Dear Ross and Gary,

I attended the Ligue Communiste's Central Committee meeting held June 17-19. Their session on preparations for the coming World Congress seemed particularly significant to me, and I have typed up a transcript of my notes of the discussion.

I'm aware of the problems of such a transcription, particular when you take notes in a different language from that used by the speakers. But I think this is a pretty accurate record of the ideas expressed, omitting mainly irrelevant material. The entire discussion was four hours long. On re-reading the transcript, I see that I have Vergeat describing the World Congress of 1969 with more clarity than was actually there. This part of his report, in fact, was highly vague and suggestive; incomprehensible to the unitiated. Other contributions, like those of Jebracq and Micheloum, have lost their violence of tone.

Here is a translation of the pseudonyms: Jebracq-Ben Said. Volodar-Micheloux. Delphin-Krivine. Ramos-Lequenne. Gilles-a leading comrade from outside the center.

A few words on the balance of their Plenum.

A discussion on Indochina solidarity work generally reaffirmed their present orientation, stressing the need to continue FSI work over the summer.

A report recommending that the Ligue run as many candidates as possible in the 1973 legislative elections met with considerable opposition from leading comrades from outside Paris. There provides the proposition from leading comrades from outside Paris. There provides saw little political gain in such a great expenditure of energy. Krivine stepped in and rebutted this opposition, in making considerable practical concessions to it regarding the number of candidates atcetra. In the end, the vote to run candidates was almost unanimous.

A couple of leading comrades emphasized the difference between this campaign and that of 1969: the latter was a propagandistic campaign for soviet power; the 1973 campaign would aim to popularize key demands; immediate demands, etc.

One aspect of the report was not accepted—the recommendation that in the "Second Round" of ballcting next year, we advocate a vote for the candiates of the "Union of the Left" now being negotieted between the Communist and Socialist Farties. Comrades of the central leadership (Micheloum, Weber) argued that since the Communist and Socialist Parties were clearly going to come to an accord based on a common program (not just an electoral trade-off) the question of the social base of the Socialist Party was irrelevant, and we should vote for the BP or the SP without distinction. There was obviously a wide

opposition to this along the lines that we should support the CP candidates but not the SP.

The implication of the Weber-Micheloux position was clearly that we could vote SP even if the SP is a bourgeois party, because it has entered into an electoral bloc with a worke a party on the basis of a common program -- which sounded to my ears like the classical definition of a popular front.

In fact, many French comrades put a big question mark over the class character of the SP, and raise that it may be evolving towards being a workers party. Howeverxyrunizwiwkirza They seem to be retreating all down the line on their previous appreciation of the politics of the French working class. How ironic, the next day, to hear that their bold ressessment of the class character of the social-democratic parties, made in 66-69, was one of their fundamental disagreements with us.

The question that came to mind, however, was why the Ligue Communiste did not attempt to intervene in this process, which they say is one of great ferment which will likely awaken the broad wavenewkwarkka support of the working class -- by trying to lay out the kind of "Union of the Left" which we feel is required, rather than waiting until the second round of the elections to vote for whatever animal the bureaucracies cook up.

There was also a dispute over a report from the Control Commission. Expulsions of individual militants appear to be fairly frequent in the Ligue Communiste. One of the latest to go is Johannes, the advocate of forming a youth movement. On two previous occasions, expelled comrades have appealed to the Control Commission, which recommended that their expulsions be reversed, and saw its recommendation accepted by the Central Committee. This time, however, there was a fight.

cuse كوت Victor

The expelled comrade in question was an ex-CC member who had held a minority position at the last congress. Apparently a bit of a mayerick, he had formed a group of revolutionary had clop railway workers, and refused to submit this work to the control of his cell, saying he had no confidence in the cell leadership. The cell threw him out, and was supported by the Trade Union Commission. They mishandled the expulsion however. The Control Commission recommended that the expulsion be reversed, but that the comrade be reduced to the rank of a candidate member. The trade union commission fought the Control Commission's recommendation, before the Central Committee. The Political Bureau maintain. abstained from the debate, until at the last moment Krivine, ing without making any political comment, proposed a reformulation of the Control Commission recommendation (which would be more acceptable to the trade union commission. This was accepted by a vote of 23-17, with the Political fureau splitting down the middle. The Control Commission's position was pushed by Ramos (Lequenne), Thomas -- trade union director for Rouge, and an older comrade whose name sounded like "Charbon".

> Ramos plays an active and articulate role in all the CC discussions, with a critical edge to most of his remarks. He

appears to be well integrated into the Ligue's work. You meet him regularly in the Imrasse. But he is clearly an "outsider" in the leadership, whose views are listened to with interest, but who does not enjoy great influence.

Pierre Frank was in Germany and therefore did not at end the Central Committee meeting.

I found it hard to talk to conrades at the neeting. The next day, however, I ran into Vera, a CC member. She shares Riel's views on many questions. She said the international discussion, in her view, had a calm and non-factional tone—though she was referring chiefly to Vergeat and Krivine. There are divisions in the leadership, she felt, and this was reflected in the more factional tone of Micheloux and Ben Said's remarks. She, too, felt that she could agree with neither the majority nor the minority on Latin America. I'm accumulating quite a list of this holders of this position.

I, too, appreciated the superficial fairness of the discussion. But I didm not notice and distinction between the leaders, other than in their speaking style. They seemed to present different nuances of a commonly worked out position. And that position was brutally factional. For it started out with the blunt assertion of a fundamental difference between the Europeans and the old-fashioned Trotskyists of North America. All that was left was for the discussion to reveal this difference in different areas. It started out with the conclusion—that the North American's views flowed from an out-of-date politics that were poison to the International. The function of the discussion is then to provide evidence to justify the conclusion. What better logic than this to line up a leadership, close their ears, and convince them that any sympathy to a view voiced by the SWP leadership is a betrayal of all that the Ligue Communiste and all the other European organizations assemble as achieved.

It has is certainly a step forward that Communist League leaders have recognized that the Latin American discussion has implications for the whole world. Why then their eagerness to defend the heritage of the 9th World Congress's continental strategy—discredited even in their eyes? Do they really believe that they have fundamental differences with us on the question of the use of violence in the advanced bourgeois democracies? It seems strained. Surely in many ways their reaction is a defensive one—attempting to rally their forces after the fiasco of Latin America (the continent which was not even mentioned by Vergest's meport). After all, they are putting their money on a pretty heterogeneous bloc, examples a which to win must maintain the unity of the ERP, the Japanese, the IMG Rossites, and the entirety of the European movement—a bloc united only by opposition to the SWP. Such an alliance needs all the glue it can get.

CC: Alen York Comeadely Crandell

Vergeat (reporter):

I'm going to divide my report in three parts. First, the lessons of the 9th World Congress. Second, the record of the last three years. Third, our perspectives for the next World Congress.

First, we must start off by noting the lack of preparation of the Ligue Communiste (LC) for the debates at the last World Congress. We arrived in Italy with little knowledge of the debate. This time, we must ensure that the Central Committee and the city leaderships are fully in touch. The World Congress had an importance which was not clear to those present. The Congress was shaped by the Latin American question. The theme was: the International is going to be constructed ***** A manual to this fact, to prepare to give support, give practical aid, Etc. A few things, a few facts, are clear now, which we did not know then. The uneven development of the sections of the International, the lack of prior distribution of documents, our lack of knowledge of the facts, the newmess of the leaderships—all this produced an imbalence ("déséquilibre") which led to decisions whose consequences we didn't understand at that time.

We believed at that thime in the reality of the organizations which had to carry out the line in Latin America. The Argentinian and Bolivian organizations, especially. The application of the line, however, led to a series of alterations in these two countries. Today the question is posed to what extent we can work on the PRT-Combatiente ("agir sur") with a view of Trotskyizing it. This question was posed then, in 1969: the question of their understanding of Stalinism, of the Cuban leadership, their appreciation of the traditions of armed struggle in Latin America, of their attachment to the Fourth International. These problems were not solved then, but there seemed to be clear possibilities of solving them.

Why then have things evolved as they have? The work of the International's leadership with this section was insufficient.
... The comrades wxtwweed assigned to this work had little impact on the education of the militants. The question of the accuracy of the reports we received. All this tied in with the capacity of the center to travel, to investigate—a capacity which was very limited. We knew little.

What is a World Congress of the International? Traditionally its function had been to maintain the theoretic al unity of the world movement, to re-examine and update our analysis of world capitalism. Many understood the 9th World Congress in this fashion. But the 9th World Congress, in fact, was different. A whole series of new forces had come in, new sections which were there on the basis of a break with the traditional forms of inx terreties activity of the International, its traditions, its themes of work: the French, the English, the Ewiss. And the themes debated at the Congress had little relationship with the real experiences of these new organizations. Thus the youth document written by the Americans in the name of the United Secretariat showed an imbalance in experience. And the Chinese dispute -- well, that documents were really "Chinese"! The differences were not very apparent. The realationship of the differences to present practice was not clear. So the debate on Latin America played the key role. And a whole series of themes which were unclear then, but have come out more and more clearly since, were brought out: the utilization of violence,

the response to Stalinism, the approach to the problem of transformation of the bourgeois state--all these were inherent in the Latin American debate.

The participation of the LC was "quantitative"; we had little political influence. We had little real understanding of what the International was, and what we knew was from books. We had no idea what it means to build an international leadership. We had a false view of the possibilities of the International functioning like an International. We didn't foresee the consequences of the congress for the International. Several sections refused to accept the line of the Congress and have continued to display their particular character ("spécificité") since. What has happened since then? That brings me to part two of my report.

The International has developed as never before, quantitatively and qualitatively. This development has confirmed what had been showen at the Congress in 1969: the manifest disequilibrium between the sections who had retained a "propagandist" make mode of intervention, and the "interventionist" sections. This makes maintaining the theoretical unity of the International more difficult. Political problems came up that urgently required solution, like that of the class character of the social-democratic party of Germany and of the British Labor Party.

And in Asia, for example, the most tumultuous sector of the world, with the greatest possibilities, apart from Japan, we see either stagnation, or decline of our organizations. In Ceylon for example there is a lengthy and strong Trotskyist tradition. But the workerist outlook of the group there, led them to underestimate the youth radicalization. The comrades couldn't take advantage of this. When it took the form of the JVP, they were bypassed. The political initative, as a result of this, and the defeat of the JVP, fell into the hands of the government.

In India, the section has a very rich tradition. But very small, only 70 comrades in a country of hundreds of millions, and in decline. Why has the section declined over the years, continuing to lose its forces by ones, twos, and by small groups?

As for the Partai Acoma in Indonesia, we have been unable, despite repeated attempts by a variety of channels, to reestablish contact with it in recent years. We do not know if anything still exists.

In the Phillipines a group, a very small group, was established through the efforts of a Phillipines comrade who had been in Europe, and a Canadian comrade. They had a false view of the politics of that country, which flowed from trying to impose European political concepts. As a result, the group has not progressed.

In China, we have some tens of comrades in Hong Kong; thex question is how to utilize their forces. This can best be done in alliance with the Japanese comrades, for printing etc.

Only in Japan, in all Asia, have we made progress. A substantial growth of the group; it cannot be excluded from the actions of the left there. We have to re-examine the whole framework of Asia from the starting point of the strength of the Fapanese section.

In the Arab World, we see the difficulty, the failure of the International leadership in intervening quickly and decisively.

In Israel, other organizations, our opponents like the Maoists and the Lambertists, stepped in and started to utilize the Israel Socialist Organization for their own ends. We had to intervene forcefully to back up our comrades and assure them of our support.

In Africa we had only two groups at the time of the last world Congress, one in Nigeria, one in South Africa. The latter had great traditions, but had always been loose (). Now the organization seems very indistinct. ("flou") As for Nigeria, the group now longer exists as a Fourth Internationalist group. But a certain progress has been made in other countries of French-speaking Africa.

We come to Europe. Clearly the European groups now have a decisive weight in the International. There has been an uneven development in the International. The debate among the European groups has centered on intervention in trade union work, and the relationship of this work with the other areas of intervention. This theme is unique to Europe. In North America the central role of trade union work is absent, due to the absence of a politicized working class. The specificity of Europe demands a mugh tighter integration of the mix organizations here. We cannot wait until after the 10th World Congress to solve these problems. For example, on the question of Vietnam: our demands have a sharply "Vanguardist" approach in Europe, as seen in the slogans (victory to the NLF) etc.) It would be totally wrong for us to miss out on this possibility for the internationalist education of the melieu.

As for the youth radicalization, its forms in Asia, America, are marked by specific historical traditions and have quite different forms than here.

(He mentions in passing, in one sentence, our groups in Australia and New Zealand)

The next World Congress will vote on the recognition of over 12 groups that exist now. Australia, New Zealand, Spain, perhaps Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Holland, Ireland, Israel, Iray, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia... This poses problems of how to function. The reality is that the International has been developing despite the politics of its center.

You see, the debate on Latin America is part of a broader debate. The North American comrades say there is an ultra-left development in the European movement. They, in North America, possess a wakkx long-established Trotskyist tradition and habit of legal functioning (tenant d'une certaine légalité et d'une wignexxx vielle tradition du Trotskysme), clearly view the question of our development in Europe from a certain standpoint. This poses several problems around how to intervene: the question of self-defense of the workers, of attacks on U.S. consulates--themes which are rejected by the North American comrades.

In North America you have a reality of the International which is different. Comrades who have been in North America have tried to understand these differences, and why they exist. The American section has a special place in the history of the International, to which the Canadians are associated. An unmatched historical continuity, political stability, strength of organizational apparatus, in a context in which the working class is not a force in the political life. This gave the youth fadicalization a wholly different franking character there. It took crazy forms, k went off in all directions—and this had

to be replied to.. The youth radicaliation took ultra-left forms, irrational forms; developed no understanding of the working class. Such movements have dominated political life in America. Comrades had to react to this, not just on the ideological plane, but in defence of their own movement against these dangers. They extrapolate these attitudes by applying them to the youth movements in Europe which are more combatitive. We'll have to pick this up, answer whether we are marked by ultra-leftism, and explain what ultra-leftism is.

The special weight of Europe is decisive in the International today. The International cannot function without the strength of all its sections in Europe. So the functioning of the International has to be transformed. We have to establish structures for the European area. The problems are evident in Germany and England. We saw in the IMG convention that the organization is very much behind in relation to its possibilities. The IMG has as many members as Healy, but it lacks the tradition, the organization, the cohesion.

Both the North American comrades and ourselves bear a responsibility here. The English section was recognized only in 1969. But previously there was no section. The group was built up on the basis of material aid from North America, which enabled the new section to be established, and posed the need for its integration into the new European reality. section had been built on the basis of North American conceptions. But the reality was in Britain was determined, after 1968, by European reality. A gap then developed between the history of the British organization and its present, which was reflected through the formation of a minority around the question of how to develop the IMG's work. This gap blowed down the development of the IMG. For example the minority said the IMG should increase its propaganda against Healey. The majority wanted to open up in another direction, by attacking the International Socialists. And the political immaturity of the leadership made it difficult to get control in the internal struggle which was a very violent one. An example is the debate on woman's liberation work. The international let this situation -- I won't say rot -- but continue in crisis, when the international should have intervened: eg. on the characterization of the labor party.

Another example is that of the German organization.

And organizational crisis there flowed from the failure of the German leadership to seize the opportunity of the youth radicalization. The organization was widely discredited through this experience. Today the group is divided into several local groupings, each with their own practice, their own policies.

There are other examples of the development of groups which have not been integrated into the European reality. In the Iberian peninsula for example. The question of violence... (unclear). Developments in a section affect the whole life of the international... The special weight of Europe and involves the question of the composition of the leadership of the International, the finances, the organizational modes, and the responsibility of national leaderships in situations where they are only indirectly involved. (this section unclear)

I now come to the question of the role of the Ligue, and of the kind of international centralization that we need. First there is the need for information, for the adequate translation and circulation of documents. Then there is the finances of the international. Until now the finances have

carried by the French and the New.Zesland organizations. This is dangerous because who has economic power in these matters tends to have political control—that is those who supply the funds have a very real weight in deciding how they are to be used. There's an obvious imbalance here. ("déséquilibre")

The leadership of the International has developed over the past years in the following manner. First there was the period of the Bruxelles center, from 1969 to June of 1970. It had a full-time staff of four comrades. But this center was weaker than any national leadership--weaker for example than the center which the Euxembourg comrades have built today. It was therefore impossible for this center to operate effectively. It was broken up by the departure of the New Zealand comrades in 1970, who were playing a key role in their own section's work--the New Zealanders than ceased paying their dues and the International was carried financially by the Ligue. This situation was partially resolved lasty year, giving the International a structure, administrative at least, which was more effective. These moves reflected a different understanding from the two sides.

The Americans understand proposed the Center along lines which reflect certain traditions. They have a position on the necessity for there to be an axis of leadership in the International. At first this was the United States and Trotsky. Then, after the war, the United States and Europe, the arrangement which blew up in 1953 and which they wished to reconstitute as the N United-States-Paris axis. They An equality was established among leading groups in dues payments. The center was relaunched on the basis of a "division of power" between the two leading groups. We need to expand the center with more participation from Europe, from Japan.

How is the World Congress to be organized?

First there will be a central text--the question of its being put for a vote is not resolved--a broad political program. But the text is not agreed on. The blocking point is one issue--the use of violence. If this point dominates the future debate, it will have heavy consequences for the equilibrium of the International.

Second, Tisserand, Sebastien and Walter are drafting a document on the European sections: the fundamental themes of the programmatic internation of the European sections.

Third is the document on the Middle Fast, which is a joint document, which reeks of compromise ("respire le compromis"). There is a point of disagreement five pages long, the question of the Hebrews in Israel. The American comrades have a firm position: no recognition of the right of the Hebrew nation to self determination in the framework of a socialist Palestine. For us, this remains an open question.

Fourth is Walter's economic analysis of the present situation.

Fifth: Tariq will be able to produce soon a document on the situation in the Indian sub-continent.

Sixth is the document on xmx women's liberation by the American comrades. There will certainly be a political debate there. It's interesting that the American comrade who toured here was astonished to xxxxx find, as she reported

in New York, mf that the relationships between the women's liberation movement and the class struggle was being discussed in a systematic way in each country. (amusement in the hall)

The support of the Ligue is very crucial. The whole of the Central Committee and city leaderships have to come to grips with ("maîtriser") this debate. The axis for us is the necessity to transform the international from a propagandistic organization to an interventionist organization, and this can only be done if theleadership knows how to combine forms of struggle which are profoundly different; so the future leadership must be ... (he fades out.)

Jebracq: (excerpts from a rapid 25 min. speech)

One of the key questions at the last World Congress was the objectivist approach to problems, Comrades (he means: comrades representing the pre-1968 mode of analysis) tended to see in revolutionery victories the force of objective processes rather than making a detailed analysis of the subjective factor, of the characteristics in these leaderships which made the victories of the revolution possible. We see this theme several times in the central document of the 9th World Congress. For example the document says that May 68 in France objectively put the question of power on the order of the day, but the subjective factor was missing. This is an absolutely meaningless statement.

Similarly, the document on youth proposed a transitional program for youth without talking of the interrelationship between the youth m vement and the vanguard party. This was entirely lacking in the text.

As for the document on Latin America, it was wrong. False in its formulations. But not wrong in its dynamic. For example, the part which says that you have to subordinate all to a brakthrough in one country. The part about rural guerrilla warfare. (he picks up the texts and reads the relevant quotes from Livio's "insufficient document" and from the Resolution). This idea that the International will be built through Bolivis. This kind of short-cuts. Take Livio's text in response to Hansen, (he reads another quote) which draws an absolutely fallacious parallel between a guerrilla struggle and a general strike. Quite false.

Yet we were obleged to vote for this resolution in order to give the necessary impulse to the International. But we can't let it rest there. The debate we have here (he lifts the two volumes of texts on Latin America) is a debate of paralytics—unless we give a new direction to the debate. Since 1969 we have seen defeat in Bolivia. An unclear balance in Argentina. If we don't take the initiative, a balance will be drawn of these experiences of a conservative character. This would be a catastrophe for the entire International; it would meen giving up the new and audacious forms of struggle. Here's the scenario: on the one hand the apparently orthodox positions of Moreno, and on the other the opportunist positions of the PRT, which will be tied in with their military line. This leads to a terrible confusion if we do not intervene.

(He talks of entrism: we have to break with it completely. The need to attack the AJS more effectively) Their continuation of the entrist attitude, their united front approach, their opposition to violence, etc. We haven't attacked them effectively

Hansen points out that the strategy of guerrilla warfare is applicable to the entire world. And indeed repression is highly developed in many countries of Europe, for example. Then Hansen reasserts the myth of the "classical model" of revolution—what took phace in Russia in 1917. (voice from the floor: "which never existed!) This framework of reference—the classical model—is common to Livio and Germain, too. (he quotes from Livio, and Germain—Knölher) This model is a total myth which isolates the revolution of 1917 from the particular conditions which led to it: the war, the power of the army representing the peasantry. It is absolutely catastrophic to apply this formula to the Latin America.

To propon the "propagandistic" approach in Europe would be to develop our organizations without preparing them in any way for the revolutionary explosion. In Europe today, a revolutionary crisis will not, cannot be limited to one country. So our movement in Europe must therefore be politically homogeneous.

The schema of 1917, an historic myth, blocks comrades from understanding the rhythm of the reintegration of revolutionary violence in the struggle in West Europe today.

Volodar:

A certain number of sections have found their way empirically to building up their movements, despite the weakness of the International leadership. They have done this in different conditions, in different ways. Superficially, it would seem to have produced a similar development in differ the various countries. But in fact it has produced opposed results, antagonistic results.

The political problem today is that a workers radicalization is beginning. This poses the question of an intervention towards the working class. The conceptions we applied in Latin America and in other questions: they lead us back to the question of constructing our sections in Europe and North America. The discussion we must have on this question—it in no way in is a question of interfering in other sections, but rather of replying to real questions, real problems.

The question of building the section through the establishment of a youth organization is no longer posed in any country of Europe. Rather even in countries where we have only 50-100 comrades, the questicities posed of building these groups through intervening in working class struggles. In the American sections as well it seems that questions of this nature are being posed. The kind of problem comrades have there is in fact a universal one.

The real significance of the turn of the last World Congress is not just from propaganda to agitation. More precisely, it is the turn to the building of a working class base. The differences with the American comrades are centered there. Here we have to understand the history of the United States organization. When we discuss the youth movement with them, or the women's liberation movement, this

reflects in fact that you have today in American society, in addition to a quite gradual radicalization of the working class, a very sharp radicalization of Blacks, of youth, which (isolated from the working class) has led to a tremendous waste of human resources. Thus their justified preoccupation with polemicizing against ultra-leftism. Confronted with rising struggles, the American comrades think first not of how to intervene, but of how best to explain the ways not to intervene.

It seems clear however that to build the American organization means havingwa developing a working class organization. And k that there will

(more...)

not be a gradual development here, but tather the possibility of great and very explosive developments.

... There are thus two poles in the International today: in North America the two organizations with very developed traditions in the Trotskyist movement; in Europe groups that have grown up outside these traditions. Then there is a third category of completely backward groups: Chile, India, etc.

Delphin

. . .

Let me first express my general agreement with the contributions of Jebracq and Volodar.

It's clear that in the debate in the Ligue, comrades are lost in the affair. The Central Committee has to lead this process, to explain that there is not the same kind of democratic centralism in the preparation of an international congress. Wewennewsewwe we The debate cannot be man it equally grasped (maîtriser) by the compades, by the ranks.

There are two ways of looking at the World Congress. First, that there are two tendencies; the SWP on the one hand, and on the other the Ligue, the IMG, etc. But our conception is not this. We start with the fact that at the last World Congress there was a majority and minority. But there is no way one can speak today of tendencies. The majority as a tendency does not exist. It could exist in the future. We have been wondering whether this would be useful. So, on their side, are the SWP comrades with respect to the formation of an organized minority. But such a tendency does not exist. There is not sufficient coherence of the majority. No one can say what the positions of the Ligue are on the questions of the international debate.

If we do not see this, and speak in this fashion, we create a terrorist atmosphere in the movement, this comrades who may agree with the SWP will think it is anti-Ligue Communiste to do so.

There could well be very serious divisions between now and the World Congress. (Ca risque d'y avoir des clivages très profondes d'ici le congrès mondial) Not on armed struggle. The Hansen-Livio debate has no interest for me. It is after all a debate among Trotskyists, for no one questions the necessity of armed overthrow of the state.

Rather there are three points where there are fundamental differences. (1) The method of construction of the revolutionary party. (2) The relationship of the vanguard organization and the mass movement. An example of this is the waviwwx Vietnam movement. We understand why the American comrades advocate the program they do for the NPAC. But why does the SWP not advance more advanced slogans, on its own, like victory to the NLF? (3) Extracted a lack of understanding, or of information—a lack of information on the real development of the ficlass struggle, which produces a dialogue of the deaf. But look at the problem of the elections in

Argentina. If you don't know the situation in Argentina, the positions of La Verdad do seem very correct, and very similar to the orientation of the Ligue Communiste — trade union work, student work, participation in the elections, etc. But look at the situation. To participate in the elections in Argentina, is this not to give a left-wing cover ("caution de gauche") to the bourgeoisie? And in this sense, we have to put in question the trip of Linda Jenness to Argentina, where she spoke to mass meetings of 3,000, speaking on everything—except Argentina. * Does this kind of trip not pose a terrible problem when there are hundreds in the jails of Argentina?

n sert

Now we see what we were really talking about. There is going to be no general text on Latin America. But rather, as Vergeat said, specific texts on Bolivia, Argentina.

We've got a in general little understanding of what the situation is in North America. We have to remember that. I remember when I was speaking in Canada at a university on the Prairies, I talked a lot about the class struggle, and after my talk, a student put his hand up and asked, "What is the class struggle?"

These are serious problems. The Wankedwaters United Secretariat wankemmedatine criticized the U.S. comrades for their condemndation of the kidnapping of Sallustro. And one of the reasons for the action of the SWP is that they say, if you accept the Sallustro kidnapping, you have to accept the terrorist actions of the Weathermen here, or of the FLQ in Canada. This is a very serious development.

We have to go the to the World Congress not just to have a battle (pas pour se battre) but to law down our political orientations on every point, clearly, precisely, with no concessions whatsoever.

And we will have to say what must be said to the comrades of the PRT. Our Political Bureau has decided by the way to write to the Political Bureau of the PRT on sthese questions. The PRT has submitted two documents for the discussion. The kkx Red Book, one of them—well, it makes your hair stand on end, what's in it. It hasn't much to do with Trotskyism. This document existed before, atwittentiant a long time ago, but we didn't know about it—it was part of our problem of information. We're going to say what is, with no factional considerations.

Some of the comrades of the IMG believe that the SWP is degenerated, and is no longer Trotskyist. If that is the case, you have to draw the conclusion, including the necessity of ultimately building a new organization against the SWP in the United States. But I do not think so. I do not believe there had been a degeneration. Therfore I believe there is no split perspective here. We have to be very careful; a non-factional attitude is required.

One the problem in the IMG. The SWP believes that the orientation of the IMG majority has nothing much to do with Trotakyism, that they are headed for the liquidation of Trotskyism in England.

There was a very violent debate in England. On the request

of the United Secretariat, a Fact Finding Commission was set up and made a report. The United Secretariat did not accept the report, but accepted its conclusions, which included the dropping of all disciplinary charges against the minority. This was not done in a factional manner at all, you see. There was Gisela, myself, an American and a Canadian comrade on the commission. And it made all kinds of criticisms of the ILG majority. Such an attitude, a non-factional approach, is not at all contradictory with a very hard debate.

Paulet

....

Ramos

The organization of this discussion is certainly an improvement over the organization of the last, but things are not improving very fast. I don't agree with the line of the minority on Latin America, but I don't agree with the line of the majority either. The Ligue has a big job in creating a more healthy atmosphere for the discussion.

You have to try to understand the point of view of the SWP in the international. We have no knowledge of the history of the International. For example, there was a world circulation of ideas before 1952, but that didn't stop the split. It is not true either that the International didn't exist before 1968. Several sections were strong and had an activity going beyond that of a propaganda group: the Bolivians, the Seylonese, the SWP. You can't just say that it all started in 1968 when you are talking to people who represent the continuity of the International like those in North America. There were ten years which I call the period of Pabloism. The problem of these years arises again and again. It's about time we examined it. Like entrism: it was a strategy—a strategy that lasted two whole years.

lance tic

The brochure of Rabbasan Weber continues to say that Pablo was right (the brochure on the AJS) in 1952. You have to examine this; least the continues that (gratter l'abcès). The truth was that Pablo was not right, nor was Lambert; the truth was between the two.

You think the Hansen-Livio debate is of no importance? Look at the error s we made. The position of the majority at the 9th World Congress was more than 50 % Fidelista-Guevarista—that was the standpoint of the JCR. It was not a pressure of ultra-leftism but of forces from outside our movement. Viview was dead wrong. And it was poured from the Castroist mould. (calqué sur le castrisme)

As for the Bolivian affair—I'd like to see the balance sheet of it. There something funny about this business. (Quelque chose clochait là.) We pushed the comrades there to a Castrist line, it seems, which turned out to be not correct.

If there's a correct political line in Latin America in opposition to that of the Majority, then it is the line of Hugo

Blanco. This is a history about which we have said nothing. We haven't even published the documents. And in the corridors, you hear comrades say, "Hugo Blanco, we've got to be careful" -- say that he's slipping away from Trotskysim.

In short we boosted a position, the continental strategy, which proved to be wrong.

Thy the silence on the devalopments in Cuba today? The American comrades have pointed out that this is in contradiction with our support of the Armed Struggle line in Latin America.

I agree that the question of the International's leadership is not solved by a bi-polar French-American system. We must absolutely obtain wavevxwavxvax money for continuous consultation of the best leaders of all the sections. The disester of the Latin American bureau was a reflected of the International under Pablo. But the idea itself is not necessaryly wrong. It could be part of the answer.

Gilles

I see the roots of the debate, of the present crisis, in the imbalance between the part of the International which was transformed boy the youth radicalization and the part which was untouched by this radicalization and remained as it was before.

The Hansen-Livio debate has nothing to do with reality. Their cuotations from Trotsky and Lenin have no value, lead us nowhere at all. The cuestions are often posed abstractly because we don't have information. But this caricature (the destructed debate) is damaging. Further, we don't know what it is all about. What really are the differences. Now, it seems, the debate has shifted over to other grounds. A harsh criticism, it seems, of the politics of the International as a whole. These documents don't help us to understand what it's all about. As for the problem that Delphin emphasized, of the relationship between mass work and the vanguard, no one talks about it.

(He presses hard for more information on what is the international)

Sterne

Why are Asia and Vietnam not on the agenda? They should be added.

The Vietnam revolution is a great lever for us to win the vanguard on a world scale. The sections don't know how to use it properly. You cannot explain the character and the advance of the Vietnamese revolution except through the subjective factor, the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party. (He proceeds into a lengthy panegyric of the Vietnamese communists.) They understand the national question, which the Vietnamese Trotskyists did not, and where the Trotskyist becoment in general is weak.

And on the question of the national bourgeoisie—this question is not at all well developed in our document.s. To write a simple paragraph blasting the Bolivians for the front there with bourgeois forces—that is easily done. But why they are wrong, from a tactical point of view, that's something which the International doesn't understand very well, and where the lessons of the Vietnamese kext are precious to us.

Yann

... (He wants Indochina on the World Congress agenda) ...

Margeanek

(He wants the workers states on the agenda)

Volodar

. . .

The situation of the Center kas of before last fall has been surmounted—in a purely administrative manner. We had as a result all kinds of trouble with the comrades of the IMG who accused us of forming a block with the SME North American comrades to take over. Now the comrades of the SWP are mad. For example they made an organizational compromise with us on the question of the Middle East, compromising on a text to keep us happy. Now they are confronted with a document which agrees with our position, and contradicts that of their last Convention for a secular democratic Palestine...

Vergeat

What we are talking about is not a question of a break with the old cadres, with the old Trotskyism. But it is a very necessary adaptation of our methods of work to new conditions.

It is not enough to repeat the transitional program, commendate of ten done in an illigitimate way (d'une manière abusive). Nor it is a question of liquidating it. Rather it must be verified in a new world context, that of a period of the crisis of Stalinism, which is entirely different from that of the former period.

(He refers to the danger of the alternative being posed: Moreno or the ERP. This is something which could blow up the International.)

INSERT: page 9.

She speaks of women's liberation, Vietnam, but not of the Argentinian dictatorship--if she did, these meetings could not take place.