

Issued by the California State Committee, CPA—July 1945
942 Market Street, Suite 701, San Francisco 2

Browder's speech to National Committee

This is the first meeting of the national leadership of the American Communist movement since 1930 to which I have not reported on behalf of the executive body, except for the 14 months in which I was in prison.

It is obvious that the present inner situation, in which the first gunfire of sharp criticism from some Marxists abroad has resulted, in our executive, in the proposal for a sharp and unconsidered turn in policy which makes its point of departure from general theoretical considerations rather than from a concrete analysis of the objective situation, proves without further argument that our national leadership has been resting upon an unsound foundation. I accept this fact as a basic criticism of my own role in the leadership, for I failed to foresee such a crisis of leadership and therefore failed to make any adequate preparation against it.

It seems to me necessary, even though I cannot any longer on behalf of our executive, that I shall make an accounting to the National Committee for my stewardship, that I shall give you freely and frankly the results of my own thinking about our past experiences, about the present world situation, and about the tasks of the American working-class after V-E Day.

WAS OUR WARTIME POLICY SOUND OR UNSOUND?

The basic soundness of American Communists' wartime policy had not been directly challenged in the present discussion until the reports today. But indirectly, by implication, the challenge had been made under cover of the general theoretical issues that are raised. It is therefore required that we review our entire war policy and re-test it point by point, especially all those points which were under dispute at any time, for only from the ground of a correct evaluation of the past is it possible to chart our course into the future.

During the period of the spread of the war to involve the Soviet Union and America, I was in Atlanta prison, denied the right to conduct any correspondence about the war or to talk to any visitors on the subject. I did manage to get past the censors with one thought, which I restated in different forms in every letter, sometimes in learned discourses on the Bible, sometimes in discussions of chess and checkers, etc., this thought, namely, that American national interest provided the only sound foundation for war policy which could rally a majority of the nation for consistent carry-through to victory. I flatter myself, perhaps, by believing that my abstruse messages were of any help to the comrades in the field who had the task of adjusting our movement to the realities of war participation in the days following June 22 and December 7, 1941. Regardless of how it was achieved, however, our party did proceed, with more or less clarity, to hold fast to the concept of national interest as the guide to war participation and not leave it unchallenged in the hands of reactionaries who misuse it against the nation. What we had learned through the years of the fight for collective security, and in the nearly two years of the imperialist phase of the war, was crystallized in a higher form during the last months of 1941 and the beginning of 1942.

When I returned from Atlanta in May, 1942, I found our main approach to the war problems correct but with two serious distortions. One was the idea that the struggle for Negro rights must be postponed until after the war; this had seriously endangered our relations with the whole Negro community. The second distortion was a similar attitude toward the colonial liberation movement and specifically toward Puerto Rico. I secured the agreement of our leadership to the public correction of these distortions in my first public speech in Madison Square Garden on July 2, 1942. But it took more than two years to dissolve this wrong attitude toward Puerto Rico among our membership, requiring a protracted and sometimes bitter struggle. Our correction on the question of Negro rights led directly to the campaign of 1943 that elected Ben Davis to the city council.

In the summer of 1942, I wrote my book "Victory and After" in constant consultation with our executive, with the avowed purpose of bringing coher-

ence and system into our attitude toward all questions of the war, and toward the historical development of the war. The only complaint I have ever heard against this book was from Comrade Foster, who thought it should have gone through his hands for editing before publication; but even he has not challenged any of the political ideas of the book. The final chapter, which was approved formally in meeting by our leadership before publication, laid the foundation for my later book "Teheran." It is a short chapter, and I will impose upon your patience enough to read it, for perhaps it has been forgotten, as have been so many other things. (Read Chapter XXI—The Postwar World—p. 250 to top of page 252 in "Victory and After.")

I have quoted this final chapter of "Victory and After" at length because, if it is true as charged that I have misled the American Communists onto the paths of revisionism, then here is the original sin. So far as fundamental theory is concerned there is not a word in my book "Teheran" that goes farther than the thoughts outlined in this chapter written in 1942, a year and half before Teheran. For me it was easy to greet Teheran and interpret it as I did because I foresaw its necessity. It was the unfolding of that which was required by the nature of things; it was as though one were witnessing the public performance of a long-rehearsed play.

We discuss in another place the Marxian theoretical validity of this concept. Suffice it to note at this point that a similar line of reasoning led President Roosevelt to Teheran, and led CIO-PAC to formulate its program for the great election campaign of 1944. It was this vision of a possible future that became the platform that enabled the progressive coalition in America to maintain itself in power and keep out the Dewey-Hoover-Vandenberg crowd. It is very difficult for me now to agree that it is nothing but a petty-bourgeois illusion. In fact it is impossible for me to so agree.

SOLVING THE WARTIME PROBLEMS OF THE WORKING CLASS

When I returned from Atlanta, I found the labor movement working under the no-strike policy which had been endorsed by the Communists. I approved of it heartily; but I had to take notice of the fact that organized labor had not yet learned how to perform its role as protector of the working class at the same time as it protected the nation, under the new conditions. In my book, "Victory and After," Chapter 20, I laid the basis for an integrated war-time policy which, I believe, has stood the test of time and practice and which solved the appearing contradictions. Again I will test your patience with a few quotations:

"There is a very pressing and immediate motive for the trade unions to be taking up the economic problem along new lines. The functioning of trade unions as guardians of the economic interests of the workers is becoming more important with every passing day, not only for labor but for the whole country, for production and for victory. Yet the nature of this problem is changing so rapidly that if the trade union movement lags behind in the full understanding of the changes there is grave danger that we will not only have rising economic strains within the country between labor and management, resulting in dangerous economic strife, but we will have political strains unnecessarily arising between labor and the government. We must foresee these problems so that we will not find it necessary to muddle through to a solution. We must be able to see these solutions in time to relieve these strains and to avoid the strife. . . .

"In certain irresponsible quarters the Communist

Party is already being accused of proposing to sacrifice the interests of the workers to the capitalists, because of our firm and unshakable insistence on the necessity of uninterrupted war production. Only a little while ago, that irresponsible journal, The New Leader, printed such a charge against us. And some writers who have access to the columns of the official news sheet of the American Federation of Labor have also printed such a charge against us. That charge is a malicious slander that could only be made by people who put narrow factional considerations above the true interests of labor, which are inseparable from the interests of our country in this war. . . .

"Wages must be dealt with upon the basis of providing the most efficient working class for the tasks of production consistent with the supply of consumption goods and services that can be made available in the country in an all-out war economy. . . .

"In the current discussion . . . about the dangers of inflation, the automatic answer is brought forward that inflation must be avoided by depressing the living standards of the working class, that is, by lowering the provision for maintaining the human factor in production. . . . This is utter nonsense in the economic field; it is idiocy in the political field; and it is the greatest present threat to the war production program. . . .

" . . . The capitalist is allowed his (income), not because there is any 'justice' in it, and even less because he has any economic 'use' in the war economy, but purely as a matter of public policy to keep him from becoming so discontented that he loses his patriotism and sabotages the war. The worker, on the other hand, receives wages entirely upon the basis of his usefulness in production."

A National Conference of the Communist Party was held on November 29-30, 1942, with the single item on its order of business of working out detailed labor policy in its relation to war production to apply the principles I laid down in Chapter XX. The outcome of that conference was the pamphlet, "Production for Victory," which I presume most of you have forgotten, which I would recall to your memory. It dealt, after a political introduction, with the following subjects:

- 1.—Production Schedules; the Problem of Raw Materials, the Problem of Manpower, the Problem of Small Enterprise.
- 2.—The Utilization of Labor; Increased Productivity, Piece Rates and Incentive Wage, Stabilized Employment.
- 3.—Organized Labor in Production; Labor-Management Production Committees, the Trade Unions' New Role.
- 4.—Obstacles to Correct Policies; the War Department and Production.
- 5.—Agriculture in the War Economy.

I cannot take time to review the ground covered by that pamphlet; you should re-read it.

This pamphlet was distributed in over a hundred thousand copies, it was studied by tens of thousands of union officials and shop stewards, it gave the basic orientation to the new problems for a large section of the labor movement which later proved the most successful in solving its problems. It is worthy of being re-studied today in the light of our current discussion. It is a central and integral part of the war policy of American Communists, the base from which we were able to keep the spontaneous strike movements of the workers under control, to defeat the conspiracies of the strike fomenters, and to maintain the democratic coalition intact until victory was achieved.

SOME MOMENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NO-STRIKE POLICY

The two key leaders in the labor movement, in the battle for and against the no-strike policy, were Philip Murray and John L. Lewis. One of the most important phases of this battle was to build the authority and prestige of Murray within the ranks of labor and to tear down that of Lewis. The battle had to be conducted even within the ranks of the Communists.

I secured the support of the majority of the Communist leadership, and step by step enlisted

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NOTE

We are herewith reprinting the main sections of Earl Browder's remarks to the National Committee meeting, June 18. We wish to make known that Comrade Browder at no time requested of the Secretariat or the National Board the printing of these remarks.

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that of all trade union leaders who listened to our advice. At the same time I publicly denounced John L. Lewis in a series of speeches in the midst of his several coal strikes in April and May, 1943. At that moment there were no other voices raised against Lewis in the labor movement, and even among Communists it was impossible to secure sharp and unequivocal public declarations. I was told privately that I was signing my own political death sentence when I denounced the Lewis strikes at the moment they were under way. All such warnings and hesitations proved unfounded. Once the ice was broken by my St. Louis speech, the tide turned against Lewis throughout the labor movement, and the threatening mass strike movement subsided.

The second great crisis of the no-strike policy came at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, with the referendum to rescind the no-strike policy in the Auto Workers Union, with the open repudiation of the policy by Wolchok of the Warehousemen's Union and Rieve of the Textile Union, all with the support of the Lewis forces, the Socialists, the Trotskyites, the Dubinskyites, and a large section of the daily press and the employers. The center of this crisis was the referendum in the Auto Workers Union. Well, the story is too long to recount, but step by step we succeeded in rallying the auto workers, their leaders, and then the whole CIO, until a smashing victory was registered for the no-strike policy, right in the midst of our last National Committee meeting. It proved that our policy is firmly rooted among the broadest masses, and it saved America from a mass strike movement at the time of the Nazi breakthrough on the Belgian front.

THE FIGHT FOR THE COALITION BEFORE TEHERAN

Permit me, without exaggerating my personal role, to cite from my own speeches during 1942 and 1943 to characterize the nature of our party's struggle for the coalition before Teheran; I believe that it is objectively true that these speeches are representative of the activity of the whole party.

You will pardon me if I now inflict upon you a whole series of quotations, and I think it is necessary because of the epidemic of short memories exhibited in the period of discussion.

July 2, 1942: "We now hold the keys to an adequate policy for winning the war. These keys are: the American-Soviet-British pacts and alliance — the bulwark of the United Nations and of world democracy; the Washington and London agreements to open the second front in Europe and to extend all-out aid to China. With the fulfillment of these historic agreements we will have a guiding policy for victory. But this policy must be fought for. The labor movement, the entire people must and will support this policy." . . . "The pacts announced on June 11 . . . outlined a post-war collaboration for the common tasks of world reconstruction. In the Anglo-Soviet Pact this is embodied in a formal 20-year alliance. This is of enormous significance opening up a new era in international relationships, with consequences we now can only begin to understand. It is the complete refutation of all pessimists and prophets of evil, who would weaken our will to victory now by picturing disasters to come after the war. The freedom-loving nations whether capitalist . . . or Socialist . . . are pledging themselves to peaceful co-existence and collaboration in the postwar world. All men who deeply desire the full extirpation of Nazism in all its varieties from the world will not only greet this announced program as an ideal, but will shape their every word and deed to helping to bring its full realization in life."

October 2, 1942: "The people are behind this war to the end, they are ready for every necessary sacrifice, they are impatient to go ahead. The President is doing the best he can with advisers who keep jogging his elbow and holding back his arm; he can be criticized only for hesitating to sweep these mischief makers out of his councils and for failing to chack down on the defeatist newspapers. Let us frankly face the facts, however, that the defeatist poison penetrates and tends to paralyze the war policies of our government in Washington. We must learn how to locate the seats of this poison, in order to eliminate them. . . . Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war . . . engaged not in fighting the Japanese but

in blockading the Chinese Eighth Route Army . . . and the New Fourth Army. . . . What suicidal nonsense is this, by which persons who speak for our own government keep the best Chinese fighters out of the war and create a gap which must be filled by a million American boys? . . . Our attitude toward Europe is equally ambiguous. Our State Department continues to do business with Mannerheim Finland, Franco Spain, and Vichy France, three puppet regimes of Hitler. . . . The people must be roused and organized in support of the President against this cabal of Munichmen."

October 26, 1942: "The United States is not yet exerting its full effort. This is your problem and mine and it will be solved only to the degree that you and I take it up and solve it. . . . People who are afraid to fight and afraid to die are destined to be slaves of Hitler. . . . Who is responsible for our slowness and delays? The Chicago Tribune will tell you that our troubles come from the President. But it is not the President who is responsible. It is the coalition of copperheads. . . . They who are responsible for obstructing the war effort try to place the responsibility for their obstruction and dissension on the President and on all those win-the-war forces who have been trying to go forward."

November 8, 1942: "There are still some reactionary cliques in America which cling to their old dreams of helping to destroy the Soviet Union and making partnership with Hitler in dividing up the world. They are not large in numbers, but they are powerful. They are the most bitter opponents of the second front and are the advocates of a negotiated peace with Hitler. They still dominate most of the American newspaper world. They represent some of the most powerful industrial monopolists in America. . . . But these native American Fascists are rapidly losing their power over the nation and have already lost their control over the minds of the people."

November 12, 1942: "It is necessary to speak of the past, however, because it is not dead. . . . Allow me to cite a few examples of current continuation of this prewar thinking in illusions instead of reality, which leads to disaster for our nation. In a recent meeting of big industrialists in New York to consider war policy, the government's efforts to organize and plan the war economy were denounced as 'socialism,' and the chairman summed up the sentiment of those present by saying:

"If we're going to come out of this war with a Marxist brand of national socialism then I say negotiate peace now and bring Adolf over here to run the show. He knows how. He's efficient. He can do a better job than any of us and a damned sight better job than Roosevelt, who is nothing but a left-wing bungling amateur."

"Here we have a simon-pure American example of the same treason that destroyed France. And it is deeply embedded among the big industrialists who control the war economy. This is not representative of all American industrialists (for example, at the mentioned NAM conference, the direct Morgan and Rockefeller interests did not join in these treasonable expressions) but it does represent the business-as-usual capitalists who are fighting against the essential planning of the war. . . . It is not my intention to paint for you a bright picture of the situation, nor to pretend that the problems of the war have been solved or that victory will come easily. No, the Axis will be crushed only at terrible cost, and with the full exertion of all our powers. Every step in the development of policy adequate to victory must itself be fought for, it does not come automatically, heavy obstacles must be overcome. Correct policies when established must still be fought for in practical application."

December 18, 1942: "Those who have read my book 'Victory and After' will remember that while there is a certain fundamental confidence in the eventual outcome of the war, I do not in this book engage in any excessive optimism. Indeed, I very specifically hold out the possibility and even the probability that the education of America in the necessities of this war would be accomplished through a succession of setbacks and blunders, and I am sorry to say that the course of events seems to be bearing out this perspective. . . . One of the most dangerous things in this war at the present moment is a certain move of irrational optimism that is sweeping the country. . . . It is evident that we are not yet adequately learning to make war; we are not seriously making war with all forces at our disposal. . . . This dark pic-

ture is causing quite a bit of confusion among liberal circles in the United States. Our liberals are sharply divided: One section swallows the policy of relying on deals with the Darlans 100 percent in the name of military expediency and sharply attacks anyone who criticizes this method of making war; another section falls into complete panic and finds a voice in the speech of Pearl Buck last week in which she said that this war is not a war for freedom any more. . . . Both these sections of liberal thought in America are even more discouraging than the facts themselves. . . . These aspects of our war policy can be changed by the intervention of the people, and these things must be changed. . . . A conspiracy against the war . . . is organized directly by a defeatist clique in the National Association of Manufacturers. . . . Nobody can straighten out this situation until we get the government in Washington to begin to take a sharp and clear lead in the solution of these problems. . . . We have sounded the alarm on these things and we have given suggestions of policy that will remedy the situation. We are not trying to intensify the class struggle; we want to help consolidate national unity for winning the war, but we know that national unity requires something more than mere submission of labor to intolerable conditions and practices. . . . I think the country is going to solve these problems. But I don't think they will be solved automatically; it is going to require a struggle. . . . The task of the next period is to get that mass support of all elements of the population, especially of organized labor, to the correct policies that can bring us through this crisis."

January 17, 1943: "The relation of forces has turned against the Axis and in favor of the United Nations. Public thinking . . . has reacted to this new phase in a peculiar manner. First, there has been a wave of shallow optimism which considers the war practically over . . . second, there has arisen . . . an opposite and equally shallow pessimism which suddenly is overwhelmed with the unsolved political problems of the war, and throws up its hands in despair, repudiates all responsibility for the war, predicts a new war immediately after this one and sits back to await the realization of its lugubrious prophecies. My remarks today are mainly directed against both these harmful tendencies. . . . All shallow optimism and complacency become most dangerous here. . . . The solutions must be found in the understanding and patriotism of the vast majority of the people, especially the workers, roused to action and organized. . . . More organization and activity of the people provide the basic solution to all the problems of a people's war."

February 2, 1943: "Yes, our national course is ambiguous. The President has charted a clear and correct policy, but it is challenged not only by Congress but also by members of his own cabinet and executive appointees. Instead of a showdown and clarification, the nation drifts along with compromise and appeasement of irreconcilable policies. . . . We cannot leave such questions to be settled at leisure. The war goes on, and time waits for no man or nation. If our national policy in its application remains ambiguous, then the results it will bring to our nation will also be ambiguous. . . . There is a lound-mouthed cult in our country which is willing to admit every weakness and error so long as it can blame it on the President. These are the demagogues of reaction. But there are too many honest democrats, progressives, and even labor men, who weaken the President's position by leaving all problems for him to settle, by failing to take energetic action themselves to help solve all these problems. . . . Now they chide the President for conciliating his enemies, but they are themselves among the first conciliators. No one has any right to criticize the President who is not himself in the midst of the hottest and most uncompromising fight to halt the mob of reaction. . . . American democracy needs more confidence in itself in order to win the war. It needs to snap out of the hypnosis induced by Hitler and Martin Dies, in which the cry of 'Communist' raises hysterical fear and sets the democrats to examining one another for hidden 'reds' and protesting each his own innocence of the terrible charge of which few know the meaning. American democracy must grow up, and stop believing in ghosts and witches. . . . We must strengthen the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance in the fires of war so that it will be an indestructible instrument for

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an ordered peace. All this must still be won. It can be won only by fighting."

February 15, 1943: "We have the stage today, in the evolution or exercise of our foreign policy, when the whole country must be wakened to the fact that we face the possibilities of serious catastrophes in Europe if this kind of unintelligent attitude continues to prevail in determining the policies of our government. On many occasions our President has given a clear lead for a correct policy. But it is impossible for him in his position to conduct the whole struggle for this policy. The citizenry generally—the rank and file—must take up the struggle for the correct policy that has been enunciated. . . ."

March 4, 1943: "We have no kind of guarantee in American policy for the release of the prisoners (in North Africa), but must depend upon an increased vigilance and awareness of the American public, and its increasing pressure upon Washington. We have no guarantee in American policy, because more and more the declared policies of the President are being transformed into their opposite in the course of application. . . . We find our nation is not only incapable of releasing the Spanish prisoners in North Africa, despite the directive of President Roosevelt, but also that it is incapable of keeping in prison the Nazi agent, Viereck. We bungle both ways; our errors have the fatal quality of keeping the anti-Fascists locked up and turning a Nazi fifth columnist free."

March 3, 1943: "It must be admitted that Hitler is doing better on the diplomatic than on the military front. At the moment when his armies before Stalingrad were being cut to pieces, he again appealed to the 'gentlemen of the west' for help against the 'menace of Bolshevism'—and the general response he has received must have surprised even Joseph Goebbels. . . . Clearly the war is at a crisis, a major turning point. The Red Army of the Soviet Union presented us with the possibility of victory this year—and we suddenly learn that exceedingly influential circles in our country are fearful of this victory even more than they formerly were fearful of defeat. . . . Fear of victory arises inevitably in all those circles which refuse to see the Soviet Union as a long-time friend and ally, and which have always considered the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition a mere expedient of the moment, unfortunately necessary but to be discarded at the earliest possible moment. . . . As a matter of fact, it is those Americans who dream of ruling the world in the style of Hitler who are worried about the Soviet Union. It was a big mistake to imagine it possible to 'utilize' the Soviet Union to get rid of a rival for world rule, Hitler, while 'utilizing' Hitler to smash the Soviet Union. Those who reasoned thus overreached themselves; they were too clever by far. For it simply does not work out that way in life. The Soviet Union is growing stronger in the course of winning the war, not weaker. And with crash of Hitlerism will go all the dreams of world conquest wherever such illusions may be held, even if they are in the pretty head of a new American Congresswoman. . . . I am not one of those who becomes pessimistic because of the many dangers through which our country is now passing. The appeasers and copperheads have strength in the government only to the degree that they have been able to camouflage their true policy and intentions before the country. They have been successful in their camouflage so far only from lack of aggressive leadership from the President's lieutenants and from the organizations of labor and the people. Everyone has fallen into the bad habit of depending upon the President to do everything."

April 1, 1943: "A chief leader of the anti-Soviet conspiracy in the United States is a certain Mr. N. Chanin. This gentleman operates as a leader of the so-called 'Jewish Labor Committee.' . . . This group of American conspirators, with their allies from the emigration, appointed as their representatives in the Soviet Union Messrs. Ehrlich and Alter, and heavily financed them through the channels of the Polish government-in-exile. . . . These agents . . . were informed that 'the Stalin regime, too, will be shot to pieces' and that the 'last shot will be fired from America.' . . . But everyone who goes into the Soviet Union for the purpose of destroying the Soviet government is in grave danger of being himself destroyed. That is what happened to Ehrlich and Alter. . . . It is not my role to speak here in defense of the Soviet Union. Our great ally needs no defense from me. I speak in defense of our own country, the United States, which is more en-

dangered by this miserable conspiracy hatched on its soil than is the Soviet Union. . . . Let me ask Senator Mead, Mayor LaGuardia, and those responsible labor leaders who fell into the anti-Soviet net of conspiracy. To turn for inspiration rather to Thomas Jefferson. If they have no personal knowledge of Ehrlich and Alter, and they have not, they could at least have maintained the position Jefferson took when he faced the conspiracy of Aaron Burr, the traitor who had even more respectable friends than Ehrlich and Alter. Jefferson told us how to handle such conspirators in the following immortal words: 'I did not wish to see these people get what they deserved; and under the maximum of the law itself, that inter arma silent leges, that in an encampment expecting daily attack from a powerful enemy, self-preservation is paramount to all law. I expected that instead of invoking the forms of law to cover traitors, all good citizens would have concurred in securing them. Should we have ever gained our Revolution, if we had bound our hands by manacles of the law, not only in the beginning, but in any part of the revolutionary conflict.' (Writings, Vol. XII, p. 183.) In the case of Ehrlich and Alter, there is no reason to deplore their execution except upon the part of those who share their aim to destroy the Soviet Union and its Socialist system. The whole democratic world has reason to rejoice that the Socialist state has always had the courage to strike hard and accurately and ruthlessly at its counter-revolutionary conspirators." "It is necessary to clean out the Ehrlich-Alter conspiracy from American soil. For this conspiracy is directed toward breaking up the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition."

April 9, 1943: Here I wish to note, without quotations, my speech at the Jefferson bi-centennial in which I trace the Jeffersonian policies in the development of American democracy and of American capitalism, and show the Marxists as the only consistent heirs of Jefferson. If we have revisionism to deal with in my writings, undoubtedly it is to be found in that speech. I stand by that speech in its entirety as soundly Marxist; I will defend it in detail when it is attacked in detail.

September 2, 1943: "What are the consequences that must flow from another postponement of the second front? Unquestionably such an eventuality would result in a profound deterioration of the relationships between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. The failure to realize the second front even during the beginning of the third year of coalition inevitably changes the relations between the leading powers, for it poses the alternative: Either Britain and the U. S. are unwilling to carry any proportionate share of the fighting, or they are unable to do so. And either of these alternatives is fatal to the concept of full coalition between the three leading great powers. Coalition, partnership, is equally impossible in its full sense, whether the default of obligations arises from weakness or from bad faith. . . . Without the second front in Western Europe that will engage a considerable fraction of Hitler's total armed forces, there does not exist serious coalition warfare. If the . . . coalition does not conduct serious coalition warfare, what is left of the coalition? . . . The unfortunate consequences of such a deterioration of the coalition would injure most of all the U. S. Only a shallow and vulgar conception of American national interest can ignore the supreme interest which the U. S. has in orderly world relationships which depend, in the last analysis, upon close friendship and collaboration between the two most powerful countries in the world, our own country and the Soviet Union. . . . We should finally understand that we must meet the Soviet Union halfway, as equals, if we want such a close and enduring alliance. We should understand that words carry weight in international relationships only to the degree that they are backed up by deeds. If it is not clear from the well-known facts revealed by the war that the U. S. has the most to lose from a weakening of the coalition, that fact will be beyond doubt in the further development of events. . . . Above all we should understand we are all taking part in this decision—by what we do and say, or by our passivity leaving the decision to others. . . . We can be certain of only one thing, that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is going to be much more consolidated soon, or it is going to deteriorate most seriously, that if cannot drift along as at present, and that each one of us has a duty to perform in participating in that decision. . . . It is my opinion that the President is fighting for a correct policy, and that he is fighting much better than most of his liberal critics who are so

ready to cry out that he is betraying them. He is fighting in his own way, of course, and it is not the way of the Communists nor is it the way of labor as a whole. The greatest weaknesses displayed in his leadership are weaknesses that could be remedied by more solid and consistent and energetic support from labor and all who put victory above all. Now, as so many times in the past it is fatal to demand that the President must defeat the reactionaries singlehanded, without participation of the masses in the fight, and to make the President responsible for failures which are really the shortcomings of his necessary support. We are in this war to the end with the present Commander-in-Chief, we have no prospect of getting a better one, but could easily get a worse one. The sooner we adjust ourselves to this reality the better it will be for the prospects of victory."

September 26, 1943: "The cold, hard truth is this: that unless we get down off our high horse, unless we, the U. S., consolidate the alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union on the basis of equality all around, which means every one doing something like his part in fighting the war and treating each other with full respect in reorganizing the world after the war, there is not the slightest prospect for us to emerge from this war with anything that can properly be called victory. For whatever else victory may mean, it is entirely meaningless for the U. S. as we know our country unless it brings a prolonged period of orderly relations between nations. We have a national interest in peace, and it is our greatest national interest. . . . While we must stop all childish thinking about the Soviet Union fighting our Far Eastern war for us, it still remains a basic truth that our close friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union is an absolute necessity for the final and satisfactory solution of the Far Eastern phase of the war, especially in terms of the stabilization of East Asia and her peaceful inclusion into the modern world. But if we want that invaluable cooperation of the Soviet Union, we must so shape our policies that they bring into harmony our own national interests with those of the Soviet Union. There is such a broad case of common interest, obvious to all men of good will, that intelligent men of whatever ideological trend should be able to work out such a common policy, given the will to do so."

October 4, 1943: "It was the characteristic genius of George Dimitroff that he pointed unwaveringly throughout these 10 years to the unity of Communists and non-Communists, of all democrats of whatever ideological trend, as the master key for the defeat and destruction of the Axis and its Nazi architects. Today such unity among the United Nations and such national unity within are the obvious and accepted key to victory. Such unity is the foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation. Such unity is the secret of the magnificent People's Liberation Army in Yugoslavia which is winning that land from the Nazis plus the Mikhailovich traitors even before any military help comes from the outside. Such unity is the living spirit of the Greek resistance, the Polish partisan movement, and all the risings of the peoples of the Nazi-occupied lands. Such unity rises with might and disunity out of the rubble of the collapsed Mussolini regime in Italy. Such unity is the supreme sign of victory in every country in the world."

I have made these citations from the record, which characterize the work of the whole Communist movement and not merely for one speaker, because the voice of responsible men is in danger of being drowned by those who forget or never understood that record, and the great achievements that flowed out of it.

If anybody can look at that record and talk about capitulation and lack of independent leadership, then the discussion has gone to a level in which I cannot participate.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1944

The 1942 Congressional elections gave sweeping gains to the reactionary forces, so that Roosevelt was faced with a hostile majority, composed of Republicans and anti-Roosevelt Democrats. This was obviously in contradiction to the attitude of the masses of the people. It revealed that the Democratic Party, as an organization, was less integrated and less dynamic than the Republican Party; that, therefore, the Democratic Party could be the vehicle for a people's victory only when it

(Continued on Page 6)

Problems of foreign market

I have studied the resolution of the National Committee, the article by Jacques Duclos, the articles by Foster, Dennis, Krumbein, Thompson and Minor. I will try to present the conclusions I have drawn in order, firstly the most serious errors were political, and secondly there were serious organizational mistakes.

Under the leadership of Earl Browder, the national committee failed to properly estimate the deepening of the crisis of world capitalism as a result of the present World War. The present war is a direct result of the contradictions within capitalism and the bankrupt leadership of the capitalist class as a whole. It is this class that Earl Browder would have us look to for leadership in the postwar world. I have read the Teheran agreement signed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. In it I find no mention of any postwar economic program. Therefore we see only too well how correct Comrade Duclos's article is when he says that Browder read into the Teheran agreement an economic program that was not there.

Comrade Foster points out in his letter to the National Committee that Browder says, "there is general agreement that there is no valid reason why the same economy, including agriculture, should not produce at approximately the same level (as during the war) and that no plan is worth considering that proceeds from any other basis." Let us apply this to our economy. At the time that this basic error was made our country was producing in goods and services some \$85 billions of dollars. Therefore, to keep the same economy functioning in the postwar world we must produce at the above level. Can this be done under a capitalist economy? The answer is **definitely no** for the following reasons: We have two markets, the domestic and the foreign markets. To keep this level of production we take \$42½ billion as the amount of foreign market to be maintained.

United States exports never exceeded \$5 billions of dollars and that figure was reached in the 1928-29 period. Since 1930 it hovered at less than \$1 billion to somewhat less than \$2 billion, which was reached at the height of the upturn in foreign trade in 1937. We must hold that to say it is possible to jump exports from two or even five billions to \$42½ billions will require some tall doing. The total export of all 102 countries in the world, never exceeded at its very height in 1929, \$33 billions, and this fell to \$12 to \$15 billions in total world export for the 1937-39 period. It is now proposed that as a solution for us alone to have three times as much export as all 102 countries in the world together had in the immediate pre-war period, and about 30 per cent more export for us alone than all the world had when trade flourished at its height. This is no solution but the road to rampant imperialism, and dollar diplomacy!

On the domestic market I can cite what is common knowledge, that unemployment is on the increase in war industries, aircraft, shipyards, etc. This in fact, while we are still engaged in war with Japan. In all basic industries, the introduction of labor-saving devices and nationalization point to the fact that less labor will be required in the postwar than in these same industries prior to the war. The loss of time that will occur between the cessation of war work and civilian production or reconversion of industry and the consequent dislocation of our economy which will be brought on by the release of some ten or eleven million servicemen and women, will create conditions such that there will be mass unemployment in all our large industrial areas. The solution of this problem can not be left to progressive-minded capitalists, since these conditions are regarded as ideal by the large monopolies as assuring a surplus labor market and the possibilities of lowering the living standards of the American people and destroying the unions and all progressive groups. Considering the above, we can see that Earl Browder has not too seriously considered the facts. Further he has led the party away from its true role as that of the vanguard of the working class. It is necessary that we immediately carry out a militant struggle as outlined in the national resolution to unite the trade unions and all progressive forces to protect the gains made by organized labor and increase them in the postwar world.

A great deal of criticism is due the National Committee for the manner in which it handled the change in our line. The meeting at which the program was handed down was an enlarged meeting

and even Comrade Foster was urged not to criticize the change at that time, since meetings of the political bureau would clarify the situation. It was my impression that when a change of policy occurs, especially one of such importance, that the national committee would devote a great deal of time and Marxist consideration to this change. Instead, it was presented and accepted as is and handed down to the party that way. Therefore with the exception of Comrade Foster and Comrade Darcy this revisionist line is the responsibility of the entire National Committee. The fact that no one knew that they raised serious objections, is a further **condemnation** of the manner in which the National Committee and the political bureau functioned. Why is it that to the present day we do not have access to the report made by Comrade Sam Darcy at the political bureau meeting on February 8, 1944?

This raises certain questions. Did Comrade Darcy's report point out the revisionist errors that were being made by Browder and the National Committee? Then it follows that if it did, then one can only draw the conclusion that Comrade Darcy has qualities of courageous and capable Marxist-Leninist leadership, which qualities were obviously lacking in our National Committee. Foster showed himself also, to be capable of analyzing the situation correctly and the only error that can be attributed to him is that he did not carry out at that time a militant struggle against this revisionism.

Our Comrades on the National Committee have recently indulged in a review of their positions and have gone into the reasons for falling into this error. I think that it is quite possible that they erred on the question of Comrade Sam Darcy?

I hope that our National Convention will review this case. Is it a question of premature anti-revisionism like the problem of premature anti-fascism?

How is it that the top committee could stray so far from Marxist-Leninist teachings?

Are they capable of leading us in the struggles of the immediate future?

With the exception of Comrade Foster, I feel we need new blood in our national leadership. **Breast-**

SUGGESTS A MORE ADVANCED PROGRAM

Eugene Dennis in his report to the National Committee on June 18-20 proposed at the end of his report that on the basis of "additions, changes, and improvements . . . a final draft be drawn up."

I should like to suggest one addition to the resolution which I consider to be most fundamental in a correct approach to our future policies and especially in our approach to the American working class.

The National Board resolution in its approach to jobs and security has advanced a number of "fights" such as "improved federal and state emergency unemployment insurance; to enact the Murray bill, a gigantic federal and state public works and housing program, etc."

These "fights for" are necessary and should be pushed. But, I still think that we are missing the most basic and necessary point of our entire organizational and theoretical outlook if that is all we advocate to the American people, and especially, to the American working class.

For the last few years, on many occasions, we have been "a tail" to the issues that have arisen. Now is the time for us to assume our vanguard role in the program that we put forth to the people of America.

This program that is advanced by the National Board is a program that is being advocated by many sections of our government, trade unions, and progressive groups. Today, we, as the vanguard, must give to the working class more advanced demands than the above mentioned groups. Only by doing this can we gather around us the working class and its allies. If we offer them no more than any other progressive group, why then, should they look toward us as their vanguard? I feel this is a basic mistake in our program and has been for some time. This error must be rectified if we are again to assume the leadership over the masses of the American people.

To come out only for further extension of unemployment insurance, housing, public works, etc.,

EFFECT OF POLICY ON OUR

We are now in the process of correcting our thinking and then we shall be able to correct and do our work. The practical effect of our recent policies has been the demobilization of our forces. In Los Angeles, since the presidential election, hardly a wheel has turned in our organization to any constructive effect and prior to that election very little was done, because, as I now understand, erroneous thinking led to a stalemate in our work.

I think we should be bolder in promoting active trade union leaders to sit in on national board and National Committee deliberations. Also, we must take steps sooner and send out our functionaries from time to time to work in factory or office where they can listen and learn how the workers are thinking and talking.

Certainly, such a rationalization as Browder's, that there is no danger in theoretical mistakes as long as we retain our ties with the masses, needs close, critical examination. Mistakes in evaluating the forces at work rapidly weakens our ties with the workers. They forget past benefits if we come up with unworkable, impractical and wrong analyses of the present. We must guard against any such wide swings away from the realities of life under capitalism in the future.

Now, in my opinion, Comrade Browder has been harried, and with the outstanding exception of Williamson's articles, printed comment has tended to center criticism on him personally, despite the delicate phraseology employed. Obviously, this has been a collective error. If members of the national board and National Committee aren't strong enough to stand up and be counted over a difference of opinion with a determined leader, they must resolve that in future they shall be more

beating now does not excuse these leaders for their past serious errors.

I hope that through the convention we will be reorganized as a party and not an association, and further that we increase the number of trade unionists in our national leadership.

William T. Walker, San Pedro.

is again to miss the boat. Again, we shall not be ahead of the working class, offering them greater hope and encouragement for a better world, but merely improving upon certain reforms that already are an integral part of American capitalism as it developed under the liberal-capitalist regime of Roosevelt.

The American working class, both from its own experiences here during the war and from the undeniable influence that the progressive working classes of the various European countries are exerting on it, are fully prepared for a more advanced slogan, more advanced demands, more definite solutions to the ever present problem of security and employment.

Another slogan and "fight for" (legislative, political, agitational, and educational) that we should advance in addition to the ones mentioned by the National Board is:

"That in order to insure to the people of America greater security and employment we propose improved federal and state emergency unemployment insurance, etc., etc., AND in the event that private business is unable to provide full employment those industries (and supporting industries) be nationalized."

Reasons for this addition to our national policy are the following:

1.—The experiences of the working class during the war when government had a great influence in and on industry has prepared the working class for nationalization. (Demands for government operation of strife-torn factories has had widespread support from the workers all over the country.)

2.—It is a "fight" that will offer the people greater security and hope than unemployment insurance, housing, etc., alone can do.

3.—It is an "advanced" slogan that will lead the American workers forward toward greater demands for their economic and political welfare.

4.—It is a slogan around which a flood of educational material can be given to the American

We have to learn to think

principled if less diplomatic. I witnessed this weaker attitude taking place in Los Angeles when the Teheran thesis was propounded. I feel there was more excuse for timidity here on the part of those who didn't agree or had doubts, because, as we now admit, the atmosphere and conditions was not created wherein contrary opinion could be offered freely. To my mind, Comrade Foster has conducted himself like a Bolshevik throughout, including his carrying out of the collective decision through articles in Political Affairs during this past period; his present attack on the theoretical position of the national board and his criticism of Browder has been forthright. Sam Darcy put himself beyond consideration.

I believe that Comrade Browder does right to stick to his position, if he still believes it, while discussion is open, but when a vote is taken, if Comrade Browder accepts the will of the majority, he should be asked to continue in a responsible post.

We have every reason to be proud of his courage, ability and statesmanship. His self-sacrificing devotion is proof of his sincerity. Under his leadership we made great advances and he should continue as one of our front-line fighters. This opinion is not put forward out of feelings of personal loyalty. I do not have them for him and such concepts are out of place in our approach and thinking, but, as a war worker put it, in reference to our present self-examination, "Let us not throw out the baby with the dirty water."

Let us heed Browder's cry that the present discussions shall not give us any excuse to let up on our pressure for the unconditional surrender of Fascist Japan, for passage of the FEPC, defeat of the poll tax and full steam ahead for sixty million jobs for our returning soldiers and for our workers, both men and women.

Our great strength, that of discussing together and arriving at a common point of view and program together, will bring us back to our chosen path, that of learning with the American working class and its allies in the middle class—in struggle—how best to march forward to our goal—socialism.

B. A. L.

PROPOSES CONCRETE ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS

I have read all of the bulletins sent out by the state office of the CPA and quite agree in what is said. I notice that in the letters sent in by individual members that there is still too much theorizing and not enough practical suggestion on how to remedy the situation.

This is the result I am sure of the revisionist policy we have been following as laid down by our national leaders (excluding Comrade Foster) and blindly followed by our state and local leadership. Why did our leadership accept Browder's policy without opposition? I think the answer is a simple one. We do not have to start quoting from Marx and Engels to prove this point.

They had lost contact with what the average worker was thinking and were getting their ideas from bourgeois elements who in turn analyze everything on their own selfish class interests based on the profit system.

I am an AFL building trades worker and work with people who are inclined to be more conservative, such as painters, carpenters, plumbers, etc. In talking with these workers on the job I find that they are wanting to find out what the Communist position is. They do not believe everything they read in the Hearst press but on the other hand, unless we get a correct program to them they will believe it. I have come out openly on my job as a Communist, even the superintendent and foreman know it, and I am not fired as I am an expert at my trade and even though I am a Communist, they can't see where I am doing anything wrong.

Now is the time to stop all this foolish soft-ped-

people explaining to them the ultimate aim of the Communists is socialism.

I am sure that this suggestion will be given consideration in the discussions that are taking place and in the formulation of our new policy.

J. Martin, Los Angeles, Calif.

The draft resolution of the National Board is, I feel, essentially correct in its statement of program and analysis of our basic theoretical mistakes.

Our position, as I understood it, rested fundamentally upon the assertion that the self-interest, and consequently the class interests of the big bourgeoisie, lie in the support of Teheran. In other words, we came to envisage the capitalist class as a class like the working class, capable of recognizing its long-term interests, of acting in a unified way, and of overcoming the basic contradictions of capitalism—and specifically, the contradiction which we heretofore recognized as expressing itself in the class drive towards monopoly, restricted economy and unbridled power which inevitably results in the destruction of capitalism. To envisage the capitalist class in this way represented a basic alteration of the Marxian analysis of capitalism.

Secondly, we came to feel that we could influence the course of capitalism by concessions and soft-peddling, rather than by constant opposition to and struggle against the inherent reactionary drives of monopoly capitalism. In other words, we directed our policy toward "winning the capitalists," by argument and by concession, rather than toward the working class.

It appears that the overwhelming majority of CPA members agree with the substance of the draft resolution. Comrade Duclos' article brought to a head a line of thinking begun by the recognition of a series of errors which we had considered tactical rather than strategic, together with the recognition of our theoretical and organizational unpreparedness for the events at the San Francisco conference and in the field of international relations in the last few months.

We have yet to find an explanation of why the mistake was made.

aling of socialism and bring our program openly to the people. I am a rank and file member of the Fillmore Club and in attending meetings what do I find? That they are too large and run more on the lines of a mass organization instead of the way a Communist meeting should be held. This gives members who do very little practical work a chance to take the floor and cover their inactivity up with a long-winded speech. We Communists judge people by their deeds. Words are not enough. If we are to be able to face the tasks of the future as real Marxist-Leninists I would propose the following form of organization:

1.—That the club be divided into smaller groups each with a strong executive committee who will meet before the group meeting and bring in concrete proposals to be discussed and acted upon by the members of the group.

a.—That the group meet at least every two weeks.

2.—That at least one member of the group's executive committee be elected to meet with the club executive committee whenever necessary.

3.—That committees be set up in each group to contact members who are not attending meetings and see if they can be drawn back into activity.

4.—That we concentrate on recruiting trade union people and Negro workers into the organization.

5.—That the present discussion groups be instructed to take up the fundamentals of Marxism with such pamphlets as the Communist Manifesto and Foundations of Leninism, etc.

6.—That a state and county disciplinary committee be set up to handle cases that may arise in the future.

In conclusion I want to say I feel sure that as soon as we get back on the real Marxist-Leninist road based on reality instead of illusion we will grow stronger than ever.

Edward Taylor, San Francisco.

Undoubtedly there is a large group of new comrades in the CPA during this period who have never had the benefit of any contact with Marxist theory.

However, there has been a sizeable core of comrades who do not have this excuse—although there is a tendency for them to try to use it. I do not consider myself—or the majority of comrades, like me—as well versed in Marxian theory. Yet I feel that we must face the inescapable fact that we did possess the fundamental knowledge to recognize this mistake—knowledge which needed only to extend to an elementary understanding of the nature of the contradictions of capitalism. The basic fact is that we knew this, but did not think about it. The readiness and speed with which the membership accepted Comrade Duclos' criticism is evidence of this. That is why I feel any discussion of increased emphasis on Marxist-Leninist works cannot be made without a simultaneous emphasis upon the necessity for the development of the independent thinking of every CPA member.

Many of the organization's errors which limited independent thinking have already been discussed in previous bulletins. But a most fundamental fact—perhaps more fundamental than any which has been discussed, has been either ignored or suppressed in bulletin discussion—the fact of the existence of a level of bureaucracy in the National Board which included, not only the failure to refer policy back to the membership, but which extended to the withholding of facts from the membership. (Which must be treated as deliberate until proven otherwise, since it is so completely contrary to our expressed methods of work.)

I base my conclusions on the existence of bureaucracy on the following facts (there may be others), reported to Alameda county by a member of the National Committee: (1) At one point in the last year and one-half, a completely uncomradely situation existed in the National Board, whereby some members of the National Board were not "on speaking terms" with other members. (2) One member of the National Board has stated that he felt as if Browder were his employer, rather than his comrade. (3) The Southern Communist Party was dissolved, leaving no Marxist organization in that area. At least two members of the National Committee did not even know of this fact until the June, 1945, meeting to discuss the Duclos article.

It is my conviction that it was the right of every CPA member to know of the fact of the dissolution of the Southern Communist Party; that had we known this fact, the direction toward liquidation in our position (which must have been apparent to the national Board) would have been apparent to the membership and would have been checked (as it was not by the National Board). I feel that this situation indicates the basic bankruptcy of the National Board, and the necessity for its complete reconstitution, with the possible exception of Comrade Foster. The withholding of information from the membership—together with the present failure of the National Board members to admit the level of bureaucracy which did exist—demonstrates their lack of qualification for future leadership.

In discussion bulletins 1-5, Dennis and Williamson mention the dissolution of the Southern Communist Party in passing, neither of them making any reference to the fact that members of our own National Committee did not even know of the fact. Foster made an analysis of our key mistakes in the last period and did not see fit to refer to this one. Minor and Thompson likewise ignore the fact altogether.

I can find absolutely no justification either for the actions of the National Board, or for their ignoring of the situation in their recent discussions. I recognize that the publicizing of these facts will damage the CPA—but Communists have always faced this with confidence and courage when publication of a mistake was necessary in order to correct the mistake.

It is also my feeling that the analyses of Thompson, Minor and to a lesser extent Williamson compare unfavorably with those submitted by other comrades. I think this can be substantiated by further analysis, but space does not permit.

Recognizing the unique theoretical contribution of Foster, I feel even he must answer the following questions: to what extent did he fight against

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Browder's speech to National Committee

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was supplemented by independent organizations of labor and the people (including dissident Republicans), in a broad coalition, such as had won previous elections for and under the leadership of Roosevelt.

Already in the middle of 1943 it was the judgment of our Communist executives that the needs of the nation at war required that Roosevelt should be a candidate for a fourth term. Without Roosevelt as a candidate it was clear that both Democratic and Republican parties would be dominated by their reactionary wings; that the labor, liberal and independent members of the Roosevelt coalition would either be dispersed or isolated in a minority third-party movement, and America would be taken over by the appeasement and pro-Hitler forces.

That was not an easy task. The President's own personal desires were against it. His own party organization was honeycombed with Farleyism. The bourgeoisie was dominated by violent moods of opposition to him. The liberals were running wild and accusing him of betrayal of the "New Deal." Labor was deeply disaffected, blaming Roosevelt for the Congressional and administrative sabotage of his program. The Republicans and anti-Roosevelt Democrats were riding high and confident of victory. It looked like a hopeless task to secure Roosevelt's candidacy.

There was not even a national labor center from which to launch the "draft Roosevelt" movement. The CIO-PAC was formally initiated in 1943, but it was paralyzed at this stage, due to its acceptance of the Dubinsky idea that labor's endorsement of Roosevelt should be withheld until the last moment before the Democratic Convention as a "bargaining point" in dealing with the government's labor policy.

We had to spend the last half of 1943 breaking down all these difficulties and launching the "draft Roosevelt" movement from below, from the local unions and city councils, from state trade union conventions, and from some state committees of the Democratic Party that we had judged correctly as to the basic mood and tendency of the masses; before January, 1944, the draft movement had attained such intensity that the Democratic National Committee went unanimously on record for Roosevelt's candidacy, although it had been the base of the main opposition to it until that time. From the beginning of 1944 the problems became one of convincing Roosevelt, not that he could be nominated, but that he could win the election.

In order to win the election it was necessary to extend and activate the pro-Roosevelt forces both to the right and to the left, to cut into the Republican following, to raise steadily the morale and enthusiasm of the Roosevelt movement until it reached its height at the election, while blunting and turning aside all the issues and slogans of those who believed it was "time for a change."

The right-wing Democrats, surrendering before the sweep of the "draft Roosevelt" movement, conducted a flank attack directed against Vice President Wallace, hoping to split the South away from the ticket on this issue. Wallace made a magnificent fight up to the last moment in the convention, thereby roused all the militancy of the labor and left-progressive sections, prevented the reactionaries from uniting upon one of their own camp for the vice presidency, and when the main body of the convention united around the relatively unknown Truman, Wallace went down the line for the ticket (thus consolidating the left), while the right wing was neutralized and their split stopped by their empty "victory" of getting Truman in place of Wallace. Thus was one of the main strategic attacks of reaction against the unity of the Roosevelt forces defeated, and Roosevelt placed in a stronger position than before that attack for the final election. Since I have been subjected to some of the bitterest attacks because I supported this strategy of Roosevelt, I think I should declare here and now that my opinion is firmer than ever that it was correct; that it helped substantially to secure the election victory, and that I accept full responsibility for it.

Another danger to the unity of the Roosevelt forces that had to be dissolved was the "third party" movement. We, therefore, supported, without hesitation, the move that initiated in Minnesota to merge the Farmer-Labor Party with the Democratic Party, which was effectuated before the presidential election and helped carry the state for Roosevelt. The Minnesota merger had national repercussions in heading off and rendering harm-

less the many third-party movements which were based on Social-Democrats, Socialists, Trotskyites, Lewisites, and their assorted allies. I am more than ever convinced that the decision was sound; that we should not now, any more than in 1944, change our policy in the direction of encouraging or supporting third-party movements; that we should continue to keep our eyes fixed on the task of maintaining the effective unity of a majority of the country's voters around the Roosevelt program.

A third great danger became apparent early in 1944: Labor's legitimate aspiration for direct representation in the national government, by inclusion of one or more of its leaders in the Cabinet, could not be promised realization by Roosevelt, largely because of the split between AFL and CIO; but, at the same time, it was clear that Dewey would readily make such a promise, having previous commitments to John L. Lewis, who straddled the AFL-CIO split by having been the founder of the CIO and presently negotiating readmission to the AFL—but a greater danger to labor than Lewis in the government could not be imagined. It, therefore, became necessary to oppose uncompromisingly the launching of a militant campaign for labor representation in the Cabinet during the 1944 campaign, because that would have helped Dewey and, if it was really taken up by the labor movement would have defeated Roosevelt. I am still of the opinion that our decision was entirely correct and that it should be confirmed today, since it is still called into question.

ROOSEVELT'S VICTORIOUS ELECTION PLATFORM

A fourth basic point of strategy which occasioned bitter disputes was the necessity to keep the mass campaign for Roosevelt on a non-partisan basis. Some comrades insisted that we go all out for the Democratic Party and against the Republican Party. We who then composed the majority stood solidly and without appeasement against this tendency. We insisted upon the non-partisan policy as a basic necessity for the full mobilization and effectiveness of the political action committee of AFL and CIO, as well as the various citizens' committees not to speak of the "Republicans for Roosevelt" clubs, which were of tremendous importance. At least one-third of the workers and other voters mobilized by these various committees to vote for Roosevelt were traditionally Republicans and retained ties to Republican candidates on state and city levels. A partisan campaign would have alienated these voters and would have introduced dangerous elements of dissension into the campaign; it would have endangered the solidarity of the trade unions. I am more convinced than ever that we were entirely correct in our stubborn and intransigent insistence upon the non-partisan nature of the campaign.

The main factor of Roosevelt's election success was his promise to the people that victory would bring a lasting peace for many generations with full employment and a rising standard of living—that is, the platform of Teheran.

The platform of Teheran was what brought to the campaign the fighting, crusading spirit in the struggle for Roosevelt's election. That, and that alone, could overcome the war weariness of the masses; their innumerable grievances which they had been taught to lay at the door of the Roosevelt Administration; their remnants of isolationist thinking; their tendency to listen to anyone who suggested a quick and easy way out of the war.

I venture to assert that an indispensable element of this success of the Roosevelt electoral appeal was the work of the Communists in tirelessly explaining and deepening the understanding of the masses as to the meaning of Teheran, as to the practical possibility of realizing the goals set forth. If we had followed any other course, if we had indicated any element of doubt in our minds, I am convinced that Roosevelt would have been defeated.

To emphasize the deep historical importance of this victory, which could not have been won without the full force of the Communist contribution, I want to repeat to you what I wrote at the time of the election, because I am afraid that most comrades have forgotten these things already. (Cites in full articles printed in *The Daily Worker* of November 7, November 9 and November 12).

We enter the period of beginning of reconversion, after V-E Day, with a war still to be finished in the Pacific and with inadequate preparation of government, management or labor.

Our inadequate preparation could not be avoided, since bitter experience in the half-year before V-E Day had demonstrated that preparations for reconversion were immediately reflected in most serious relaxation of the war effort. Therefore at the advice of our most trusted military leaders all such preparations were delayed until after the military decision. The death of Roosevelt further delayed all planning and added to the confusion. The exploding of all divisive forces that followed V-E Day, as we had foreseen—to some extent—has further added to the difficulties. It is necessary for the labor movement to study this problem and take the lead in formulating policy for the nation, just as it did in the period of conversion to war.

There is one profound difference between the problems of conversion and reconversion. Conversion was directed toward satisfying a war-market whose only limit was our physical capacity to produce; the market was given and was automatically effective. Reconversion has but the most limited markets instantly available, and the peace-time market for full production and employment has yet to be planned and created. It will not come automatically. Without plans for realizing peace-time markets approximately equal in volume to the market of war, all talk about full employment or 60 million jobs becomes the purest of illusions, becomes only empty shouting into the wind.

The basic problem of reconversion is therefore the problem of markets on a scale to match American productive resources multiplied more than twice in the course of the war. Let us write this into our book as item number one, and begin to find answers to it, or else admit that we are abdicating leadership of the nation on this key question.

ON THE DISCUSSION OF THE DUCLOS ARTICLE

I have already published my basic reply to the charge of revisionism directed against me by Jacques Duclos in *The Worker* of June 10. I make this a part of my report without repeating it here. And that contains my basic estimate of the relation of forces in the world which must be the starting point for any Marxist thinking.

We have undoubtedly been suffering from a number of vulgarizations and distortions of our correct political line, which require correction. They can be corrected, however, only upon the foundation of that political line and not upon its abandonment or disintegration—which is the course being attempted in the draft resolution that has been placed before this National Committee meeting.

The draft resolution tries to ride off in all directions at once. Its estimate of the relation of forces is based upon superficial and temporary phenomena. Its program of action is but an incomplete carryover of our correct program of 1942 to V-E Day, while discarding the theoretical foundations upon which it was erected. It thereby introduces, for the first time in 15 years in any basic resolution of our movement, a fundamental conflict between theory and practice. It is my opinion that this represents the most fundamental revision of Marxism which has ever been committed in our movement. Its self-critical section, so-called, is a mechanical parody of Marxist self-criticism which has in practice opened up a veritable Pandora's box of deviations, a large part of which borders dangerously upon and even begins to merge with Trotskyism.

* * *

The correct Marxian attitude to the problem of the economic reconstruction of backward and devastated areas is that which I put forth at our convention in May, 1944, in my response to the greetings of the Latin-American delegates. Permit me to quote from that address: (Cites paragraph bottom of first column page 98 to bottom page 99—CPA Convention Proceedings.)

This policy corresponds to the policy formulated by the Latin American Federation of Workers which unites the labor movements of most of the Republics, in fact all that function with any freedom. It corresponds to the program of the democratic mass movements and parties of those countries. It corresponds to the program of the Communist Parties of those lands. It corresponds to the program of the Chinese Communist Party, which declares that "foreign capital shall be encouraged to invest in China in conformity with Chinese laws to aid the development of the nation's economy." It corresponds to the policy of every

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ANALYZES CLUB WORK

As secretary of the Fillmore Club responsible for the press-literature-education work for a membership of 330, I feel a deep sense of responsibility in having carried out to the best of my ability the Teheran perspective as outlined by Browder. I had no reservations whatsoever about the post-war line as developed by Browder and in the past eighteen months have done all I could to explain it to the membership.

Not being a Marxist of any great development, it would be easy to excuse myself of any responsibility, were it not for the fact that I have learned a few things from life that all workers eventually learn, and this alone should have been a warning. Having worked for a living for 15 years, I learned very quickly in life than an employer, no matter how nice a fellow, was never eager to collaborate with me in order to raise my standard of living. In fact, on that question many an employer and I parted company. Another thing I knew beyond doubt was the inherent contradictions in capitalism, the character of monopoly capital and the source of fascism. This I learned my first day in a state training school. It is my sincere opinion that any Communist who knows these fundamental things, has a great deal of responsibility to bear and in this category I include myself.

It is no easy job to try to analyze the work of our club in the past months and know where to blame policy for our shortcomings, and also, in what manner did we make a contribution to the working class movement. In the Fillmore community we have always been faced with questions that we could not possibly avoid tackling. Questions such as discrimination, housing, jim-crow auxiliaries, FEPC, etc. In this regard I think we were very fortunate in working in a community with problems that forced us to keep our feet on the ground to a certain extent; to the extent that many of our club members did fight strongly on the question of jim-crow auxiliaries (Boilermakers decision) and on the question of leading the fight for better housing in the community. However, instead of developing a strong program for fighting these questions through on every front, our tendency was to let a few individual Communists carry the ball in community organizations, under the leadership of the NAACP and others, and relinquished our role as a vanguard organization.

I sat through many NAACP meetings and FEPC committee meetings lamenting the fact that they did not have a strong enough program and a lack of leadership—and yet did not carry this back to our club to mobilize it for working out a correct program—I forgot that what has always set apart a Communist organization from any other was its collective work based on a program of action for the benefit of the people. And in this lack of a program that was so necessary to carry through the tasks facing us we lost our character as a Marxist organization.

In spite of our shortcomings as far as a community program was concerned, the little work that was done attracted hundreds of Negro people to our club. During the past two recruiting drives we increased our membership by over 200 people; the

Learn to think

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bureaucracy in the National Board; why did he voluntarily suppress his January, 1944, letter; why did he fail to mention the dissolution of the Southern CP in his most recent speech (June)?

The CPA can emerge from this struggle immeasurably strengthened. But we must not—as we did before—let our conviction substitute for a most determined struggle, the only thing which can assure this result.

Every comrade must be strengthened. Our club, county and state leadership must be reviewed and strengthened. Since participation in the revisionist error was so general, that alone cannot be used as a criterion for removal from leadership. But the condoning and strengthening of bureaucracy in its worst forms is surely evidence of lack of qualification for leadership. On that basis, I feel that no member of the National Board should be considered for re-election unless he can demonstrate that he actively opposed existing bureaucracy in the National Board, and that he actively worked for the release of information regarding the dissolution of the Southern Communist Party.

B. W., Berkeley, Cal.

great majority shipyard workers, longshoremen and warehousemen, women, etc. The executive committee elected last January was representative of the new membership in a way that was never before seen in the club. We gained tremendously in forces that were willing to work, to learn and to become Communists. Our policy as far as promoting and training new leadership I feel was in the main correct. We conducted discussion groups outside of club meetings, having as our main purpose the training of leadership and the education, at least in part, of our huge membership. We did not hesitate in placing new members in positions of responsibility. The results were the successful carrying through of press and recruiting campaigns and the development of a leadership that was really representative of the community.

The work done by our literature director and committee in the community was outstanding in that it did reach masses of people in the churches and fraternal organizations. It was through our literature (that dealing with Negro history mainly) and through the influence of our press that our prestige in the community was maintained in spite of the lack of a forceful program on questions above mentioned.

However, in examining the results of our educational efforts we find that we had not tackled the question of Marxist education, without which the training of leadership was weakened, outside of sending members to state training schools. Our club meetings were devoted to reports of progress in the war, explanations of the election campaign, a lecture on Negro history, a memorial to FDR, lectures and very little discussion on Dumbarton Oaks, peacetime military conscription, etc.

Our approach in our discussion groups was to make it easy for new and old members to bring out questions on their minds, to give them an opportunity for discussing questions that we could not take the time to talk about at meetings. The discussions were generally conducted by state, county and club leaders who spoke for a few minutes on current questions and then threw the floor open for discussion. I was present at many such group meetings and heard our comrades bring up time after time the question of postwar jobs, lay-offs and discrimination in rehiring in the shipyards. We were asked what to do about this, what to do about bad housing, what to do in certain cases of discrimination—and in almost every case the only thing we did was to explain the role of the CPA—explain coming postwar conditions a la Teheran—that was the only answer we had—outside of recording what the Communist movement had done for the Negro people in the past. That we did get recruits and subs at these discussions was mainly due to the sincerity of the group in trying to find answers to problems raised. I want to say that I admire the tenacity and loyalty of members of the group. They asked the same questions over and over again and it took a long time to discourage them from finding the answers, which eventually happened. I remember two discussions we held where eight people's opinion was that the S. F. Conference was developing along the path of failure; and three of us who were very smug and confident tried to convince the rest that capitalism had no choice but make it work because it was to our mutual advantage. We, the educators, were reminded of Argentina, Greece, and the anti-Soviet campaign going on. I feel very deeply responsible for having carried through such an educational program in the club.

As far as the future organization of our club is concerned, I don't believe that we can carry out the tasks of education facing us with a group as large as 330. I don't believe that the community form of organization has given adequate guidance to trade unionists. As far as our club is concerned, I don't believe that trade union clubs will be the complete answer because a large proportion of our membership has not yet won the right to belong to a union. If such workers are organized into trade union groups with members who have the opportunity to work as Communists in their unions, there is the danger of completely overshadowing and evading the particular fight that has to be made first to break down jim-crow in the unions before attempting to develop Communists in unions.

Changing our name to a party at this time I believe would be premature and might become the answer to everything. It seems to me that we must get on the right path first and change to a party only when basic questions of policy have been decided. It would really not matter much for the next

six months if we called ourselves a party or an association. We must first give meaning to the word Communist.

The executive committee brought up questions of Marxist education, of our role as a community group. We seriously discussed how to retain new recruits, develop leadership; what our relationship was to the fight going on re FEPC, housing, etc. The mistake we made was in discussing all these questions as organizational problems instead of discussing them and examining our work on the basis of basic policy and program of the association.

Among the hundreds of members who have joined our association since January, 1944, at least in our club, are the members who have worked untiringly to build the club. They have brought with them a spirit of comradeship and loyalty that we cannot afford to lose. There is a danger of losing these forces if the present situation continues to exist where a handful of "old-timers," very articulate, are overwhelming the rest of the membership with lengthy discussion. These are in every case comrades who haven't been to meetings for as long as a year and who never lifted a finger in the past period. I believe we must wage a fight to keep from leadership such insincere and destructive members.

On the resolution: I agree with the main line, but feel that we need a stronger expression on our policy as far as the fight against jim-crow is concerned. There is no difference in the words than that contained in our resolution of January, 1944. I know the meaning must be different, but we have to say it that way. I believe we need to state our position as far as seniority of postwar employment of women, Negroes and veterans. I feel that we very definitely must state our position on the integration or the self-determination of the Negro people of America.

Judging from statements published by national committee members and from reports heard of our state officers who attended the national committee meeting, I feel that Browder should be removed from leadership and never again be given a position of responsibility. Minor and Ford, from their statements, do not satisfy me that they are fit to be national leaders. They have not taken responsibility nor do they sound as if they have as yet gotten off the fence. It seems to me regrettable that Comrade Williamson did not wait to hear the sentiment of the membership at large before substituting what seems to be one set of directives for another.

I believe we should be ruthless about cleaning out from our movement all opportunist and sectarian elements. We should guard against allowing people to take leadership who are not fit for it under the confusion of heated discussion. We must fight against members who are using the present discussion period as a vehicle to express their petty gripes and personal dislikes for leadership; especially the "I told-you-so boys," who take no responsibility—not even for having kept silent when so many doubts were presumably in their minds.

I believe we owe a deep debt of gratitude to Comrade Duclos. I feel confident that we shall emerge from the present struggles stronger than ever and look forward to the struggles ahead which shall lead to socialism.

Lee Levy, Fillmore Club, San Francisco.

READ

July Number

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Speeches made at National Committee meeting, June 18-20

Documents:

The Duclos Letter

The Foster Letter

Amended Resolution

NOTES ON THE PRESS

In this period of discussions, questions have been raised by clubs and individuals on the role and character of The Daily People's World as well as on its editorial and business management.

I would like to give some information and opinions as well as raise a few points for collective discussion.

The Daily People's World was founded on January 1, 1938, as a "people's newspaper." Its leading editorial stated that it stands for unity, militancy and progressive policies necessary in a people's movement for security, democracy and peace.

The Communist organization has been its major organizational and financial support. The paper has been edited and managed by responsible Communists.

Just as the Communist policy has gotten off the beam of Marxism-Leninism, so has the policy of The People's World. The same is true about some of its weak organizational methods of work.

As a member of the State Committee and manager of the paper, I am responsible for my part in policy and management.

The total net paid circulation has averaged 11,500 daily and about 13,500 of the weekend edition. About 90 percent of the total circulation is subscriptions, delivered by mail, the balance is newsstand and street sales. Of the total readers, it is estimated that about two-thirds are non-CPA.

Except for a few special editions, we did not break through for a mass circulation. The 225,000 election edition was a notable example.

We have been self-conscious about our low circulation figures, but we did not hide these facts of life from the leadership of the CPA in the California counties. They received monthly reports on the status of their subscription list, new subs, expirals, renewals and bundle orders. It is evident that this information did not get below into the clubs and to the membership.

We have been criticized for not making these figures public through the paper. We often considered this, but never got to do it because we always rationalized by saying "there is no way to make these low circulation figures look good in print." By this attitude we were expressing a lack of confidence in our readers and supporters.

Questions have been asked why we set this year's financial-circulation drive quota for \$75,000 when we knew three months ago that \$90,000 was needed to meet the deficit for the year. Last year's drive raised close to \$90,000 which included \$11,500 in subs.

It was the opinion of the management of the paper for a number of years that the goal should be as low as possible, with the object for all counties to go over the top by a large percentage. This worked most of the time.

This year, when we reported the needs of the paper to the State Office and county leaders, they accepted the quota of \$75,000 with the objective of reaching the \$90,000 we raised last year. In deciding on this quota, we also kept in mind the usual "bargaining" attitude on the part of the Big Three county leadership to have the smallest possible quotas because of their fear of over-burdening the membership.

For some time to come, the membership of the CPA will have to carry the predominant load of the financial burden. When we achieve a larger circulation, at least double what it is now, the income of the paper will come closer to its operating expenses.

But the larger the circulation, the greater will be the demand and need for a larger and better newspaper.

The expansion of the plant in San Francisco, with the purchase of a modern high-speed press has been a good investment. Technically, we are able to print a newspaper that meets the best standards of printing. The facilities we have will be very useful to help us improve the paper into a mass, popular, people's newspaper.

However, this expansion has given us added responsibilities, particularly in the increase of cost operations. Besides, we are not yet able to pay the wages necessary for a larger and more competent editorial staff to edit and operate the paper.

One of our worst weaknesses is the lack of close contact on the part of the editors and management with our readers and supporters. Because of bad methods of work and war conditions, our contact with our readers has been only during campaigns, and then on a limited organizational basis.

Our readers must become an active force in molding the policy and content of The Daily People's World. The pages of the paper should be open for a critical evaluation of its policies and contents by our readers.

On a permanent basis, a page or section in the paper should be devoted to worker correspondence. Our readers should have the opportunity of contributing letters and articles bringing their problems, conditions, observations from shops, factories and farms. This has been a tradition in the working class press and will give our editor a form for testing the correctness of policy in editorials and articles.

A form of periodic consultation should be established with our readers on policies and contents of The Daily People's World. This may be done through reader's meetings and conferences. Editors and staff members should be invited to speak at trade union meetings and people's organizations.

A newspaper is a distinct institution in American life. One of our major roles as an organizer and educator is to be of service to the labor movement. Our staff members should be experts who can be called by trade unions for help and advice.

For some time it has been evident to many readers that The Daily People's World has lost its

initiative and militancy and could hardly be distinguished from capitalist papers which in one way or another were supporting the policies of the Administration. We denied that. We tried to rationalize about its independent role, but the opposite was true.

From that situation emerged proposals to primarily institute commercial methods for building and maintaining the paper. Gradually the idea got hold within the ranks of leading people and members of the CPA that it (the CPA) would have less and less financial and organizational responsibility for maintaining the circulation of The Daily People's World. The idea also developed that sooner or later advertising from big and little business would become a decisive factor in financing the paper. These ideas have proven patently incorrect.

Up to now, more than 85 percent of the finances and efforts come directly from the working class readers of our paper, the balance from middle-class supporters and other forms of income. It is my opinion that the progress of the paper in the immediate future, organizationally, financially, and in circulation, must come mainly from the support The Daily People's World will receive from the working class, and especially the members of the CPA.

Harry Kramer

Browder's speech

(Continued from Page 6)

Communist Party everywhere which has faced squarely the issue and given it a considered answer. It corresponds to the policy put forward by Lenin for the Soviet Union in its first difficult period after the revolution and before the giant rise of socialist industry under the Five-Year Plans.

I have not had time to complete my re-study of Lenin for that period, but even in cursorily looking over his speeches of 1920-21, I was immediately struck by this expression: "This union (of the Soviets) with the state trusts of the advanced countries is absolutely essential for us owing to the fact that our economic crisis is so profound that we shall be unable to restore our ruined economy by our own efforts, without equipment and technical assistance from abroad. Merely importing this equipment is not sufficient. We can grant concessions on a wider basis, perhaps, to the biggest imperialist syndicates. . . . Thus we can catch up a little, if only a fourth or a half, with the modern advanced syndicates of other countries. . . . Negotiations have already started with some of the biggest world trusts. On their part, of course, it is not merely rendering a service to us; they are simply doing it for the sake of unlimited profits." (Vol. IX, pp. 96-7, Selected Works.) And further: "We know that capitalist industry was built up in the course of decades with the assistance of all the advanced countries of the world. Have we already dropped into second childhood to think that at a time of dire distress and impoverishment in a country in which the workers are in a minority, in a country with a tortured and bleeding proletarian vanguard and a mass of peasants, we can complete this process so quickly?" (Ibid. p. 128.)

THE RESOLUTION MUST BE COMPLETELY REWRITTEN

I must come to a close, although there are many questions I have not been able even to touch upon. I must finish with some proposals on the resolution:

1.—The resolution must be referred back to committee to be completely rewritten. The Committee should be guided in redrafting by the following points:

(a) Our policy since 1942 has been basically correct, has proved itself so in life, and has brought victories and advances in all fields to the nation and to the working class, including the matter from the change from Party to Association.

(b) We therefore reject the charge that our policy has been based upon or has included any revision of Marxism.

(c) The basic analysis of the relation of world forces contained in my speech of June 2 must be included in the resolution.

(d) The program of action for the next period must be solidly based upon the rapid and complete

defeat of Japan, while simultaneously carrying forward the tasks of reconversion to a peace-time economy and full employment, and must include a rounded-out series of proposals for realizing the peace-time market, both foreign and domestic, equal in volume to the war market.

(e) There must be organized a campaign of education from top to bottom of the Association in the fundamentals of Marxism and its application to current world and national problems, combatting the simple opportunistic vulgarizations of our correct policy and eliminating them, and especially to stop the influx of Trotskyism and semi-Trotskyism which is the most corroding and destructive form of degeneration of Marxism—which is the main danger before the Communist Political Association at this time.

2.—The functioning leadership of the Association, in the Board, must be composed of members of the Association and National Committee who in their majority have not succumbed to the onslaught of alien ideas and fallen into panic before them in the course of the current political discussion.

WE LET LABOR DOWN

In reviewing the world we find that in England they have an election between labor and conservative capital; capital being led by Churchill (who at one time in the past, in fact at the beginning of the war said that he was not a leader to promote the liquidation of the British Empire).

How true. Churchill is out of the war stage of his career and is facing his public in an election against organized labor.

He at this time is doomed to lose as most of us are sure of. The majority he spoke of in the past is definitely out. We can assume his group does win (Churchill might win by a close margin), where de we in the CPA stand as a party in the USA. We will have no support of labor in the USA. We let down the leadership of labor in the past by putting potential leaders in neighborhood branches. It will take some time to reorganize the backbone of our party.

The reaction of the elections in England will be felt throughout the world in both labor and political circles. I wonder where the CPA will stand in the opinion of the workers of the world in the impending revolt in Greece; our support or lack of foresight in combatting Grew's action in China, also the issue of Spain.

I would say that we should confine the discussion to as few meetings as possible and that leaders who wish a prolonged issue review their own thoughts as leaders of a Marxist Workers Party and get to the basic facts; that before it is too late we must organize labor in this country to realize we must be a world labor party membership.

Carl Swan, Burlingame