well as on paper, and will provide links necessary for the building of a socialist movement led by the working class, aimed at workers' control of the entire productive and distributive apparatus. Workers won't be convinced by moralistic abstractions about the need to fight imperialism and combat racism; these slogans will only become real when injected in the course of workers' struggles. White workers, for example, should support preferential demands of black workers, but will only do this if at the same time they are fighting around demands such as more jobs for all. Only when white workers see that in order to win class demands they must win the support of black workers will they support black demands, and thus fight racism in a meaningful way.

As a first step towards implementing this perspective we propose that this body endorse and will organize for a demonstration:

DECEMBER 12, 1969 4-6pm 570 LEXINGTON

WHO'S PAYING FOR THIS WAR?

When Nixon tells us we must fight for "freedom" in Vietnam, he means that we, the working people of this country, must fight, giving our lives if necessary, to protect the property of American corporations against the working people of Asia and Latin America.

Right now, the General Electric workers are on strike all across the country. They are fighting one of the largest corporations in the world and one of the major profiteers from the war in Vietnam. At issue in this struggle is whether or not the workers are going to be forced to bear the full brunt of inflation, by sacrificing any real wage gains to the prerogatives of GE and its need to maintain high profits. As the GE workers point out in a leaflet, "GE gets huge profits from selling war material while working people pay the price in higher taxes, inflation and our son's lives." If GE wins this battle, it will set a precedent for all of industry - management profits from war, the workers pay. We should demand a 100% tax on war profits! As long as troops are not withdrawn from Vietnam and U.S. intervention ended, let the corporations make the same sacrifices we're making. We'll see how long they support the war when they no longer benefit from it.

AND WHO HAS THE POWER TO END IT?

By now, the majority of Americans are opposed to the continuation of the war. Yet the fighting continues, while Nixon talks of his "peace plan" and liberal politicians mumble about the immorality of the war. Why does this unpopular war continue, and how can we stop it?

The fact is, we don't have any control over what our "leaders" do. Whether "liberal" or "conservative," the politicians are financed and controlled by the very interests who profit from the war at our expense. Until working people and their unions begin to fight against the corporations and their flunkey politicians they cannot stop the war and will continue to pay in blood and dollars for it.

THERE IS NO "MIDDLE GROUND"

The Nixon administration has made it clear that he considers those in the "silent majority" to be supporting the war. It is no longer possible to be neutral when silence is taken for support. We must demonstrate our opposition now, to make clear that we do not stand with Nixon! Let us stand with the GE workers against those who would have us die to maintain their profits and privilege.

THE BAY AREA PEACE ACTION COUNCIL, SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED ELECTRICAL WORKERS, 1412, IS CALLING FOR A

MARCH AGAINST THE WAR, GE

RALLY NOON SATURDAY DEC. 13
GREENMAN FIELD, 66th & E.14 St. Oak.

THEN MARCH TO G.E. TRANSFORMER PLANT NEARBY.

Name _____ Address _____ Phone _____

Occupation _____ I would like more information about the I.S. _____

I would like to join I.S. _____

Send to: INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS P.O. Box 910, Berkeley, CA 94701

March against the War, G.E.

The Bay Area Peace Action Council has joined with the United Electrical Workers Union to call for a mass rally and march against the war in Vietnam and in support of the strike against General Electric Co. This action Saturday will be the first major anti-war action in the Bay area since the S.F. march. It will be an important step in building the anti-war movement among workers, whose own struggles against exploitation are aimed above all at the giant corporations, like G.E., which profit directly from the war in Vietnam.

RALLY AT NOON SATURDAY DEC. 13
GREENMAN FIELD, 66th & E.14 St. Oak.

THEN MARCH TO G.E. TRANSFORMER PLANT NEARBY.

The strike against G.E. itself has resulted in part from the war. While G.E.'s profits have soared in the last three years, G.E. workers have been left with less real income than they had to start with. Nor is G.E. an exception among the giant corporations. All U.S. business is fighting the war-exacerbated inflation -- by squeezing wages, raising productivity at the expense of workers, and trying to smash workers who resist. But the workers on strike against G.E. are resisting. Their struggle is crucial to all workers who are being forced to pay the price of the war, and crucial to the anti-war movement, which will gain enormous political strength if masses of workers, in their own interest, start to fight against the war in Vietnam.

Leaflet East Bay plants on Wed., Thurs., Fri.:
Carpools from Bancroft & Dana at 3p.m.

People are needed to help publicize the rally and march at East Bay factories .Leaflet teams will leave Bancroft & Dana at 3 p.m. Wed., Thurs., Fri. for local plants. It is important to contact as many working people as possible, to explain the need for action and win their support.

Berkeley Campus International Socialists

labor donated

[W]MEDIATE WITHDRAWAL?

leaflet - Boston I.S.

The U.S, did not get involved in the war in Vietnam because of a "mistake", except in that the government was mistaken in judging how hard the Vietnamese would fight against foreign domination. Especially since the end of World War II, the U.S. has consistently stepped in whenever an underdeveloped country has tried to raise itself out of poverty in the only way it could; by fighting against the domination of the foreign corporations and their local allies and agents who drain off the national wealth.

Vietnam and the other under-developed countries are important to big business because they are a source of cheap labor which can drive American workers' wages down and profits up. Because they are a source of cheap raw materials to run corporations' factories. And because they are a source of markets which can be monopolized by U.S. businessmen to make even more money for themselves. BUT NOW, MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, VIETNMA IS AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE EX-COLONIES OF THE WORLD. If that tiny country can defend its independence against the U.S. it will be a tremendous encouragement to the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even now we're beginning to hear about new "vietnams" in Thailand and Laos.

Regardless of how one feels about the NLF, the fact remains that they are Vietnamese fighting against a foreign power and its puppets in Vietnam. The Vietnamese are the only ones who have the right to decide what happens in Vietnam. The U.S. has no right to decide anything for the Vietnamese. As socialists we support the right of nationa to self-determination.

The Vietnamese struggle has forced the U.S. to try winning at the conference table what it has failed to win on the battlefield. "Negotiations", token "withdrawals", "reasonable compromises," so-called "Vietnamization" -- a[ll] are attempts by Nixon & the other phony politicians (McGovern, McCarthy, Kennedy, etc.) and the business and financial interests they represent to win the war "peacefully". Americans should not buy this bill of goods. [I]MMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES [is] the only way to stop the war.

Jerry H. LA IS

On the Middle East

In the seven or eight weeks since I wrote and submitted an addendum to Wayne Price's position paper on the Middle East to the Convention., I have been exposed to some new information and arguments and have done some re-thinking about this document and my position on the issue. I now come to the conclusion that I must disavow the document and urge its withdrawal from the NC's consideration, as I would vote against it myself now. This should not be interpreted as being similar to Stalinist-style "self-criticism" and admission of 'errors'. I simply have changed my mind on a few things, particularly the role of the Zionist "left" in strengthening the bourgeois class rule inIsrael and the imperialist repression of the Palestinian Arab people (as well as Israeli Jews).

I maintain the necessity for revolutionary forces, both Jew and Arab, to strive to combat the Zionist drive for national, as opposed to class, unity. Although I am very pessimistic about revolutionary prospects in the foreseeable future, as Comrade Price's analysis implies, our position should be one of a demand for immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories and the move toward de-zionization that would almost assuredly come about the same time.

As I stated in my original document, the revolutionary transformation from below that can and eventually will accomplish the only true liberation of both Jewish and Arab peoples, cannot be acheived until there is a diminuation of the national chauvanism that exists on both "sides." Consistant with this goal, it must be the task of IS comrades to actively combat the arguments of those on the left whose opposition to Zionist imperialism and oppression leads them to what is, in effect, support of Arab national chauvanism -- be it disguised as "revolutionary socialist" or "anti-imperilaist." Thusly, we must not sit on our asses and wait for solutions to present themselves. We should actively support and publicize in every way possible the Israeli anti-Zionist left and similar internationalist Arab groups and we must voice our opposition to Palestinian group' use of terrorism against civilian populations which-- unlike massive resistance in the occupied territories-- serves not to build revolutionary-democratic consciousness in the Arab masses, but only to build intense national chauvanism amoung all classes of the Jewish people (not only in Israel, unfortunately, but throughout the world). This Jewish national chauvanism makes inevitable continued national conflict (and perhaps even nuclear conflict) and greatly hinders the class struggle amoung both Jewish and Arab peoples. We must actively present an internationalist revolutionary-democratic alternative to both the oppression of the Israeli and Arab ruling classes and those on the left whose policies do nothing but feed foolish romantic notions of "revolution" and strengthen the drive for national unity among both the Jewish and Arab people.

The GE Strike and the Myth of "Progressive" UE

by Ted Dibble
Berkeley Campus IS

Officials of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE) have long claimed for their union a leading position in the "progressive" wing of the American labor movement. This argument has been accepted by many radicals involved in support of the GE strike. However, even a brief examination of UE history is sufficient to dispel this illusion.

The UE was a founding member of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. After a series of militant drives, the union organized virtually the entire electrical industry, including GE, Westinghouse, and RCA. Within a short time, the UE ranked as one of the CIO's Big Three.

The CIO arose out of the conditions created by the Depression. Forming as the Committee for Industrial Organization within the older American Federation of Labor in 1935, it represented an important extension of union influence into production line factories. It opposed the conservative ideas and extreme bureaucratization of the AFL.

The AFL, under the influence of its narrow craft orientation, had long considered industrial workers unorganizable. The AFL leadership, already used to the comfort of its own domain, was frankly opposed to new innovations, and refused to mount a campaign to attract workers it considered outside its jurisdiction. The fight for industrial unionization could only be carried on within the AFL against the resistance of the old guard. The CIO was officially formed in 1938, when industrial unions were expelled from the AFL. CIO success quickly began to prove wrong the out-lived ideas of the AFL leadership.

Militants of all hues, united only by the desire to see the rise of strong unions where none had previously esisted, participated in the fight for the CIO, including members of the Communist Party. In its early years, the CIO experienced rapid growth and expansion. In this situation, it was not difficult to rise to positions of power in the newly formed unions. This rise was especially easy for those political parties possessing disciplined cadre and clearly defined goals, as did the CP. In accord with its customary bureaucratic manuvers, one of the CP's major goals of this period undoubtedly was to accumulate positions of influence within the CIO, and many of the new unions became top heavy with members of fellow-travelers of the CP.

Within the CIO, the UE became the major base of the CP. In fact, the CP was able to control the UE more tightly than any other CIO union in which it was active. Most of the top echelon leaders were either members of the Party or closely under its influence, the kind of men who were said to "cheat the Party of dues." After 1941, the union was headed by Albert Fitzgerald, President, James Matles, Organization Director, and Julius Emspak, Secretary-Treasurer.

The Stalinist partnership of Emspak-Matles actually ran the union, Fitzgerald served as little more than a slow-thinking cover. Whether either Matles or Emspak ever actually joined the CP isof little improtance, since both followed the Party line in all things. These men in turn appointed business agents and lower-level union officials. The precondition for holding these posts was substantial agreement with the official leadership.

The early years of the UE were its best. The union pursued a militant course in its drive to attract workers. It could have done less only at the risk of failing to organize the electrical industry. After 1937, however, the UE, and the entire CIO, had passed the days

of its most rapid growth. The wave of sit-down strikes in which the CIO was born occurred during a period of relative properity from 1935 to 1937. In 1937, the economy broke down again; this time, the depression was more severe than it had been in 1929. Only with the mobilization of the economy for war production was the depression overcome in 1941 or '42.

Throughout this period, the Stalinist line in the CIO followed every turn made necessary by the foreign policy of the Russian state. The period of the founding of the CIO corresponded to the "People's Front" interlude, when the CP urged all those opposed to fascism, from "progressive" capitlaist to factory worker, to combine into one happy family for the purpose of defeating fascism. The "People's Front" was proclaimed because Russia was seeking an alliance with western capitalist powers against Nazi Germany. Prerequisite for the successful culmination of this alliance was moderate and respectable conduct by Communist Parties in the West. Thus as early as 1937, the American CP was loudly proclaiming its opposition to "unauthorized" strikes which were detrimental to the "national interest." Shortly thereafter, the CP opened a campaign in the CIO to gain support for Franklin Roosevelt's third term.

The signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact changed this. The Pact was a mutual non-agression treaty designed to give Hitler a free hand with his western opponents while protecting his eastern flank, and which ratified the division of Poland between Russia and Germany. In accordance with this new development, the line of the CP took the required turn. Even though the CP never publicly renounced their support of FDR, they now loudly opposed American entrance into the war on the side of the Allies. The new propaganda was anti-war, anti-militarist, and pro-class struggle. "The Yanks are not coming," was the CP watchword.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact was to last less than two years, and was broken in 1941 by the German invasion of Russia. Now at war with the Axis powers, Russia was thrust into the camp of the Allies. This new turn in the world necessitated a change of course for those Communist Parties in countries which, until yesterday, had been lined up against Russia, but now found themselves on the same side in the war. Formerly opposing intervention in the war, all of these adjunct Parties rushed to support their own national war effort.

Obediently, the American CP changed camps. The Party had been against American entrance to the war only for the brief interval of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Now it found itself back in familiar territory, and the most vociferous of interventionists. Patriotism became the new order of the day, and the Party rivalled the American Legion in waving the flag. The logic of this position finally led to the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943. In this kcountry, a burst of enthusiasm for capitalism saw the Young Communist League subsumed into a student front group, and the CP itself was reorganized as a "political association." These actions were taken to strengthen the alliance between the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States.

Within the UE, 1941 and the invasion of Russia saw the election of Albert Fitzgerald to union presidence, signalling the assumption of complete control over the union by the Stalinist faction. Now the UE became a fully pliant tool in the hands of Matles and Emspak. The official leadership played its role in support of the war by issuing pleas for "national unity," and "equality of sacrifice" between worker and capitalist in the war effort. Workers were to give up the right

to strike, thereby losing the only means by which they could defend their standard of living. Capitalists, on the other hand, were to make the "sacrifice" of converting from peace production, which had ceased to be lucrative during the Depression, to war xx production and astronomical profits. However, UE officials claimed "eauality of sacrifice" was a burden imposed on all by the necessary tribulations of the Second World War.

These arguments provided the smokescreen behind which attempts were made to suspend the class struggle for the duration. Strikes hurt the war-effort, so the UE bureaucracy signed blanket no-strike pledges with management, and was able to introduce piece-work and "incentive pay." The result was a vicious spee-up of the work process, pitting worker against worker and seriously damaging labor solidarity. At one point, UE officials urged all workers to make a contribution to the war effort by increasing their productivity 15 per cent. The Matles-Emspak leadership even went so far as to expell UE members who failed to meet war-time production standards, and asked management to lay off workers for the period of their expulsion. Often workers who were careless enough to voice dissatisfaction wirh piece work at union meetings were expelled on charges of engaging in a "slow-down." The UE war policy was made explicit by Harry Bridges, longshore leader and ranking Stalinist spokesman, when, in a speech before the San Francisco CIO Council, he said, "To put it bluntly, I mean your unions today must become instruments of speed-up of the working people of America." In a short time, wages in UE-organized plants were among the lowest in the CIO.

Under the influence of round after round of anti-labor measures, profits boomed as never before. The most successful businessmen were able to raise their average after-tax profits 200 to 300 per cent above pre-war levels. Workers' productivity increased during the war by more than 25%, while wages rose less than 1%. With a government-imposed wage freeze, and inflation induced by the war economy, real wages plummeted downward. Gains fought for and won in the early days of the CIO were lost, sometimes irrevocably. As living standards declined, the number of strikes closely followed profits in an ascending spiral. This new rash of strikes was but a foretaste of the post-war strike wave.

POST WAR UPSURGE:

The end of the war was preceded by a wave of wildcat strikes during 1944 and 1945. While the war was still on, workers had to fight not only the governemnt and their employers, but the unabashedly frank alliance with them into which their own unions had entered. Although workers had fought hard to maintain their standard of living during the war, their efforts were hampered by the no-strike pledge, a wage-freeze, and incessant patriotic propaganda in the bourgeois press. The war-time strike wave gave warning that old greivances would soon be settled.

The end of the war brought with it the specter of mass unemployment, thus fueling an already tense situation. During the less than four months between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan, more than one million workers were laid off. Within a month after the war had ended, more than two million additional workers hadx been forced out of work.

V-J Day swept away the last restraints and ushered in the great-

est labor offensive in American history. In the year after the war ended, over five million workers participated in strikes in all major industries. This strike wave came closer to a general strike than anything the US has ever witnessed.

The Communist Party had seriously misjudged the mood of the work-class. Even before the war had ended, the Daily Worker, organ of the CP, had begun to press for the adoption of a permanent, peacetime no-strike pledge. A permanent pledge, so the argument went, would make production continuous and thus ensure a steady wage for all workers.

This orientation inevitably found repetition within the CIO. Such labor savants as Harry Bridges were quick to pick it up. No less quickly, Albert Fitzgerald, UE president, began arguing for retention of the no-strike pledge after the war. In a 1945 speech before UE members in Minneapolis, subsequently reported in UE News, Fitzgerald stated, "As far as I am concerned, the no-strike pledge was not made jsut for the duration of the war."

Even though they wished to follow their old course, UE officials were subject to the same tensions which beset every other union bureaucracy. Under pressure from the rank and file, UE leaders were forced to adopt at least a verbal militancy. In this atmosphere, union posts could only be retained by acquiesing to the demand for action. In short, leaders could either ride the crest and accede to the strike demand, or be swept out of office.

The strike against General Motors in 1946 was the out-standing strike of this period. In an effort to regain ground lost during the war, the strikers, led by Walter Reuther, demanded that wages be increased without any price increases by the corporation. The workers hoped to raise the level of real wages, and to slow down or stop inflation, which had been playing havoc with their incomes throughout the war. This could only be done if their gains were not eaten up by a new round of price increases set off by GM. When the industrialists complained of their inability to meet this demand, the strikers demanded that GM open the books, and try to prove its case.

The central demands of the GM strike; "Wage Increases without Price Increases," and, "Open the Books of the Corporation," went far beyond the usual strike issues of wages and hours. The strike linked together wages, prices, and profits, challenging traditional methods of indus trial decision-making, and questioning the exclusive right of the capitalists to fix the rate of profit.

The logic of these demands went even further. Ultimately, they raised the prospect of the direction of the entire economy by organized labor. If the corporations proved themselves incapable of raising wages without setting off a round of price increases harmful to the entire population, if they were incapable of running the economy without throwing it into chaos, the logic of the strike demanded that the unions call for the nationalization of industry under workers' control.

Although the conservatism of the UAw leadership prevented them from pursuing this logic to its conclusion, the GM strike nonetheless remains the most political strike in the history of the American labor movement. For 113 days, one of the largest of industrial giants was completely shut down.

The role of UE officialdom in the GM strike was anything but salutary. The GM strike was only one of a number of strikes called in virtually every basic industry. The CIO, however, failed to coordinate these strikes, so that the workers' full power was not applied simultaneously throughout industry. The UE was a prime offender in this re-

gard. The 275,000 UE workers in the electrical industry were scheduled to go out a full two months after the auto workers. The GM strikers were thus allowed to bear the full force of the back-to-work movement initiated by Truman and the bourgeois press. Even worse, the Matles-Emspak leadership refrained from calling out the 30,000 UE workers in the General Motors Electrical Division. These workers were to be called out with the rest of the workers in the electrical industry, two months after auto workers in the same plant had gone out on strike. Even the most elementary considerations of labor solidarity dictated a different course, but UE officials remained adamant even after CIO officials had issued a public strike appeal to the UE workers. Matles and Emspak thus prevented the auto workers from applying maximum pressure against GM. These Stalinist officials proved, if nothing else, that they knew how to be first-rate scabs.

Following close on the heels of this betrayal, the UE bureaucracy was to match it with another. CIO leaders at first demanded a 30% increase in wages in each of the strikes in which their unions were involved. Under pressure, this demand was scaled down to a minimum increase of 19½ cents an hour.

In the third month of the GM strike, after electrical workers had been out less than one month, UE officials negotiated a settlement with GM behind the backs of the other strike leaders. James Matles met secretly in Detroit with representatives of General Motors. There he agreed to a wage increase of 18½ cents an hour, a full one cent an hour less than the UAW was demanding, thereby accepting a wage increase below even the minimum demand of the strike, and far less than the original demand.

The premature UE settlement helped to boost back-to-work pressure, and deprived the auto workers of valuable material aid durint the strike. For the second time since they went out, UAW workers were forced to watch as the electrical workers crossed their picket lines, and returned to work. In addition, the Matles settlement cut the ground from under the other striking unions, since their new contract tended to be the basis on which GM and the other employers pressed for an end to the strike. By their actions, UE officials betrayed not only their own membership, but the UAW workers as well. This attempt to break the GM strike was not an isolated event. During the period of the People's Front, and the Second World War, Stalinists in the CIO had also acted as scabs and strikebreakers.

Never breaking with their reactionary, anti-labor policies of the past, the UE leaders simply extended them into the post-war period. However, the overriding consideration which motivated UE officials was the attitude of the Communist Party to Walter Reuther, UAW leader in charge of the GM strike. Originally in league with the Stalinists, Reuther had parted company with them in 1939. By 1946, they and Reuther were fighting each other for control of the union. From the start, the CP fraction in the UAW had attempted to cool off the strike. The Party wished to undercut Reuther's position by making it appear that he had bungled the strike. With Reuther discredited, their only formidable opposition in the UAW would have been out of the running. To this end, the CP was perfectly willing to let their followers in the UE sell out the auto workers.

The striking thing about UE conduct in the GM strike is that it occured several months after the CP's highly advertised, post-war "left turn." It occurred after Earl Browder, national secretary since 1929, had been expelled for leading the Party on a "revisionist"

course. And finally, after a new program had been adopted which promised a return to "Marxism-Leninism" and "militant struggle" in the workers' interests.

SPLIT IN THE CIO:

Despite its blatantly reactionary and unpopular practices, the UE bureaucracy was able to retain power during the war years. In this, it was inestimably aided by Phillip Murray, president of the CIO.

Murray was not a Stalinist, and, during the interval when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was in effect, had frequent skirmishes with CPers in the CIO. After the German invasion of Russia, American and Russian imperialism, while still in conflict, formed a marriage of convenience to fight a common enemy. When this turn was reflected in the CIO, Phillip Murray once again became the staunch, though silent, ally of the CP. If the UE leaders, and Stalinists like them in the labor movement, were able to retain their union posts, it was only because they had the tacit support of Murray. Workers were never able to break this alliance. While it existed, it prevented wide-spread discontent from breaking into effective action.

With the end of the Second World War, however, American and Russian imperialism ceased to be bound together by the necessities of self preservation. Internationally, the Cold War was coming on apace. As the East-West gulf widened, it was reflected by the stance of the American Communist Party. The Soviet Union wished to extend its war-time alliance with Western capitalism into the post-war period. This required the CP to adopt a "left" course, in order to apply pressure to the Democratic Party and the government, and preserve the old alliance.

The Moscow-Washington split was mirrored in the CIO. Largely because the CIO had always been a major arena of CP involvement, the Cold War was to take its first victims in the labor unions. For its prat, the CIO Executive Board took the first tentative steps to remove Stalinists from positions of power, inaugurating a fierce faction fight. By this, Murray and the other "labor statesmen" were to demonstrate again their extreme sensitivity to the needs of world capitalism.

The guiding consideration of both Murray and the Stalinists was the desire to preserve their power, and with it to preserve their control over the workers. Different purposes motivated them both, but these purposes could only be served by the maintainence of their power. In this may be seen the essential identity between Murray and his opponents. Once they had been allies, and had helped each other to preserve their union positions. However, that was possible only when the different goals which they served had been compatible. Now these goals were antagonistic, and each moved to deprive the other of his power. The CIO was not large enough to contain within itself support for rival imperialsims.

In his campaign to drive the CP from the CIO, Murray was emboldened by the victory of the Reutherites over the Stalinist faction in the UAW. Reuther's accession to the presidency was an important precondition for Murray's success, since it strengthened his position considerably. On the other hand, the Matles-Emspak leadership of the UE was at a disadvantage. When confronted with the extent of CP domination of union affairs, these officials feebly lamented that they

were being "red-baited." Disgraced by their conduct during and after the war, they were incapable of mounting a vigorous campaign in their own defense. Instead they prepared to take the UE out of the CIO. The climax of the faction fight was reached when Matles demanded that the CIO Executive Board protect UE autonomy and guarantee that the UE would not be raided by other CIO unions. UE officials attempted to back up their demands by threatening to withold the per-capita tax owed to the CIO. This threat constituted sufficient grounds for expulsion, and Murray responded by suspending the UE. The final stage of the fight consisted of bureaucratic manuvering in which Murray assured himself of sufficient strength at the coming convention in order to deal with the UE as he pleased. Once support was obtained, the outcome of the proceedings could only be anti-climactic.

A short time later, the 1949 CIO convention met, and declared that positions of union responsibility were not compatible with membership in the Communist Party, specifically naming, and expelling, the UE and one other union.

Expulsion would probably have occurred in any case. However, the UE not only provided the pretext for the split by threatening to withold the per-capita tax, but thereby demonstrated that the leadership was willing to split the union and the CIO, rather than risk losing their positions of power. Thus while the UE was expelled from the CIO, it was already half way out under its own power. Its officials didn't bother to show up at the convention to defend the union against the pending expulsion.

Within the next year, some ten unions were to be expelled from the CIO. These Stalinist unions were expelled not because their leaders had engaged in anti-labor practices (with this criterion Murray and the rest of the CIO tops should have been expelled as well), but because their politics could no longer be tolerated. The expulsions represented the opening round of the Cold War, as well as the final bureaucratization of the CIO. The center of power had long since moved upward from the ranks; now it came to rest exclusively in the leaden rumps sitting on the Executive Board.

OLD DOGS, OLD TRICKS: THE GE STRIKE

After 1949, UE strength in the electrical industry rapidly disintegrated, and membership in the union declined at a fantastic rate. Even before the split in the CIO, the policies pursued by UE officials had driven over 100,000 workers from the union in less than a year. After the split, membership continued to dwindle, and the UE was particularly vulnerable to raiding by other unions. Because of its past record, the union lost many workers to a new CIO affiliate, the International Union of Electrical Workers.

The UE's former hegemony in the electrical industry was replaced by a crazy quilt amalgam of thirteen unions. The fight which began in the CIO was simply carried to a new arena, and continued after the split. For twenty years, these thirteen unions fought an exhausting fratricidal woar, in which the only possible victor was General Electric. To this day, workers have not been able to overcome the legacy of UE officials: wages in the electrical industry are among the lowest of all production line industries, a tribute both to GE's power and to factional war. Recent events, however, have made this conflict intolerable for rank and file members.

The inflation normally connected with the permanent war economy

was exaggerated by the war in Vietnam. Dating fromthe early sixties, war-induced inflation and taxation began seriously encroaching on workers' incomes. As real wages fell rapidly, the incidence of wildcat strikes and job actions increased. Inevitably, along with this increase in the level of rank and file militancy, an end to union infighting and defense of workers' living standards was demanded from t the officials. This paved the way for unity between the labor bureaucracies in the electrical industry.

At the top, the thirteen-union coalition was mad possible when James Carey was booted out of the IUE presidency in 1965. Carey had been UE president until defeated by the Stalinists, and was a major obstacle to UE-IUE rapprochment. In turn, Carey"s defeat was a direct reflection of the new militancy in the union ranks. By 1966, the coalition had been forged, and the GE strike marked its first test on a national level.

Of all the old-line UE officials, only Juslius Emspak has disappeared from the bureaucracy. Fitzgerald and Matles are still the union's two top officers. Recent experience demonstrates their inability to learn new tricks.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, the November and December Moratoriums marked the first attempt to consciously link together the anti-war and labor movements by holding joint actions. For the November Moratorium, IS comrades pushed for an afternoon of student picketing in support of the GE strike, as one part of the day's projected actions. This course had first to be cleared with the UE local, but through a series of misunderstandings and sectarian manuvers peculiar to the Berkeley New Left, the certainty of the action was never fixed. When it was finally called, too little time remained to organize effective support, and only a few students turned out on the picket lines.

With the advent of the December Moratorium, IS comrades again urged local anti-war groups to plan a joint action with the GE strikers as the main action and central focus of the Moratorium. It was planned to hold a demonstration near a GE plant, followed by a march and picketing of the plant. At first, the UE local approved this plan, and agreed to co-sponsor the rally. As the day of the Moratorium approached, however, union officials began to vacillate in their support of the joint demonstration.

The demonstration was to be sponsored by the Bay Area Peace Action Council and the UE. BAPAC's membership consists largely of the CP and assorted independents, and is the major anti-war group in the Bay Area outside of the New Mobilization Committee, which takes much of its politics, direction, and staff from the CP.

The first sign of an impending split between union officials and BAPAC came when Paul Chown, UE business agent and ex-CPer still under the Party's influence, successfully urged the UE Executive Committed to withdraw their official sponsorship of the demonstration, while continuing to support the rally and march. The day before the Moratorium, Chown took the union out of the demonstration altogether, and urged other participating unions to disavow the demonstrationx.

Presumably, the CP used what little influence it still has in the labor movement to effectively cancel the demonstration, both because it was sponsored by a "Trotskyist" organization, and because it did not mesh with their own plans for the anti-war movement.

But Paul Chown was not motivated solely by this; uppermost in his mind were also the national needs of the UE. Since its expulsion

from the CIO, the UE has sought entrance to other labor organizations. With the founding of the Alliance for Labor Action, a formation consisting of the UAW and the Teamsters, the UE hoped to gain admission. UAW officials, however, can hardly have forgotten the history of the UE. If they are to enter the ALA, UE officials must present sufficient proof that they have mended their ways.

Its plans to enter the ALA would have been upset had the UE co-sponsored the rally, for one of the scheduled speakers was a member of the Black Panther caucus in the Fremont local of the UAW. The caucus was formed when its members found they could not rely on the local for protection, and since that time it has had to fight both union officials and the company. Had the UE co-sponsored a demonstration which featured a speaker critical of the UAW bureaucracy, the UE would have undoubtedly lost its chance to enter the ALA.

In its conduct of the strike itself, the union has pursued a deliberately mild course. Nominally, one of the main demands of the strike calls for wage parity between men and women. However, the UE, like every other union in the coalition, has not fought to win this demand. Instead, parity remains the least-known demand of the strike, even though women compose nearly one quarter of the UE's total membership.

This cautious, timid policy has permeated the entire conduct of the GE strike. Officers of the Oakland UE local asked for student support on their picket lines before the strike began. If, however, during the course of the strike it appeared that large numbers of students might actually appear on the union's lines, this support was discouraged by UE officials. They argued that GE was about to bring in scabs, and mass picketing before that time would only result in the filing of injunctions against the union. This, of course, would then prevent effective counter-action when the scabs did appear. The result of this policy was that mass picketing never took place, but the expected injunctions were issued nevertheless.

Throughout the strike, the leadership's conservative outlook has led to a policy of defusing the struggle whenever it might have become effective and gained support. UE officials have been fearful of initiating actions which they could not fully control at all time. In this can be seen the mainspring behind the behavior of UE officials; the desire to preserve their own bureaucratic power. Instead of working to build workers' struggles, instead of pushing the strike forward, UE leaders have instead acted to hold back the struggle, and to confine it to the lowest possible level. The leadership has shown itself only too aware that in a militant struggle, UE workers might see the necessity of sweeping away the reactionary officials of their union. As in 1946, so today the course UE officials will follow is determined by the alternating relation of forces between themselves and the rank and file. If the leadership feels secure, it will follow its own course. When discontent is widespread, the bureaucrats will swim with the tide, while maintaining themselves in power.

Thus the record of the UE bureaucracy: strike-breaking, scabbing, and wage-cutting. For those who support unions, and looke toward the revival of militancy and rank and file power within them, the UE, embodied in the policies of its officials, hardly merits the label "progressive."

 Neil C. Boston I.S.

On picking Up the Gun . art 3

A program for the defense of the International Socialist organization will have to be based on the legal and technical limitations under which we are forced to operate. In theory one would work out a better defense plan involving the use of Kalashnikov assault carbines, M-79 grenade launchers, and laser beams, but that would have little relevance to the real world.

Individual IS members will, of course, have to defend their own persons as best they can against the dangers they will encounter when doing political work. Our primary focus should be on the defense of the organization. This includes offices, printing equipment, stocks of literature, and lists of members and contacts, as well as meetings and demonstrations. The damage that even one individual with a match can do to the IS if precautions are not taken should be obvious, especially now when the building of the organization requires the fullest committment of resources of the small membership.

The two factors involved in a defense system are weaponry and tactics. These are closely bound together since we adapt our tactics to the weapons available and procure weapons which are suitable to the tactics we have chosen. These are subjects which have usually been neglected by the left, often to our sorrow. There have been a few exceptions such as the Judishe Arbeiter Kampfengruppe of Czarist Russia, and the Austrian Schutzbund. Julius Deutsche of the Schutzbund is said to have written some excellent material on the subject of worker's armed defense, but none of it seems to be presently available.

The best defensive weapon available is the 12-guage, pump action shotgun. The shotgun is rapidly replacing the less effective .38 revolver as the main police weapon. The solid round embodies great penetration and stopping power. The buckshot round enables even the unskilled firer to hit his target with at least a few pellets.

The 12-guage is originally a hunting rather than a military weapon. It is designed for fast use against close targets rather than carefully aimed long-range shots. Its main weakness is that its maximum effective range is limited to about 100 meters. Most of the situations we would find it useful for, however, would involve fighting at closer ranges than this.

Late model shotguns are chambered for the 3" magnum round which is more powerful than the standard 2 3/4" round. Shells for one type should never be fired from guns of the other type.

Long barrelled shotguns are more effective at longer ranges, especially when equipped with rifle-type sights. However short-barrelled models are handier in cramped quarters,

such as cars.

The 12-guage pump gun is effective, reliable, and simple to operate and maintain. Its use requires a minimum of training. Ammunition for it is readily available everywhere. At present there are few legal barriers to buying a shotgun, although this situation may not last. A second-hand 12-guage can be bought for about $40 if one is willing to shop around.

Pistols are of very limited utility. Except in the hands of an expert, they are wildly inaccurate. Most people would find it easier to hit a target with a thrown rock than with a pistol bullet. Except for a few models such as the 9mm. Lauger they have very little range or stopping power.

The value of the pistol is that it can be brought into action very quickly in an emergency. Since we are arming for defense rather than attack, we must have the capacity for fast reaction to any act of aggression. Obviously for the defense of an IS office for example, a pistol in the desk drawer of the comrade near the door is more useful in an emergency than a rifle tucked away in the closet.

Because of this, each chapter should have a few pistols even though they are a hassle. Aside from being expensive, most states require a police permit to legally own a pistol, and these permits are usually hard to get. The Walther P-38 and the .38 special revolver are about the best handguns that can be bought at a reasonable price, but probably we'll have to take what we can find.

There are a tremendous variety of rifles on the market. Those most suitable for our purposes are semi-automatic military surplus weapons such as the .30 Army Carbine and the Garand M-1. Usually a shotgun should be sufficient defensive weapon, but a rifle may be needed for accurate fire at long ranges. The 1903 Springfield is a wonderfully accurate long-range weapon, but since it is a bolt action it is too slow for rapid fire at close ranges.

Used Carbines, Garands and Springfields tend to cost between $75 and $125, although bargains can occasionally be found. In most states a rifle can be bought as easily as a can of beer.

Careful training is required for the proper use and maintenance of the rifle, especially the semi-automatic. This job should be given to comrades with military experience.

An important consideration toward the choice of any firearm is the type of ammunition it requires. Of course, each comrade who buys a weapon should buy at least 50 rounds for it, and under normal circumstances this should be sufficient. Nevertheless there may be a time when we need large amounts of ammunition. At such a time, it would be impossible to but cartridges at the local gun shop. Therefore it would be convenient if our weapons chambered the same rounds as those used by the police, national guard and army , since

this may be all that is available. Of course even a single .22 is much better than nothing.

Once we have our weapons we'll have to learn to use them, individually and in groups. Basically security is a matter of simple common sense. For example, defensability is an important consideration when choosing an IS office. One should avoid the kind of store front office that can be shot into from a passing car. The higher the office is, the less vulnerable. The office door should be as strong as possible and equipped with a good police lock. While one should not be ostentatious about it, a comrade with a pistol within reach should keep an eye on the door. There is a YSAer who might be alive today if this precaution had been observed.

Consideration should also be given to protection against gas, an increasing supply of which is in police and civilian hands. A determined person can function under exposure to ordinary tear-gas, CN, but not stronger types such as CS. Home-made defenses are of little value, there is no substitute for an Army-surplus gas mask. Comrades buying such masks should be sure that the charcoal filters are in working condition and have been kept dry. Those who wear glasses can have corrective lenses installed in the mask. A little time should be devoted to practice in putting the mask on in a hurry. Soldiers are trained to don the mask in 7 seconds while encumbered with rifle and steel helmet so its not so hard.

FORUM POLICY

1) The pages of IS FORUM are open to all members of the IS who wish to present, comment on, or argue any political or organizational question. Nonmembers are also invited to contribute to the debates within the organization. The FORUM will be circulated primarily to members of the organization, but may also be used as a piece of literature to give or sell to nonmembers interested in the debates within the organization.

The only editorial restriction on the content of articles in the FORUM will be on the publication of names or events, the publication of which might seriously impede the functioning of the organization or its members. Disputes between the author and the editor, typist, or mimeo operator on this question will be referred to the NAC.

2) Technical limitations:

Because of the enormous amount of work required in issuing the FORUM on a regular basis we must now request that all articles, leaflets etc. be submitted to the FORUM on Gestetner Mimeo Stencils. In case of extenuating circumstances, we will try to stencil the articles but we make no guarantees.

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Double space, (or 1 and 1/2 space if possible) btween paragraphs.

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