

## Refutation of Wrong Trends Advocating Withdrawal Of Telangana Armed Struggle\*

### PREFACE

The armed struggle, for that matter, the revolutionary movement, in Telangana is important for Indian Revolution, in more than one way. **Firstly** it has provided an occasion to test the general line followed by the then Communist Party of India. It was proved that the line was wrong. **Secondly** it has provided a path for Indian Revolution. I am aware that not all are unanimous about these points. They have been controversial in the past and they continue to be so.

Of late, there has been some discussion going on, on origin, development and end of this struggle. There have been books and articles by authors, some of whom are directly or indirectly connected with the movement and others were not. For the younger generation, it is a thing of past. Therefore, a few of them, who are interested in the subject, are going in for the research work on the subject and its various aspects. All this is a welcome development because it is a subject matter which has become a living subject discussed again and again.

Another positive feature, the most important at that, is that the discussion is related to the line to be adopted as a path of Indian Revolution. So far as we are concerned, our general line is worked out on the basis of the experiences and lessons we have drawn from Telangana Armed Struggle. Others have their own versions of the struggle as well as its lessons. Some others claim that their line is the same as ours but their practice is quite opposite and nothing common with ours. Therefore, we have been joining issues with them. Our opponents, more so in Andhra, are attaching importance to the subject because Telangana Armed struggle has become part and parcel of the consciousness of entire people in

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Andhra Pradesh, though there is a difference in degrees from region to region. Therefore they are putting up a show that their general line is in accordance with the experiences of this armed struggle, to convince their following. It is a futile attempt in which they are indulging.

## I

There were two trends in the Telangana people's movement from the very beginning i.e., anti-Nizam and pro-Nehru, and anti-Nizam and anti-Nehru. Of course there was another trend which was of a local nature and was presented by the Hyderabad City Committee. It can be characterised as *Azad Hyderabad* trend. Though this was part and parcel of former one although, it has appeared in a specific form and in specific conditions. They have never been academic. They were operating because communists, as practical workers, were working among the people, i.e, workers, peasants, middle classes and other sections of the people who were to be mobilised against Nizam's regime. And the mobilisation was not limited to public meetings and rallies, which were rare because there was no semblance of civil liberties in the State. Therefore, any genuine mobilisation of people would have only taken place, when the struggles, class struggles at that, were taking place. This does not mean that there were no public meetings or rallies. In fact they were held, but only with the permission of the government, which was accorded rarely and sparingly.

One of these trends is associated with right opportunism represented by late PC Joshi, who was the Secretary of the Party till the end of 1947. It can be said that it (anti-Nizam and pro-Nehru trend) was dominant during the same period. This expressed in the movement in the form of lining up with a section of the State Congressmen who were claiming that they were for a mass movement against the Nizam. In fact there was no such movement at any time, and there was no programme activity organising it. They were the state Congressmen who belonged to such section as Swamy Ramananda Thirtha, Govinda Das Sharaff etc. They had their counterparts in Telangana, and Warangal District (which includes present Khammam Dist) was an important centre where they were present. But the course of the movement proved that there were no such elements in Nalgonda district and it left no scope for them to emerge. Of course there were a few individuals here and there who claimed that they were nationalists, but in fact

they were Gandhians just like any others. This was the picture outside the Party.

Telangana people's movement, taken as a whole, covers entire Telangana because there was the working class movement, a student movement, a movement of the middle classes, specially the gumastas, i.e., clerks working in private shops etc. There was a movement of weavers and such artisans. All these movements had more or less Telangana-wide character because the organisations were spread all over it including Hyderabad. But so far as the peasant movement is concerned, it was more or less concentrated in the two districts of Nalgonda and Warangal, though other districts too had their share, Karimnagar being one such important district. Therefore, when dealing with the peasant movement, we were confronted with these trends more often, and we had to decide one way or the other, what attitude we should adopt towards these trends.

Nalgonda district was the centre of the anti-Nizam and anti-Nehru trend, which has taken birth in a part of it (Suryapet) and which has grown strong as the movement also grew. At the same time, even in that district, anti-Nizam pro-Nehru trend was present in strength and there was a constant conflict although, though for a long time there was no confrontation between the two. But the anti-Nizam pro-Nehru trend had its own adverse effects on the movement in the district as a whole but it had its roots in certain parts, where it was strong (Bhongiri etc) Though such trends were there in Warangal district also, the anti-Nizam anti-Nehru trend was feeble and could not assert itself in practice, as the character of the peasant movement which took shape in the district showed. To be more precise, in places where anti-Nizam anti-Nehru trend took roots and asserted itself we could build an agrarian and anti-feudal peasant movement, and where it was weak or non-existent, such a movement could not be built. In such areas there was a general anti-Nizam peasant movement which was loose and less organised, so that it could not be transformed into an anti-feudal revolutionary movement.

## II

Viewed in this background, the mistakes the communists committed and the shortcomings that were existing in the movement were not related to the local leadership alone. In fact the wrong line that was advocated and implemented by the leadership of the

centre as well as the state (Andhra PC-as it was called) was solely responsible for what had happened. There was no line of building an anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement under the leadership of the party with a clear-cut programme. It is a fact there was a difference between the situation existing in Telangana and coastal and Rayalaseema districts, which were part of British India at that time. But this was in regard to civil liberties and certain other features existing in deltaic areas. There too were vast areas where feudal exploitation and oppression was rampant and it was possible to develop an anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement in those areas. But the right opportunism that existed and dominated at that time prevented the party from taking up this task in right earnest manner. Therefore the anti-Nizam-pro-Nehru right opportunist trend was not of a local nature either inside Nalgonda and Warangal districts, or in Telangana. But it was of an all-Andhra character. In fact it was an all-India feature.

Therefore the anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement which developed in parts of Telangana, that is Nalgonda and to an extent Khammam and Warangal, was neither a spontaneous movement nor merely a product of Telangana being a part of feudal Nizam State. It was a revolutionary movement headed by a revolutionary trend inside the party as against the official policy of the then existing party. The anti-Nizam aspect had helped to tone down the struggle between the two trends because both were united against Nizam and the revolutionary movement that was headed by this anti-Nizam movement enormously contributed to the growth of the political prestige of the party not only in Telangana but in coastal and Rayalaseema parts of Andhra also. Perhaps there might be another reason for not having any confrontation between the two trends: it was that the dominant right opportunist trend did not know to what levels this movement would reach in so short a time. In a way, this trend was caught unaware at every turning point, so that, it could not decide what to do and what not to do to suppress the other trend that was revolutionary. But they could contain its growth to a certain extent.

Therefore, the top leadership could not enforce totally its line of class collaboration and Right opportunism when faced with a new situation which was developing against that line. There was a shortcoming with the revolutionary trend also, perhaps indispensable in the given situation, in that the comrades concerned had to work

within the framework of official and wrong line. Therefore, even when the movement and organisation were developing as revolutionary and basically on correct lines, certain weaknesses did remain in them. And they could not be fought out as long as the official line was on force, and as long as the revolutionary trend was not conscious of the wrongness of the official line and its consequences. In a way, the revolutionary trend co-existed with the right opportunism formally, though in practice both were opposite as was manifested by two different types of the movement, one revolutionary, and the other, reformist.

To be more precise, in the earliest phase of the movement we were developing contacts and searching for reliable cadres who can work for the party and among the masses. We distributed literature and organised campaigns by mobilising the masses on issues within the framework of the law. This was the period when the party was banned and intense repression was there on it. This period ended by 1942. And then we went into the masses to organise peasant struggles against landlords in a limited scale until the middle of 1944. Though there was relaxation in overall repression against the party due to our supporting anti-Fascist war, we had to undergo severe repression due to organising these struggles, though they were limited in scope to an extent. There were differences inside the party at the state level in that the right opportunist trend grumbled that they were essential and there was nothing wrong with them. Though the right opportunist leadership could not stop the struggles being organised, it could successfully prevent the development of similar struggles in other parts of the district and Telangana as a whole. Thus the struggles organised and developed by the Comrades belonging to revolutionary trend and its leadership were more or less isolated and were suppressed by the authorities, though temporarily and partially. The same thing happened when a struggle developed to a higher level, i.e., covering an extensive area in Janagaon Though we confined ourselves to legal activities in the main, we had also mobilised peasantry on a big scale against bigger and more oppressive feudal landlords. Though there were no differences in the earlier phase as long as we confined ourselves to legal activities, we again had to fight an isolated battle in 1945 and 1946 when the land distribution and armed resistance began. This time there was no active opposition to this phase of the movement; but not taking up same issues and not extending the movement in the same district and other districts, had not only

weakened the movement (1945-1946) in Nalgonda district, but also prevented developing a similar movement throughout Telangana where similar conditions did exist. This was due to the predominance of the right opportunist trend.

### III

Situation changed when anti-Nizam struggle started some time around August 1947 because the Nizam had refused to join in Indian Union. The struggle was joined by the Congressmen, and in Telangana we were in the forefront. Then again there were differences whether we should take up the programme of land distribution or not. At some stage we took it up, but to some extent it was delayed, in most of the districts it was not implemented. Obviously this had its adverse impact on the development of agrarian revolutionary movement in entire Telangana. Therefore, by the time the Central Government marched its armies into Telangana to suppress the agrarian revolutionary movement, which developed in the two districts in the main (Nalgonda and Warangal), the leadership, the party and the movement had to face a disadvantageous situation not only in facing stronger armed forces of the Union Government but also in having no such movement in other parts of Telangana. Added to this, the right opportunist wing of the party stabbed in the back of the movement by disorganising and abandoning it. This was the situation we had faced immediately after the Union armies entered.

This was also the time when there was a change in the party line from one of right opportunism to left adventurism. The Second Party Congress took place in February, 1948, which provided the party the left adventurist line. Seeing that there was an all-sided recognition to the Telangana armed struggle that was going on in isolation till that time, P. C. leadership, with the limited understanding provided by the struggle dared to put forward a line for future of Indian Revolution in its document, which was prepared and sent to the Polit Bureau of the party. The Polit Bureau, instead of realising the correctness of the line and working out a line for Indian Revolution, denounced it outright and rejected as reformist. This step of the leadership, which was expected to take up the responsibility of helping the struggle in all its aspects, was again a stab in the back of the struggle which was already undergoing critical phases due to suppression by Nizam and Union military forces.

A left adventurist line always sees right opportunism or

reformism in a basically correct revolutionary line. This was so in the past, the same continues even today. At the same time, it was not opposed to continue the armed struggle in Telangana against Nehru Government and its armies. Therefore it was a blessing in disguise for us who were for continuing the armed struggle, and in fact we were continuing the armed struggle by the time the Polit Bureau has rejected our line and the document in which the line was incorporated. This is not to say that there was nothing wrong in the document. In fact, it contained certain shortcomings which could be overcome by a healthy and proper discussion. But this did not happen. As a result, we had to face additional difficulties and obstacles which were of a serious nature than what it would have been if there was a correct line.

An armed struggle of this nature could be conducted only on the basis of a basically correct line, or there must be enough provision inside the party to conduct armed struggle and an internal struggle for a correct line basing on it. But to our disappointment, there was no inner-party democracy to conduct an inner-party struggle and armed struggle simultaneously. Therefore, a situation has arisen where we had to compromise with the wrong line to certain extent and continue the armed struggle. This again could be compared favourably with a situation which was existing during the earlier phase of the movement when a revolutionary trend backed by the revolutionary movement was developing within the framework of the wrong and reformist line and overwhelmingly reformist mass movement. The difference was that the leadership had a basically correct line as mentioned above, while the central leadership (PB) had rejected it outright characterising it as reformist. This is not a small difference which could be ignored. It was difference of basic and important nature which came in the way of defending and extending the movement in a correct direction.

This is not to say that the PC leadership was free from mistakes while leading the armed struggle. It could not correctly assess the growing level of the movement even in the limited area of two districts and its consequences. Therefore, it could not prepare itself and the movement for the impending military intervention of the Union Government and prepare itself and the party to face it. As a result, even a section of the revolutionary trend which wanted to continue the armed struggle was reduced to a state of helplessness. Therefore, barring a section of this trend, the major part of the

leadership of the area of the armed struggle advocated its withdrawal and in fact laid down arms. They had their own reasons advanced for their continuation of withdrawing it. They were discussed in this document comprehensively. An important feature of this document is that it has not gone in for quotations from the classics. Rather it relied on the experiences that we gained during the various stages of the Telangana movement including the armed struggle. We have summed up these experiences to the extent we understood them and drawn basically correct lessons which are valid even today. At the same time, we had to work out this document within the frame work of the wrong line that was forced on us by the Polit Bureau. Some of the quotations and explanations given in this document contain extracts from the Polit Bureau document. 'Tactical Line' as it was called. And we used them to defend our line of continuing armed struggle. Barring this, the rest of the document gives more or less a correct picture of the situation existing then and a correct programme to continue the armed struggle.

#### IV

In fact the Polit Bureau itself was a victim of desperationism. Which is manifested in its attitude towards Telangana Armed Struggle in the following manner: "It is no doubt true that Telangana is in danger and it has to bear the brunt. That it is more or less isolated. Yet we must fight to the last. Because by not resisting you are not only not going to save anything but completely demoralise the people. Whether you resist or not, repression is going to be brutal. Prolonged and protracted resistance, if possible, however, might even retrieve the situation if we keep it prolonged for a time" (*Documents of the History of CPI*, Vol.VII, p.417. PPH).

Here the Polit Bureau, after three months of police action, sees that there is a danger of Telangana armed struggle being crushed because it did not evaporate immediately after it, as was perhaps anticipated by it. Therefore it only could see the danger, having no confidence that a deep-rooted agrarian revolutionary movement, with a programme of land distribution could not only sustain armed struggle against the onslaughts of the Union armies, but could advance it also, because we had taken up guerilla warfare and not a positional warfare as our form of struggle. It should be noted that the Polit Bureau was silent about guerilla warfare as our form of struggle. It should be noted that the Polit Bureau was silent about guerilla warfare as its strategy and tactics as enunciated by Mao (some extracts

from his works were quoted in the documents) because it was opposed to Mao as such. Not only that: it was waiting for insurrection which it thought was round the corner. Polit Bureau realises that the armed struggle was more or less isolated. Which was a fact. But such an isolation was the creation of Polit Bureau itself, because having sufficient time -- of more than nine months ever since it came into existence in February 1948 (The police action took place after six months--Sep 13, 1948 -- and the above formulation was made three and half months after the Police action, i.e., the end of the Dec. 1948) -- it could not prepare the organisation and the mass movement in various states either to take up the issue of Telangana and campaign for its solidarity or to reorganise the mass movement so as to take it to higher levels. It advanced the existence of reformism as the whole reason for it. It did nothing to overcome it.

It wanted that Polit Bureau should fight to the last but not to continue the armed struggle. There is a difference between continuing armed struggle and fighting to the last. The former means a protracted armed struggle reaching higher levels; and fighting to the last means to resist till the last man dies and then the armed struggle automatically stops. This betrayed the lack of confidence in the peasant armed struggle. Therefore, Polit Bureau put up a militant posture by advocating to fight to the last. It was not shy of saying that by not resisting we are not only not going to save anything but completely demoralise the people. Therefore, it wanted resistance so as not to demoralise the people; and not for defending the gains of armed struggle, about which the Polit Bureau might have thought that they were already lost. Further, it thought that by prolonging the resistance, the situation might come wherein struggles might take place in other places leading to insurrection. Subsequent events show that though the situation is ripe for peasants to take up arms in various places (Armed Struggle in Tripura in 1950), such measures were not taken; instead, the struggles were allowed to be fizzled out (Worli in Maharashtra, peasant struggles in Kerala and elsewhere).

Therefore, the desperationism mentioned in the document applied to the Polit Bureau itself. We did not comment on it; instead, we left it at that. As far as I remember, some comrades, either from Telangana or from elsewhere within the jurisdiction of the PC, had also expressed a more or less similar view.

There are certain mistaken views of the Polit Bureau incorporated in the document as I mentioned above. One of them related to strategy. The strategy has been visualised in Andhra Secretariat's document which is popularly known as *Andhra Thesis*. It contained the following: "*Objective: to overthrow imperialist big business-feudal combine and completely wipe out all the features of feudalism, medievalism and colonial impress. Main force of the revolution: workers, both rural and industrial. Immediate reserve: Peasantry in general with the exception of those rich farmers who are unable to shake off their tails of feudalism; and poor and middle peasants, in particular, remain as immediate reserves throughout this stage of new democratic revolution. Direction of the main blow: against the collaborationist bourgeoisie and its henchmen who have been duping the peasantry and are still trying to keep their grip on them to betray the revolution. The proletariat must carry to completion the new democratic revolution by allying itself with the mass of peasants in general and poor and middle peasants in particular in order to crush by force the power of resistance of the imperialist-big business-feudal combine and paralyse instability of the middle bourgeoisie, upper middle class and a section of the rich peasantry*" (p.837.lbid)

I can not say that the strategy as formulated here is correct. It is defective in many respects and was liable for correction and improvement. At the same time, it was a strategy for new democratic revolution in which the object of the revolution was to overthrow the collaborationist big bourgeois-feudal combine. Though the *Thesis* mentioned that it was imperialist - big business - feudal combine, by overthrowing the big business-feudal combine the revolution automatically liquidates imperialism. Therefore to say that it is a partner in the state power was not correct. In other respects, though there is a possibility for improvement, the fact remains that the strategy visualises a united front with national bourgeoisie and rich peasantry. The national bourgeoisie was mentioned there as middle bourgeoisie. It also was clear about the hegemony of the proletariat in the new democratic revolution.

Therefore the strategy that we mentioned in the document is not correct even according to our own understanding at that time. We mentioned it only to be in line with the then Polit Bureau. In the same way, throughout the document, we mentioned it was the bourgeoisie who is in power and not imperialist-big business-

feudal combine, as mentioned in the *Andhra Thesis*. In the same way, there was another extract from the Polit Bureau Document (*Tactical Line*) which was related to the developing struggles in that period. It was: "These struggles bear one special character.....its stage being determined by the form and successful character of the resistance offered" (See P.13 - 14).

This was rather over simplifying the picture of that time though it was the same in 1945 - 1946 and 1947; but later, the mass upsurge was continuing though not of the same level. The very fact that the railway-men strike which was to take place subsequently was a miserable failure, and the struggles that were taking place earlier could not continue, proved that though there was not a period of lull as such, there was no powerful mass upsurge in subsequent months. All the same, people were on the move, and wherever we could organise them into struggle, they were ready to take part in them; even then they continued for a long time. Situation in Telangana was also the same.

## V

The document has a distinct feature in posing the question of path of Indian revolution as shown by Telangana armed struggle, though it was forced to link it with the insurrection in accordance with the then Polit Bureau line. This is how it puts it.

*"The experiences that we had in Telangana armed struggle have shown a new path for New Democratic Revolution in India. Here the class struggle has reached a higher level in the countryside even before the working class was prepared for insurrection. By creating a people's army and overthrowing Nizam's power through armed struggle..... on the basis of the slogans of land to the tiller and Gram Rajyas.....we could commence and advance revolution. Though, after military action, the armed struggle suffered major setbacks because of weaknesses in the movement, the Congress-Nizam set of ruling classes failed to suppress it by their armed forces. On the other hand, it is again spreading in the struggle areas and extending to newer areas. Thus Telangana Armed Struggle was not confined to overthrowing Nizam's rule; instead it is continuing to overthrow the Indian Bourgeoisie also from power. The experience of Telangana proves clearly that, even in India, it is possible to overthrow Bourgeois- Zamindari rule in the countryside by developing guerilla struggles basing on land question, and that such struggles*

*will be of utmost help to the proletariat's struggle to seize power through insurrection....." (See Page 38).*

Earlier, we had dealt with the distinguishing features of successful Russian and Chinese revolutions and applied their experiences to our own revolution. But we never said that it will take the course of either of the two or both. We said clearly that it is Telangana which showed a new path for New Democratic Revolution of India in unmistakable terms. If we had in mind that it is the Chinese path, we would not have said it is a *new* path. A new path is always a new path, which distinguishes itself with others. Therefore, our view that Telangana armed struggle has shown a new path for Indian revolution is not a new one of today, but it took its origin long back when Telangana armed struggle was developing and continuing. The mention of insurrection was superfluous. Because it was meant only to be in tune with Polit Bureau's line as was mentioned earlier; in fact it contradicts the idea of insurrection. Because the armed struggle being a new path cannot subordinate itself to insurrection. Therefore, the insurrection's secondary role will be there and not primary role. This is how the new path took its origin and developed. Therefore, those (Chandra Pulla Reddy etc) who think that I have borrowed this idea from China or Chinese writings in 1967-68 are wrong, and their stand is baseless. I had these views at that time itself. And when I advocated the same after we broke from CPI (M), I was reviving the old idea and not a new fabricated and manipulated one as CP Reddy has developed for his own reasons.

## VI

The document often mentions about the mistakes committed and the shortcomings of the movement. It has pointed out some of them as being the open methods of functioning instead of secret methods; failure to build the political organisation at lower levels (villages) and doing everything through armed guerilla squads; failure to draw masses to actively participate in the armed struggle in majority of the places and thus reducing them as passive spectators etc. This was true. Apart from this there was one important shortcoming, that was a wrong line followed by the central leadership which had its own disastrous effect on the entire course of armed struggle. Unless we realise its important aspect, we cannot understand why the other mistakes were committed in conducting the struggle. Some of the other mistakes were the tendencies of militarism; compromise

with land lords, and sometimes giving them a leading position in the struggle; having illusions in the liberating role of the Congress and the Union Government and creating these illusions among the people instead of fighting them back; failure to prepare the party and guerillas in advance to face the onslaughts of the Union Army etc.-- these were some of the weaknesses manifested. It should be known that we were racing against time with a disinterested central leadership at the top. At the same time, any leadership with a political foresight should take these measures whatever be the attitude of the centre and others.

That we could improve the situation by continuing the struggle was evident by the reports and subsequent experiences from the struggle areas and those areas where we extended. It shows that if we had a correct line from the beginning and acted accordingly from top to bottom, the situation would have been very favourable, but we could not expect it in the given situation. And also we cannot adopt an attitude of '*if it were so*' and such deviations are products of the internal and external situations in a given period.

The document appears to be belated as the date of its finalisation shows (September, 1949, one year after the police action). The background of this situation is as following: We prepared our draft note (*Andhra Thesis*) in the March itself -- roughly after one month of Party Congress -- and sent it to the Polit Bureau either in April or in May.

There was no reaction from the Polit Bureau till the meeting of the Polit Bureau was concluded, which was long after the document was sent, i.e., 9 months. Meanwhile the armed struggle continued and advanced till the police action and received severe setbacks immediately after it. We continued armed struggle after the police action on our own responsibility and Polit Bureau had no role to play in it. Though myself and Sundarayya, who were in the struggle areas at the time of police action, instructed the area committees to continue the armed struggle, and to retreat the guerilla squads and important leading cadres to the forest areas, while making arrangements to put up resistance and defend the gains from the local offensive of the landlords and the Govt. forces, they could not materialise because of the weaknesses existing in the organisation and the movement. The main reason for suffering so many losses was this.

A meeting of the Polit Bureau concluded by the end of December, 1948. We had the documents with us either in January or February when we started discussion on them. While discussing them, we worked out a line for continuing the armed struggle in '*Andhra Committee's Letter*', and in political resolution on the Hyderabad state. In which the then existing situation was analysed. It was those comrades who were either opposed to the line of continuing armed struggle or are not satisfied with our approach, sent their criticism together with proposing a political retreat by withdrawing armed struggle and abandoning the revolutionary gains. We dealt their views by criticising on the basis of the experiences we had by then in the armed struggle in Telangana itself. We issued a first set of documents, i.e., the '*Andhra Committee's Letter* and Political Resolution some time in April, and it took six months to issue this document after we circulated them. It was natural that the discussion on our first set of documents in the lower units, i.e., area committees and down below went on for about two months, and we started receiving their criticism from May onwards. We immediately attended the criticism and started working on this document and it took some two months to prepare and finalise it. Since we sent comprehensive document, the '*Andhra Committees's Letter*, in March itself directing the lower units to organise themselves and continue the armed struggle, there was no occasion to complain that we had provided no guidance. The time gap that appears should be understood in this context.

Though most of the comrades at lower levels, mainly area committees and important comrades down below, laid down arms in violation of instructions we issued on our individual responsibility immediately after police action, a good number of them, realising their mistakes, reorganised themselves and guerilla squads with the remaining cadres and continued the armed struggle as disciplined soldiers of the party; though some of the leaders of the area committees.....could not reconcile themselves to continuing the armed struggle they did not stage revolts or break away from the organisation, as it has been the practice of the last one decade and more.

The leadership of Huzurnagar Area Committee could not reorientate itself to the new line for some time; it gradually changed itself and continued armed struggle to some extent. The Palwancha leadership left the struggle area for good and went into the interior

area of the forests, with the remaining squads, where there was no need for resistance because there was no military offensive and people were not in action. The Tiruvuru organiser, not reconciled himself to the new line, organised some raids on individual rich men's houses, looted money, gold and other valuables, betrayed secrets to the police resulting in the death of many a valuable comrade and sympathisers of our party. After this treachery, he left the place once and for all, and took shelter with a top Congress man who had his property in an adjacent state. He lived there for the rest of his life not to be seen again by the people in Andhra who knew him. The only comrade who differed to begin with but was convinced of the need of continuing the armed struggle after we issued this document was Muthaiah of Munagala paragona. He continued the armed struggle with convictions of a communist revolutionary and died a martyr's death after some time.

It was clear from this that there was certain amount of inner-party democracy to enable the comrades expressing their differences with the line the leadership was following without fear, and their differences were taken into consideration and criticised in a way that a healthy discussion could be possible while implementing the line. No action was taken against them for their expressing their differing views. There were some black sheep in the leadership of the area committees who refused to implement the line and did not reconcile with it. They could sabotage the armed struggle to certain extent. Barring this, we could reorganise and continue the armed struggle with the remaining cadres and guerilla forces so that we could consolidate the struggle areas and extend it to the adjacent districts and forest area. This is how inner-party democracy and discussion helped us in overcoming the differences and continue the armed struggle. Unlike this, today there is a tendency from those who are supposed to have differences to assert either not to implement the line till the discussions are over or form themselves into a group by disrupting the organisation and the movement.

This attitude of theirs has nothing in common either with the experience of the party or the principles of revolutionary party organisation. We should fight this disruptive tendency to the finish and unify the organisation and the movement in a proper way.

## VII

There are certain similarities between the wrong views expressed by the present-day leaders of various parties and groups, and those that were expressed and dealt with in this document. The CPI holds that it was wrong to continue the armed struggle after the police action and abandoned the gains. They proved to be wrong because Congress is no friend of the people. We could defend the gains as long as we continued the armed struggle. As and when we laid down the arms the Congress regime liquidated all those gains, i.e., land etc., and restored landlordism. We can see the domination of landlords even today.

The CPI(M) argues that it was correct to continue the armed struggle after the police action and it was also correct to withdraw it in 1951 before the elections. The armed struggle which continued for three long years after police action could also continue subsequently and there was no reason why it should have been withdrawn half way. The very fact that the revolutionary gains, the land and armed guerilla forces, were liquidated after the withdrawal leading to shrinking of our mass base to the minimum shows that their views are wrong.

Those who claim themselves to be revolutionaries, especially Chandra Pulla Reddy (CP), say that armed struggle should be conducted without land distribution, or express views similar to some extent with those who advocated the above-mentioned views. If one says 'no land distribution and no armed struggle', CP says 'no land distribution but armed struggle'. Here both are common in their views so far as abandoning the distribution of land and abolition of landlordism are concerned. The difference will be only about the need for armed struggle. The CPI (M) advocates formally that armed struggle may be conducted as a partial struggle for some partial demand without raising question of seizing power. CP also advocates that armed struggle can and should be conducted without distributing the land of landlords. Thus his raising the question of seizure of power becomes too formal. Now both CPI and CPM took up the parliamentary path. Therefore what the CPM says has no meaning because of its adopting parliamentary path. Renouncing distribution of land of the landlords and seizure of power is common to all, i.e., CPI, CPM and CP group. To say that there can be an armed struggle without land distribution and seizure of power, as CP advocates, has no meaning and is purposeless and it is a

fake armed struggle and not a genuine one. It is nothing but trading with the idea of armed struggle.

The comrades who advocated political retreat and withdrawal of armed struggle after police action wanted that the revolutionary gains should be abandoned and preparations should be made afresh for armed struggle. CP advocates 'armed struggle' for armed struggle without linking it to the basic revolutionary gains, i.e., the distribution of the land of the landlords, setting up of Gram Rajyas. Thus there is a certain amount of commonness in having no revolutionary gains between these two.

The former was honest enough to advocate withdrawal, but the latter (CP), in order to pose himself a revolutionary, does not admit this. Instead he wants an 'armed struggle' for armed struggle sake etc.

This is how the same mistakes, wrong trends, deviations appear under new conditions and in new forms. Now that the people and the revolutionaries are likely to be carried away -- in fact they were carried away with such slogan as armed struggle -- the newcomers in the field needed 'left' slogans to enforce their rightist views and programmes. CP is one who is implementing his rightist programme with left slogans. There are some others who take similar attitude. Of course people have realised the fraud played upon them and are not believing what the new slogan-mongers say. They are discarding them and embracing the revolutionary mass line we are advocating.

## VIII

This document was prepared by me as a draft and was adopted by the Secretariat of the Andhra Provincial Committee\*. There were no important changes made by the Secretariat when it was adopted. I do not remember if any minor changes were made at that time. Even if some were made they are of no consequence. As it stands today, the rest of the Secretariat members left the politics of this document. I do not want to comment here on them.

There was some scope to improve this document. But I preferred to publish it without any such changes so that readers may know my views and the situation existing then as they were at that time.

\*Secretariat consisted of Chandra Rajeswara Rao, Secretary, P. Sundarayya, M. Basavapunniah, B. Narasimha Reddy and myself.

The necessary explanations are given in the footnotes so that the readers may understand the context and my present views on some of the subjects. In English translation, there is a change in using the word *armed struggle* instead of 'guerilla struggle' in the Telugu original text, since the armed struggle sounds better and more comprehensive than the 'guerilla struggle'. (In Telugu it is used as 'Guerilla Poratam'). The rest of the words were retained as they are and translated accordingly. I hope readers will appreciate our attempt to publish this document which has played an important role in continuing the armed struggle for two years after it was issued. The readers will know more about the revolutionary movement and armed struggle in Telangana after going through this book. Many questions are asked on various aspects of the struggle and there are answers in this book. One can see that my writings in the recent past contain the same views which I expressed in this work.

Dated : 20-9-1982

-Author